Ashendrias E. Reed v. State of Mississippi , 180 So. 3d 755 ( 2015 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2014-KA-01486-COA
    ASHENDRIAS E. REED A/K/A ASHENDRIAS                                     APPELLANT
    XAVIER REED A/K/A ASHENDRIAS REED
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                                                      APPELLEE
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                        09/25/2014
    TRIAL JUDGE:                             HON. ROBERT B. HELFRICH
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:               FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                  OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
    BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                   OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                       PATRICIA A. THOMAS BURCHELL
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                      CRIMINAL - FELONY
    TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:                 CONVICTED OF GRAND LARCENY AND
    SENTENCED AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER
    TO FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF
    THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS, WITHOUT THE BENEFIT
    OF PROBATION, PAROLE, OR ANY FORM
    OF EARLY RELEASE
    DISPOSITION:                             AFFIRMED: 11/17/2015
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE LEE, C.J., CARLTON AND FAIR, JJ.
    FAIR, J., FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.   Ashendrias Reed was convicted of grand larceny after stealing an automobile that
    turned out to have a GPS tracking device onboard. He was sentenced as a habitual offender
    pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015). Sentencing under
    that statute requires that the defendant “have been convicted twice previously of any felony
    or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at
    different times and who shall have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more
    in any state and/or federal penal institution.” 
    Id. ¶2. Reed
    contends on appeal that one of his prior convictions does not qualify under
    section 99-19-81 because it does not reflect a sentence of one year or more. In that instance,
    Reed was charged with grand larceny. He pled guilty, but the court withheld accepting the
    guilty plea for five years, conditioned on Reed’s good behavior and his acceptance of one
    year of supervision by the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Reed was subsequently
    arrested for a myriad of other offenses, and the circuit court entered an order accepting the
    previously nonadjudicated guilty plea. The sentencing order required that Reed complete the
    regimented inmate discipline (“RID”) program, and, upon completion, that he would be
    “returned” to “post-release supervision.”
    ¶3.    According to Reed, because the adjudication order did not itself specify the term of
    the RID program or the post-release supervision, Reed was not shown to have been sentenced
    to a term of “one year or more” as the statute requires in order for the conviction to count
    toward habitual status. See § 99-19-81.
    ¶4.    We note at the outset that Reed failed to present this objection to his sentencing as a
    habitual offender to the trial court. “When an accused fails to object to the habitual offender
    issue during the sentencing phase, he is procedurally barred to do so the first time on appeal.”
    2
    Heidelberg v. State, 
    45 So. 3d 730
    , 732 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010); see also Vanwey v. State,
    
    149 So. 3d 1023
    , 1024 (¶3) (Miss. 2014).
    ¶5.    Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find no merit to Reed’s argument. The trial
    court’s revocation order clearly referred back to the original nonadjudication order when it
    stated that Reed would “return” to “post-release supervision.” The nonadjudication order
    specified a supervision period of one year. Although it is not clear how much supervision
    time Reed had remaining at the time the sentence was imposed, that is immaterial; when it
    is credited to the sentence, time served prior to the conviction is counted in determining
    whether a sentence was for more than one year for the purposes of the habitual offender
    statutes. See Feazell v. State, 
    761 So. 2d 140
    , 141-43 (¶¶7-11, 14) (Miss. 2000). Moreover,
    for section 99-19-81, it is the length of the sentence that controls, not how much of it is
    actually served. See Jackson v. State, 
    381 So. 2d 1040
    , 1042 (Miss. 1980).
    ¶6.    Reed’s claim that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender is procedurally
    barred and without merit.
    ¶7.  THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FORREST COUNTY OF
    CONVICTION OF GRAND LARCENY AND SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL
    OFFENDER OF FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF PROBATION,
    PAROLE, OR ANY FORM OF EARLY RELEASE, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF
    THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO FORREST COUNTY.
    LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL, JAMES
    AND WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE
    RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2014-KA-01486-COA

Citation Numbers: 180 So. 3d 755

Filed Date: 11/17/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023