Ronald Vance Mason v. State of Mississippi , 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 367 ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-CP-00594-COA
RONALD VANCE MASON A/K/A RONALD V. APPELLANT
MASON A/K/A RONALD MASON
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/02/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES SETH ANDREW POUNDS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ALCORN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RONALD VANCE MASON (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
DISMISSED
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/07/2016
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE, JAMES AND WILSON, JJ.
JAMES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Ronald Vance Mason (pro se) appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his motion
for postconviction relief (PCR). Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On September 4, 2009, Mason was indicted on one count of sexual battery in violation
of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95 (Rev. 2014), and one count of fondling in
violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-5-23 (Supp. 2015). On November 18,
2010, Mason pled guilty to fondling. The sexual-battery charge was retired to the files. On
December 16, 2010, the circuit court sentenced Mason to fifteen years, with nine years to
serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), six years
suspended, and five years of post-release supervision. His nine-year sentence was ordered
to be served day-for-day. Mason was also ordered to register as a sex offender upon release
and to pay a fine and court costs.
¶3. On January 7, 2015, Mason filed a PCR motion arguing that his sentence was illegal.
Mason claimed that his sentence exceeded the statutory limit under section 97-5-23(1). On
March 10, 2015, the circuit court dismissed Mason’s PCR motion, finding that his sentence
was within the statutory maximum of fifteen years allowed by section 97-5-23(1). The
circuit court found that under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-34(1) (Rev. 2015),
“[a] court . . . may impose a term of post-release supervision. However, the total number of
years of incarceration plus the total number of years of post-release supervision shall not
exceed the maximum sentence authorized to be imposed by law for the felony committed.”
As a result, the circuit court held that Mason’s sentence of nine years of incarceration plus
five years of post-release supervision was within the statutory maximum sentence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4. “The [circuit] court may summarily dismiss a PCR motion where it plainly appears
from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits[,] and the prior proceedings in the case that
the movant is not entitled to any relief.” Bailey v. State, 65 So. 3d 349, 350 (¶2) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2011) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2015)). “This [C]ourt will affirm
the summary dismissal of a PCR motion if the movant fails to demonstrate a claim
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procedurally alive substantially showing the denial of a state or federal right.” Id.
DISCUSSION
¶5. Mason’s PCR motion is time-barred under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-
5(2), because it was filed more than three years after the entry of his judgment of conviction.
However, “the right to be free from an illegal sentence is a fundamental right that is not
subject to the time-bar[.]” Hughes v. State, 106 So. 3d 836, 840 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
Mason argues that his sentence was illegal because he claims it exceeds the statutory
maximum of fifteen years. We disagree.
¶6. Under section 47-7-34(1), “the total number of years of incarceration plus the total
number of years of post-release supervision shall not exceed the maximum sentence
authorized to be imposed by law for the felony committed.”
¶7. In Brown v. State, 923 So. 2d 258, 260 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), the PCR movant
argued that her sentence, when combined with her term of post-release supervision, exceeded
the statutory maximum of twenty years for the crime of manslaughter. We rejected her
argument, and held that although she was sentenced to twenty years, plus four years of post-
release supervision, her sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum because four years
of her sentence had been suspended. Id.
¶8. Similarly, Mason was sentenced to a term of fifteen years, but six years were
suspended. As a result, the nine years that Mason will be incarcerated combined with five
years of post-release supervision is within the permissible statutory maximum sentence of
fifteen years for fondling. Therefore, Mason’s argument is without merit.
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¶9. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALCORN COUNTY
DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO ALCORN COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR,
WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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