Charles Edward Wilson v. State of Mississippi , 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 129 ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2014-CP-01732-COA
CHARLES EDWARD WILSON A/K/A CHARLES APPELLANT
WILSON A/K/A CHARLES E. WILSON A/K/A
WINDING
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/08/2014
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. FORREST A. JOHNSON JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: AMITE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHARLES EDWARD WILSON (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED – 03/08/2016
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE IRVING, P.J., BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.
IRVING, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Charles E. Wilson appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Amite County,
denying his motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). He alleges: (1) the trial court erred in
ruling that his PCR motion was time-barred; (2) the trial court erred by not deciding his claim
of actual innocence on the merits; (3) he was prejudiced by the State withholding evidence
and the State’s destruction of exculpatory evidence; and (4) and he was subjected to double
jeopardy.
¶2. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3. On October 29, 1982, an Amite County grand jury indicted Wilson, along with three
codefendants, for kidnapping one adult female and three children in Tangipahoa Parish,
Louisiana, and removing them to Amite County, Mississippi, with the intent to secretly
confine and imprison them in Amite County against their will. In addition, Wilson, along
with the same three codefendants, was also indicted for the rape of the female victim.1 On
March 10, 1983, following a trial, a petit jury convicted Wilson of the kidnapping charge,
and the circuit court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). After that conviction and sentencing,
Wilson took a plea deal on the separate, yet related, rape charge. The plea agreement
provided that Wilson would waive his right to an appeal of the kidnapping conviction2 and
plead guilty to the rape charge. Also, the plea agreement provided that the State would
recommend that Wilson be sentenced to forty years on the rape charge, with the sentence to
run concurrently to his life sentence on the kidnapping conviction.
¶4. On June 20, 1986, Wilson filed a PCR motion, seeking relief from his kidnapping
1
The indictment for the rape charge was not made a part of the clerk’s papers in the
matter before this Court. However, the indictment is provided as Exhibit “E-1" within
Wilson’s brief.
2
This information was not made a part of the record before us; however, it was
revealed through a search of documents found withing the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
record in Wilson v. State, cause number 57,888.
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conviction. In that motion, Wilson argued that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective; (2)
evidence that was seized pursuant to an illegal search was admitted during his trial; (3) his
confession was coerced; (4) the indictment was defective and, therefore, invalid; and (5) the
State failed to prove the intent element of kidnapping. On July 21, 1986, the circuit court
denied Wilson’s PCR motion. He appealed. On August 24, 1988, the Mississippi Supreme
Court, in an unpublished opinion, found no error in the circuit court’s denial of Wilson’s
PCR motion and, on September 16, 1988, issued its mandate to the trial court.3
¶5. On August 4, 2014, after a host of other motions had been filed by Wilson and ruled
on by both the supreme court and the circuit court, Wilson filed his second PCR motion, the
denial of which by the circuit court forms the basis of this appeal. Wilson argued in his
motion before the circuit court that (1) the circuit court erred by proceeding on a “fatally
defective indictment”; (2) cumulative errors in his trial proceedings violated his due-process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (3) he was actually
innocent; (4) exculpatory evidence in his case was destroyed “in bad faith” before a direct
appeal was processed, thereby violating his due-process and equal-protection rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and (5) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. On October 8, 2014, the circuit court denied Wilson’s PCR motion
3
We note that the record before us in this matter does not include the unpublished
opinion rendered in this case. However, we were able to find a portion of the subject opinion
upon a search of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s records. The unpublished opinion,
addressing Wilson’s first PCR motion, was issued in Wilson v. State, cause number 57,888.
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as both time-barred and without merit. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
¶6. “We review the dismissal or denial of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion. We will
only reverse if the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous.” Hughes v. State, 106 So. 3d
836, 838 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citation omitted). We review issues of law de
novo. Small v. State, 141 So. 3d 61, 65 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). Under Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2015), a trial court may deny a PCR motion if “it
plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits[,] and the prior
proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief.”
¶7. We note at the outset that the circuit court addressed only the time-bar, but it seems
clear that Wilson’s PCR motion was also a successive writ. Therefore, we address the
successive-writ bar as well.
I. Successive Writ
¶8. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2015) provides that an order
“denying relief . . . is a final judgment and shall be conclusive until reversed. It shall be a
bar to a second or successive motion under this article.” As we have already noted in the fact
section of this opinion, Wilson filed his first PCR motion on June 20, 1986, and the circuit
court denied that motion. Wilson appealed, and the supreme court affirmed the judgment of
the circuit court. Based on the provisions of section 99-39-23(6), Wilson was precluded from
filing the PCR motion that is the subject of this appeal.
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II. Time-Bar
¶9. In this appeal, Wilson’s first argument is that the circuit court erred in dismissing his
PCR motion as time-barred. He asserts that he raised issues affecting his fundamental
constitutional rights. Therefore, according to him, his PCR motion is exempt from the
procedural bars. More specifically, Wilson contends that his indictment was defective in that
it failed to allege that all of the actions constituting the essential elements of kidnapping
occurred in Amite County. Wilson is correct that if his indictment failed to allege an essential
element of the crime that he was convicted of, he would not be precluded from raising that
issue now. However, we note that Wilson raised in his first PCR motion the issue of his
indictment being defective. So this issue is res judicata and cannot serve to remove the
procedural bars. Therefore, we find no merit to Wilson’s argument that the circuit court erred
in ruling that his PCR motion was procedurally time-barred.
¶10. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015) provides, in pertinent part:
A motion for relief under this chapter shall be made within three (3) years after
the time in which the prisoner’s direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme
Court of Mississippi or, in case no appeal is taken, within three (3) years after
entry of the judgment of conviction.
As noted in our recitation of the facts, Wilson’s kidnapping conviction occurred on March 10,
1983. However, the subject PCR motion was not filed until August 4, 2014. As such, the
circuit court found the motion to be time-barred because it was not made within the three-year
time limitation set out in section 99-39-5(2). It is true that our supreme court has stated that
“errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars of
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the [Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA)].” Rowland v. State, 42 So.
3d 503, 506 (¶9) (Miss. 2010). However, “merely asserting a constitutional-right violation
is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.” Means v. State, 43 So. 3d 438, 442 (¶12)
(Miss. 2010).
¶11. As noted, Wilson also argues that (1) his counsel was ineffective; (2) the State withheld
information regarding a confidential informant; (3) he is innocent; (4) the State destroyed
biological and physical exculpatory evidence; and (5) he was subjected to double jeopardy.
First, as to Wilson’s claim that his counsel was ineffective, we find this issue was raised and
rejected in his first PCR motion. Therefore, this claim is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. Second, we note that Wilson’s claim that biological and physical exculpatory
evidence was destroyed by the State in bad faith refers to evidence introduced during Wilson’s
trial but later destroyed by the Mississippi Crime Laboratory after Wilson had been convicted.
We fail to see how the destruction of such evidence affects any fundamental right that Wilson
possessed or possesses. This is particularly true since, pursuant to the plea deal, Wilson
agreed not to pursue his appeal of the kidnapping charge. Third, as to Wilson’s claim that the
State failed to disclose that an informant was instrumental in securing his arrest, suffice it to
say that this issue was not raised in the circuit court, but even if it had been, it would have
been procedurally barred as are all of the issues that he did raise. Fourth, Wilson’s claim that
he has been subjected to double jeopardy is premised on his notion that the rape charge, to
which he pleaded guilty, is a lesser-included offense of the kidnapping charge that he was
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found guilty of. This argument is so baseless on its face that no discussion of it is warranted.
Moreover, as noted, he pleaded guilty to the rape charge.
CONCLUSION
¶12. We find that since Wilson was convicted prior to the passage of the UPCCRA, he had
three years from April 17, 1984, or until April 17, 1987, to file his PCR motion. Rowland v.
State, 42 So. 3d 545, 549 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (reversed on other grounds). Since his
motion was filed on August 4, 2014, more than twenty-seven years after it was required to be
filed, the circuit court did not err in finding that it was time-barred. We also find that his PCR
motion is barred as a successive writ because he had previously filed a PCR motion. And
lastly, we find that Wilson has failed to prove that any of the exceptions set forth in section
99-39-5 apply or that errors affecting a fundamental right were committed so as to exempt him
from the procedural bars. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMITE COUNTY
DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO AMITE COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES,
WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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