Nitin Malik v. State of Mississippi ( 2017 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2016-KA-01495-COA
    NITIN MALIK A/K/A NATIN MALIK A/K/A                                    APPELLANT
    MATIN MALIK
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                                                     APPELLEE
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                       05/11/2015
    TRIAL JUDGE:                            HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN III
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:              RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                THOMAS M. FORTNER
    RICHARD ANTHONY FILCE
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: KAYLYN HAVRILLA MCCLINTON
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                     CRIMINAL - FELONY
    DISPOSITION:                            AFFIRMED: 12/05/2017
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND GREENLEE, JJ.
    GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.   Nitin Malik was convicted of two counts of the sale of hydrocodone with
    acetaminophen, a schedule III controlled substance, in violation of Mississippi Code
    Annotated section 41-29-139 (Rev. 2013). He was sentenced to two consecutive eight-year
    terms. The Rankin County Circuit Court denied Malik’s posttrial motion. Malik now
    appeals. We find no error and affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2.   On May 3, 2013, the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics (MBN) sent a confidential
    informant (CI) into Hometown Quickie, a convenience store located in Richland. The CI
    went there to purchase hydrocodone with acetaminophen pills, more commonly known as
    Lorcet 10 pills. The MBN agents equipped the CI with an audio-and-video recording device,
    fifty dollars, and a vehicle. When the CI entered the store, she encountered Malik and after
    several minutes of random conversation, requested “eight for forty.” This transaction was
    captured on the audio recording but not on video.
    ¶3.    Immediately after the purchase, the CI met with an MBN agent and turned over eight
    pills and ten dollars change. The pills were sent off to a crime lab and tested positive for
    hydrocodone with acetaminophen, or Lorcet 10 pills. The pills were later used as evidence
    against Malik. MBN did not immediately arrest Malik; instead the agency continued
    building a case against him.
    ¶4.    On June 3, 2013, an MBN agent and the CI worked together to make another purchase
    from Malik. The CI allegedly prearranged a meeting with Malik. The CI again drove to the
    convenience store and purchased pills from Malik. The CI purchased ten pills for fifty
    dollars. This subsequent transaction was not captured on audio or video recording because
    the device’s battery died shortly before the transaction began.
    ¶5.    On this occasion, the MBN agent followed the CI to the store and watched her go
    inside. The agent waited outside and listened to the transaction through his equipment,
    which worked with the CI’s device. Once the task was complete, the MBN agent met with
    the CI and collected the bag of pills. The crime lab confirmed that the ten pills contained
    hydrocodone with acetaminophen.
    ¶6.    On September 3, 2014, a grand jury returned a four-count indictment on Malik. Malik
    2
    was charged with two counts of the sale of a controlled substance (Counts I and III) and two
    counts of conspiracy to sell a controlled substance (Count II and IV). On May 4, 2015, the
    case proceeded to trial on Counts I and III only. Counts II and IV were ordered nolle
    prosequi1 pursuant to the State’s motion that in exchange for Malik’s guilty plea on Counts
    I and III, the conspiracy charges would be abandoned. Notably, the State did not pursue the
    conspiracy charges after Malik elected to proceed with a trial.
    ¶7.    Following a two-day jury trial, Malik was found guilty on both counts. On May 11,
    2015, he was sentenced to eight years on Count I, for the sale of less than ten dosage units,
    and he received an eight-year sentence on Count III, for the sale of ten dosage units but less
    than twenty dosage units. The sentences were order to run consecutively, with all time to be
    served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
    ¶8.    Malik timely filed posttrial motions for a new trial and an amended motion for a
    judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial. Within his
    motion he also requested a hearing to allow testimony of witnesses for completion of the
    record. Malik asserted that (1) the State failed to provide the defense with exculpatory
    evidence during discovery, (2) the State made improper closing arguments, (3) the trial court
    erred in allowing evidence of prior bad acts, and (4) his counsel was ineffective. Following
    a hearing on August 29, 2016, the circuit judge found that the motions were not supported
    by the evidence in the case. The motions were denied. Aggrieved, Malik appeals and asserts
    the same. We find no error and affirm.
    1
    Nolle prosequi is a Latin term that serves as “a legal notice that a lawsuit or
    prosecution has been abandoned.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
    3
    ANALYSIS
    ¶9.    On appeal, Malik raises each issue asserted below. He asserts that each issue is
    inextricably intertwined and resulted in prejudice to him during the trial. We address each
    separately.
    I.     Brady Violation
    ¶10.   Malik first argues that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence that was
    favorable to him, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963). He argues that the
    State had a duty to reveal that the same CI that testified against him had unsuccessfully
    sought to purchase pills from him on an occasion prior to May 3 and June 3, 2013. Malik
    asserts that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
    request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
    irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 
    Id. at 87
    . He argues that the
    State never disclosed the failed purchase attempt, and, in fact, it argued otherwise to the jury.
    He contends that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been
    different if this evidence had been disclosed.
    ¶11.   The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “[t]he standard of review for a trial
    court’s ruling on a discovery violation is abuse of discretion.” Curry v. State, 
    939 So. 2d 785
    , 787 (¶8) (Miss. 2006). Further, the supreme court “has stated not all failures to disclose
    exculpatory evidence constitute reversible error.” 
    Id.
     “The question to be asked regarding
    a discovery violation is whether there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have
    been different but for the governmental evidentiary suppression, which undermines
    4
    confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id.
    ¶12.   Following his conviction, Malik obtained new counsel and filed an “Amended Motion
    for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative a New Trial and Specific
    Request for a Hearing to Allow Testimony of Witnesses for Purposes of Completion of
    Record.” The circuit judge granted the request for a hearing. On August 29, 2016, both
    parties argued their positions with regard to the alleged exculpatory evidence. Malik asserted
    that the video and/or audio recording, made by law enforcement, of the unsuccessful
    purchase attempt constituted exculpatory evidence. He argued that the evidence could have
    been used at trial to substantially discredit the CI’s testimony. The State contended that the
    failed purchase attempt was not exculpatory evidence because it turned out that Malik had
    no pills to sell – not that he refused to sell the CI the pills. The circuit judge agreed with the
    State and declined to find that the failed purchase should be considered exculpatory evidence.
    ¶13.   The issue is now before us. When dealing with alleged Brady violations, the supreme
    court has held:
    To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove the following: (1) that
    the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including
    impeachment evidence); (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence
    nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the
    prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence
    been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome
    of the proceedings would have been different.
    Fortenberry v. State, 
    191 So. 3d 1245
    , 1255 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting King v.
    State, 
    656 So. 2d 1168
    , 1174 (Miss. 1995)).
    ¶14.   As to the first prong, the record clearly provides that the State did not possess a
    5
    recording, or any physical evidence, of the prior failed purchase attempt. During the hearing
    on the motion, the State informed the court that Agent Richard Wright with MBN was
    present and prepared to testify to the events surrounding the failed purchase attempt. The
    State confirmed that MBN did in fact send the CI into Malik’s store to purchase pills;
    however, Malik had no pills to sell and directed the CI to a relative’s home. The CI was
    unable to purchase from Malik’s relative because the relative also had no pills to sell. As a
    result, MBN made no record of the attempt, and, in fact, the recording had been taped over
    since no case was being made from the attempt. Because the alleged encounter was not
    recorded, and also because the MBN agent’s testimony would likely show that the only
    reason the CI was unsuccessful was because Malik had no pills to sell at the time, we do not
    find the alleged exculpatory evidence favorable to Malik. This prong is not satisfied.
    ¶15.   We also do not find that the second prong of Brady is satisfied. It is evident that
    Malik does not possess physical evidence of the purchase attempt, as the record confirms that
    no audio or video recording exists. The audio and video recording was never downloaded,
    no report of the attempt was made, the recording was eventually taped over, and no criminal
    case exists regarding the attempt. With regard to whether Malik could have obtained the
    recording, we find no evidence in the record that Malik’s trial counsel either corresponded
    with or attempted to meet with the MBN agents to obtain information pertaining to any
    previous purchase attempts. There is also no claim that Malik had no access to the agents.
    Thus, we find that with reasonable diligence, Malik’s trial counsel could have obtained this
    information.
    6
    ¶16.   As to the third prong, we do not find that the State suppressed evidence that was
    favorable to Malik. First, we cannot say that the evidence was actually favorable to him.
    Furthermore, we find no evidence in the record that suggests that the State suppressed the
    evidence. This prong is not satisfied.
    ¶17.   Likewise, we find that the fourth prong is not satisfied. Based on the foregoing
    analysis, we do not conclude that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have
    been different if the purchase attempt had been disclosed to the defense.
    ¶18.   We do not find that Malik’s theories or speculation of how the jury may have
    perceived the information overcomes the four-pronged test in Brady. Therefore, we find no
    error in the circuit judge’s holding that the failed purchase attempt did not constitute
    exculpatory evidence. This issue is without merit.
    II.    Improper Closing Argument
    ¶19.   Malik next argues that the State improperly stated in its closing argument that the CI
    had bought drugs from him on prior occasions. He further argues that the State made the
    statements in an attempt to bolster the CI’s credibility, which he asserts was lawyer
    misconduct that created prejudice and also violated the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.
    ¶20.   “The standard of review that this Court must apply to lawyer misconduct during
    opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the
    improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused[,] so as to result in a
    decision influenced by the prejudice so created.” Wilson v. State, 
    194 So. 3d 855
    , 864 (¶30)
    (Miss. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of a closing
    7
    argument is to fairly sum up the evidence.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). “Prosecutors are not
    allowed to employ tactics [that] are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated
    to unduly influence the jury.” 
    Id.
     (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The
    prosecutor may comment upon any facts introduced into evidence, and he may draw
    whatever deductions and inferences that seem proper to him from the facts.” 
    Id.
     (citation
    omitted). “Counsel cannot, however, state facts which are not in evidence, and which the
    court does not judicially know, in aid of his evidence.” Id.
    ¶21.     During closing argument, the State discussed the CI’s inclination to cooperate with
    law enforcement. The State noted that the CI was a former nurse who had been caught
    forging prescriptions in order to obtain pills illegally. The CI had lost her nursing license,
    was facing criminal charges in both Rankin and Simpson Counties, and, if convicted, she
    could lose custody of her children. The State acknowledged that the CI’s credibility was an
    issue.
    ¶22.     The State noted that the CI had been addicted to pain medication and that she was
    willing to buy drugs to cooperate with law enforcement. The State then made the following
    statement to the jury:
    Where does somebody addicted to pain medicine go to get their drugs? To
    somebody they know . . . will sell them drugs. . . . Who did she make
    arrangements to buy Lorcet or Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen from? This
    defendant, two separate times, May the 3rd, June the 3rd, that’s who she went
    and bought drugs from, not some stranger, not some random person at a
    convenien[ce] store that she had never met or didn’t know.
    At that point, defense counsel objected that the statements were going beyond the record.
    The circuit judge overruled the objection, stating that “the jury’s recollection of the evidence
    8
    will control. This is argument.” The State continued its argument, asserting that the CI
    “went to Nitin Malik, who she knew she could buy drugs from.”
    ¶23.   Malik contends that the State’s reference implied that the CI had purchased drugs
    from him on prior occasions. He asserts the statements served to introduce facts that were
    not in evidence – which prejudiced him before the jury. He argues the statements were also
    used to bolster the CI’s credibility.
    ¶24.   This Court has previously held that “arguing statements of fact that are not in evidence
    or necessarily inferable from it and that are prejudicial to the defendant is error.” Mitchell
    v. State, 
    720 So. 2d 492
    , 495-96 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). However, this Court has also held
    that counsel “may draw whatever deductions and inferences that seem proper to him from
    the facts.” Giles v. State, 
    187 So. 3d 116
    , 124 (¶28) (Miss. 1998). While the State’s
    comments suggest that the CI previously purchased pills from Malik, the statements were not
    improper. The CI and two MBN agents testified that Malik became known to them through
    their investigation into the CI’s alleged relationship with him. Therefore, the State’s
    comments were appropriately based upon facts established through witness testimony.
    ¶25.   The inference that the CI had previously purchased pills could have been reasonably
    drawn from the testimony. The State did not make reference to the previous attempt or
    provide any new facts pertaining to prior purchases. Furthermore, we note that the jury was
    instructed to regard the arguments, statements, and remarks made by counsel during closing
    arguments as a means to help with understanding the evidence and application of the law, but
    not as evidence. Therefore, we do not find that the closing argument created unjust prejudice
    9
    against Malik or influenced the jury’s decision.
    ¶26.   This Court has previously held that “[t]he standard of review for the admission or
    exclusion of evidence is . . . abuse of discretion.” Liddell v. State, 
    33 So. 3d 524
    , 529 (¶12)
    (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). “A trial judge enjoys a great deal of discretion as
    to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence.” 
    Id.
     “Unless the judge abuses this discretion
    so as to be prejudicial to the accused, the Court will not reverse th[e] ruling.” Id at 529-30
    (¶12) (quoting Williams v. State, 
    991 So. 2d 593
    , 597 (¶8) (Miss. 2008)). This issue is
    without merit.
    III.   Prior-Bad-Acts Evidence
    ¶27.   As to the alleged violation of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b), we do not find that
    the statements made by the State during closing argument sought to introduce evidence of
    other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts of the defendant. Malik contends that the State’s references
    were used to show that he had committed other similar offenses, and, therefore, he must have
    committed the offenses for which he was being tried. We do not find that the State suggested
    that the CI had purchased pills from Malik on a prior occasion. Rather, we interpret the
    statements to mean that the CI knew that she could buy drugs from him. Such knowledge
    was not necessarily limited to previous personal experience.
    ¶28.   During the hearing on the posttrial motion, the circuit judge declined to accept Malik’s
    reasoning that mere knowledge was proof that he had sold pills on a prior occasion. The
    circuit judge concluded that the statements did not equate to the State “putting on evidence
    of any prior bad acts.” Likewise, we hold that the State did not violate Rule 404(b) in its
    10
    closing argument because the statements were not made to prove that Malik had sold drugs
    to the CI before.
    ¶29.   We find no abuse of discretion by the circuit judge. The decision to overrule Malik’s
    objection to the State’s closing argument created no prejudice to the accused. This issue is
    without merit.
    IV.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    ¶30.   In his final assignment of error, Malik asserts that he received ineffective assistance
    of counsel when his trial counsel failed to adequately conduct a pretrial investigation to
    explore an eyewitness’s potential testimony for trial. He further asserts that the eyewitness’s
    prospective testimony refuted the State’s case. He contends that the eyewitness testimony
    would have been persuasive to the defense’s theory that the CI fabricated the drug buys.
    ¶31.   “When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must find
    that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that there would have been a different
    result in the verdict if it were not for trial counsel’s deficiency.” Payton v. State, 
    41 So. 3d 713
    , 719 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). “There is a rebuttable presumption
    that counsel’s representation is competent and that the acts in question fall within the ‘wide
    range of professionally competent assistance.’” Porter v. State, 
    963 So. 2d 1225
    , 1229 (¶15)
    (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 690 (1984)).
    ¶32.   Additionally,
    [this] Court rarely determines issues of ineffective assistance of counsel on
    direct appeal unless: “(1) the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of
    constitutional dimensions, or (2) the parties stipulate that the record is
    adequate to allow the appellate court to make the finding without consideration
    11
    of the findings of fact of the trial court.”
    Payton, 
    41 So. 3d at 719
     (¶23) (quoting Graves v. State, 
    914 So. 2d 788
    , 798 (¶35) (Miss.
    Ct. App. 2005)).
    ¶33.   Malik maintains that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to
    adequately explore the cashier’s eyewitness testimony. He argues that the cashier should
    have been called to testify on his behalf about the CI’s alleged fabricated drug purchase. In
    support of this claim, he cites to the supreme court’s holding in Johns v. State, 
    926 So. 2d 188
     (Miss. 2006), where the court reversed on the basis that the defendant’s counsel had
    rendered ineffective assistance. The defendant’s trial counsel had failed to interview an alibi
    witness.
    ¶34.   The State disputes Malik’s contention that this case is analogous to Johns. The State
    asserts that, “at a minimum, counsel has a duty to interview potential witnesses and to make
    independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” (Quoting Payton v.
    State, 
    708 So. 2d 559
    , 561 (¶8) (Miss. 1998)). The State asserts that unlike the factual
    scenario in Johns, Malik’s eyewitness was in fact interviewed before the trial, albeit just
    three days prior to the trial. We agree that this case is distinguishable from Johns.
    ¶35.   Moreover, we find that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance solely
    because he elected not to call the cashier as an eyewitness for Malik. This Court has
    previously held that “[c]ounsel’s choice of whether or not to file certain motions, call
    witnesses, ask certain questions, or make certain objections fall[s] within the ambit of trial
    strategy and will not stand as support for an ineffective[-]assistance[-]of[-]counsel claim.”
    12
    Jackson v. State, 
    73 So. 3d 1176
    , 1181-82 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    ¶36.   Further, “[t]his Court will only under exceptional circumstances[] second guess
    counsel on matters of trial strategy.” Hill v. State, 
    850 So. 2d 223
    , 226 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App.
    2003) (citing Marshall v. State, 
    759 So. 2d 511
    , 513 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)). We do
    not find that the alleged errors by Malik’s trial counsel “were so egregious as to constitute
    a deficiency in performance or prejudicial to [Malik]’s defense as to affect the outcome of
    trial.” Cole v. State, 
    666 So. 2d 767
    , 777 (Miss. 1995).
    ¶37.   Additionally, we find no indication of ineffective assistance of counsel in the record.
    “The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that, where the record cannot support an
    ineffective[-]assistance[-]of[-]counsel claim on direct appeal, the appropriate conclusion is
    to deny relief, preserving the defendant’s right to argue the same issue through a petition for
    post-conviction relief.” Wilcher v. State, 
    863 So. 2d 719
    , 761 (¶162) (Miss. 2003) (quoting
    Aguilar v. State, 
    847 So. 2d 871
    , 878 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). “We may determine the
    merits of the claim [of ineffective assistance of counsel] on direct appeal only if the record
    affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or the parties stipulate that
    the record is adequate . . . . ” Liddell, 
    33 So. 3d at 533
     (¶31) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). The record does not affirmatively show ineffectiveness of constitutional
    dimensions. And the parties did not stipulate to the adequacy of the record for this Court to
    find ineffective assistance. Therefore, we decline to find ineffective assistance of counsel
    at this juncture, but we preserve this issue for post-conviction relief.
    13
    ¶38.   We conclude that Malik’s arguments are without merit, and we affirm the circuit
    court’s judgment.
    ¶39.   AFFIRMED.
    LEE, C.J., CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.
    BARNES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE
    WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY
    WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. IRVING, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT
    SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. TINDELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: NO. 2016–KA–01495–COA

Judges: Griffis, Carlton, Greenlee

Filed Date: 12/5/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024