Shirley E. Pinion v. Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2018-SA-01044-COA
SHIRLEY E. PINION APPELLANT
v.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM APPELLEE
OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/22/2018
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JEFF WEILL SR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: GEORGE S. LUTER
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SAMUEL MARTIN MILLETTE III
JANE L. MAPP
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/29/2019
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND C. WILSON, JJ.
WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. On February 26, 2013, the Board of Trustees (the PERS Board) of the Public
Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi (PERS) entered an order approving and
adopting the recommendation, findings of fact, and conclusions of law of the PERS’s
Disability Appeals Committee (the Committee), thereby denying Shirley Pinion’s application
for in-the-line-of-duty disability benefits pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section
25-11-114(6) (Supp. 2011). Dissatisfied, Pinion appealed to the Hinds County Circuit Court
seeking reversal of the PERS Board’s decision. The circuit court affirmed the PERS Board’s
decision on June 22, 2018. Finding the PERS Board’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Shirley Pinion was employed with the University of Mississippi Medical Center
(UMMC) for 23 3/4 years before her departure in 2012.1 Around 1997, Pinion received a
carpal-tunnel-syndrome (CTS) diagnosis, revealing that the disease was most severe in her
right hand. Despite the diagnosis and its accompanying discomfort, Pinion continued to
work in her usual capacity with UMMC. The daily functions of Pinion’s position entailed
a great deal of typing and other computer-based work. In an attempt to avoid surgery, Pinion
used braces to assuage the pain. Unable to cope, Pinion elected to undergo a carpel-tunnel-
release surgery on her right hand in July 1999. The surgery was intended to relieve the CTS
symptoms, but Pinion continued to experience pain. Pinion sought further evaluation from
a series of physicians, and each provided different hypotheses about the persisting
discomfort.
¶3. On August 13, 2001, Pinion was referred to and evaluated by rheumatologist Dr.
Suzanne Sanders. Dr. Sanders suspected Raynaud’s disease as the cause of Pinion’s pain and
recommended further testing. Dr. Sanders was not able to reach a definitive diagnosis.
¶4. On February 11, 2004, Pinion sought a pain-management consultation from Dr.
1
At the time of her disability filing, Pinion was the “Manager of Supply Chain
Information Services” but had worked in other data-input positions with UMMC over the
course of her employment.
2
Jeffery Summers, who suggested sympathetic pain was the culprit. Still seeking relief,
Pinion agreed to another surgery and allowed Dr. William Lineweaver to perform a
sympathectomy procedure in April 2004. Pinion reported increased pain after the procedure
but returned to work in May 2004.
¶5. Failed by surgical solutions, Pinion visited Dr. Rahul Vohra in February 2006. Dr.
Vohra developed an effective pharmacologic-pain-management regimen to relieve the
unbearable CTS symptoms. Drugs used in Pinion’s treatment included a number of narcotic
pain medicines and analgesic patches. Pinion experienced notable relief and was able to
continue working with the aid of the medications.
¶6. On February 13, 2012, UMMC family physician Dr. Rebecca Waterer evaluated
Pinion. Although the prompt for Pinion’s appointment with Dr. Waterer is unclear, the visit
resulted in a determination that Pinion could not safely perform the work tasks required of
her and simultaneously adhere to the drug regimen prescribed by Dr. Vohra.
¶7. On February 14, 2012, UMMC placed Pinion on leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 20 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2012), pending the discontinuation
or significant decrease in the use of the narcotics. In light of UMMC’s determination, Pinion
returned to Dr. Vohra, who adamantly rejected UMMC’s request that Pinion discontinue or
significantly decrease her use of the narcotics as unreasonable after evaluating Pinion’s pain
levels. Dr. Vohra also noted that Pinion had followed the drug regimen while working for
a number of years without incident. The drugs allowed Pinion to cope with her discomfort
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so that she could continue working.
¶8. Based on the inability to work without the prohibited pain medication, Pinion filed for
PERS duty-related disability benefits (with planned retirement) on February 22, 2012.2 As
a part of the application, Dr. Vohra and Dr. Waterer completed PERS Form 7, “Statement
of Examining Physician.” Dr. Vohra indicated that Pinion’s pain was likely permanent, and
Dr. Waterer opined that Pinion could not work while taking the medications used to treat her
pain.
¶9. At PERS’s request, Pinion submitted to an independent medical evaluation by Dr.
Philip Blount in June 2012. Dr. Blount reported that Pinion’s ability to continue working
was contingent on her tolerance of pain symptoms related to the CTS. After reviewing Dr.
Blount’s report alongside Pinion’s application, the PERS Medical Board denied Pinion’s
request for disability retirement.
¶10. Pinion appealed the decision to the Committee, which held a hearing on December
3, 2012. The Committee entered its “Proposed Statement of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation” to deny Pinion’s request for duty-related disability benefits; however, the
Committee granted Pinion’s request for non-duty-related disability benefits. On February
26, 2013, the PERS Board of Trustees (the PERS Board) entered an order approving and
2
Pinion’s employment with UMMC had not ended at the time her “Application for
Retirement Benefits” was filed on February 22, 2012, and listed April 4, 2012, as a
“Projected Date of Retirement.” As of December 3, 2012, Pinion’s employment had not
ended and she was still on FMLA leave.
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adopting the Committee’s recommendation, findings, and conclusions.
¶11. Still dissatisfied, on March 27, 2013, Pinion filed an appeal in the Hinds County
Circuit Court based on the PERS Board’s denial of duty-related disability benefits. On June
22, 2018, the circuit court entered an order affirming the PERS Board’s decision. Aggrieved,
Pinion now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶12. PERS is categorized as an administrative state agency, and as such, our judicial review
of this administrative appeal is limited. Davis v. Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys., 750 So. 2d 1225, 1229
(¶12) (Miss. 1999). This Court has the authority to reverse the decision of PERS if the
decision (1) was not supported by substantial evidence, (2) was arbitrary and capricious, (3)
was beyond PERS Board’s power to adopt, or (4) violates a constitutional or statutory
provision. Id. We apply the same standard of review as the circuit court and “may neither
substitute [our] own judgement for that of the agency which rendered the decision nor
reweigh the facts of the case.” Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. Walker, 126 So. 3d 892, 895 (¶5)
(Miss. 2013) (citing Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Merchants Truck Line Inc., 598 So. 2d 778,
782 (Miss. 1992)). A rebuttable presumption exists in favor of PERS. Id. (citing Pub. Emps’
Ret. Sys. v. Dishmon, 797 So. 2d 888, 891(¶9) (Miss. 2001)). The employee seeking the
benefit is left with the burden of proving the contrary. Davis, 750 So. 2d at 1230 (¶12).
DISCUSSION
¶13. Pinion spent over two decades as a UMMC employee working in various keyboarding
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capacities. It is uncontested that the corresponding typing and computer tasks contributed
to or caused Pinion to develop CTS that ultimately warranted the use of the narcotic pain
regimen. Pinion argues that because her CTS was shown to be a permanent and direct result
of the UMMC work duties, PERS lacked substantial evidence to deny her request for duty-
related disability benefits. While there is an obvious and undisputed link between Pinion’s
employment and her CTS, absent a corresponding accident or traumatic event, the applicable
statute does not render Pinion eligible for duty-related disability benefits. Accordingly,
PERS granted Pinion regular, non-duty related disability benefits and maintains that Pinion
is legally precluded from recovering the presently requested relief.
¶14. At the time of Pinion’s application, Mississippi Code Annotated section 25-11-114(6)
(Supp. 2011) governed her eligibility for duty-related disability benefits. The pertinent
statutory portion provided that
[r]egardless of the number of years of creditable service, upon the application
of a member or employer, any active member who becomes disabled as a
direct result of an accident or traumatic event resulting in a physical injury
occurring in the line of performance of duty, provided that the medical board
or other designated governmental agency after a medical examination certifies
that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further
performance of duty and the incapacity is likely to be permanent . . . .
(Emphasis added).
¶15. PERS draws parallels between the instant case and the Court’s decision in Public
Employees’ Retirement System v. Card, 994 So. 2d 239 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), where the
Court affirmed the PERS Board’s decision to deny Mary Card duty-related disability
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benefits. Id. at 245 (¶30). After working as an accounting assistant with the State for fifteen
years, Card developed severe pain from writing and was subsequently diagnosed with CTS.
Id. at 241 (¶5). Like Pinion, Card underwent carpel tunnel release surgery but continued to
experience discomfort. Id. at 241 (¶6). Akin to the “shearing injury” idea Pinion advances,
Card argued that she was qualified for duty-related disability benefits based on a micro-
trauma theory. Id. at 245 (¶31). Evidence revealed that, like Pinion, Card had “consistently
experienced problems with carpal tunnel.” Id. Consistent with the PERS Board’s decision,
the Court rejected Card’s micro-trauma theory, determining that it did not fall within the
statutory definition of a “traumatic event,” and found that Card “provided no evidence of
[CTS] resulting from an accident or traumatic event.” Id. at 246 (¶32).
¶16. The Court embraced the Mississippi Office of the Attorney General’s interpretation
of a “traumatic event”:
[A]n event in which a worker involuntarily meets with a physical object or
some other external matter and the worker is a victim of a great rush of power
that he himself did not bring into motion. This definition was held not to
include physical injuries resulting from a slip and fall accident and physical
conditions resulting from a slip and fall accident and physical conditions
resulting from an excessive work effort.
Id. (quoting Miss. Att’y Gen. Op., 93-1017, 1994 WL 117329, at *2 (Mar. 16, 1994)).
¶17. Mirroring Card, Pinion struggles to identify any “accident or traumatic event” that
“occur[ed] in the line of duty” and can be connected to her diagnosis. In fact, Pinion fails
to pinpoint any actual accident or traumatic event at all that comports with the applicable
statute and interpretation referenced in Card. Pinion argues that the statute is ambiguous and
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the Court improperly adopted the Attorney General Opinion’s definition of “traumatic
event.” Gleaning legislative intent from the subsequent codification of the Card decision,
we disagree. In 2016, lawmakers amended the statute outlining eligibility for duty-related
disability benefits as follows:
Regardless of the number of years of creditable service, upon the application
of a member or employer, any active member who becomes disabled as a
direct result of a physical injury sustained from an accident or traumatic event
caused by external violence or physical force occurring in the line of
performance of duty, provided that the medical board or other designated
governmental agency after a medical examination certifies that the member is
mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty and
the incapacity is likely to be permanent . . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 25-11-114(6) (Rev. 2016) (emphasis added). The amendment clarified
that the “accident or traumatic event” must be “caused by external violence or physical force
occurring in the line of performance of duty” and reflects Attorney General Opinion Number
93-1017 acknowledged by this Court.
¶18. Despite the statute’s progression, Pinion asserts the Attorney General’s definition is
“clearly against the weight of modern medical evidence” and cites an online research article
hypothesizing a causal link between CTS and a “shearing injury.”3 Pinion opines the
“shearing injury” must have occurred during the work-related keyboarding at UMMC and
unsuccessfully petitions this Court to qualify the injury as a traumatic event in the line of
3
Mayo Clinic, Researchers Find Evidence for Traumatic Cause of Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome (Nov. 10, 2006), ScienceDaily, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006
/11/061109153942.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2019).
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duty.
¶19. At best, the article purports that researchers determined a “shearing injury” may cause
CTS. Mayo Clinic, supra note 3. For the sake of argument, even if we accepted the article’s
hypothesis as true, Pinion failed to provide relevant evidence specific to her diagnosis. No
medical records or testimony from any of Pinion’s doctors support a finding that any
particular accident, event, or “shearing injury” caused her CTS. Form 8 of the disability
application requires the applicant, Pinion, to provide a description of the alleged disability.
Pinion begins by writing, “I developed carpel tunnel in both hands around 1996-97 . . . .”
Also, an injury report dated June 17, 1999, indicates “continuous typing” as the cause. The
medical records and forms completed by her treating physicians reflect the same.
¶20. Throughout her briefs, Pinion also discusses the 1999 carpel-tunnel-release surgery
as the qualifying cause of her pain. Again, Pinion’s assertion does not meet the statutory
requirement. It would be counterintuitive to qualify the surgery as the cause of the CTS it
was intended to treat. While the surgery was perhaps traumatic, especially given its failed
attempt at alleviating Pinion’s CTS pain, the procedure was elective and certainly did not
occur in the line of performance of duty. Pinion’s “lack of evidence presented to PERS
creates the substantial evidence necessary for this Court to uphold the Board’s decision.”
Card, 994 So. 2d at 246 (¶33). Thus the assertion that Pinion suffered a traumatic event of
some sort is without merit, and the Board’s decision should stand.
¶21. Pinion correctly points to the Court’s ruling in Public Employees’ Retirement System
9
v. Trulove, 954 So. 2d 501 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), as being instructive but not in her favor.
Nurse Truelove had suffered neck and shoulder injuries in an August 1995 automobile
accident that occurred during the course of her work duties but continued her employment.
Id. at 502 (¶¶4-5). Five years later, in October 2000, Truelove suffered a second work-
related injury while attempting to restrain a patient and subsequently filed for duty-related
disability. Id. at 502 (¶¶6-7). In support of her claim, Truelove submitted corroborative
findings from her physician along with a detailed incident report Truelove completed the day
after the second incident. Id. at 504 (¶14). The Court reversed the PERS Board’s decision,
holding that the Committee failed to “thoroughly consider” medical evidence and the incident
report evincing Trulove’s eligibility for duty-related disability benefits. Id. at 505 (¶15). The
Court also noted that Trulove sustained not one, but two qualifying injuries. Id. at 505 (¶16).
As previously discussed, neither Pinion’s records nor her incident report established the
existence of a qualifying traumatic event.
¶22. Pinion also distinguishes the current facts from those involved in the denial of the
duty-related disability claim in Brinston v. Public Employees’ Retirement System, 706 So.
2d 258 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). Mary Brinston also suffered from CTS, but unlike Pinion, the
facts clearly established that Brinston suffered a traumatic event while engaged in the
performance of her work duties. Id. at 259 (¶¶2-3). For Brinston, timing emerged as the
primary issue when Brinston was unable to connect her CTS diagnosis date with the injury
she suffered. Id. at 259 (¶2). Ultimately, both of the plausible diagnoses’ dates predated
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Brinston’s injury, establishing that the traumatic event could not have been the cause of
Brinston’s CTS. Id. Pinion argues that because her UMMC employment and CTS
undisputedly overlap, the outcome here should differ from the result in Brinston. We
disagree.
¶23. Finally, Pinion directs this Court to Cartagena v. City of New York, 345 F. Supp. 2d
414 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The New York case, considered only as persuasive authority, is
consistent with the above referenced precedent of our Court and likewise distinguishable
from the case at bar. The Cartagena court reversed an administrative decision denying a
New York police officer active-duty retirement benefits (i.e., duty-related disability benefits).
Id. at 415. Facts indicated that Officer Cartagena tripped and injured her right hand while
in pursuit of a robbery suspect. Id. After approximately one year of subsequent visits and
consultations in connection with her injury, Cartagena was diagnosed with CTS. Id.Cartagena and the other cases cited by Pinion present a recurring theme marked by stark
contrast to the present set of facts—a traumatic event or accident existed. As discussed
above, Pinion’s record is devoid of any alleged accident or traumatic event as defined by the
statute.
¶24. Absent the showing of evidence that an accident or traumatic event even occurred, the
Board had substantial evidence to deny Pinion’s request for duty-related disability benefits.
¶25. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE, TINDELL, McDONALD,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. J. WILSON, P.J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.
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