Amy Wiggins Blevins v. Monty Allen Wiggins ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CA-01283-COA
AMY WIGGINS BLEVINS APPELLANT
v.
MONTY ALLEN WIGGINS APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/23/2017
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. D. NEIL HARRIS SR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: G. CHARLES BORDIS IV
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CALVIN D. TAYLOR
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/05/2019
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND C. WILSON, JJ.
C. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Amy Wiggins Blevins and Monty Allen Wiggins filed a joint complaint for divorce
on November 8, 2006. On May 25, 2007, the Chancery Court of Jackson County,
Mississippi, entered a final judgment of divorce upon the statutory ground of irreconcilable
differences. On October 12, 2011, Amy filed a complaint for modification to modify
Monty’s child support obligation. The chancery court entered an agreed order on March 8,
2012, increasing Monty’s child support obligation and altering his visitation schedule. On
July 29, 2016, Amy filed a second complaint for modification, again requesting an increase
in Monty’s child support obligation on the basis of “substantial and material changes in
circumstances.” The chancery court held a trial on February 23, 2017, and on May 23, 2017,
the court entered a final judgment granting Amy’s request in part and denying the remainder
of Amy’s complaint for modification. Aggrieved, Amy filed this appeal.
¶2. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. Amy and Monty were lawfully married on March 16, 2000, in Gautier, Mississippi,
and they resided together as husband and wife until their separation on October 22, 2006.
Amy and Monty are the parents of two minor children—one daughter born in March 1999,
and another daughter born in February 2004.1
¶4. Amy and Monty filed a joint complaint for divorce on November 8, 2006. On May
25, 2007, the Chancery Court of Jackson County, Mississippi, granted a divorce on the
ground of irreconcilable differences and pursuant to the parties’ mutually executed property
settlement agreement. Amy received physical custody of the two children and the right to
claim her youngest daughter for federal and state income tax purposes. Monty received
visitation privileges with the two children on alternating weekends, alternating holidays, and
during the summer, and he also received the right to claim his oldest daughter for federal and
state income tax purposes. The chancery court further ordered Monty to pay Amy $130 per
week in child support for the benefit of the two children and declared Monty responsible for
one-half of reasonable college expenses if the children elected to pursue post-secondary
education.
¶5. On October 12, 2011, Amy filed a complaint for modification of Monty’s child
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Both children were minors at the time of the underlying request for modification.
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support obligation. The chancery court entered an agreed order on March 8, 2012, which
increased Monty’s child support obligation from $130 per week to $833 per month ($192.37
per week) and altered his visitation schedule to include visitation on Wednesday afternoons.
The chancery court denied Monty’s request for credit or reimbursement for overpayment of
child support. The chancery court also denied Amy’s request for monetary aid for the
children’s extracurricular activities.
¶6. On July 29, 2016, Amy filed a second complaint for modification. Amy again
requested an increase in Monty’s child support obligation based on “substantial and material
changes in circumstances” related to the children’s increased needs and Monty’s increased
income. Amy alleged the following changes in circumstances: (1) “[i]t has been more than
four (4) years since the court set child support”; (2) “[t]he needs of the children have
increased”; (3) “[Monty] earns substantially more income”; (4) “[t]he costs of food, clothing
and shelter have increased exponentially”; (5) “[t]he children are active and participate in
many events and activities”; (6) “[t]he oldest child is a licensed driver in Mississippi and has
costs affiliated with such”; and (7) “[o]ther changes to be shown at trial.” In support of her
complaint, Amy produced Uniform Chancery Court Rule 8.05 financial statements—
including copies of her pay stubs, her W-2 tax form, and her 2016 tax return—and an exhibit
that included a detailed list of expenses that she stated were a result of the increased needs
of the children.
¶7. Amy requested that the chancery court modify its prior orders to (1) award Amy the
right to claim both children as dependents for federal and state income tax purposes; (2)
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order Monty to pay the cost of each child’s extracurricular activities; (3) order Monty to pay
for automobile insurance for the children; (4) order Monty to pay for expenses incurred
during each child’s senior year of high school, including senior portraits, invitations, caps
and gowns, diplomas, yearbooks, etc.; and (5) order Monty to provide each child with a four-
year college education, including the cost of tuition, books, room and board, and living
expenses. Amy also requested that the court award her reasonable attorney’s fees and enter
a withholding order for the collection and disbursement of child support.
¶8. Monty filed an answer and counterclaim on October 28, 2016, based on “a substantial
and material change in circumstances.” In his counterclaim, Monty requested custody of the
children and the right to claim both children as dependents for federal and state income tax
purposes. Amy filed an answer to Monty’s counterclaim and asserted certain affirmative
defenses to the relief Monty requested.
¶9. The chancery court held a trial on February 23, 2017, and on May 23, 2017, the court
entered final judgment granting Amy’s request in part and denying the remainder of Amy’s
complaint for modification. Specifically, the chancery court clarified the prior order in which
it declared Monty responsible for one-half of “reasonable” college expenses and ordered the
parties to split college expenses for the children after scholarships, grants, and loans are
applied against college expenses, irrespective of the type of institution attended. The court
denied the remainder of Amy’s modification request and ordered the parties to pay their own
attorney’s fees.2 Aggrieved by the chancery court’s ruling, Amy filed this appeal.
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Although it was litigated by the parties during trial, the chancellor did not address
Monty’s counterclaim in the final judgment. Monty raises no issue on appeal with regard
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10. A chancellor’s factual findings “will not be disturbed unless [he] was manifestly
wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Blakely v. Blakely, 88 So.
3d 798, 801 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). “As long as substantial evidence supports the
chancellor’s findings, [we are] without authority to disturb them, even if [we] would have
found otherwise as an original matter.” Id. (quoting Joel v. Joel, 43 So. 3d 424, 429 (¶14)
(Miss. 2010)). A chancellor’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Chesney v.
Chesney, 910 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (¶5) (Miss. 2005) (citing Southerland v. Southerland, 875
So. 2d 204, 206 (¶5) (Miss. 2004)).
ANALYSIS
¶11. Amy challenges the chancery court’s denial of her request for modification on several
grounds. For brevity, we address these points collectively. Amy also asserts that the
chancery court erred by denying her request for attorney’s fees.
I. Whether the chancery court erred by denying Amy’s request for
modification.
¶12. Amy asserts that the chancery court erred when it denied her request to modify
Monty’s child support obligation despite “proven” substantial and material changes in
circumstances.
¶13. “Child support can be modified if there has been ‘a substantial and material change
in the circumstances of one or more of the interested parties.’” Strange v. Strange, 43 So.
to the substantive relief he sought in his counterclaim and instead urges us to affirm the
chancery court’s final judgment.
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3d 1169, 1174 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Caldwell v. Caldwell, 579 So. 2d 543,
547 (Miss.1991)). A material change in circumstances can be shown by proof of the
following:
(l) increased needs caused by advanced age and maturity of the children; (2)
increase in expenses; (3) inflation factor; (4) the relative financial condition
and earning capacity of the parties; (5) the health and special needs of the
[children], both physical and psychological; (6) the health and special medical
needs of the parents, both physical and psychological; (7) the necessary living
expenses of the father; (8) the estimated amount of income taxes the respective
parties must pay on their incomes; (9) the free use of a residence, furnishings,
and automobile; and (10) such other facts and circumstances that bear on the
support subject shown by the evidence.
Id. (citing Sessums v. Vance, 12 So. 3d 1146, 1148 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). “Increased
income by the parent paying child support is not, by itself, enough to warrant an increase in
child support.” McNair v. Clark, 961 So. 2d 73, 81 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). “While the
increase in a child’s age alone is an indicator that an increase in support may be warranted,
it is not, standing alone, evidence of a material change in circumstances.” Id. at 80 (¶29).
Further, “[t]o find a material change in circumstances based upon increased expenses, the
amount of those expenses must not have been foreseeable at the time of the original order,
and the parent seeking an increase in child support must state specifically the basis and
amounts of those increased expenses.” Id. The burden of showing that there has been a
material change in circumstances rests on the party requesting an increase in child support.
McNair, 961 So. 2d at 81 (¶¶21, 30).
¶14. In the May 23, 2017 final judgment, the chancery court applied these standards,
stating “[i]f the Court finds, based on the foregoing factors that a material change in the
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needs of the parties has occurred necessitating a modification, the Court is permitted to
increase or decrease the child support award.” The chancery court then denied Amy’s
request for modification—despite clarifying the support obligation relating to college
expenses—ultimately concluding that “the law does not require an increase in child support,”
based on the financial declarations, testimony, and exhibits adduced at the hearing.
¶15. In the final judgment, the chancery court addressed both Amy’s and Monty’s monthly
income and expenses, their financial declarations, and a detailed list of expenses relating to
the “increased needs” of the children. The chancery court emphasized that Amy’s income
had decreased by approximately $12,000 since 2011, based not on anything attributable to
Monty, but on her own decision to change jobs. The chancery court also noted that Amy’s
financial declarations did not include the $833 she receives per month from Monty. There
was also evidence that the children spent about forty percent of their time with Monty as of
the time of the request for modification, such that Monty was already paying for some of the
children’s expenses underlying Amy’s request for modification.
¶16. Based on the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude that the chancery court erred
in denying Amy’s request for modification. Substantial evidence exists in the record to
support the chancery court’s conclusion that Amy failed to satisfy her burden of proving a
material or substantial change in circumstances warranting modification. We find no abuse
of discretion in the chancery court’s ruling.
II. Whether the chancery court erred by denying Amy’s request for
attorney’s fees.
¶17. Amy asserts that the chancery court applied an erroneous legal standard to deny her
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request for attorney’s fees. She contends that Monty’s counterclaim was not filed in good
faith because Monty “did not allege that a material change in circumstance had occurred
which had an adverse impact on the children.” Amy further contends that Monty filed the
counterclaim to financially harass her and that the chancery court failed to consider her
inability to pay attorney’s fees.
¶18. “The standard for an award of attorney[’s] fees on a motion for modification of
support is basically the same as that applied in an original divorce action.” Setser v. Piazza,
644 So. 2d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 1994). “Attorney fees are not awarded in child support
modification cases unless the party requesting fees is financially unable to pay them.” Id.However, “[t]he question of attorney fees in a divorce action is a matter largely entrusted to
the sound discretion of the trial court,” and we are generally “reluctant to disturb a
chancellor’s discretionary determination whether or not to award attorney fees and of the
amount of [any] award.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 937 (Miss. 1994); Geiger
v. Geiger, 530 So. 2d 185, 187 (Miss. 1988).
¶19. Further, Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-55-5(1) (Rev. 2012) provides that
in any civil action commenced or appealed in any court of record in this state,
the court shall award, as part of its judgment and in addition to any other costs
otherwise assessed, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs against any party or
attorney if the court, upon the motion of any party or on its own motion, finds
that an attorney or party brought an action, or asserted any claim or defense,
that is without substantial justification, or that the action, or any claim or
defense asserted, was interposed for delay or harassment . . . .
(Emphasis added).
¶20. Here, the chancery court considered the relative financial condition and earning
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capacity of the parties—specifically, Amy’s and Monty’s financial declarations and monthly
incomes and expenses— and concluded that “[u]nder the facts of this case, the law requires
that each party pay their own attorney fees.” Regarding Amy’s inability to pay attorney’s
fees, the chancellor heard the testimony, considered the financial evidence offered by the
parties, and determined that an award of attorney’s fees was not warranted. Consequently,
we decline to disturb the chancery court’s ruling with regard to attorney’s fees.
¶21. Furthermore, based on the record, we cannot find that Monty’s counterclaim for
custody was filed without substantial justification or was interposed for delay or harassment
such that the chancery court erred in declining to award Amy attorney’s fees under section
11-55-5(1). At trial Monty testified that he was seeking custody of the children “[b]ecause
I would love [for] them to live with me. They have been with [Amy] ever since we have
been divorced and, you know, I mean, why shouldn’t I have the opportunity to raise them as
well.” Monty also testified that, in his opinion, receiving custody “would [put an end to] a
lot of the fighting [over] the money because I wouldn’t be asking for any money.”
Effectively, Monty’s counterclaim involved the same issues raised in Amy’s petition for
modification such that the same evidence and issues were to be tried whether Monty asserted
his counterclaim or not. We cannot conclude that the chancery court erred in denying Amy’s
request for attorney’s fees.
¶22. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR.
McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION.
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