Sidney A. Huggins a/k/a Sidney Huggins a/k/a Sid v. State of Mississippi; ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2018-CP-01418-COA
SIDNEY A. HUGGINS A/K/A SIDNEY HUGGINS APPELLANT
A/K/A SID
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/19/2018
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STEVE S. RATCLIFF III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: SIDNEY A. HUGGINS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: KAYLYN HAVRILLA McCLINTON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/18/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND TINDELL, JJ.
TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. On August 22, 2003, Sidney Huggins pled guilty to armed robbery. On December 5,
2003, the Madison County Circuit Court sentenced him to forty years in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with twenty years suspended and twenty
years to serve. On February 13, 2017, Huggins filed an unsuccessful post-conviction relief
(PCR) motion, arguing that newly discovered evidence existed by way of his co-defendant’s
affidavit and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Huggins now appeals
from the circuit court’s dismissal of his PCR motion as time-barred. Finding no error, we
affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Huggins’s PCR motion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On October 31, 2002, a Madison County grand jury indicted Huggins for one count
of armed robbery. Huggins pled guilty on August 22, 2003, and on December 9, 2003, the
circuit court sentenced him to forty years in MDOC custody, with twenty years suspended
and twenty years to serve. Huggins’s sentence was set to run concurrently with a sentence
that he was already serving in Hinds County.
¶3. On February 13, 2017, Huggins filed a PCR motion with the circuit court and argued
that (1) newly discovered evidence existed by way of his co-defendant’s affidavit, and (2)
he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Huggins also moved for an evidentiary hearing
on his PCR motion. On September 13, 2018, the circuit court found that an evidentiary
hearing was unnecessary in the matter, and pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section
99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015), the circuit court dismissed Huggins’s PCR motion as untimely.
Aggrieved, Huggins appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4. “We review the dismissal or denial of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion. We will
only reverse if the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous. When reviewing questions of
law, our standard is de novo.” Ware v. State, 258 So. 3d 315, 317-18 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App.
2018).
ANALYSIS
I. Procedural Bar
¶5. Huggins argues on appeal that the circuit court erroneously dismissed his PCR motion
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as time-barred. “Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015), a
movant has three years to file a PCR motion, and failure to file a PCR motion within the
three years is a procedural bar.” Franklin v. State, 203 So. 3d 9, 10 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App.
2016). As stated, Huggins pled guilty to armed robbery on August 22, 2003, and he was
sentenced on December 9, 2003. He filed his PCR motion on February 13, 2017—more than
thirteen years after his conviction and sentence. Therefore, Huggins’s PCR motion is time-
barred.
II. Exceptions
¶6. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, Huggins asserts that his claim of newly
discovered evidence presents an exception. Section 99-39-5(2)(a)(i) includes a newly-
discovered-evidence exception to the three-year statute of limitations. The Mississippi
Supreme Court has held that this exception applies to cases in which the defendant pleads
guilty. See Chancy v. State, 938 So. 2d 251, 252-53 (¶4) (Miss. 2006). To qualify for the
exception, Huggins must show “that he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time
of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had such been
introduced at trial[,] it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(i); Tomlin v. State, 269 So. 3d 1232, 1235 (¶8) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2018).
¶7. Huggins argues that he presented newly “discoverable” evidence in his PCR motion
by attaching the affidavit of his co-defendant, Curtis Calhoun. However, this argument fails
for several reasons. In his affidavit, Calhoun states:
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Nevertheless, I swear under oath that Mr. Huggins is truly “[i]nnocent,”
because he had no knowledge of what was happening before it happened, and
after Mr. Singleton, Mr. Huggins and I were apprehended, I tried
numerous times to take full responsibility for this crime, but Mr.
Huggins’s attorney, Mr. Nathan Elmore[,] would not take my statement.
(Emphasis added). Huggins offers no explanation as to how he discovered this information
or why this information was not readily discoverable at trial, which we have found weighs
in favor of the procedural bar. See Kennedy v. State, No. 2016-CP-00755-COA, 2019 WL
1349682, at *7 (¶¶35-36) (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019), cert. denied, 279 So. 3d 1087(Miss. 2019); Johnson v. State, 39 So. 3d 963, 966 (¶¶11-12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). In fact,
Calhoun’s affidavit itself makes it clear that his statement was readily discoverable prior to
Huggins’s guilty plea because Calhoun stated that he tried numerous times to take
responsibility for the armed robbery after he and Huggins were apprehended.
¶8. In addition, the record reflects that Huggins swore under oath, by way of his plea
petition and guilty plea, that he understood the facts and allegations against him, he agreed
with those facts and allegations, and he admitted that he was guilty of the crime. Again, we
have held this factor weighs in favor of the procedural bar. See Kennedy, 2019 WL 1349682,
at *7 (¶36); Johnson, 39 So. 3d at 965-66 (¶¶7-12).
¶9. Lastly, in his affidavit, Calhoun swears under oath and “to the best of [his own] belief
and knowledge” that Huggins “had no knowledge of what was happening before it
happened.” In other words, Calhoun’s affidavit attempts to testify as to Huggins’s personal
knowledge, which is something that only Huggins can attest to. Such testimony is
speculative, as Calhoun cannot rightfully testify as to what exactly Huggins knew prior to the
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crime. Based upon these foregoing reasons, Huggins’s newly-discoverable-evidence
argument lacks merit.
¶10. Huggins also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, which he
argues constitutes a fundamental-rights exception to the procedural bar. “The supreme court
has held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . are indeed subject to the
procedural bars.” Salter v. State, 64 So. 3d 514, 518 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Kirk
v. State, 798 So. 2d 345, 346 (¶6) (Miss. 2000)). Mere assertions of a fundamental
constitutional-rights violation or an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fail to qualify for
an exception to the procedural bar. See Mays v. State, 228 So. 3d 946, 948 (¶5) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2017). Instead, Huggins must prove that some basis of truth exists for his claim. Id.
¶11. Here, Huggins makes only mere assertions to support his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel argument. Huggins provides no proof of his claim, and nothing in the record
suggests that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Therefore, Huggins fails to prove that
he meets the requirements necessary to invoke a fundamental-rights exception, and this
argument is likewise without merit. As such, Huggins’s PCR motion remains procedurally
barred.
III. Evidentiary Hearing
¶12. Finally, Huggins argues that the circuit court erred by summarily dismissing his PCR
motion without first granting an evidentiary hearing. A circuit court possesses the authority
to summarily dismiss a PCR motion without an evidentiary hearing “[i]f it plainly appears
from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits, and the prior proceedings in the case, that
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the movant is not entitled to relief[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2015); Moore
v. State, 248 So. 3d 845, 848 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). “To be entitled to an evidentiary
hearing, a [defendant] must demonstrate, by affidavit or otherwise, that there are unresolved
issues of fact that, if concluded favorably to the [defendant], would warrant relief. This may
not be accomplished through [the defendant’s] own unsupported allegations.” Id. at 849
(¶12) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶13. Again, Huggins makes nothing more than unsupported allegations that he was entitled
to an evidentiary hearing. Nothing in the record indicates that any unresolved issues existed
that would entitle Huggins to relief. Upon review, we agree with the circuit court that the
record provides sufficient evidence to combat all of Huggins’s claims. Therefore, an
evidentiary hearing was not necessary.
CONCLUSION
¶14. Upon review of the record, we find no error in the circuit court’s dismissal of
Huggins’s PCR motion without an evidentiary hearing. Huggins’s PCR motion is time-
barred, and he has failed to prove that an exception applies. We therefore affirm the circuit
court’s judgment.
¶15. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.
McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION.
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