Daniel Wood v. State of Mississippi ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2018-CP-00889-COA
DANIEL WOOD APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/29/2018
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GERALD W. CHATHAM SR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DANIEL WOOD (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: MATTHEW WYATT WALTON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/10/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., TINDELL AND McDONALD, JJ.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Daniel Nathan Wood pleaded guilty to child fondling and child exploitation charges
brought against him. Wood was sentenced to serve fifteen years in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) for the child-fondling conviction and five
years for the child-exploitation conviction, with these sentences set to run concurrently.
Wood was also sentenced to ten years of post-release supervision and was ordered to pay a
$1,000.00 assessment to the Children’s Trust Fund.
¶2. The trial court summarily dismissed Wood’s subsequently-filed motion for post-
conviction collateral relief (PCR) in which Wood asserted that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel; his guilty plea was involuntary; and he was incompetent to plead
guilty. Wood appealed, raising the following issues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his
request for new counsel; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) his guilty plea
was involuntary; (4) he was incompetent to enter a guilty plea; and (5) the trial court erred
in failing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons addressed below, we
affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. A DeSoto County grand jury indicted Wood in January 2015 for one count of sexual
battery in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2014), one
count of fondling in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-5-23 (Rev. 2014),
and one count of child exploitation in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section
97-5-33(5) (Rev. 2014).
¶4. Wood was appointed counsel. His lawyer filed a “Motion for Mental Examination”
in the trial court, seeking a determination whether Wood could “ascertain[] the difference
between right and wrong and . . . whether . . . [Wood had the] capacity to assist his Counsel
in this cause.” That motion was granted in June 2015, and the trial court ordered that Dr.
Criss Lott perform Wood’s evaluation. The trial court ordered Dr. Lott to evaluate Wood to
determine:
(a) whether or not [Wood] has a factual as well as rational understanding of the
nature and object of the legal proceedings against him, and has the ability
reasonably to assist his attorney in the preparation of his defense; (b) to
describe his mental state at the time of the alleged offense with respect to his
ability to know the difference between right and wrong in relation to his
actions at that time, and (c) to describe his current mental state as it may be the
product of mental illness or substance abuse.
2
Dr. Lott evaluated Wood in September 2015, addressed the points set forth in the trial court’s
order in his report, and found that Wood was competent to proceed in this matter. Dr. Lott’s
report will be discussed in detail below.
¶5. Wood filed a “Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty” on January 7, 2016, pleading guilty
to the child-fondling and the child-exploitation charges against him.1 Wood’s plea hearing
took place on the same day. At the beginning of the plea hearing, the trial court asked Wood
if he had any history of mental illness or emotional problems. When Wood responded that
he did, the trial court conducted a competency hearing before proceeding with the plea
hearing. The details of the competency hearing are discussed below.
¶6. The trial court then continued with Wood’s plea hearing. The State presented the
factual basis for the child-fondling and sexual-exploitation charges against Wood. When the
State was done, the trial court asked Wood whether he had any disagreements with the
State’s factual basis for these charges against him. Wood responded, “No, sir.”
¶7. The trial court then advised Wood of each right that he would be giving up by
pleading guilty and specifically asked Wood, “Do [you] understand these rights I’ve gone
over with you and [do] you understand that you’re giving those up by pleading guilty here
today, Mr. Wood?” Wood replied, “Yes, sir.” The trial court then told Wood the possible
sentences and other penalties Wood would face by pleading guilty, and Wood confirmed that
he understood these potential penalties. The trial court also asked Wood, “Has anyone tried
to threaten you or tried to force you or tried to offer you any money, put you under duress,
1
The sexual-battery charge against Wood was remanded to the file.
3
intimidate you in any manner to get you to plead guilty, Mr. Wood?” Wood responded, “No,
sir.”
¶8. Wood also confirmed at his plea hearing that he had no complaints with his lawyer
and that he was satisfied with his lawyer’s services, as follows:
[COURT:] Mr. Wood, are you satisfied with the services rendered to you by
[your lawyer]?
[WOOD:] Yes, sir.
[COURT:] Has [your lawyer] been available to you at all reasonable times
and places?
[WOOD:] Yes, sir.
[COURT:] Do you have any complaints against [your lawyer] or against
this court?
[WOOD:] No, sir.
Wood admitted that he committed the crimes to which he was pleading guilty, and in
response to the trial court’s question, “[Was it] [y]our decision to plead guilty or [your
lawyer’s] decision?” Wood said, “My decision.”
¶9. After he pleaded guilty, but before his sentencing hearing, Wood filed a letter
addressed to the trial judge in which Wood asked the court to appoint a new public defender
to represent him. Wood asserted that he was too intimidated by his lawyer to ask questions
about his guilty plea and that the only reason he pleaded guilty was because his lawyer told
Wood there were no other options available to him. Wood also asserted that his lawyer did
not discuss Dr. Lott’s report with him and that his lawyer would not return phone calls or
respond to letters from Wood. Additionally, Wood asserted that his lawyer did not go over
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Wood’s discovery with him. In concluding his letter, Wood asked that the trial court “please
grant my request for new coun[se]l based upon [my lawyer’s] ineffective assistance in my
case.”
¶10. Wood’s sentencing hearing was held on March 17, 2016. Before the sentencing
hearing began, however, there was some discussion about whether Wood was seeking to
withdraw his guilty plea. The facts pertaining to this issue are discussed below.
¶11. At Wood’s sentencing hearing, the trial court also addressed Wood’s written request
for new counsel. The trial court allowed Wood to read a statement that Wood had prepared
in which he essentially repeated the same assertions about his lawyer that Wood had made
in the letter he sent to the trial judge prior to his sentencing hearing.
¶12. After Wood finished making his statement, the trial court read from a transcript from
Wood’s plea hearing and noted on the record the contradictions between Wood’s assertions
about his lawyer at his sentencing hearing and Wood’s prior sworn testimony from his plea
hearing, as follows:
[COURT:] . . . . I asked you during that plea dialogue, “Has anyone tried to
threaten you or tried to force you or tried to offer you any money
to put you under duress, intimidate you in any manner to get you
to plead guilty?” You said, “No, sir.” Then I said, “Mr. Wood,
are you satisfied with the services rendered to you by [your
lawyer]?” And you said, “Yes, sir.” I said, “Has [your lawyer]
been available to you at all reasonable times and places?” And
you said, “Yes, sir.” “Do you have any complaints against [your
lawyer] or against this court?” To which you replied, “No, sir.”
Now you’re telling me that—you read a letter to me saying [your
lawyer] wouldn’t call you, wouldn’t talk to you, wouldn’t do any
of these things, more or less voicing these complaints against
your lawyer.
5
[WOOD:] Yes, sir.
After making this comparison, the trial court denied Wood’s request for new counsel, finding
that Wood’s “complaints against [his lawyer] . . . are unfounded and contradictory to what
[Wood] told [the court] under oath back in January.”
¶13. The trial court then proceeded with the sentencing hearing, announcing, “All right.
As stated, Mr. Wood entered a guilty plea back on January 7, 2016, to the charges of child
fondling and exploitation. I’ll hear from the State.” The State presented the testimony of
two witnesses: the victim’s father and the detective who investigated Wood’s case. After
the State’s witnesses testified, Wood’s lawyer explained that he did not have any witnesses
but that he did have a statement from Wood’s mother about his social and behavioral
problems from kindergarten through Wood’s post-high school training at Moore School of
Technology. The statement from Wood’s mother and Dr. Lott’s mental evaluation of Wood
were admitted into evidence. The trial court then heard oral argument from counsel.
¶14. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Wood to serve fifteen years
for fondling in violation of section 97-5-23 and five years for child exploitation in violation
of section 97-5-33(5) in the custody of the MDOC, with these sentences set to run
concurrently. The trial court also sentenced Wood to ten years of post-release supervision
but waived all fines, costs, and assessments except for a $1,000.00 assessment to the
Children’s Trust Fund.
¶15. Wood filed his PCR motion in March 2018. He asserted (1) that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) that his guilty plea was involuntary; and (3) that he was
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incompetent to plead guilty. After considering the entire court file, proceedings, and
transcripts in Wood’s PCR cause and his criminal case, the trial court concluded “that it
appears beyond doubt that Wood can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which
would entitle him to relief.” Accordingly, the trial court summarily dismissed Wood’s PCR
motion. Wood appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16. “When reviewing a circuit court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will only
disturb the circuit court’s factual findings if they are clearly erroneous; however, we review
the circuit court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.” Skinner v. State,
270 So. 3d 1046, 1050 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
DISCUSSION
I. Wood’s Request for New Appointed Counsel
¶17. Wood asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant his
request for new counsel after Wood pleaded guilty, but before he was sentenced. Wood
asserts that the trial court allegedly proceeded with the sentencing hearing “with the full
knowledge that [Wood] and [his] attorney had reached an insuperable impasse.” We find
that Wood’s first issue on appeal is procedurally barred because Wood did not present this
issue as a basis for post-conviction relief before the trial court. This Court “do[es] not
consider matters on appeal that were not placed first before the trial judge for decision.”
Bates v. State, 952 So. 2d 320, 324 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
¶18. Even if Wood had raised this assertion in his PCR motion, we find that it is without
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merit. As this Court recognizes, “[w]hen a defendant seeks to have his appointed counsel
removed, the sound discretion of the trial judge is invoked.” Parks v. State, 228 So. 3d 853,
866 (¶48) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). In Parks, this Court found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for new counsel where the trial court
determined that counsel “was a competent attorney who had done nothing detrimental to [the
defendant’s] case.” Id. at 866 (¶50). As the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized in
Rowsey v. State, 188 So. 3d 486, 499 (¶43) (Miss. 2015), “[c]ounsel is presumed to be
competent. An indigent criminal defendant is not entitled to expert counsel, or to counsel
of his own choosing, but only to reasonably effective assistance of counsel.” The supreme
court also observed that “[a]dept representation encompasses two broad principles: minimum
competence and loyal assistance.” Id. at 498 (¶41) (citation omitted).
¶19. We find that the supreme court’s analysis in Rowsey of what constitutes competent
and effective counsel is applicable here. In Rowsey, the defendant filed a bar complaint
against his lawyer, and, according to Rowsey’s lawyer, there existed “such a state of conflict
. . . [and] animosity” between counsel and his client that Rowsey’s lawyer felt compelled to
move to withdraw from the case. Id. at 498 (¶42). The trial court did not rule on this motion.
Id. at 491 (¶9). On appeal, Rowsey asserted that this conflict between him and his lawyer
constituted “per se ineffective[ness]” on the part of his lawyer. Id. at 498 (¶40). The
supreme court disagreed, finding that despite the apparent “personality conflict” between
Rowsey and his lawyer, this did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where
Rowsey’s lawyer “filed pretrial motions, performed an investigation into the case, filed a
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motion for Rowsey to receive a mental evaluation, cross-examined witnesses at trial, and
made evidentiary objections.” Id. at 499 (¶43).
¶20. A similar situation is present here. Wood alleges that he and his lawyer had “reached
an insuperable impasse,” but even if this perceived personality conflict existed between
Wood and his counsel, we find no evidence in the record that Wood’s lawyer was ineffective,
incompetent, or had done anything detrimental to Wood’s case that would support a
determination that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Wood’s motion for an
appointment of new counsel. On the contrary, the record reflects that Wood’s lawyer moved
to have Wood receive a mental evaluation, that motion was granted, and Dr. Lott’s report
was submitted to the trial court and admitted into evidence at Wood’s guilty-plea hearing and
sentencing hearing. The record also reflects that Wood’s lawyer stated at the hearing that he
had “worked carefully with [Wood’s] mother, who provided [him] with [a] statement and
information” about Wood’s behavioral problems, which Wood’s lawyer presented at Wood’s
sentencing hearing.
¶21. The sentencing hearing transcript also shows that Wood’s lawyer effectively cross-
examined the State’s witnesses at that hearing and presented cogent, mitigating reasons for
the trial court’s consideration in determining Wood’s sentences, including Wood’s
psychological profile and social problems as described in Dr. Lott’s report and in the
statement from Wood’s mother. Wood’s lawyer also pointed out that Wood accepted
responsibility for his actions.
¶22. In denying Wood’s request for new counsel, the trial court also observed that Wood
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was appointed an experienced lawyer, recognizing that Wood’s lawyer was “the most senior
member of the public defenders’ staff in DeSoto County . . . . He’s got more experience as
a public defender than all the rest of them put together.” Under these circumstances, we find
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wood’s motion for an appointment
of new counsel in this case.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶23. In addition to asserting that the trial court erred by denying Wood’s request for new
counsel, Wood asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer
allegedly did not return phone calls or letters and allegedly “made no effort to discuss any
possible defense . . . [or] discuss potential mitigating factors” with him. Wood also asserts
that his lawyer allegedly did not file “motions” on Wood’s behalf or give Wood a copy of
certain discovery.
¶24. First, we find that Wood’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue on appeal is
procedurally barred because he cites no legal authority to support his assertions that his
lawyer’s performance was constitutionally deficient. “The failure to cite any relevant
authority operates as a procedural bar, and obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review
such issues.” Robinson v. State, 169 So. 3d 916, 923 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
¶25. Although this Court has consistently held that procedural bars apply to ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims, Parish v. State, 203 So. 3d 718, 723 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App.
2016), we recognize that in certain cases, “an attorney’s performance is so deficient and
10
prejudicial to a defendant, that it is deemed to be violative of the defendant’s fundamental
constitutional rights.” Hamberlin v. State, 165 So. 3d 491, 494 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
We therefore address Wood’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on the merits. In order
to prove his ineffective-assistance claim, the caselaw provides that Wood must show “(1) his
attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2) this deficiency deprived him of a fair trial.”
Gaulden v. State, 240 So. 3d 503, 510 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018); see Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
¶26. In the guilty plea context, as here, in order to eliminate the procedural bar, Wood must
“establish that counsel’s ineffective assistance caused him to enter his plea, and he would not
have entered the plea but for counsel’s incorrect advice.” Moore v. State, 248 So. 3d 845,
851 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotation mark omitted). Further, “a defendant’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be pled with specificity, and the claim must
be supported by affidavits other than his own.” Id. at (¶15) (internal quotation mark
omitted). In this regard, “[w]hen the only support the movant offers is his own affidavit, and
it is contradicted by unimpeachable documents in the record, an evidentiary hearing is not
required.” Kennedy v. State, 287 So. 3d 258, 265 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting
Lackaye v. State, 166 So. 3d 560, 564 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied, 279 So. 3d
1087 (Miss. 2019)). However, if the movant “attaches an affidavit of another who supports
the allegation, the circuit court may be required to conduct an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at
265-66 (¶22).
¶27. Regarding Wood’s assertion that his lawyer allegedly did not return his phone calls
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and letters, we recognize that Wood submitted his own affidavit and the affidavit of
Benjamin Rodriguez. Rodriguez stated in his affidavit that he met Wood in October 2014
when he and Wood were housed in “G-Tank” at the DeSoto County jail in Hernando,
Mississippi. Rodriguez’s affidavit, however, reflects that Rodriguez was only in “G-Tank”
from July 2014 to January 2015. Wood did not file his guilty-plea petition until January
2016—one full year after Rodriguez was no longer in jail with Wood. We find no evidence
in the record that Rodriguez had any personal knowledge of what went on between Wood
and his lawyer during the entire year before Wood pleaded guilty. As such, Wood’s
affidavit, alone, is Wood’s only support for his “lack of communication” assertion for the
year prior to him pleading guilty and it is not enough. Moore, 248 So. 3d at 851 (¶¶14-15).
¶28. Regarding Wood’s other allegations—that, according to Wood, his lawyer allegedly
did not discuss with Wood any mitigating factors or possible defenses, refused to file motions
on Wood’s behalf, or refused to give Wood a copy of certain discovery—these allegations
are supported only by Wood’s own affidavit. As the supreme court has held, “in cases
involving post-conviction relief, ‘where a party offers only his affidavit, then his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is without merit.’” Parish, 203 So. 3d at 724 (¶25) (emphasis
added) (quoting Vielee v. State, 653 So. 2d 920, 922 (Miss. 1995)).
¶29. Under these circumstances we find that the trial court was not required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing. We further find that Wood failed to prove any instance of deficiency
on his lawyer’s part that would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel of constitutional
dimensions. Indeed, as we found in our discussion above, the record contains numerous
12
instances demonstrating that Wood’s lawyer rendered competent, effective assistance with
respect to all aspects of Wood’s case. Moreover, Wood’s assertions about the alleged lack
of communication between him and his lawyer are contradicted by the “unimpeachable
documents in the record”—including Wood’s plea petition in which Wood agreed that “[m]y
lawyer has advised me of the nature of the charge(s) and the possible defenses that I may
have to the charge(s)” and the transcript from Wood’s plea hearing in which Wood testified
that his lawyer went over his plea petition with him and answered all questions to his
satisfaction and also confirmed that he (the lawyer) “had ample time to investigate, prepare,
and discuss this case with [Wood] and . . . go over all possible defenses.” Wood also assured
the trial court at his plea hearing that he was “satisfied with the services rendered to [him]
by [his lawyer]”; that his lawyer was reasonably available to him; and that he had no
complaints against his lawyer. See Thomas v. State, 159 So. 3d 1212, 1216 (¶12) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2015) (“[S]tatements made in open court under oath ‘carry a strong presumption of
veracity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶30. Regarding Wood’s allegations that his lawyer failed to filed “motions” on his behalf
or give Wood a copy of certain discovery, we observe that Wood has failed to establish that
these actions caused Wood to enter his guilty plea; thus, Wood’s ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim also fails for this reason.2 Moore, 248 So. 3d at 851 (¶14).
2
Additionally, Wood’s assertion that his lawyer did not file “motions” on his behalf
ignores the fact that his lawyer filed a motion seeking a mental evaluation for Wood, which
the trial court granted. Wood does not specify any other “motions” he believed should have
been filed. Further, any decision about whether other motions were necessary is
discretionary and “within the ambit of trial strategy.” Dedeaux v. State, 205 So. 3d 697, 701
(¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). Any such decision does not, therefore, constitute grounds for
13
¶31. Finally, in his reply brief, Wood acknowledged that his lawyer told the trial court that
he had Asperger’s Syndrome, but Wood also asserts that his lawyer should have gone into
more detail at Wood’s sentencing hearing on the limiting effect that Wood’s condition had
on his “social awareness, communication and understanding.” Wood cannot rely on this bare
assertion to support his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Neal v. State, 186 So. 3d
378, 381 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). Even if he could, this assertion, like Wood’s assertions
discussed above, are contradicted by the record. As we have detailed above, the record
reflects that Wood’s lawyer addressed possible mitigating factors at Wood’s sentencing
hearing, including Wood’s social, mental, and behavioral history. Wood’s lawyer obtained
a mental evaluation for Wood and had Dr. Lott’s detailed evaluation admitted into evidence
at Wood’s sentencing hearing, and Wood’s lawyer worked with Wood’s mother to obtain her
statement about Wood’s social and behavioral history. Wood’s lawyer also had this
information admitted into evidence at Wood’s sentencing hearing. For all these reasons, we
find that Wood’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is without merit.
III. Wood’s Guilty Plea
¶32. In his third assignment of error, Wood asserts that his guilty plea was involuntary.
Wood’s allegations with respect to this issue are set forth in his brief as follows:
[Wood] was afraid (and it resulted that [his] fear was justified) that counsel
would retaliate against any effort to speak out against him by intentionally
performing in an even more severely sub[-]par fashion in court for the purpose
of seeing [Wood] receive a harsher sentence.
In his PCR motion, Wood asserted that he “did not understand why he was charged with
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Id.14
some of the charges.”
¶33. We find as an initial matter that this issue on appeal is procedurally barred because
Wood cites no factual or legal support for his contention that his guilty plea was involuntary.
See Robinson, 169 So. 3d at 923 (¶18). Notwithstanding this procedural bar, we also find
that Wood’s involuntary-guilty-plea assertion is without merit for the reasons discussed
below.
¶34. “A guilty plea is valid as long as it is entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Haney v.
State, 281 So. 3d 84, 89 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). In this regard, “[f]or a plea to be
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, the judge must advise the defendant of his rights, the
nature of the charge against him, and the consequences of his plea, including applicable
minimum and maximum sentences.” Id. Wood bears the burden of proving that his plea was
invalid. Britton v. State, 130 So. 3d 90, 94 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
¶35. As this Court has recognized, “[i]n assessing the voluntariness of a plea, the
thoroughness of the trial court’s interrogation during the plea colloquy is the most significant
evidence of all.” Neal, 186 So. 3d at 381 (¶6) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this
case, the plea hearing transcript reflects that (1) Wood was advised by the trial court of all
rights he was giving up; (2) Wood understood (and admitted) the facts and circumstances of
the charges against him; and (3) Wood understood the consequences of his plea. Wood’s
sworn plea petition likewise reflects that Wood (1) knew the rights he was giving up; (2)
discussed the charges against him (and possible defenses) with his counsel; and (3) was
15
advised of the possible sentences and other consequences of pleading guilty. Wood’s bare
assertions that his guilty plea was involuntary do not overcome the detailed interrogation by
the trial court during Wood’s plea colloquy or Wood’s own sworn statements in his plea
petition. Id. We therefore find that Wood has failed to show his guilty plea was involuntary.
¶36. The same is true for Wood’s allegations that he was intimidated into pleading guilty
because he was afraid that if he did not, his lawyer would allegedly “retaliate” by performing
“in an even more sub-par fashion.” The record plainly contradicts these allegations. In his
plea petition, Wood swore:
I have not been beaten, threatened, mentally or physically forced, intimidated,
or coerced in any manner to plead guilty to the crime charged against me. I
offer my plea of “guilty” freely and voluntarily and of my own accord and with
full understanding of all matters set forth in the indictment herein and in this
Petition, and this plea is with the advice and consent of my lawyer.
Wood likewise confirmed at his plea hearing that he was not forced to plead guilty, he was
satisfied with the services rendered to him by his lawyer, and that it was his decision to do
so, as follows:
[COURT:] . . . . Has anyone tried to threaten you or tried to force you or
tried to offer you any money, put you under duress, intimidate
you in any manner to get you to plead guilty, Mr. Wood?
[WOOD:] No, sir.
[COURT:] Mr. Wood, are you satisfied with the services rendered to you
[your lawyer]?
[WOOD:] Yes, sir.
[COURT:] Do you have any complaints against Mr. Jones or against this
court?
16
[WOOD:] No, sir.
[COURT:] Do you admit on the date that’s charged in the indictment that
you committed the crime to which you’re pleading guilty?
[WOOD:] Yes, sir.
[COURT:] Your decision to plead guilty or [your lawyer’s] decision?
[WOOD:] My decision.
[COURT:] Do you want me to accept your guilty plea?
[WOOD:] Yes, sir.
¶37. Wood did not submit any affidavit or other evidence in support of his “intimidation”
allegations. Just as we observed above, Wood’s bare assertions cannot overcome his sworn
testimony from his plea hearing. Id. For these reasons, we find Wood’s involuntary guilty
plea assignment of error without merit.
IV. Wood’s Competency to Enter a Guilty Plea
¶38. Wood asserts in his fourth assignment of error that he was incompetent to enter his
guilty plea. He sets forth this assertion in his brief as follows, “[Wood] was in special
education from an early age as a result of social and emotional developmental disorders that
limited his abilities to make clear and rational choices regarding his defen[s]e.” For the
reasons stated below, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that Wood was
competent to enter his guilty plea.
¶39. “A trial judge’s determination that a defendant is competent to stand trial will be
reversed only if it is manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Hutto v.
State, 227 So. 3d 963, 974 (¶23) (Miss. 2017) (internal quotation mark omitted). “The
17
standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Montalto v. State,
119 So. 3d 1087, 1093 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶40. Wood pleaded guilty in January 2016. At that time, Uniform Rule of Circuit and
County Court Practice 9.06 governed competency issues,3 and it provided:
If before or during trial the court, of its own motion or upon motion of an
attorney, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent
to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental
examination by some competent psychiatrist selected by the court . . . .
After the examination the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the
defendant is competent to stand trial. After hearing all the evidence, the court
shall weigh the evidence and make a determination of whether the defendant
is competent to stand trial. If the court finds that the defendant is competent to
stand trial, then the court shall make the finding a matter of record and the case
will then proceed to trial. . . .
URCCC 9.06. “Though geared toward competency to stand trial, Rule 9.06 may be applied
to a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea. The standard of competency necessary to enter a plea
of guilty is the same as that for determining competency to stand trial.” Williams v. State,
220 So. 3d 996, 999 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
¶41. In this case, on the motion of Wood’s lawyer, the trial court entered an order requiring
Wood to submit to a mental evaluation. Dr. Lott performed Wood’s mental evaluation in
September 2015, and it was then filed with the trial court. In his evaluation, Dr. Lott found
3
Pursuant to the Adopting Order of the Mississippi Supreme Court dated December
13, 2016, the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on July 1, 2017. The
Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure now set forth the procedure for competency
hearings and adjudications. See MRCrP 12.1–12.6.
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that Wood was competent to proceed in this matter, as follows:
It is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that Mr.
Wood has sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding in preparation of his defense, and
has rational as well as factual understanding of the nature and object to the
legal proceedings against him. He understands the charges against him and the
maximum penalty he could receive if convicted. He was familiar with most
of the basic legal processes. He understands his right to testify and he has a
good understanding of the plea process. Mr. Wood had no difficulty
communicating with me in a rational and coherent manner. He received
psychological testing and his reading and intellectual scores fell in the superior
range - and he should have no difficulty comprehending any legal information
that is presented to him.
¶42. Wood filed his guilty-plea petition in January 2016, and in his petition Wood swore
that “[a]t this time I am not under the influence of drugs or alcohol nor suffering from any
mental disease of emotional problem.” Wood’s plea hearing was held the same day.
¶43. At Wood’s plea hearing, the trial court asked Wood whether he had any history of
mental illness or emotional problems. Wood told the trial court that he had a history of
mental illness. The trial court noted that the file contained Dr. Lott’s report, and a copy of
Dr. Lott’s report was admitted into evidence at the hearing. The trial court noted that Dr.
Lott had been very “thorough in his assessment and his testing and his opinions,” and then
the trial court closely questioned Wood’s lawyer about whether he, “as an officer of the
court,” believed that Jones was competent to proceed with his guilty plea. The trial court
asked Wood’s lawyer the following questions: (1) “[A]re you satisfied [Wood] understands
the nature of these proceedings and that he is charged with a felony?” (2) “Has [Wood] been
able to assist you in investigation and preparation for any defenses that he may have?” and
(3) “Have you found [Wood] to be rational and capable of assisting you in his defense?”
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Wood’s lawyer responded affirmatively. The trial court asked Wood if he disputed anything
his lawyer said, and Wood responded, “No, sir.”
¶44. The trial court then asked Wood whether he had discussed Dr. Lott’s report with his
lawyer. Wood said he had not planned to do so “because [he] didn’t expect anything of
significance to be in it.” Nevertheless, before hearing any further evidence on Wood’s
competency, the trial court required Wood and his lawyer to meet and for Wood’s lawyer to
go over Dr. Lott’s report with Wood. After Wood and his lawyer returned, Wood told the
trial court that he had gone over the report with his lawyer and stated that he did not disagree
with anything in the report. Wood also told the trial court that he had gone over his plea
petition with his lawyer and that his lawyer answered all the questions that he had about the
petition. The trial court specifically questioned Wood as follows:
[COURT:] So you’re telling me [that] you read it, you went over it with
your lawyer, and you understand that by presenting this to me,
you’re asking me to allow you to plead guilty to child fondling
and sexual exploitation?
[WOOD:] Yes, sir.
¶45. Wood was questioned further by the trial court, and Wood confirmed that he had
finished high school, he received two years of college, and that he could read and write well.
Finally, the trial court asked Wood, “You’re telling me now that you understand where you
are and what you’re doing here today?” Wood responded, “Yes, sir.”
¶46. The trial court then questioned Wood about his understanding of the proceedings, and
Wood confirmed that he understood where he was and why he was at the courthouse that
day; that he had not been coerced or threatened into pleading guilty; and that it was “[his]
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decision” to plead guilty.
¶47. Taking into consideration Dr. Lott’s report, the statements made by Wood’s lawyer,
and the statements from Wood, the trial court made an on-the-record finding that Wood was
competent to enter a guilty plea. Neither Wood nor his lawyer objected to this determination
or requested a continuance to place other materials or testimony regarding Wood’s
competency before the trial court.
¶48. Nevertheless, Wood asserted in his PCR motion that he was incompetent to plead
guilty, attaching to his motion medical records from June and July of 2014 relating to his
treatment for “stabilization” when he was found “at home searching for a gun to harm
himself.” This treatment, however, was received approximately eighteen months before
Wood pleaded guilty. As the trial court observed in its order dismissing Wood’s PCR
motion, these medical records did not “relate to Wood’s competency around or at the time
of [Wood’s] guilty plea.”
¶49. As the movant, Wood bore the burden of proof to show that he lacked the competency
to enter his guilty plea. Williams, 220 So. 3d at 1000 (¶9). Like the trial court, we find that
medical records relating to Wood’s anxiety and depression suffered eighteen months before
his plea hearing are wholly insufficient to meet this burden. Id. at 1000 (¶12) (recognizing
that health records from prior years did not constitute evidence of whether the defendant
lacked competency at the time of his plea hearing). Dr. Lott’s report reflected that Wood’s
reading and intellectual scores fell in the superior range and that Wood was competent to
proceed. Further, Dr. Lott’s competency finding was supported by the responses of both
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Wood and his lawyer to questioning from the trial court at Wood’s plea hearing where both
Wood and his lawyer confirmed that Wood had the ability to consult with his lawyer
regarding potential defenses and that he understood the proceedings against him. We find
no error in the trial court’s determination that Wood was competent to enter his guilty plea.
V. Wood’s Purported Request to Withdraw His Guilty Plea
¶50. Wood asserts that the trial court erred in not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea.
He sets forth this assertion in his brief as follows:
[Wood] made compelling arguments to support a decision by the trial court to
allow the withdrawal of his guilty plea due in part to the fact that his counsel
was grossly incompetent regardless of his long service as a public defender.
Long service does not automatically endow someone with the necessary
intelligence, ethics, or ability to prosecute a simple defense.
Wood briefly addressed his alleged desire to withdraw his guilty plea in his PCR motion as
follows: “It’s also plain in the transcript that the petitioner wanted to withdraw his guilty
plea, which the trial judge only considered as a request not a motion. It was a motion[,] not
a request.”
¶51. This issue on appeal is procedurally barred because Wood cites no factual or legal
support for his contention that the trial court erred when it allegedly did not “allow” him to
withdraw his guilty plea. See Robinson, 169 So. 3d at 923 (¶18). Even if Wood were not
procedurally barred from raising this issue, we also find that Wood’s assertions are without
merit as addressed below.
¶52. In its order summarily denying Wood’s PCR motion on this point, the trial court
observed that Wood did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court further
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stated that it did not believe that Wood “was actually making a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea [at the sentencing hearing].” Our review of the record likewise indicates that Wood did
not make a written or an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. To be clear, there is no
written motion to withdraw Wood’s guilty plea in the record. As described above, Wood
filed a letter requesting a new lawyer, but our review of this letter reveals that it does not
contain a request from Wood to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶53. Based upon our review of the record, we also find that Wood did not make an oral
request to withdraw his guilty plea. We recognize that the sentencing hearing transcript
reflects that before that hearing began, Wood’s lawyer told the trial court that “Mr. Wood has
filed I believe a request to set aside his plea. . . . I will let you address that with him.” The
trial court responded, “Well, what are we proceeding on here today?” In response, Wood’s
lawyer stated, “I’m here for sentencing unless the Court entertains [Wood’s] motion to set
aside his plea of guilty.” The trial court then sought clarification from Wood on whether he
wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, as follows:
[COURT:] Mr. Wood, you want to withdraw your guilty plea?”
[WOOD:] I would like to get a new attorney first and then discuss it with
him.
[COURT:] Have you got any money to hire a lawyer with?
[WOOD:] No, sir.
[COURT:] How are you going to get a lawyer then?
[WOOD:] I was hoping the Court would appoint me one.
(Emphasis added).
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¶54. The following exchange took place between the trial court and Wood later during the
hearing:
[COURT:] Now you want me to fire [your counsel] and give you somebody
else?
[WOOD:] Yes, sir.
[COURT:] I have been told by [your counsel] that you want to withdraw
your plea of guilty; is that correct?
[WOOD:] I haven’t decided on that yet.
[COURT:] You better decide pretty quick because you’re fixing to be
sentenced.
[WOOD:] That is an option I was going to pursue, yes, sir.
(Emphasis added).
¶55. At the time of Wood’s March 17, 2016 sentencing hearing, Uniform Rule of Circuit
and County Court Practice 8.04(A)(5)-(6) addressed the requirements to withdraw a guilty
plea,4 as follows:
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. It is within the discretion of the court to permit
or deny a motion for the withdrawal of a guilty plea.
Sufficiency of Motion. In order to be sufficient, a motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty must show good cause.
See Britton v. State, 130 So. 3d 90, 94 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (“The decision of whether
4
Pursuant to the Adopting Order of the Mississippi Supreme Court dated December
13, 2016, the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on July 1, 2017. See
Bernard v. State, No. 2017-KA-01081-SCT, 2019 WL 6606212, at *5 (¶27) (Miss. Dec. 5,
2019) (recognizing that the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice were “the
law” during the relevant time period prior to the adoption of the Mississippi Rules of
Criminal Procedure). Rule 15.4(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth
the current requirements to withdraw a guilty plea.
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to allow a defendant to withdraw a valid guilty plea lies within the discretion of the trial
court.”) (quoting Burrough v. State, 9 So. 3d 368, 372-73 (¶11) (Miss. 2009)).
¶56. We find that Wood’s responses to the Court’s questioning set forth above were
insufficient to constitute an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He made no explicit
request to withdraw his guilty plea. Further, even if Wood’s statements were enough to be
treated as an oral request to withdraw his guilty plea, we find that the trial court plainly did
not abuse its discretion in denying such a motion. A guilty plea is binding when it is entered
knowingly and voluntarily. Id. As we found above, Wood’s plea was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily given. As such, Wood entered a binding guilty plea. Id. Wood,
in this case, offered no evidence at all that proves his guilty plea was invalid or to show good
cause for its withdrawal. We therefore find this assignment of error without merit.
¶57. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., J. WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.
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