Leonard Cureton a/k/a Leonard Bernard Cureton v. State of Mississippi ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2018-KA-00862-COA
LEONARD CURETON A/K/A LEONARD APPELLANT
BERNARD CURETON
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/12/2018
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE J. HOWARD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF
GEORGE T. HOLMES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: SCOTT WINSTON COLOM
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/24/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND McDONALD, JJ.
GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Following a jury trial, Leonard Cureton was convicted of aggravated assault for
stabbing Steven Jennings in front of a local grocery store in Columbus, Mississippi. On
appeal, Cureton argues that the trial court erred by giving “Jury Instruction S-2.” Finding no
error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2. On the night of September 16, 2011, Steven Jennings went to a store called M&M
Grocery to purchase a snack and drink. When he arrived at the store, Jennings saw Cureton
standing outside. Jennings completed his purchase and started to exit the store. On his way
out, Cureton, with a steak knife in hand, charged and stabbed Jennings twice in the head.
Jennings testified that he defended himself by forcing Cureton to the ground while reaching
for Cureton’s knife. Jennings further testified that he got cut or bit on his right hand during
the struggle. The store clerk, Tobias Saddler, called the police.
¶3. Saddler testified that Cureton and Jennings often frequented M&M Grocery. On the
night in question, Saddler saw Cureton walk into the store and ask Jennings for money.
Jennings declined. According to Saddler, this made Cureton upset as he left the store. A few
moments later, Cureton re-entered the store and walked toward Jennings with a “pocketknife
or something” in his hand. Saddler testified that other customers, including kids, were in the
store, so Jennings, in a protective measure, “caught” Cureton’s hand and “took him towards
the door.” When Saddler approached the door, he saw both Cureton and Jennings on the
ground. Cureton was not moving and Jennings was using his shirt to apply pressure to his
head.
¶4. Shortly after Saddler called the police, the Columbus Police Department (CPD)
arrived and secured the scene. Officer Kenneth Brewer, one of the first responders, testified
that when he arrived, he noticed Cureton lying on the ground and Jennings wearing a white
shirt wrapped around his head. He further testified that a knife was on the ground near the
two men. Officer Brewer assisted the EMTs with loading Cureton into an ambulance and
traveled with Cureton to the hospital.
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¶5. Raymond Hackler, who was employed as an investigator with the CPD at the time of
the incident, testified that he was dispatched to the scene to investigate the stabbing. When
he arrived, Officers Strevel and Brewer explained that Cureton had stabbed Jennings in his
head. Both men were injured during the altercation and transported to the hospital as a result.
Hackler then testified that he processed the scene, took crime-scene photos, recovered the
knife, and gathered a statement from Saddler. After he processed the scene, Hackler reported
to the hospital where he documented Jennings’s injuries.
¶6. Dr. Keith McCoy, Jennings’s primary ER physician, testified that Jennings endured
two lacerations to his scalp and one laceration to his left flank below the armpit area.
According to Dr. McCoy, Jennings did not suffer from deep penetrating injuries, but he did
receive pain medication, antibiotics, and staples to close the wounds. After Dr. McCoy
testified, the State rested its case-in-chief.
¶7. Cureton testified in his own defense. According to Cureton, he was “panhandling”
outside of the grocery store on the night in question. Cureton testified that he and Jennings
got into an argument about Jennings’s girlfriend. Because of the argument, Cureton claimed
that Jennings approached him in a “threatening manner” and “in attack mode.” Cureton then
conceded he hit Jennings twice in the head. On cross-examination, Cureton dismissed a pre-
trial statement he had given to the CPD on September 21, 2011. Cureton further alleged his
statement was coerced. No other witnesses corroborated Cureton’s testimony. However,
upon Cureton’s request, three additional witnesses, each of whom had worked for the CPD
at the time of the proceedings, testified, but declined having any knowledge of the events that
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resulted in the charge against him. The defense then rested.
¶8. Upon completion of the trial, the jury found Cureton guilty of aggravated assault
under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(2) (Supp. 2011). At a subsequent hearing,
the circuit court judge sentenced Cureton to serve a twenty-year term in the Mississippi
Department of Corrections as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section
99-19-81 (Rev. 2006). Cureton moved for a new trial, but that motion was denied. Cureton
filed his notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9. This court reviews a trial court’s decision to give or refuse jury instructions for an
abuse of discretion. Moody v. State, 202 So. 3d 1235, 1236-37 (¶7) (Miss. 2016). “The
instructions are to be read together as a whole, with no one instruction to be read alone or
taken out of context.” Young v. State, 891 So. 2d 813, 819 (¶16) (Miss. 2005) (quoting
Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704, 761 (¶203) (Miss. 2003)). There is no reversible error if the
jury instructions, when read together, fairly announce “the law of the case and create no
injustice.” Carson v. State, 212 So. 3d 22, 28 (¶22) (Miss. 2016) (citing Newell v. State, 49
So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010)).
DISCUSSION
¶10. In his only assignment of error, Cureton argues the trial court erred by giving “Jury
Instruction S-2.” At trial, Cureton did not object to “Jury Instruction S-2.” “To preserve a
jury instruction issue on appeal, the defendant must make a specific objection to the proposed
instruction to allow the circuit court to consider the issue.” Caffie v. State, 269 So. 3d 1203,
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1205 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Husband v. State, 204 So. 3d 353, 356 (¶10)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2016)). Because Cureton failed to object to the proposed instruction, it
appears his argument is procedurally barred. See Windless v. State, 185 So. 3d 956, 961
(¶11) (Miss. 2015).
¶11. Regardless, this Court will consider the issue for plain error. Id. “To determine
whether plain error has occurred, the reviewing court must determine: (1) if the trial court
deviated from a legal rule; (2) whether that error is plain, clear, or obvious; and (3) whether
the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial.” Robinson v. State, 247 So. 3d 1212, 1226
(¶27) (Miss. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 829 (2019). “For the plain-error doctrine to
apply, there must have been an error that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Husband, 204 So. 3d at 357 (¶11).
¶12. In particular, Cureton argues the instruction peremptorily instructed the jury to find
the steak knife as a deadly weapon. We disagree. The law requires that the jury “must be
instructed regarding the elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged.” Hunter
v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 636 (Miss. 1996). We find that “Jury Instruction S-2” does so. That
instruction read as follows:
The Court instructs the Jury that if you find from the evidence in this case
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Leonard Cureton, did on or
about September 16, 2011, in Lowndes County, Mississippi, unlawfully,
willfully, feloniously, purposely and knowingly cause bodily injury to Steven
Jennings, a human being, with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, by stabbing
Steven Jennings with said knife, without authority of law and not in necessary
self-defense, then you shall find the Defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault,
as charged. If the State has failed to prove any of these elements beyond a
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reasonable doubt, then you shall find the Defendant not guilty.
The aggravated-assault statute reads, in pertinent part, “A person is guilty of aggravated
assault if he . . . (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to
another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily
harm[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2). Thus, we find the instruction contained the essential
elements outlined the statute: (1) Cureton, on September 16, 2011, in Lowndes County; (2)
unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, purposely and knowingly caused bodily injury to Steven
Jennings; (3) with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife; (4) by stabbing Steven Jennings with said
knife; and (5) without authority of law and not in necessary self-defense. See Boyd v. State,
47 So. 3d 121, 124-25 (¶¶11-14) (Miss. 2010).
¶13. Cureton, however, now contends the trial court should have given an instruction that
provided the definition of a “deadly weapon.” We cannot say a manifest miscarriage of
injustice resulted or that the judicial proceedings were seriously affected because that
instruction was not given. See Williams v. State, 134 So. 3d 732, 737 (¶17) (Miss. 2014).
¶14. In Williams, our supreme court dealt with a similar argument in the context of an
armed-robbery conviction. Id. at 733 (¶1). The disputed jury instruction read as follows:
The Defendant [Williams], has been charged with the crime of Robbery with
a Deadly Weapon, also known as Armed Robbery. If you find from the
evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1) On or about March 10, 2011, the Defendant [Williams],
2) Did take from the presence or from the person of [Long],
3) Certain personal property, being approximately $280.00 in cash
money, which was the personal property of the DeSoto County Sheriff's
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Department, and
4) Such taking was against the will of [Long], and
5) As a means of taking the cash money, [Williams] put [Long] in fear
of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon,
to-wit: a pistol;
then you shall find [Williams], guilty of Robbery with a Deadly Weapon.
If the State has failed to prove any one or more of the above listed elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the defendant not guilty.
Id. at 737 (¶17) (emphasis added). Similar to Cureton, Williams argued the trial court should
have defined what legally constitutes a deadly weapon. Id. at (¶18). But our supreme court
disagreed, finding the jury instruction “set forth all the elements of the crime of armed
robbery” and “d[id] not assume or charge the jury that the [weapon] was in fact a deadly
weapon.” Id. at (¶19).
¶15. Likewise, “Jury Instruction S-2” properly set forth the essential elements of
aggravated assault. It also clearly allowed the jury to determine whether Cureton employed
the use of a deadly weapon. Therefore, we cannot say that “Jury Instruction S-2” was an
improper announcement of the law or that it created an injustice to Cureton. As such, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion.
CONCLUSION
¶16. We affirm Cureton’s aggravated-assault conviction and the sentence imposed by the
Lowndes County Circuit Court.
¶17. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
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TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.
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