Mumtaz Lalani v. Director of Revenue ( 2014 )


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  •                 SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
    en banc
    MUMTAZ LALANI,                                        )
    )
    Appellant,                   )
    )
    vs.                                                   )   No. SC94097
    )
    DIRECTOR OF REVENUE,                                  )
    )
    Respondent.                  )
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission
    The Honorable Mary E. Nelson, Commissioner
    Opinion issued December 9, 2014
    Mumatz Lalani petitioned for review of an Administrative Hearing Commission
    (AHC) decision determining that he was liable for the 10-percent tax imposed on the
    “first sale of tobacco products, other than cigarettes, within this state …” Section
    149.160. 1 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3, of the Missouri
    Constitution. The AHC decision is affirmed.
    I. Facts
    Lalani bought tobacco products from a Missouri wholesaler. Lalani did not sell
    the tobacco products at retail to consumers. Instead, Lalani sold the tobacco products to
    Missouri retailers. Lalani did not report his sale of tobacco products on his tax returns.
    1
    All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000.
    The director audited the wholesaler from whom Lalani purchased the tobacco
    products. The director noticed that the wholesaler had reported tax-exempt sales to
    Lalani while Lalani reported no taxable purchases or sales during that same period. The
    director determined that Lalani was responsible for the first sale of the tobacco products
    within the state because he purchased tobacco products from a wholesaler and then resold
    the products to Missouri retailers. The director sent Lalani notice of a tax lien in the
    amount of $42,863.19 for back taxes, penalties, and interest. Lalani sought
    administrative review of the director’s decision from the AHC. The AHC agreed with
    the director’s decision.
    II. Standard of Review
    The AHC decision will be affirmed if: (1) it is authorized by law; (2) it is
    supported by competent and substantial evidence based on the whole record;
    (3) mandatory procedural safeguards are not violated; and (4) it is not clearly contrary to
    the reasonable expectations of the legislature. Section 621.193. The AHC’s
    interpretation of revenue statutes is subject to de novo review. Aquila Foreign
    Qualifications Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 
    362 S.W.3d 1
    , 3 (Mo. banc 2012).
    III. Analysis
    1. Lalani made the “first sale” and is subject to the 10-percent tax
    Missouri law imposes a tax on “the first sale of tobacco products, other than
    cigarettes, within the state . . . at the rate of 10-percent of the manufacturer’s invoice
    price before discounts and deals, [which] shall be paid by the person making the first sale
    within the state.” Section 149.160.1. The “first sale within the state” is defined as “the
    first sale of a tobacco product by a manufacturer, wholesaler or other person to a person
    who intends to sell such tobacco products at retail or to a person at retail within the state
    of Missouri.” Section 149.011(5).
    The plain language of section 149.011(5) provides that the “first sale” occurs
    when a tobacco product is sold by a “manufacturer, wholesaler, or other person” to a
    person who intends to sell the products at retail in Missouri. Even though there may be
    multiple manufacturers, wholesalers, and other persons in the chain of commerce, only
    one of them makes the “first sale” to a retailer. In this case, Lalani made the first sale to a
    retailer because he purchased the tobacco products from a wholesaler and then re-sold the
    products to Missouri retailers. Consequently, the AHC determined correctly that Lalani
    is responsible for the paying the 10-percent tax imposed by section 149.160.
    2. Sections 149.011 and 149.160 are not unconstitutionally vague
    Lalani claims that sections 149.160.1 and 149.011 are unconstitutionally vague as
    applied to him because imposing the “first sale” tax on anyone other than manufacturer or
    wholesaler renders it impossible to calculate the tax because only the manufacturer or
    wholesaler knows the invoice price on which the tax is based. Lalani does not claim that
    the imposition of the 10-percent tax is vague or that any provision of section 149.160
    prohibits him ascertaining the invoice price. Consequently, Lalani’s alleged lack of
    knowledge of the invoice price is a due diligence and accounting issue rather than a
    constitutional infirmity with the statute. Lalani’s vagueness argument is without merit.
    3
    3. The director is not estopped from collecting the tax from Lalani
    Lalani’s final point is that the director should be estopped from collecting the tax.
    Lalani asserts that one of the director’s employees informed him that no tax was owed on
    the first sale of tobacco products within the state if those products were purchased from a
    Missouri wholesaler.
    Lalani relies on the following facsimile from one of the director’s employees:
    If you purchase form [sic] a licensed wholesaler you don’t need a
    license. If you purchase from a [sic] unlicensed wholesaler, you will
    need a license. Since you now have a license, you will need to file the
    monthly reports that I sent with the license. This way we can make
    sure the tobacco tax has been paid on the tobacco product. If you
    have any other questions please contact me . . . .
    The facsimile does not support Lalani’s estoppel argument. First, the facsimile
    does not state that Lalani will not have to pay the 10-percent tax. On the contrary, the
    facsimile confirms that Lalani was a “licensed wholesaler” who must file “monthly
    reports” so the department of revenue “can make sure the tobacco tax has been paid.”
    Second, even if the facsimile was ambiguous regarding Lalani’s tax liability, the
    “doctrine of equitable estoppel is rarely applied in cases involving a governmental entity,
    and then only to avoid manifest injustice.” Lynn v. Dir. of Revenue, 
    689 S.W.2d 45
    , 49
    (Mo. banc 1985). Further, because taxation is determined by statute, the “Director of
    Revenue and subordinates have no power to vary the force of the statutes.” 
    Id. Sections 149.160
    and 149.011 indicate clearly that an individual, like Lalani, who makes the first
    sale of tobacco products to a Missouri retailer is subject to the 10-percent tax. Even if
    4
    the director’s facsimile communication with Lalani was ambiguous or misleading, that
    communication cannot alter Lalani’s statutorily mandated tax obligations.
    The AHC determined correctly that the director’s assessment of tax, interest,
    penalties, and costs was proper. The decision of the AHC is affirmed.
    _________________________________
    RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, JUDGE
    All concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SC94097

Judges: Judge Richard B. Teitelman

Filed Date: 12/9/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024