State ex rel. T.J., Relator v. The Honorable Terry Cundiff ( 2021 )

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
STATE ex rel. T.J., ) Opinion issued October 26, 2021
)
Relator, )
)
v. ) No. SC98951
)
THE HONORABLE TERRY CUNDIFF, )
)
Respondent. )
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION
On January 4, 2021, when he was seventeen years old, T.J. is alleged to have
committed three felony offenses. The state charged T.J. in the court of general jurisdiction.
T.J. moved to dismiss the state’s prosecution, arguing the circuit court’s juvenile division
had the exclusive statutory authority to adjudicate these charges pursuant to legislation
enacted in 2018 (hereinafter, “the 2018 legislation”), which raised the age of individuals
subject to the juvenile division’s authority. The circuit court overruled T.J.’s motion. T.J.
seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from taking any further action other
than to dismiss the state’s prosecution without prejudice so the juvenile division may
adjudicate the charges against him.
This Court holds the circuit court did not exceed its authority in overruling T.J.’s
motion to dismiss because the general assembly intended the 2018 legislation to become
effective only after sufficient funds were appropriated to support the expansion of juvenile
division services provided for in the 2018 legislation, which occurred on July 1, 2021.
Consequently, the 2018 legislation conferring statutory authority on the juvenile division
to adjudicate charges for those individuals younger than eighteen years was not in effect at
the time T.J. is alleged to have committed the offenses. Because the state’s criminal
complaint was filed properly in the court of general jurisdiction, the preliminary writ of
prohibition is quashed.
Factual and Procedural History
T.J. is alleged to have committed felony offenses on January 4, 2021. The state
filed a criminal complaint in the court of general jurisdiction charging him with three
felony counts. T.J. moved to dismiss the case, arguing the juvenile division had the
exclusive statutory authority to adjudicate the charges pursuant to section 211.031.1(3),
RSMo Supp. 2018, 1 because he was younger than eighteen years at the time the alleged
offenses occurred. The state countered that section 211.031.1(3) did not control because it
was not effective at the time T.J. committed the offenses due to a funding contingency
contained in section 211.438, which also was enacted in the 2018 legislation. After a
hearing, the circuit court overruled T.J.’s motion to dismiss.
1
All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2018 unless otherwise indicated.
2
T.J. sought a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern
District, which denied relief. T.J. then filed a writ of prohibition with this Court seeking
to compel the circuit court to dismiss the criminal prosecution without prejudice so the
juvenile division could adjudicate the charges against him. On April 6, 2021, this Court
issued a preliminary writ of prohibition and commanded the circuit court to take no further
action in this matter, other than to show cause as to the reasons this writ should not issue,
until ordered to do so by this Court.
Standard of Review
This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs. Mo. Const. art. V,
sec. 4. “The writ of prohibition, an extraordinary remedy, is to be used with great caution
and forbearance and only in cases of extreme necessity.” State ex rel. Zahnd v. Van
Amburg, 533 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting State ex rel. Douglas Toyota III,
Inc. v. Keeter, 804 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Mo. banc 1991)).
A writ of prohibition is appropriate: (1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial
power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an
excess of authority, jurisdiction or abuse of discretion where the lower court
lacks the power to act as intended; or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable
harm if relief is not granted.
State ex el. Becker v. Wood, 611 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Mo. banc 2020).
Chapter 211 and “Raise the Age” Legislation
A brief overview of the relevant chapter 211 statutes and subsequent amendments
is instructive in this Court’s resolution of this dispute. Chapter 211’s purpose “is to
facilitate the care, protection and discipline of children who come within the [statutory
authority] of the juvenile [division].” Section 211.011, RSMo 2016. Chapter 211 “shall
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be liberally construed, therefore, to the end that each child coming within the [statutory
authority] of the juvenile [division] shall receive such care, guidance and control as will
conduce to the child’s welfare and the best interests of the state ….” Id.Prior to the enactment of the 2018 legislation, section 211.021(1), RSMo 2000,
defined “adult” as “a person seventeen years of age or older” while section 211.021(2),
RSMo 2000, defined “child” as “a person under seventeen years of age.”
Section11.031.1(3), RSMo 2000, conferred upon the juvenile division the original statutory
authority “in proceedings … [i]nvolving any child who is alleged to have violated a state
law or municipal ordinance, or any person who is alleged to have violated a state law or
municipal ordinance prior to attaining the age of seventeen years.”
In 2008, the legislature amended the definitions of “adult” and “child.”
Section 211.021(1), RSMo Supp. 2008, defined “adult” as “a person seventeen years of
age or older except for seventeen year old children as defined in this section.”
Section 211.021(2), RSMo Supp. 2008, defined “child” as “any person under seventeen
years of age and … any person over seventeen but not yet eighteen years of age alleged to
have committed a status offense.” Section 211.021 also included a funding contingency
provision stating the amendments would not become effective until the general assembly
appropriated certain funds for additional juvenile division personnel. Section 211.021.2,
RSMo Supp. 2008. 2
2
This section provided in pertinent part:
The amendments to subsection 1 of this section, as provided for in this act,
shall not take effect until such time as appropriations by the general assembly
for additional juvenile officer full-time equivalents and deputy juvenile
4
Ten years later, the general assembly enacted the 2018 legislation, commonly
referred to as “Raise the Age,” which increased the age an individual may be prosecuted
in the court of general jurisdiction from seventeen years of age to eighteen years of age,
along with several other provisions governing juvenile division proceedings. Accordingly,
the legislature amended section 211.021(2)’s definition of “child” to mean “any person
under eighteen years of age” and amended section 211.021(1) to define “adult” as “a person
eighteen years of age or older.” Section 211.031.1(3) also was amended to confer upon
the juvenile division original statutory authority “in proceedings … [i]nvolving any child
who is alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance, or any person who is
alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance prior to attaining the age of
eighteen years.” The 2018 legislation included two statutes regarding appropriation and
the effective date. Section 211.438 provided, “Expanding services from seventeen years
of age to eighteen years of age is a new service and shall not be effective until an
appropriation sufficient to fund the expanded service is provided therefor.”
Section 211.439 provided the repeal and enactment of relevant provisions of chapter 211,
including sections 211.021 and 211.031, “shall become effective on January 1, 2021.”
officer full-time equivalents shall exceed by one million nine hundred
thousand dollars the amount spent by the state for such officers in fiscal year
2007 and appropriations by the general assembly to single first class counties
for juvenile court personnel costs shall exceed by one million nine hundred
thousand dollars the amount spent by the state for such juvenile court
personnel costs in fiscal year 2007 and notice of such appropriations has been
given to the revisor of statutes.
(Footnote omitted).
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In 2021, the general assembly made additional changes to chapter 211 through
combined Senate Bill Numbers 53 and 60 (hereinafter, “the 2021 legislation”). The 2021
legislation included section 211.012, which provides, “For purposes of this chapter,
section 221.044, and the original [statutory authority] of the juvenile [division], a person
shall not be considered a child if, at the time the alleged offense or violation was committed,
the person was considered an adult according to then-existing law.” The 2021 legislation
also repealed sections 211.438 and 211.439. The 2021 legislation declared:
Because immediate action is necessary to protect children, [and] because
immediate action is necessary to expand services from seventeen years of
age to eighteen years of age … the enactment of section[] 211.012 … and the
repeal of sections 211.438 and 211.439 … are deemed necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public health, welfare, peace, and safety, and
are hereby declared to be an emergency act within the meaning of the
constitution, and the enactment of section[] 211.012 … and the repeal of
sections 211.438 and 211.439 … shall be in full force and effect upon its
passage and approval.
The governor signed the 2021 legislation into law on July 14, 2021. The legislature
appropriated funds for the 2018 legislation in its fiscal year 2022 budget, which went into
effect on July 1, 2021.
Analysis
T.J. argues he is entitled to an order prohibiting the circuit court from taking any
further action other than sustaining his motion to dismiss because the circuit court had no
statutory authority to permit the state to prosecute him in the court of general jurisdiction
because he was seventeen years old at the time of the alleged offenses. T.J. relies on
section 211.439, which provides the 2018 legislation—including section 211.031.1(3)—
became effective on January 1, 2021. The state counters that section 211.438 states the
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2018 legislation did not become effective until an appropriation sufficient to fund the
expanded services was enacted by the legislature, which occurred on July 1, 2021.
“This Court’s primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative
intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.” State ex rel. Robison v.
Lindley-Myers, 551 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting Parktown Imps., Inc. v.
Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009)). “In construing a statute, the
Court must presume the legislature was aware of the state of the law at the time of its
enactment.” D.E.G. v. Juv. Officer of Jackson Cnty., 601 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Mo. banc 2020)
(quoting Suffian v. Usher, 19 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Mo. banc 2000)). “Accordingly, when the
legislature amends a statute, we presume the legislature intended to change the existing
law.” Id. “The provisions of a legislative act are not read in isolation but construed
together, and if reasonably possible, the provisions will be harmonized with each other.”
R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 429 (Mo. banc
2019) (quoting Bachtel v. Miller Cnty. Nursing Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d 799, 801
(Mo. banc 2003)). Because these statutes were passed in the same legislative session as
part of the same legislative act, this Court must attempt to harmonize them in such a way
as to give each statute meaning, if possible.
Sections 211.438 and 211.439 appear to provide ostensibly conflicting effective
dates for different provisions of the 2018 legislation in that section 211.439 provides an
effective date of January 1, 2021, while section 211.438 provides expanded services for
seventeen-year-olds will take effect only after sufficient appropriations have been made to
pay for the services. The expansion of services from seventeen to eighteen years of age
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was accomplished by the 2018 legislation amending the definition of “child” to include
seventeen-year-olds in section 211.021(2), which serves as the catalyst for providing
juvenile division services. Yet, T.J. believes section 211.438 has no bearing on his case
because this statute does not address or concern the juvenile division’s exclusive statutory
authority to adjudicate the charges, only the expansion of services to seventeen-year-olds.
T.J. contends services are wholly irrelevant unless, first, he were found delinquent, which
cannot occur until the juvenile division exercises its statutory authority.
The state disagrees, citing the juvenile officer’s testimony it presented at the hearing
on T.J.’s motion to dismiss. The juvenile officer testified services are rendered during the
disposition and adjudication process and it was “a rare occasion” in which there is a
juvenile division disposition and “the only service may be reporting to a deputy juvenile
officer for a short period of time.” The juvenile officer further testified his particular
juvenile office had not received any funds and extending services to seventeen-year-olds
without additional funding would be “prohibitively expensive.”
“Statutes cannot be interpreted in ways that yield unreasonable or absurd results[.]”
State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 508 (Mo. banc 2011). Coming within the juvenile
division’s statutory authority, in and of itself, is a service, which may occur only if an
individual is defined as a “child” for purposes of chapter 211. T.J.’s proposed construction
of section 211.438 leads to an absurd result. The general assembly would not give the
juvenile division statutory authority over seventeen-year-olds while simultaneously
preventing the juvenile division from actually providing these same seventeen-year-olds
services until sufficient funds are appropriated. A more reasonable construction that gives
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both sections meaning would be to find section 211.439 sets the earliest date the 2018
legislation could take effect, while section 211.438 provides that the expansion of services
would not take effect at that earliest date if the general assembly had not yet appropriated
sufficient funds for the expansion of services. This interpretation gives effect to both
statutes while harmonizing these sections of the same legislative act.
Under this interpretation, if the funding contingency was not met by January 1,
2021, then the expansion of services did not take effect on that date as otherwise
contemplated by section 211.439. Accordingly, the juvenile division did not have the
statutory authority to proceed in any matter involving any child who is alleged to have
violated a state law or municipal ordinance, or any person who is alleged to have violated
a state law or municipal ordinance prior to attaining the age of eighteen years until July 1,
2021, when the funding was appropriated pursuant to the 2018 legislation.
The state urges this Court to declare section 211.012, enacted by the 2021
legislation, provides a bright-line rule for the courts to follow in determining whether an
individual was considered a child pursuant to chapter 211 at the time of the offense, which
will determine which division of the circuit court has authority to adjudicate the claims.
Section 211.012 provides, “For purposes of this chapter, section 221.044, and the original
[statutory authority] of the juvenile [division], a person shall not be considered a child if,
at the time the alleged offense or violation was committed, the person was considered an
adult according to then-existing law.”
T.J. argues section 211.012 restricts only the definition of “child” and was not
intended to impact the independent clause in section 211.031.1(3) concerning a “person
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who is alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance prior to attaining the age
of eighteen years[.]” T.J. further contends section 211.012 has no bearing on his case
because section 211.031.1(3) as amended in the 2018 legislation provides an independent
basis for the juvenile division to exercise its statutory authority in his case. T.J. relies on
J.O.N. v. Juvenile Officer, 777 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989), in which the court
held “[t]he legislature’s use of the word ‘person’ in [section 211.031.1(3)] is deliberate and
significant” because it demonstrates the juvenile division has statutory authority in any
“proceeding involving a person, regardless of age, who is alleged to have violated a state
law prior to attaining the age of [eighteen] years” as enumerated in section 211.031.1(3)
after the 2018 legislation became effective. (Emphasis in original). Hence, T.J. believes,
because he was seventeen years old at the time the offenses are alleged to have been
committed, section 211.031.1(3) confers upon the juvenile division statutory authority to
adjudicate the charges.
Although section 211.012 was not enacted until after T.J. is alleged to have
committed the offenses, this Court believes section 211.012 merely codifies in chapter 211
the well-settled premise that “a defendant must be tried for the offense as defined by the
law that existed at the time of the offense.” State v. Pierce, 433 S.W.3d 424, 427 n.1
(Mo. banc 2014) (quoting State v. Edwards, 983 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Mo. banc 1999)). When
examining the law as it existed on January 4, 2021, when T.J. is alleged to have committed
the offenses, section 211.438 had not been repealed nor had the general assembly
appropriated sufficient funds to expand the juvenile division’s services to seventeen-year-
olds. Consequently, the 2018 legislation amending the definition of “child” to include
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seventeen-year-olds and conferring statutory authority upon the juvenile division also was
not in effect. Instead, section 211.021(1), RSMo 2016, defined an “adult” as “a person
seventeen years of age or older except for seventeen year old children as defined in this
section.” Section 211.031.1(3), RSMo 2016, conferred upon the juvenile division statutory
authority “in proceedings … [i]nvolving any child who is alleged to have violated a state
law or municipal ordinance, or any person who is alleged to have violated a state law or
municipal ordinance prior to attaining the age of seventeen years.”
Hence, T.J.’s reliance on J.O.N. is misplaced. T.J. was seventeen years old at the
time the alleged offenses were committed. He was considered an adult for purposes of
chapter 211 pursuant to section 211.021(1)’s definition in effect at the time of the alleged
offenses, and he was not a “person” contemplated under section 211.031.1(3) in that he
allegedly committed the offenses after attaining the age of seventeen years. Accordingly,
the juvenile division did not have the statutory authority to adjudicate the charged offenses.
The circuit court did not err in overruling T.J.’s motion to dismiss the state’s prosecution
in the court of general jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The preliminary writ of prohibition is quashed.
______________________________
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Judge
All concur.
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