State ex rel. Walter Barton, Relator v. William Stange ( 2020 )

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
STATE EX REL. WALTER BARTON ) Opinion issued April 27, 2020
)
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Relator, )
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v. ) No. SC98343
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WILLIAM STANGE )
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Respondent. )
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN HABEAS CORPUS
PER CURIAM
On February 18, 2020, this Court issued its order setting Walter Barton’s execution
date for May 19, 2020. 1 Barton seeks a writ of habeas corpus from this Court, arguing he
is actually innocent. His evidence, however, does not show actual innocence but is simply
additional evidence that might have been used to impeach a jailhouse informant and
provide competing expert testimony to explain the presence of blood on his clothes. While
this might have been helpful, it does not show actual innocence by a preponderance of the
evidence as required for a gateway claim of actual innocence, nor does it rise to the level
1
The factual background underlying Barton’s first-degree murder conviction can be found in this
Court’s opinion affirming his death sentence. State v. Barton, 240 S.W.3d 693 (Mo. banc 2007).
of clear and convincing evidence required for a freestanding claim of actual innocence.
State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546-47 (Mo. banc 2003). Accordingly, his
claims of actual innocence do not entitle him to relief.
Barton further claims he is not competent for execution because a traumatic brain
injury gave him major neurocognitive disorder of sufficient severity that he meets the
standard for incompetence set by the United States Supreme Court in Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007). He argues his execution would violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, article I, §§ 10 and 21 of
the Missouri Constitution and § 552.060. 2 “A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a
proper means to raise a claim of incompetency.” State ex rel. Cole v. Griffith, 460 S.W.3d
349, 356 (Mo. banc 2015). This Court denies the petition because Barton has not
demonstrated the “substantial threshold showing of insanity” required by Panetti and Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 426 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) nor has he demonstrated
he is incompetent under § 552.060. 3
2
All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, unless otherwise provided.
3
On March 17, 2020, Barton filed a motion for stay of execution with this Court. That motion is
contemporaneously overruled.
2
Analysis
A. Claim of Actual Innocence 4
Mr. Barton claims he presented evidence he is actually innocent of the murder for
which he was convicted and sentenced to death. He says this evidence is sufficient to show
his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, which would entitle him to have this
Court consider his otherwise defaulted claim that the State failed to reveal certain
exculpatory evidence. Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Mo. banc 2000). This Court
disagrees.
There are two types of evidence of actual innocence on which Barton relies. The
first is testimony from a blood spatter expert who he says would have testified that the
blood found on Barton’s shirt and pants after the murder was not blood spatter evidence as
claimed by the State’s expert. But Barton made this very claim at trial, arguing the evidence
on which the State’s expert relied did not support his conclusions. On appeal, this Court
stated Barton’s attack on the admissibility of the State’s expert was frivolous. Barton, 240
S.W.3d at 705. Further, Barton’s counsel considered hiring the very expert on whose
testimony it now relies but decided that it would be more effective to just impeach the
State’s expert. Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 755 (Mo. banc 2014).
4
Generally the first step in this Court’s analysis of a petition for habeas corpus claiming of actual
innocence – whether it be a gateway or freestanding claim – would be to consider whether the
petitioner alleged new evidence to support the claim that was not available at trial, when combined
with the other evidence, would meet the relevant standard for relief. As is evident from the
following discussion, Barton does not meet that threshold for habeas relief based on actual
innocence.
3
Now, in support of his claim for habeas relief, Barton argues similar testimony
would have made the difference in the outcome of the case, for it shows he was actually
innocent. To the contrary, while this testimony might have been useful to counter the
testimony of the State’s expert, it does not exculpate him or inculpate another. It simply
provides competing expert testimony as to the source and nature of the blood on his clothes
after the murder. Even if the jury believed this evidence, it would not require the jury to
find he was actually innocent. To the contrary, at the time counsel believed the testimony
might be inconsistent with Barton’s explanation of how the blood got on his clothes. Id. at
756. Further, Barton already presented similar evidence in support of his post-conviction
motion alleging ineffective assistance, and this Court found counsel was not ineffective in
presenting this evidence. Id.
Barton also states his actual innocence is shown by his discovery of additional
evidence impeaching the testimony of the State’s jailhouse informant, Katherine Allen,
who said Barton threatened to kill her “like he did that old lady.” Barton, 240 S.W.3d at
700; Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 748.
Barton suggests that, at his fourth trial, his counsel had impeached this witness with
six prior convictions, but his conviction later was set aside after the postconviction court
found she had 29 prior convictions and certain additional criminal charges had been
dismissed in return for her testimony.
Accordingly, the evidence of the full extent of Ms. Allen’s prior convictions was
known to Barton’s counsel before his fifth and final trial. When she again lied and said
she had only six prior convictions, defense counsel chose to impeach her with 12 of her
4
prior convictions for forgery, fraud, bad checks and similar crimes going to lack of
truthfulness. He did not mention the other convictions or the charges that had been
dismissed, nor was this issue raised in his post-conviction motion. The issue was raised
but relief was denied in his federal habeas proceedings. Now Barton argues that, because
this Court has not yet had an opportunity to consider this evidence, it should now consider
it and hold this evidence in combination with new evidence that she was convicted in 2016
of identity theft and mail fraud, would make the difference and would show his actual
innocence.
Taking Barton’s claims about Ms. Allen’s convictions as true, such evidence does
not support a finding of actual innocence. While counsel might have discredited Ms. Allen
even more at the trial, the impeachment he did undertake demonstrated for the jury that she
had been convicted of multiple crimes involving untruthfulness. That she had been
untruthful on yet more occasions is still merely impeachment evidence. Unlike in Amrine,
in which the witnesses’ testimony was recanted, Ms. Allen has not recanted her testimony,
and the offered evidence does not require a finding she lied at Barton’s trial. It remains an
issue of credibility for the jury. Further, the opinion of this Court on direct appeal
delineates the substantial additional evidence supporting the conviction, including Barton’s
presence in the victim's trailer and answering her telephone near the time of the murder, a
check the victim made out to him, his washing blood off his hands prior to the victim’s
body being found, his inconsistent stories, his behavior at the time of the murder, and the
undisputed presence of blood on his clothes, whether from spatter or otherwise. The
5
additional impeachment evidence does not show actual innocence by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Because the evidence is insufficient to make a gateway claim of actual innocence
by a preponderance of the evidence, it necessarily is also insufficient to support a
freestanding claim of actual innocence, which requires clear and convincing evidence of
actual innocence.
B. Claim of Incompetence
“The Eighth Amendment . . . prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental
illness prevents him from rationally understanding why the State seeks to impose that
punishment.” Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 722 (2019) (internal quotations
omitted). The prisoner must prove he suffers from a psychotic disorder that makes him
either unaware of the reasons for his punishment or such that he has no “rational
understanding” of it. Id. at 723 (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 957-60). If the prisoner has a
psychological dysfunction that “may have resulted in petitioner’s fundamental failure to
appreciate the connection between the petitioner’s crime and his execution” then he may
be incompetent to be executed. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 960 (internal quotations omitted.) In
Panetti, the prisoner alleged he met this standard because he experienced “gross delusions
preventing him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which
he ha[d] been sentenced.” Id. Barton similarly must allege and demonstrate a “substantial
threshold showing of insanity.” Id. at 949; Ford, 477 U.S. at 426.
In support of his claim he is incompetent to be executed, Barton relies almost
exclusively on the “Forensic Evaluation Report” authored by Dr. Patricia Zapf. Dr. Zapf
6
was hired by Barton’s counsel after November 19, 2019, when the State filed its motion to
set Barton’s execution date. Dr. Zapf reviewed Barton’s records and conducted a two-day
evaluation of him. Dr. Zapf ultimately concluded: “As a result of his Major Neurocognitive
Disorder, Mr. Barton has significant impairments in executive function, problem solving,
attention, concentration, working memory, and abstract reasoning, which result in the
inability to provide rational assistance to counsel and to engage in consistent, logical, and
rational decision making.” For these reasons, Dr. Zapf opined that Barton was incompetent
under the standard set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), and Justice
Marshall’s plurality opinion in Ford, but noted he was competent under Justice Powell’s
controlling concurring opinion in Ford. Neither Dusky nor Justice Marshall’s plurality
opinion however, provide the relevant, controlling standard by which this Court evaluates
Barton’s incompetency claim. 5
Dr. Zapf’s report supports a finding that Barton is competent to be executed for
several reasons. First, Dr. Zapf concluded Barton had a factual understanding of why the
State is imposing capital punishment:
5
The issue in Dusky was the petitioner’s competency to stand trial, not his competency to be
executed. 362 U.S. at 402. The relevant standard for competency to stand trial is “whether
[defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against [defendant].” Id. While that standard is somewhat similar to the standard for
competency to be executed, it is clear the standards are different and cannot be used
interchangeably. The portion of Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion in Ford regarding a prisoner’s
claim of incompetency to be executed garnered the votes of only three other justices. Because it
was not a majority opinion, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion on the same grounds is controlling
because it “offered a more limited holding.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 949. In any event, competency
is a legal determination that is made by courts, not experts. State ex rel. Clayton v. Griffith, 457
S.W.3d 735, 741 (Mo. banc 2015).
7
Mr. Barton demonstrated a rudimentary factual understanding of the
punishment he is about to receive and the reasons for it. He was able to
describe the reason why he is in prison and elaborate on his place of residence
within the prison. He was able to provide information about his conviction,
a general description of the criminal act, and basic identifying information
about the victim. Mr. Barton was unable to engage in abstract discussions
regarding the justness of his conviction, maintaining that he was “railroaded”
and reporting that “they’re going to execute me if I can’t prove my
innocence[.]”
Emphasis added.
Second, Dr. Zapf concluded Barton had a “rational understanding” 6 of his
punishment, noting, “Mr. Barton demonstrated a simplistic, but rational understanding of
the punishment he is about to receive and the reasons for it.”
Third, Dr. Zapf explicitly found Barton does not suffer from delusional thinking.
Dr. Zapf stated “he did not demonstrate any delusional thinking or loss of contact with
reality and no perceptual disturbances were noted.” (Emphasis added). In other words,
Barton does not suffer from “gross delusions preventing him from comprehending the
meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he has been sentenced.” Panetti, 551
U.S. at 960.
Additionally, Dr. Zapf did not state that Barton had other psychotic disorders that
prevented him from forming both an awareness of the State’s rationale for executing him
and a rational understanding of that rationale, as required by Panetti. The DSM-5 provides
that traumatic brain injury, like dementia and certain other diseases, can cause
6
According to Dr. Zapf, “[r]ational understanding is differentiated from factual understanding in
terms of the individual’s ability to apply factually understood information to the specific instance
of his own case.”
8
neurocognitive disorders of a major or minor character. Dr. Zapf argues Barton is
incompetent because his brain injury impaired his ability to provide rational assistance to
his attorneys and to demonstrate rational decision-making in his own defense. But these
conclusions are insufficient to support the determinations required by Madison, Panetti,
and Ford unless she found his impairments resulted in an inability to have a rational
understanding of the reasons for his punishment and the rationale for it. The mere fact that
the prisoner does not believe he deserves the punishment is inadequate. In Panetti, the
Supreme Court held:
The mental state requisite for competence to suffer capital punishment
neither presumes nor requires a person who would be considered ‘normal,
or even ‘rational,’ in a layperson’s understanding of those terms. . . . The
beginning of doubt about competence in a case like [Barton]’s is not a
misanthropic personality or an amoral character. It is a psychotic disorder.
551 U.S. at 959-60 (emphasis added). While Dr. Zapf opines Barton has a neurocognitive
disorder that causes him to lack the ability to provide rational assistance and to demonstrate
rational decision-making due to his brain injury, she admits this does not meet the standard
set out in Ford and she does not say Barton’s cognitive dysfunction meets the standard set
out in Panetti. His mental condition simply does not rise to the extreme level of a psychotic
disorder. To the contrary, in response to Barton’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
State provided Barton’s “Complete Mental Health History” dated November 1, 2019. The
history provides in pertinent part, “Offender does not appear to have any clinically
significant symptoms of a mental illness at this time. Records indicate no requests for
mental health services. [Barton] continues to make a good institutional adjustment.”
9
Barton does not and cannot demonstrate a substantial threshold showing of insanity as
required by Panetti and Ford.
In addition to his constitutional challenges, Barton also argues his brain injury
leaves him incompetent to be executed under § 552.060.1, 7 which provides:
No person condemned to death shall be executed if as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks capacity to understand the nature and purpose of
the punishment about to be imposed upon him or matters in extenuation,
arguments for executive clemency or reasons why the sentence should not be
carried out.
Barton’s statutory arguments mirror his constitutional ones, and they fail for similar
reasons. When addressing § 552.060.1 challenges, this Court has looked to several factors
in considering the prisoner’s competency. For example, in Cole, this Court looked to
whether the prisoner can articulate and understand legal issues with his case. 460 S.W.3d
at 361. Further, the Court surveyed whether the prisoner understood the underlying facts
of his case. Id. at 362. Dr. Zapf’s report demonstrates Barton understands the nature and
purpose of his pending execution. He remembers facts about the events giving rise to his
conviction as well as information about the victim. In addition, Barton’s claim that
“they’re going to execute me if I can’t prove my innocence” proves his understanding of
where he is in the legal process and the unique legal issues he currently faces. This Court
finds Barton competent to be executed under § 552.060.1.
7
Barton’s arguments regarding § 552.060.1 are nothing more than conclusory statements claiming
he lacks the capacity to understand anything enumerated in the statute. These statements alone do
not carry Barton’s burden of establishing entitlement to habeas corpus relief. State ex rel.
Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Mo. banc 2013). However, the Court will address
this argument ex gratia.
10
Conclusion
Barton has not proved the substantial threshold showing of insanity required by
Panetti and Ford. Therefore, the constitutional principles announced in Madison, Panetti,
and Ford do not render him incompetent to be executed. Additionally, Barton has not
proven that he is incompetent under § 552.060. Further, Barton has not offered evidence
sufficient to show actual innocence as either a gateway or a freestanding claim. Barton’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
All concur.
11