arizon-structures-worldwide-llc-v-global-blue-technologies-cameron-llc ( 2015 )


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  •                    In the Missouri Court of Appeals
    Eastern District
    DIVISION FOUR
    ARIZON STRUCTURES WORLWIDE, LLC,      )                 No. ED102757
    )
    Respondent,                     )
    )
    vs.                                   )
    )
    GLOBAL BLUE TECHNOLOGIES-CAMERON, )
    LLC, GLOBAL BLUE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., )                  Appeal from the Circuit Court of
    GLOBAL BLUE TECHNOLOGIES-             )                 St. Louis County
    INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and GLOBAL BLUE )
    TECHNOLOGIES-USA, LLC,                )
    )
    Appellants,                     )
    )
    and                                   )
    )
    DAVID K. WILLS and JAMES E. SALMON,   )
    )                 Honorable Michael D. Burton
    Defendants,                     )
    )
    and                                   )
    )
    JOHNSON MARCRAFT, INC., JAN LIGAS and )
    RON SCHARF,                           )
    )
    Respondents.                    )                 Filed: October 6, 2015
    Introduction
    Global Blue Technologies-Cameron, LLC, Global Blue Technologies, Inc., Global Blue
    Technologies-International, LLC, and Global Blue Technologies-USA, LLC, (collectively,
    “Buyers”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County denying their motion to
    compel arbitration in an action for breach of contract filed by Arizon Structures Worldwide,
    LLC, Johnson Marcraft, Inc., Ron Scharf, and Jan Ligas1 (collectively, “Sellers”). Buyers claim
    the trial court erred because:     (1) the parties executed a valid and enforceable arbitration
    agreement; and (2) Sellers’ claims against the individual, non-signatory defendants, as well as
    the corporate defendants, are subject to the arbitration agreement. We affirm.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Buyers, affiliated aquaculture companies, farm shrimp in manmade ponds. Sellers design
    and manufacture fabric-covered, air-supported structures, or domes, commonly referred to as “air
    structures.” On April 4, 2014, Buyers and Sellers signed a letter of intent for the purchase and
    sale of six customized air structures.
    On April 16, 2013, Buyers and Sellers executed a “non-disclosure agreement, financing
    and supply agreement” (NDAFS) pursuant to which the parties agreed to provide each other
    certain confidential information “with a view to entering into a relationship or transaction with in
    [sic] regards to the products or process of the other party.” The NDAFS defined “confidential
    information” to include Buyers’ “financial statements, tax returns and other information required
    for the financing of [Buyers’] products and processes” and Sellers’ “designs and ideas” relating
    to the “manufacture of air, frame and tension structures.” The NDAFS required the parties to
    “receive and maintain such Confidential Information in the strictest confidence” and provided
    that “[i]f either Party shall violate any terms of this [NDAFS], the breaching party shall be liable
    to the non-breaching Party for all actual profits, costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees incurred by
    the non-breaching Party to enforce this Agreement or recover any damages for breach thereof.”
    In regard to dispute resolution, the NDAFS contained the following arbitration provision
    (NDAFS Paragraph 5):
    1
    Jan Ligas was president of Arizon, and Ron Scharf was chairman of Arizon and Johnson
    Marcraft, Inc.
    2
    5. This agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York and
    any dispute relating to this Agreement or any other matter shall be fully and
    finally resolved by binding Arbitration under the rules of the American
    Arbitration Association (“AAA”) at a location that is mutually agreed by the
    Parties hereto, or if no such agreement is reached, then at a location specified
    by an Arbitrator selected by the AAA, and any decision by said Arbitrator shall
    be final and binding upon the Parties, from which there shall be no appeal.
    The NDAFS also contained a provision addressing forum selection (NDAFS Paragraph 6),
    which provided:
    6. Should either Party bring any action arising from this Agreement, such
    action must be initiated and maintained in a federal or state court located in or
    covering Saint Louis County, Missouri (“Competent Court”). Further, a
    determination or judgment by any Competent Court may be enrolled and
    enforced in any jurisdiction where the Interested Party may be found or where
    any breach of this Agreement may occur.
    On April 27, 2013, Sellers sent Buyers two, eight-page “budget quotations” (Quotations)
    for the sale of air structures for a price of $1,361,154 each.2 The Quotations detailed the scope
    of work, schedule of payments, and terms and conditions of the sale. The Quotations’ cover
    pages stated: “Buyer expressly acknowledges the Non-Disclosure Agreement, Financing and
    Supply Agreement (‘NDAFS’) dated April 16th, 2013 and Exhibit 1 attached thereto . . . . The
    Goods being purchased by the Buyer from the Seller are part of the Exclusive products and
    processes provided for in said NDAFS.”
    The first paragraph of the “Terms and Conditions of Sale” provided, in pertinent part:
    1. Goods, Equipment, and Services (“goods”) sold by Arizon Structures
    WorldWide, LLC (“Seller” or “Manufacturer”) are made solely on the terms
    and conditions hereof notwithstanding any additional or conflicting terms or
    conditions that may be contained in any purchase order, specifications,
    contract or contract documents, or other form of purchase, all of which
    additional or conflicting terms and conditions are hereby objected to and
    rejected by Seller. . . .
    2
    Quotation No. QUO-2946 was dated March 26, 2013. Quotation No. QUO-2989 was dated
    April 27, 2013. The Quotations are substantively identical, and GBT signed the “Buyer’s
    Acceptance” of each Quotation on April 29, 2013.
    3
    In addition, the Quotations contained the following forum selection provision (Quotations
    Paragraph 14):
    14. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to payment, or to
    Seller’s Submittal, Buyer and Seller’s Contract, including these Terms and
    Conditions of Sale, or any other matter, shall be settled exclusively in St.
    Louis County Missouri Circuit Court, or at Seller’s option, by arbitration
    administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its
    Construction Industry Arbitration Rules in St. Louis County, Missouri, and
    Buyer hereby waives any appeal from the arbitration award and consents to the
    confirmation and entry of judgment thereon with or without notice in any court
    having jurisdiction over either Buyer or Seller. Buyer and Seller agree to use
    the Fast Track Procedures provided for by AAA Rules and Procedures.
    (emphasis added). On April 29, 2013, David Wills and James Salmon signed page three of the
    Quotations, titled “Buyer’s Acceptance,” on behalf of Buyers.          Pursuant to the parties’
    agreement, Sellers manufactured and supplied to Buyers two air structures.
    In December 2014, Sellers filed a petition against Buyers, Mr. Wills, and Mr. Salmon in
    the Circuit Court of St. Louis County alleging that the defendants breached the sales contract by
    failing to make installment payments on two air structures.3 Sellers sought damages in the
    amount of $3.5 million.
    Approximately one week later, Buyers filed with the AAA a statement of claim and
    demand for arbitration against Sellers seeking damages for fraud and breaches of contract and
    warranties.    Buyers alleged that the air structures supplied by Sellers were defective and
    “unsuitable for their intended use.” Mr. Wills and Mr. Salmon were not parties to the demand
    for arbitration.
    3
    Sellers filed an amended petition in January 2015 adding a request for a declaration that “any
    claims between the parties must be litigated in this Court and are not properly subject to
    arbitration with the AAA . . . .”
    4
    In January 2015, Sellers filed a motion to stay arbitration on the grounds that no valid and
    enforceable arbitration agreement existed between the parties.          More specifically, Sellers
    asserted that the forum selection provision in Quotations Paragraph 14 superseded the
    inconsistent language in the previously signed NDAFS and Quotations Paragraph 14 merely
    “provide[d] [Sellers] with an option to initiate arbitration, but [Sellers] ha[ve] not exercised that
    option.” (emphasis in original). Sellers further argued that, even if the forum selection language
    in Quotations Paragraph 14 did not supersede the NDAFS’s arbitration provision, conflicts
    between the NDAFS Paragraph 5, NDAFS Paragraph 6, and Quotations Paragraph 14 rendered
    the NDAFS’s arbitration provision ambiguous and therefore unenforceable.
    In response, Buyers filed a motion to compel arbitration and suggestions in opposition to
    Sellers’ motion to stay arbitration and in support of compelling arbitration. Buyers asserted that
    Sellers “entered into a broad, mandatory arbitration agreement with [Buyers] which was not
    rescinded by any other agreements of the parties and does not even conflict with any other
    agreement of the parties.” According to Buyers, the NDAFS and the Quotations “can and must
    be read together” because the Quotations expressly incorporated the NDAFS. Buyers further
    argued that neither NDAFS Paragraph 6 nor Quotations Paragraph 14 negated the arbitration
    provision in NDAFS Paragraph 5 because those forum selection provisions: (1) were consistent
    with an intent to address post-arbitration litigation; and (2) did not specifically preclude
    arbitration.
    After hearing arguments, the trial court entered an order granting Sellers’ motion to stay
    arbitration. Buyers filed a notice of appeal, and this court entered an order to show cause noting
    that the trial court’s order was not denominated a judgment and suggesting that Buyers “ask the
    trial judge to explicitly rule on the motion to compel arbitration in the judgment.” The trial court
    5
    subsequently entered a judgment affirming its order granting Sellers’ motion to stay arbitration
    and denying Buyers’ motion to compel arbitration. Buyers appeal.4
    Standard of Review
    “Whether the trial court should have granted a motion to compel arbitration is a question
    of law that this [c]ourt reviews de novo.” Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 
    461 S.W.3d 426
    , 431
    (Mo. banc 2015). “However, issues relating to the existence of an arbitration agreement are
    factual and require our deference to the trial court’s findings.” Katz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
    
    347 S.W.3d 533
    , 539 (Mo.App.E.D. 2011). Where, as here, the trial court denied a motion to
    compel without comment, “it is the burden of this court to determine if substantial evidence and
    the weight of the evidence support the court’s conclusions.” Greene v. Alliance Auto, Inc., 
    435 S.W.3d 646
    , 650 (Mo.App.W.D. 2014). “All fact issues upon which no specific findings are
    made shall be considered as having been found in accordance with the result reached.” Rule
    73.01(c).
    Discussion
    In their first point, Buyers claim the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel
    arbitration and granting Sellers’ motion to stay arbitration because the NDAFS and Quotations,
    “read together, contain an enforceable arbitration clause that . . . is fully consistent with the
    remainder of the parties’ contract, including the forum selection clauses . . . .” Buyers further
    assert that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the NDAFS’s arbitration agreement because
    “the question of arbitrability of a particular dispute is for the arbitrator to decide.” Sellers
    4
    Pursuant to Section 435.440.1(1), a party may appeal an order denying a motion to compel
    arbitration. Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 
    112 S.W.3d 421
    , 427 (Mo. banc
    2003).
    6
    counter that the trial court properly refused to stay proceedings and compel arbitration because
    Quotations Paragraph 14 conflicted with and therefore superseded NDAFS Paragraph 5.
    “Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute
    that it has not agreed to arbitrate.” Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 
    112 S.W.3d 421
    , 435 (Mo. banc 2003). When deciding whether to compel arbitration, a trial court must first
    determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue. Hopwood v. CitiFinancial,
    Inc., 
    429 S.W.3d 425
    , 427 (Mo.App.S.D. 2014). The usual rules of state contract law and canons
    of contract interpretation govern such determinations. Kohner Props., Inc. v. SPCP Group VI,
    LLC, 
    408 S.W.3d 336
    , 342 (Mo.App.E.D. 2013). The party seeking to compel arbitration has
    the burden of proving the existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. Whitworth
    v. McBride & Son Homes, Inc., 
    344 S.W.3d 730
    , 737 (Mo.App.W.D. 2011).
    “The guiding principle of contract interpretation under Missouri law is that a court will
    seek to ascertain the intent of the parties and to give effect to that intent.” Triarch Indus., Inc. v.
    Crabtree, 
    158 S.W.3d 772
    , 776 (Mo. banc 2005). “The intent of the parties to a contract is
    presumed to be expressed by the ordinary meaning of the contract’s terms.” 
    Id. Additionally, “a
    writing is interpreted as a whole and all writings forming part of the same transaction are
    interpreted together.” Osage Water Co. v. Golden Glade Land Owners Ass’n, Inc., 
    270 S.W.3d 459
    , 463 (Mo.App.S.D. 2008) (quoting Cure v. City of Jefferson, 
    380 S.W.2d 305
    , 310 (Mo.
    1964)). However, “when two writings are inconsistent, the contract last executed, if valid, will
    supersede the first to the extent that the two are inconsistent.” Berry v. Crouse, 
    376 S.W.2d 107
    ,
    112 (Mo. 1964).
    The principal question before this court is whether the arbitration provision in NDAFS
    Paragraph 5 is valid and enforceable in light of the subsequently executed Quotations Paragraph
    7
    14, which requires that all disputes “be settled exclusively” in a judicial forum.5 Buyers contend
    that the NDAFS and Quotations “are part of the same contract” and “must be read together as
    forming one agreement.”         They also assert that, to the extent NDAFS Paragraph 5 and
    Quotations Paragraph 14 conflict, they create an ambiguity, which we must construe against
    Sellers as drafters of the contract. In support of their argument, Buyers rely upon the factually
    distinguishable case of Johnson v. J.F. Enters., LLC, 
    400 S.W.3d 763
    (Mo. banc 2013). There,
    the defendant dealership presented to plaintiff, who was purchasing a car, “a pile of documents,”
    including an installment contract and a one-page arbitration agreement.6        
    Id. at 765.
       The
    installment contract did not reference arbitration and contained a merger clause, stating: “this
    writing . . . is the complete and exclusive statement of the agreement between us . . . .” 
    Id. The plaintiff
    signed the installment contract and arbitration agreement “within minutes of each other,
    in a single sitting, as part of a single sales transaction.” 
    Id. at 767.
    On review of the trial court’s order refusing to compel arbitration, the Johnson Court
    rejected the plaintiff’s argument that, by operation of the merger clause, the installment contract
    contained “the complete and exclusive statement of the agreement.” 
    Id. at 766.
             The Court
    reasoned that such an interpretation would negate all other documents signed at the time of sale,
    5
    Buyers assert for the first time on appeal that Quotations Paragraph 14 has no effect on the
    parties’ rights under NDAFS Paragraph 5 because Quotations Paragraph 14 is “void and
    unenforceable for lack of consideration.” Generally, we will not review issues raised for the first
    time on appeal because “an appellate court will not convict a trial court of error on an issue
    which was not before it.” River City Devt. Assocs., LLC v. Accurate Disbursing Co., LLC, 
    345 S.W.3d 867
    , 873 (Mo.App.E.D. 2011).
    6
    The arbitration agreement stated, in relevant part:
    Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute, or otherwise (including
    the scope of this Arbitration Agreement, and the arbitrability of the claim or
    dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors, or assigns,
    which arise out of or relate to your credit application, purchase or condition of
    this vehicle, your purchase or financing contract or any resulting transaction
    or relationship . . . .
    
    Id. at 768
    (emphasis in original).
    8
    including the sales contract, in contravention of the parties’ intent. 
    Id. at 766-67.
    The Court
    therefore concluded that, because “the intent of the parties is demonstrated by all the documents
    the parties signed contemporaneously[,] . . . . all the provisions in the writings can and should be
    harmonized and given effect, including a valid arbitration agreement.”7 
    Id. at 769.
    The instant case is factually distinguishable from Johnson because the parties did not sign
    the NDAFS and Quotations contemporaneously. To the contrary, Buyers signed the Quotations
    thirteen days after they signed the NDAFS. Furthermore, the NDAFS and Quotations cover
    distinct aspects of the parties’ transaction – the NDAFS, executed in anticipation of entering a
    sales contract, protects the parties’ confidential information, while the Quotations outlined the
    terms of the sale. Finally, while the installment contract in Johnson was silent on the matter of
    dispute resolution, the NDAFS and Quotations contained contradictory and mutually exclusive
    provisions. A court cannot simultaneously give effect to an arbitration agreement stating that
    “any dispute . . . shall be . . . resolved by binding Arbitration” (NDAFS Paragraph 5) and a
    contractual provision requiring “[a]ny controversy or claim . . . be settled exclusively in St. Louis
    County Missouri Circuit Court. . . .” (Quotations Paragraph 14).
    Additionally, Buyers contend that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Dunn, absent a
    clear and unequivocal manifestation of the parties’ intent to rescind an agreement, a subsequent
    contract’s forum selection clause will not supersede an earlier arbitration 
    agreement. 112 S.W.3d at 429
    . In Dunn, the subcontractor and general contractor executed a construction
    contract with a broad, mandatory arbitration clause.8 
    Id. at 427.
    Two years later, the parties
    7
    The Johnson Court distinguished Berry v. Crouse, which held that “when parties signed a sales
    agreement and then several hours later signed a contradictory lease agreement, the latter
    prevailed and determined rights and liability of parties.” 
    Johnson, 400 S.W.3d at 767
    n.3 (citing
    
    Berry, 376 S.W.2d at 112-13
    ).
    8
    The construction contract contained the following arbitration provision:
    9
    entered a change order, which incorporated “all terms and conditions of the [construction
    contract] to the extent those terms did not conflict with terms of the change order.” 
    Id. at 429.
    In regard to dispute resolution, the change order stated that “either party, at any time, may resort
    to their respective contract remedies or remedies as provided by law.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    The subcontractor later filed mechanic’s lien claims against the general contractor who, in turn,
    filed a motion to compel arbitration. 
    Id. at 427.
    The trial court denied the motion to compel
    arbitration, and the Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the parties’ change order “did
    not modify, rescind, or otherwise change the arbitration provision of the construction contract[.]”
    
    Id. Dunn is
    inapposite. Unlike Quotations Paragraph 14, the change order in Dunn “can be
    interpreted consistently with the broad mandatory arbitration provision of the original
    construction contract.” 
    Id. at 429.
    In Dunn, the change order’s “contract remedies or remedies
    as provided by law” provision did “not expressly exclude the marked change orders from
    arbitration.” 
    Id. at 430.
    “Instead, it preserve[d] the parties’ agreement to arbitrate and other
    unspecified rights or remedies that [were] not inconsistent with that obligation.” 
    Id. In contrast,
    Quotations Paragraph 14 cannot be “interpreted consistently” with NDAFS Paragraph 5 because
    the later-executed contract expressly contemplates state court resolution of disputes. 9
    Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
    breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
    Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
    Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be
    entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
    
    Dunn, 112 S.W.3d at 428
    .
    9
    Other cases that Buyers rely upon for the proposition that this court can and must harmonize
    NDAFS Paragraph 5 and Quotations Paragraph 14 are also factually distinguishable. See, e.g.,
    See also Unison v. Juhl Energy Devt., Inc., 
    789 F.3d 816
    , 820 (8th Cir. 2015) (interpreting
    supply agreement’s arbitration provision did not nullify the financing agreement’s forum
    selection clause because “these two clauses . . . are not in conflict”); Bank Julius Baer & Co.,
    10
    Although not precedential, Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Capital Markets, LLC,
    provides useful guidance in determining whether the forum selection clause in the Quotations
    revoked the previously executed arbitration agreement. 
    645 F.3d 522
    (2d Cir. 2011). In that
    case, Applied Energetics, a manufacturer of military technology, entered into a “preliminary”
    engagement agreement with NewOak, an independent broker dealer.                   
    Id. at 523.
       The
    engagement agreement contained an arbitration provision, stating that: “any dispute arising out
    of or relating to this letter, the Indemnity Agreement and/or the transactions contemplated hereby
    or thereby . . . shall be resolved through binding arbitration . . . .” 
    Id. The parties
    later signed a
    more formal placement agreement, which omitted any reference to arbitration and instead
    provided: “[a]ny dispute arising out of this Agreement shall be adjudicated in the Supreme
    Court, New York County or in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York.”
    
    Id. After NewOak
    initiated arbitration against Applied Energetics, Applied Energetics filed a
    petition to stay arbitration.   
    Id. at 524.
       The trial court found that the letter agreement’s
    arbitration clause and the placement agreement’s forum selection clause “may be read as
    complementary” to one another and ordered the parties to arbitrate. 
    Id. The United
    States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the trial court’s order
    compelling arbitration because “the Placement Agreement’s language that ‘any dispute’ between
    the parties ‘shall be adjudicated’ by specified courts stands in direct conflict with the
    Engagement Agreement’s parallel language that ‘any dispute . . . shall be resolved through
    Ltd. v. Waxfield Ltd., 
    424 F.3d 278
    , 284-85 (2d Cir. 2005) (permissive forum selection clause in
    subsequent contract could be read as complementary, rather than contradictory, to the parties’
    original agreement to arbitrate); Glenn Martin Engineering, Inc. v. Huawei Tech. Jamaica Co.,
    Ltd., 
    2010 WL 318504
    (W.D. Mo. January 20, 2010) (forum selection clause in subsequent
    contract did not negate earlier arbitration agreement because the “language of the forum
    selection clause [was] consistent with an intent to address post-arbitration litigation” and “did not
    specifically exclude arbitration.”).
    11
    binding arbitration.’” 
    Id. at 525.
    The court explained: “Both provisions are all-inclusive, both
    are mandatory, and neither admits the possibility of the other.” 
    Id. Furthermore, it
    was “well
    established that a subsequent contract regarding the same matter will supersede the prior
    contract.” 
    Id. at 526
    (quotation omitted). The Applied Energetics court therefore concluded that
    the placement agreement’s provision requiring adjudication superseded the engagement
    agreement’s arbitration provision. 
    Id. See also
    Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Sch.
    Fin. Auth., 
    764 F.3d 210
    , 214 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A]n agreement to arbitrate is superseded by a
    later-executed agreement containing a forum selection clause if the clause ‘specifically
    precludes’ arbitration, but there is no requirement that the forum selection clause mention
    arbitration[.]”).
    Like the parties in Applied Energetics, Buyers and Sellers entered a preliminary
    agreement that contained a mandatory arbitration provision. The NDAFS, which the parties
    executed in anticipation of the later sales agreement, provided that “any dispute relating to this
    Agreement or any other matter shall be fully and finally resolved by binding Arbitration . . . .”
    Buyers and Sellers subsequently executed a comprehensive sales agreement with a contradictory
    forum selection provision. Quotations Paragraph 14 stated: “Any controversy or claim arising
    out of or relating to payment, or to Seller’s Submittal, Buyer and Seller’s Contract, including
    these Terms and Conditions of Sale, or any other matter, shall be settled exclusively in St. Louis
    County Missouri Circuit Court . . . .” Like the forum selection clause in Applied Energetics, the
    language of Quotations Paragraph 14 supersedes the earlier arbitration agreement because it is
    mandatory (“shall be settled exclusively”) and all-inclusive (“any controversy or claim arising
    out of or relating to payment . . . or any other matter.”).
    12
    In fact, Quotations Paragraph 14 communicates more clearly than the placement
    agreement in Applied Energetics the parties’ intent that Buyers settle any disputes exclusively in
    Missouri courts. Where the forum selection provision in Applied Energetics did not mention
    arbitration, Quotation Paragraph 14 provides that “[a]ny controversy or claim . . . be settled
    exclusively in St. Louis County Missouri Circuit Court, or at Seller’s option, by arbitration . . .
    .” (emphasis added). The explicit reference to “St. Louis County Missouri Circuit Court” makes
    clear that the parties intended a judicial forum and precludes resolution by any other means
    except that Sellers, but not Buyers, may elect arbitration. 10       “[Where] the new agreement
    contains terms that are clearly inconsistent with the previously existing contract or claim, the fact
    of inconsistency is itself a sufficient indication of intention to abrogate the old and substitute the
    new.” Berry v. Crouse, 
    376 S.W.2d 107
    , 115 (Mo. 1964) (quoting 6 Corbin on Contracts,
    Section 1296, page 212).
    Having concluded that Quotations Paragraph 14 governs dispute resolution in this case,
    we do not reach Buyers’ second point in which they claim that “the issue of whether this dispute
    is subject to the arbitration clause in the NDAFS is a matter for the arbitrator to decide.” We
    note, however, that “[w]hether a dispute is covered by an arbitration clause is relegated to the
    courts as a matter of law . . . .” Greenwood v. Sherfield, 
    895 S.W.2d 169
    , 174 (Mo.App.S.D.
    1995). See also 50 Plus Pharmacy v. Choice Pharmacy Sys., LLC, 
    463 S.W.3d 457
    , 460
    10
    Moreover, like the placement agreement in Applied Energetics, the Quotations contained a
    provision stating that Sellers sold its goods “solely on the terms and conditions hereof
    notwithstanding any additional or conflicting terms or conditions that may be contained in any . .
    . contract or contract documents . . . all of which additional terms and conditions are hereby
    objected to and rejected by Seller. . . .” In Applied Energetics, the court held that the placement
    agreement’s adjudication clause “specifically preclude[d]” arbitration, “and, by operation of the
    merger clause, displace[d]” the engagement agreement’s arbitration 
    clause. 645 F.3d at 525-26
    .
    Similarly, language in the Quotations manifested the parties’ intent to “displace” NDAFS
    Paragraph 5.
    13
    (Mo.App.W.D. 2015) (“[T]he issue of arbitrability is a question for the courts and is to be
    determined by the contract entered into by the parties.”).
    Because the subsequently executed contract’s dispute resolution provision conflicted with
    and therefore superseded the earlier arbitration agreement, we conclude that the trial court did
    not err in denying Buyers’ motion to compel arbitration and granting Sellers’ motion to stay
    arbitration. Point denied.11
    Conclusion
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Patricia L. Cohen, Judge
    Sherri B. Sullivan, P.J., and
    Kurt S. Odenwald, J., concur.
    11
    Because our analysis of Buyers’ first point is dispositive of this appeal, we do not reach their
    second point on appeal.
    14