Rhiannon Zukowski v. Division of Employment Security , 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 1431 ( 2014 )


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  •                                         In the
    Missouri Court of Appeals
    Western District
    RHIANNON ZUKOWSKI,                          )
    )
    Appellant,                   )   WD77569
    )
    v.                                          )   OPINION FILED:
    )   December 23, 2014
    DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT                      )
    SECURITY,                                   )
    )
    Respondent.                   )
    Appeal from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission
    Before Division Three: Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge
    and Gary D. Witt, Judge
    Rhiannon Zukowski ("Zukowski") appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial
    Relations Commission ("Commission") denying her unemployment benefits because it
    found that Zukowski was discharged for misconduct connected with work. Zukowski
    argues that the Commission erred because Kelly Services, Inc., ("Employer") failed to
    prove that her actions rose to the level of willful misconduct. Because Zukowski does
    not challenge the Commission's conclusion that her actions disregarded the standards the
    Employer had the right to expect, and because the statutory definition of "misconduct" in
    effect at the time of the Commission's decision did not require such conduct to be willful,
    we affirm.
    Factual and Procedural History
    Zukowski was hired by Employer, a temporary help firm, in August 2012. She
    was assigned to do full time work for third-party customers. When she was hired by
    Employer, Zukowski signed a Release and Consent to Drug Screening form in which she
    agreed to submit to drug testing and acknowledged that her refusal to submit to drug
    testing requested by Employer could result in her termination.
    On June 11, 2013, Zukowski began a new assignment in a warehouse with Ted
    Cycles. At about 1 p.m. the same day, a representative from Ted Cycles called Employer
    and requested that Zukowski be removed from the workplace because she smelled of
    alcohol. Employer sent Denise Harris ("Supervisor") to Ted Cycles to inform Zukowski
    of the complaint and to remove her from the workplace.
    Supervisor testified that after she informed Zukowski of the complaint, she told
    Zukowski that she would have to take a drug test. Zukowski testified that she told the
    Supervisor that she uses a strong mouthwash to clean her dentures and that the
    mouthwash was the cause of the alcohol smell. Both Supervisor and Zukowski testified
    that Zukowski told the Supervisor she would be willing to drive herself to the drug
    testing facility to take a drug test. Both Supervisor and Zukowski testified that the
    Supervisor told Zukowski that she could not drive herself to the drug testing facility but
    would need to ask someone to give her a ride. Both Supervisor and Zukowski testified
    2
    that Zukowski told the Supervisor no one could take her because everyone she knew was
    at work.
    Supervisor and Zukowski dispute what occurred next. Supervisor testified that
    Zukowski became upset, said she was done with Employer, then walked to her car and
    left. Supervisor said that Zukowski left before Supervisor had the opportunity to offer
    her a taxi. Zukowski testified that she left because she thought she was in a stalemate
    with Supervisor. There is no dispute that Zukowski did not take a drug test.
    Zukowski filed a claim for unemployment benefits on July 9, 2013. Employer
    filed a protest letter disputing Zukowski's claim on July 22, 2013.                                A Division of
    Employment Security ("DES") deputy determined that Zukowski did not qualify for
    unemployment benefits because she was discharged for misconduct connected with work
    under section 288.030.1(23).1
    Zukowski timely appealed the deputy's decision to the DES Appeals Tribunal.
    The Appeals Tribunal affirmed the deputy's decision denying Zukowski unemployment
    benefits. The Appeals Tribunal deemed Supervisor's testimony credible and thus found
    that Zukowski "just walked away without allowing [Supervisor] an opportunity to offer
    other options of getting her to the drug testing facility. The [Supervisor] understood
    [Zukowski's] actions as a refusal to take the test." The Appeals Tribunal found that
    Zukowski's actions amounted to misconduct because Zukowski "willfully disregarded the
    employer's interest and standards of behavior that the employer had a right to expect."
    1
    We are referring to the version of section 288.030.1(23) in effect prior to its amendment in 2014, as that is
    the version relevant to determination of Zukowski's claim for unemployment benefits.
    3
    Zukowski timely appealed the Appeals Tribunal decision to the Commission. The
    Commission affirmed the Appeals Tribunal decision and adopted its findings of fact and
    conclusions of law.2 The Commission also supplemented its decision by finding that it
    was convinced that Zukowski walked away from Supervisor after Supervisor told
    Zukowski she could not drive herself to the drug testing facility. The Commission held
    that "[w]alking away was not an option, and, at minimum, amounts to insubordination."
    Zukowski now timely appeals the Commission decision, setting forth a single
    point on appeal that she did not commit misconduct because her actions were not willful.
    Standard of Review
    "Appellate review of the Commission's decision in an unemployment case is
    governed by Article 5, Section 18, of the Missouri Constitution and section 288.210."
    Sanders v. Div. of Employment Sec., 
    417 S.W.3d 895
    , 897 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014). "We
    may not reverse, remand, or set aside the Commission's decision unless the Commission
    acted without or in excess of its powers, the decision was procured by fraud, the decision
    was not supported by the facts, or the decision was not supported by sufficient competent
    evidence in the whole record to warrant the making of or the denial of the award."
    Kimble v. Div. of Employment Sec., 
    388 S.W.3d 634
    , 638 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing
    section 288.210; Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 
    121 S.W.3d 220
    , 223 (Mo. banc
    2003)). "The decision we review on appeal is the Commission's," and "[w]e do not
    2
    The Commission affirmed the Appeals Tribunal decision on a 2-1 vote. A dissenting opinion was filed in
    which the dissenting commissioner found that while Zukowski exhibited "very bad judgment" in driving away after
    being told she could not drive herself to the drug testing facility, Zukowski's conduct was "far short of any deliberate
    or conscious attempt to harm employer or its interests."
    4
    review the decision of the Appeals Tribunal except to the extent it is adopted by the
    Commission." 
    Sanders, 417 S.W.3d at 897
    .
    "An appellate court must examine the whole record to determine if it contains
    sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award, i.e., whether the
    award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." 
    Kimble, 388 S.W.3d at 638
    (internal quotations omitted). "In reviewing the Commission's decision, an appellate
    court must view the evidence objectively, not in the light most favorable to the decision
    of the Commission." 
    Id. "However, [o]n
    matters of witness credibility and resolution of
    conflicting evidence, the appellate court defers to the Commission's determinations." 
    Id. "As the
    trier of fact, the Commission may choose to believe or disbelieve all or none of
    the testimony of any witness." Rush v. Kimco Corp., 
    338 S.W.3d 407
    , 410 (Mo. App.
    W.D. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). "The Commission's findings as to fact[s], if
    supported by competent and substantial evidence, in the absence of fraud, are
    conclusive." 
    Id. "While the
    appellate court gives deference to the Commission's findings of fact,
    the court is not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law or the Commission's
    application of law to the facts." 
    Kimble, 388 S.W.3d at 638
    (internal quotations omitted).
    "The determination of misconduct connected with work is a question of law that we
    review de novo." 
    Rush, 338 S.W.3d at 410
    (internal quotations omitted).
    Analysis
    Zukowski's single point on appeal argues that her refusal to take a drug test was
    not willful misconduct authorizing the denial of unemployment benefits. "If a person is
    5
    terminated from his employment for misconduct connected with his work, that person
    may be denied employment security benefits under section 288.050.2."                              
    Rush, 338 S.W.3d at 410
    . Misconduct is defined in section 288.030.1(23) as:
    [1] an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer's interest, [2] a
    deliberate violation of the employer's rules, [3] a disregard of standards of
    behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his or her
    employee, or [4] negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest
    culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or show an intentional and
    substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties
    and obligations to the employer.
    (emphasis added; italicized brackets added).3 "In general, a claimant bears the burden of
    demonstrating that he is entitled to unemployment benefits; however, when the employer
    claims that the applicant was discharged for misconduct, the burden shifts to the
    employer to prove misconduct connected to work." 
    Rush, 338 S.W.3d at 411
    . "The
    employer bears the burden of demonstrating misconduct by a preponderance of the
    evidence." 
    Id. In its
    decision denying Zukowski unemployment benefits, the Commission ruled
    that Zukowski "willfully disregarded the employer's interest and standards of behavior
    that the employer had a right to expect."                    The Commission thus concluded that
    Zukowski's decision to walk away from the Supervisor having made no arrangements to
    take a drug test constituted misconduct under both the first and third categories described
    3
    This section was materially amended by the General Assembly in 2014. The effective date of the amended
    provision is August 28, 2014. Our Opinion addresses and applies the version of the statute in effect at the time
    Zukowski's claim for benefits arose. However, we note that the 2014 amendment eliminates the reference to
    "wanton and willful," and now requires for conduct that amounts to a disregard of the employer's interest or a
    violation of the standards which the employer expects of his or her employee that the conduct be "knowing." RSMo
    section 288.030.1(23) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
    6
    in section 288.030.1(23). If the record supports the Commission's findings as to either of
    these categories of misconduct, we must affirm.
    The Commission found with respect to both categories of misconduct that
    Zukowski's actions were "willful." In Seck v. Dep't of Transp., 
    434 S.W.3d 74
    (Mo. banc
    2014), however, the Missouri Supreme Court held that willfulness need not be
    established for each category of misconduct described in section 288.030.1(23) because
    the degree of scienter required is set forth in the statute itself. 
    Id. at 82.
    Specifically, the
    Supreme Court held that "willfulness" need not be established with respect to the third
    category of misconduct--disregard for the standards of behavior which the employer has
    the right to expect--because the requirement "has no basis in the plain language of section
    288.030.1(23)." 
    Id. at 83.
    The Commission found that the Employer established that Zukowski's conduct
    constituted a disregard for the standards of behavior which the Employer had the right to
    expect and that Zukowski's disregard was willful. In light of Seck, the Commission thus
    found that the Employer established more than section 288.030.1 requires with regard to
    the third category of "misconduct."
    Zukowski does not argue that it was error to conclude that she walked away in
    frustration while discussing arrangements to take the drug test with the Employer. Nor
    does Zukowski contend that that it was error to conclude that her conduct in walking
    away was not an option and, thus, disregarded the standards of behavior which the
    Employer had a right to expect. Zukowski argues only that it was error to characterize
    7
    her conduct as "willful."4           Though this claim of error remains relevant to the first
    category of misconduct described in section 288.030.1(23), the claim of error is
    immaterial to the third category of misconduct described in section 288.030.1(23) in light
    of the Supreme Court's decision in Seck.
    Because Zukowski does not challenge the Commission's conclusion that her
    conduct disregarded the standards the Employer had a right to expect from her, we are
    required to affirm the Commission's decision. It is thus unnecessary for us to address
    whether the Commission's additional conclusion that Zukowski willfully disregarded the
    Employer's interest is supported by the record as a whole.
    Zukowski's sole point on appeal is denied.
    Conclusion
    The Commission's decision denying unemployment benefits is affirmed.
    __________________________________
    Cynthia L. Martin, Judge
    All concur.
    4
    Zukowski admitted during oral argument that her sole point on appeal challenged the Commission's
    conclusion that her conduct was willful.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WD77569

Citation Numbers: 451 S.W.3d 321, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 1431, 2014 WL 7342048

Judges: Mitchell, Martin, Witt

Filed Date: 12/23/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024