Michael Lee Muza v. Dena Leann Muza , 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 1438 ( 2014 )


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  •                In the Missouri Court of Appeals
    Western District
    MICHAEL LEE MUZA,                        )
    Respondent, )
    v.                                       )           WD77431
    )           FILED: December 23, 2014
    DENA LEANN MUZA,                         )
    Appellant. )
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY
    THE HONORABLE KENNETH R. GARRETT, JUDGE
    BEFORE DIVISION ONE: THOMAS H. NEWTON, PRESIDING JUDGE,
    LISA WHITE HARDWICK AND ANTHONY REX GABBERT, JUDGES
    This appeal arises from the circuit court's division of property in the
    judgment dissolving the marriage of Michael Muza ("Husband") and Dena Muza
    ("Wife"). Wife contends the court erred in classifying the future proceeds from a
    pending lawsuit as marital property. Because Wife failed to appear at trial and did
    not present evidence to overcome the presumption of marital property, we find no
    error and affirm the judgment.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Husband and Wife were married on July 8, 2000. Two children were born
    of the marriage. On April 16, 2013, Husband filed a Petition for Dissolution of
    Marriage, for which he later amended. Wife filed an Answer and a Counter-Petition
    for Dissolution. During discovery, Wife failed to comply with the standard
    dissolution requests that were due on June 23, 2013. The trial court ordered Wife
    to provide discovery responses by January 3, 2014, and further ordered that
    discovery was to close on January 10, 2014.
    Prior to trial, the court struck Wife's pleadings as a sanction for failure to
    comply with both the discovery order and an order for payment of guardian ad
    litem fees. The court also granted the motion of Wife's counsel of record to
    withdraw on the basis that Wife had ceased communication with her attorneys.
    Wife failed to appear at the dissolution trial. Husband presented evidence of
    the marital assets and debts. One of the items listed as a marital asset was a
    pending lawsuit that Wife had filed against her former employer, AT&T Mobility
    Services ("AT&T"). Husband's attorney requested the trial court to take judicial
    notice of Husband's Exhibit 6—which was a copy of the petition that Wife had filed
    against AT&T.
    In the pending lawsuit against AT&T, Wife alleged that she was fired on
    November 22, 2011, in retaliation for her complaints regarding sexual harassment
    at work. Wife initially filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights
    ("MCHR") on May 18, 2012. She later received a right to sue notice and filed suit
    against AT&T in the Jackson County Circuit Court on April 1, 2013. In her
    petition, Wife alleged that she suffered substantial damages, including: "lost past
    and future income and employee benefits, humiliation, mental distress, harm to
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    reputation and severe career disruption, plus other pecuniary and non-pecuniary
    actual damages…"
    Following the dissolution trial, the court entered a judgment classifying the
    lawsuit as marital property and awarding Husband 50% of any damages awarded
    in the lawsuit. The court explained:
    [Wife]'s lawsuit was filed during the marriage and alleges relief for
    claims and damages that occurred during the marriage. [Husband]
    shall receive as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any
    right, title or interest of [Wife], fifty percent (50%) of any monetary
    recovery [Wife] receives from said claims as currently set forth and/or
    any subsequent claims or lawsuits arising therefrom.
    Wife appeals, contending the trial court erred in classifying the potential damages
    from the lawsuit as marital property.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We will reverse the trial court only if the judgment was against the weight of
    the evidence, was not supported by substantial evidence, or misstated or
    misapplied the law. Petties v. Petties, 
    129 S.W.3d 901
    , 905 (Mo. App. 2004).
    We will reverse a judgment as against the weight of the evidence "only with
    caution and a firm belief that the judgment is wrong." King v. King, 
    66 S.W.3d 28
    , 32 (Mo. App. 2001). The trial court is vested with broad discretion in
    identifying marital property. 
    Petties, 129 S.W.3d at 905
    . The appellant bears the
    burden of showing trial court error. Taylor v. Taylor, 
    25 S.W.3d 634
    , 638 (Mo.
    App. 2000). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's
    ruling, disregarding contrary evidence. 
    Id. 3 ANALYSIS
    In her sole Point on appeal, Wife contends the trial court erred in awarding
    Husband a portion of her pending lawsuit against AT&T as marital property. She
    points out that her lawsuit seeks damages for future lost earnings, mental distress,
    and humiliation—all of which could qualify as nonmarital property. In response,
    Husband argues that Wife failed to overcome the presumption that all property
    acquired during the marriage is marital property.
    Section 452.330 provides in relevant part that "[i]n a proceeding for
    dissolution of the marriage… the court shall set apart to each spouse such spouse's
    nonmarital property and shall divide the marital property… in such proportions as
    the court deems just after considering all relevant factors…." § 452.330.1. A
    statutory presumption exists that all property acquired by either spouse subsequent
    to the marriage, but before dissolution, is considered to be marital property.
    § 452.330.2. The party challenging that presumption must show by clear and
    convincing evidence that the property is nonmarital. Schubert v. Schubert, 
    366 S.W.3d 55
    , 69 (Mo. App. 2012).
    In considering whether this presumption is triggered, this court must initially
    determine the date the property was acquired. With regard to most property,
    determining the date of acquisition is relatively straightforward, as it is the date the
    property is purchased or received. 
    Petties, 129 S.W.3d at 908
    . In other
    circumstances, however, the date of acquisition is considered to be "when the
    recipient acquires legal rights or interests in the property." 
    Id. This court
    has
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    stated that, in the context of a workers' compensation settlement, "the important
    date is not when [the spouse] received the workers' compensation settlement, but
    rather instead when [the spouse] was injured." 
    Id. Once triggered,
    the presumption of marital property can be overcome in
    cases where one spouse may be entitled to a future damage award or settlement.
    Missouri follows the "analytic method" of classifying money recovered by a spouse
    for injuries sustained during the marriage. In re Marriage of Tullier, 
    989 S.W.2d 607
    , 610–11 (Mo. App. 1999). This method seeks to determine what the award
    was intended to replace. Mistler v. Mistler, 
    816 S.W.2d 241
    , 247 (Mo. App.
    1991). For example, if the recovery is intended to compensate for losses to the
    marital estate—such as loss of wages during marriage—it is marital property.
    Wood v. Wood, 
    193 S.W.3d 307
    , 312 (Mo. App. 2006). Conversely, if the
    recovery is intended to compensate for losses to a spouse's separate estate—such
    as future wages that would be earned post-dissolution—it is his or her separate
    property. 
    Id. In this
    case, the legal rights asserted in Wife’s lawsuit were acquired during
    the marriage, thereby triggering the statutory presumption of marital property
    subject to division under section 452.330. The parties were married on July 8,
    2000. Wife's employment was terminated on November 22, 2011, and she filed
    her administrative claims with the EEOC and the MCHR on May 18, 2012. She
    then filed suit against AT&T in the Jackson County Circuit Court on April 1, 2013.
    All of this occurred during the marriage. Husband did not file his petition for
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    dissolution until April 16, 2013, and the trial court did not enter a judgment
    dissolving the marriage until February 10, 2014. Thus, Wife acquired legal rights
    or interests in the "property" subsequent to the marriage, but before dissolution.
    Therefore, a statutory presumption exists that any damages resulting from the
    lawsuit are marital property. § 452.330.2.
    Because the statutory presumption contained in section 452.330 was
    applicable, the trial court was required to presume that potential proceeds from the
    pending lawsuit are marital property. It was incumbent upon Wife to rebut that
    presumption by introducing clear and convincing evidence that the property is
    nonmarital. See 
    Schubert, 366 S.W.3d at 69
    . However, Wife did not meet that
    burden because she failed to appear at the dissolution proceeding and presented no
    evidence on the issue. Husband presented his statement of marital assets and
    debts, which listed the pending lawsuit as marital property. The presumption of
    marital property was never rebutted.
    The court faced a similar issue in Wood v. Wood, 
    193 S.W.3d 307
    (Mo.
    App. 2006), where the husband had a pending lawsuit against his former employer
    for wrongful termination at the time of the marital dissolution proceeding. The
    court classified the lawsuit as marital property and awarded each party one half of
    the marital interest in the potential proceeds. 
    Id. at 310.
    On appeal, the husband argued that the trial court erred in awarding the wife
    half of the lawsuit's proceeds because the court failed to separately designate
    which components (i.e. damages) of the lawsuit were separate and which were
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    marital. 
    Id. at 312.
    The court rejected the husband's argument, noting that the
    husband failed to produce clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the
    statutory presumption that the property was marital property. 
    Id. The court
    reasoned:
    [The husband]'s employment with [his former employer] ended during
    the marriage, and [the husband] filed the Lawsuit during the marriage.
    [The husband] testified that in the Lawsuit, he was claiming lost
    wages during the marriage, but not after the marriage. Although [the
    husband] expressed some uncertainty as to what specific relief he was
    seeking in the Lawsuit, the trial court was free to believe or disbelieve
    all, part or none of his testimony. Further, [the husband] did not offer
    into evidence his petition filed in the Lawsuit to assist the trial court in
    determining whether or not [the husband] sought relief that might be
    classified as separate property.
    
    Id. at 313–14
    (citations omitted). The court concluded that the trial court had not
    erred in classifying any potential proceeds from the lawsuit as marital property
    because the husband did not meet his burden of showing that a portion of the
    lawsuit proceeds were nonmarital property. 
    Id. at 314.
    Wife argues that Wood, on which Husband relies for support, actually lends
    support to her position. She claims that here, unlike in Wood, the petition that
    Wife filed against AT&T—which describes the particular types of damages for
    which Wife seeks to recover—was entered into the record when the court took
    judicial notice of Husband's own exhibit. She argues that the exhibit is sufficient
    to constitute clear and convincing evidence that a portion of the proceeds would be
    nonmarital property, notwithstanding the fact that she failed to appear at the
    hearing to produce her own evidence.
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    However, Wife cannot merely rely on the fact that the trial court had taken
    judicial notice of Husband's own exhibit—a copy of Wife's petition against AT&T—
    to show that she met her burden. Rebuttable presumptions place upon the party
    against whom the presumption operates the obligation to introduce evidence to
    rebut the presumed fact. Deck v. Teasley, 
    322 S.W.3d 536
    , 539 (Mo. banc
    2010). Wife presented no evidence. We recognize that in meeting its burden, as
    in the case of a defendant's burden of proof with regard to an affirmative defense,
    a party may have the benefit of its own evidence or that given by its opponent.
    Stewart v. K-Mart Corp., 
    747 S.W.2d 205
    , 208 (Mo. App. 1988). However, it is
    not a court's responsibility to invent arguments to aid a party that fails to appear
    and produce evidence to rebut a statutory presumption. See Chandler v. Furrer,
    
    823 S.W.2d 27
    , 29 (Mo. App. 1991).
    Although Wife's petition was entered into evidence in this case, Wife did not
    appear at the hearing to direct the trial court's attention to the language of the
    petition on which she now relies. She failed to present any argument that certain
    types of damages in the pending lawsuit were intended to compensate her for
    losses to her separate estate. Thus, Wife cannot be said to have met her burden in
    overcoming the "strong presumption" that the property was marital property. See
    Roberts v. Roberts, 
    432 S.W.3d 789
    , 794 (Mo. App. 2014); see also Ehrhardt v.
    Volkart, 
    883 S.W.2d 553
    , 555 (Mo. App. 1994) (holding that opponent of child
    support modification failed to rebut prima facie showing of substantial and
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    continuing change in circumstances by failing to appear and produce contrary
    evidence.)
    We conclude that the trial court did not err in classifying the pending lawsuit
    as marital property when it was shown to have been "acquired" during the
    marriage and Wife failed to produce any evidence or argument to rebut the
    statutory presumption. Because Wife failed to show by clear and convincing
    evidence that the property was nonmarital, there was no abuse of discretion. See
    Buckner v. Buckner, 
    912 S.W.2d 65
    , 69 (Mo. App. 1995). The point on appeal is
    denied.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
    ____________________________________
    LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
    ALL CONCUR.
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