STATE OF MISSOURI v. CREGG ALLEN SNYDER ( 2019 )

Missouri Court of Appeals
Southern District
Division One
STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. SD35615
)
CREGG ALLEN SNYDER, ) FILED: November 19, 2019
)
Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PHELPS COUNTY
Honorable John D. Beger
AFFIRMED
Following a jury trial, Cregg Allen Snyder (“Defendant”) was convicted of two counts of
first-degree statutory sodomy involving S.L. (Counts 1 and 2) and two counts of first-degree
statutory sodomy involving T.L. (Counts 3 and 4). See section 566.062. 1
Defendant raises three points on appeal. His first point alleges an abuse of trial court
discretion in the exclusion of certain testimony from Nikki Breuer, a Division of Social Services
(“DSS”) employee, from evidence. His second and third points request plain error review of the
trial court’s submission of jury instructions 13 and 17, the verdict directors for Counts 3 and 4,
respectively. Determining that Defendant’s first point is not preserved for appellate review and
1
All statutory references are to RSMo Cum.Supp. (2006). All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2019).
1
that his requests for plain error review in his second and third points are denied, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.
Briefly summarized and viewed in the light most favorable to the finding of guilt, State v.
Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Mo. banc 2016), the evidence reveals that S.L. and T.L., born
in May 2008 and June 2004, respectively, moved in with Defendant in January 2015 and lived
with him until July 2015. During this timeframe, Defendant committed acts of abuse against S.L
and T.L., which included inserting his penis in S.L.’s mouth and anus, touching T.L’s penis, and
making T.L. touch Defendant’s penis.
Following his convictions on four counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, Defendant was
sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment for each count and those terms were ordered to run
consecutively. Defendant timely appeals.
Additional relevant background is set out, infra, as we discuss Defendant’s three points
relied on. Due to their similarity, Defendant’s second and third points are addressed together.
Discussion
Point 1 – Claim not Preserved for Appellate Review
In his first point, Defendant contends that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion in
sustaining the State’s objection and excluding the testimony of Nikki Breuer[.]” Specifically, he
asserts that the trial court erred in “excluding the testimony of Nikki Breuer that the Division of
Family Services ceased its investigation of [Defendant.]” (Emphasis added.) This evidence,
according to Defendant, “was relevant to show that the children’s story changed, either due to
pressure from investigators or the children’s family, which caused the State to charge these
allegation [sic] and calls into question the children’s credibility.” For the reasons set forth
below, the claim in this point was not preserved for appellate review.
2
At trial, Defendant called Nikki Breuer as a witness and attempted to ask her questions
relating to a July 25, 2016, letter from the Children’s Division in Dent County that was addressed
to Defendant and signed by Breuer (“the letter”). The letter stated that the Children’s Division,
following an investigation into a report alleging sexual abuse by Defendant against S.L. and
H.L., 2 had determined that there was insufficient evidence to conclude based on a preponderance
of the evidence that S.L. and H.L. had been abused.
Following an objection by the prosecutor, the trial court looked over the letter and asked
“For the record, this is marked as Exhibit A; is that correct?” Defense counsel responded, “That
is correct. That was before [H.L.] dropped out of it.” The trial court then indicated that it did not
think that the letter was admissible. Defense counsel responded, “I’m not gonna admit it” and
clarified that “I’m just gonna have her acknowledge that she sent the letter and that it is . . . .”
Before defense counsel could finish, the trial court stated, “You’re gonna have her acknowledge
that she sent a letter saying they were not gonna pursue the investigation?” Defense counsel
responded in the affirmative “as far as [S.L.]” The trial court then stated that it thought the
evidence was irrelevant but “I will send the jury back and let you make an offer of proof, all
right, and we’ll see if you can make it relevant.”
Once the jury was out of the courtroom, defense counsel asked Breuer to identify the
letter, confirm the accuracy of the date and her signature, and confirm that the letter “purport[s]
to conduct business concerning [Defendant.]” Then, without addressing any substance in the
letter, defense counsel stated, “That’s my offer of proof.”
Following another objection by the prosecutor, the trial court stated, “My understanding
is, from what you said at the Bench, you’re not going to offer the letter in evidence?” Defense
2
H.L. is the sibling of S.L. and T.L. No criminal charges against Defendant involving H.L. were brought to trial.
3
counsel responded, “That’s correct.” The trial court then asked why defense counsel thought the
fact that Breuer wrote the letter was relevant. Defense counsel responded, “That the letter did, in
fact, say that they weren’t going to continue the investigation.” The trial court then observed that
defense counsel did not elicit that testimony from Breuer. Asked by the trial court if he had any
objection, the prosecutor stated, “an alternative decision by an independent administrative body
doesn’t have any relevance on the veracity of the allegations.” The trial court then replied, “That
objection will be sustained.”
Following the jury’s findings of guilt, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. None of
the allegations in that motion, however, claim any trial court error in excluding any testimony
elicited from Breuer. Rather, Defendant alleged:
The trial court erred in that initial letters sent to Defendant by the Dent and
Phelps County Division of Family [sic] Services, State of Missouri, concluding
that the entities were closing their respective investigations against Defendant
because there was not sufficient evidence by a preponderance of the evidence to
proceed against Defendant were deemed inadmissible. The trial court’s failure to
allow the admission of said evidence violated Defendant’s rights under the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Sections, 2, 10, 15, 18(a), 19 and 21 of the Missouri S[t]ate
Constitution.
(Emphasis added.) This claim addresses the letter and its content, which Defendant expressly
and affirmatively represented to the trial court that he did not seek to admit at trial.
Now, in this appeal and without explanation, Defendant grafts the letter’s information
that DSS was closing its investigation onto Breuer’s purported testimony at trial and that the trial
court erred in excluding that testimony. As previously noted, however, nothing in the record
supports that such testimony was ever offered to the trial court by Defendant.
“If an objection to the proffered evidence is sustained, the proponent must then make an
offer of proof in order to preserve the record for appeal and to allow the trial court to consider
further the claim of admissibility.” State v. Yole, 136 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Mo.App. 2004).
4
However, “[a] defendant cannot, on appeal, broaden the stated purpose of an offer of proof made
at trial.” State v. Cote, 60 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo.App. 2001); see also State v. Johnson, 207
S.W.3d 24, 43 (Mo. banc 2006) (“A point is preserved for appellate review only if it is based on
the same theory presented at trial.”). Moreover, in a jury-tried case, a claim generally must be
included in a motion for new trial in order to be preserved for appellate review. Rule 29.11(d).
Here, the information that DSS had closed its investigation into Defendant was not
established by Breuer’s testimony as part of Defendant’s offer of proof. Moreover, Defendant
made no claim in his motion for new trial that the trial court erred in excluding any of Breuer’s
testimony. Defendant’s claim raised in this appeal directed toward the exclusion of Breuer’s
testimony, therefore, is not preserved for appellate review. Accordingly, point 1 is denied.
Points 2 and 3 – Requested Plain Error Review Declined
Defendant concedes that his instructional error claims in his second and third points are
not preserved for appellate review in that he did not object to Instructions 13 and 17 as required
by Rule 28.03. He requests that we review for plain error under Rule 30.20. 3
“Rule 30.20 is no panacea which a criminal defendant can use to obtain appellate review
of any alleged error that is unpreserved.” State v. Campbell, 122 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Mo.App.
2004). “[A]n appellate court is not required to engage in plain error review; the decision whether
to grant or deny such a request is left to the court’s discretion.” Id. at 740. “The court may
simply decline to exercise its discretionary authority to review the point for plain error.”
Shifkowski v. State, 136 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Mo.App. 2004). 4
3
Rule 30.20 provides, in pertinent part, “Whether briefed or not, plain errors affecting substantial rights may be
considered in the discretion of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has
resulted therefrom.”
4
In the absence of a request, we may, nevertheless, sua sponte engage in plain error review where we find a
manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., State v. Kimes, 234 S.W.3d 584, 590 (Mo.App. 2007) (sua
sponte found plain error in trial court’s imposition of jail sentence for infraction where only authorized punishment
was a fine).
5
If we exercise our discretion and engage in the requested plain error review of
unpreserved error, a “defendant must show not only that the trial court committed evident,
obvious, and clear error, but also the existence of manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.”
State v. Stuckley, 573 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Mo.App. 2019).
A defendant’s attempt to show that the trial court committed evident, obvious and clear
error where the defendant was represented by counsel at trial, however, also necessarily
implicates that trial counsel’s failure to timely and properly object to such error. In other words,
if the alleged error should have been evident, obvious, and clear to the trial court, it also should
have been evident, obvious, and clear to trial counsel. Trial counsel’s then timely and proper
objection bringing such error to the trial court’s attention would have allowed the trial court to
immediately address and resolve the alleged issue and the defendant’s objection. If the trial
court committed error in resolving either, that error would have been preserved for review for
ordinary prejudice, thereby, making plain error review unnecessary. While only one alleged trial
error is at issue, the two actors involved—the trial court and the defendant’s trial counsel—
implicate two different reviews.
Rule 30.20 plain error review in a direct appeal of a criminal conviction is focused upon
the trial court’s failure to respond to and address the alleged trial court error. A subsequent Rule
29.15 post-conviction review, however, is focused upon trial counsel’s failure to object to that
alleged error. See Rule 29.15(a). Although each has a different focus, they are related in several
respects when the same alleged trial error is at issue in each. First, in the former, the question is
whether the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte intervening in response to that issue and, in
the latter, the question is whether trial counsel was ineffective in not raising an objection to that
issue.
6
Second, in Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 425-29 (Mo. banc 2002), our Supreme Court
compared the Rule 30.20 plain error relief “outcome determinative” standard with the Rule 29.15
post-conviction relief “reasonable probability result would have been different” standard and
held that, even though closely related, they are not equivalent. The former is more stringent than
the “somewhat lower” latter such that “there are a small number of cases in which the application
of the two tests will produce different results.” Id. at 427-28. As illustrated in Deck, even
though no “outcome determinative” plain error was found on direct appeal in the submission of
erroneous jury instructions, id. at 424, the “reasonable probability result would have been
different” post-conviction relief standard was met by trial counsel’s ineffective failure to object
to the submission of those instructions to the jury, id. at 429-31.
Plain error review and post-conviction review for ineffective assistance of trial counsel
are also related in a third respect—trial counsel’s reasonable tactical and strategic trial decisions
defeat both. “Defendant ‘cannot seek plain error review arising from failed tactical and strategic
decisions made at trial.’” State v. Evans, 517 S.W.3d 528, 549 (Mo.App. 2015) (quoting State v.
Turner, 242 S.W.3d 770, 779 (Mo.App.2008)). Likewise, “‘[r]easonable choices of trial
strategy, no matter how ill-fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of
ineffective assistance.’” Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting
Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. banc 2006)).
The application of this shared principle, however, differs in the context of each. When
considered on direct appeal, a trial court does not commit plain error for failing to take action
when the record clearly indicates that the defendant’s counsel strategically allowed that action.
See State v. D.W.N., 290 S.W.3d 814, 817-27 (Mo.App. 2009) (no plain error for failing to
prohibit testimony when the record showed defendant’s counsel strategically chose not to object
7
and allowed the evidence to be admitted). A trial record on direct appeal, however, is not
developed for the purpose of considering and evaluating trial counsel’s motivation in failing to
object and, therefore, may not include all relevant evidence on that issue and may shed little, if
any, light on that issue. On the other hand, in addition to the trial record, the Rule 29.15 motion
court has available to it an expanded record generated in that proceeding specifically developed
for the purpose of determining trial counsel’s motivation in failing to object, which includes
consideration as to whether that failure was in accordance with trial counsel’s execution of a
reasonable trial strategy. See Rule 29.15(i) (court may order on-the-record hearing on claims).
This expanded record affords the Rule 29.15 motion court a more complete evidentiary picture
and, therefore, a better opportunity to appropriately focus upon, consider and evaluate trial
counsel’s inaction and his or her motivation for such inaction. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 564
S.W.3d 380 (Mo.App. 2018).
Fourth, the results of a successful appeal pursuant to Rule 30.20 and of a successful Rule
29.15 motion “are the same: the court vacates the judgment of [a defendant’s] conviction and
remands [the] case for a new trial.” D.W.N., 290 S.W.3d at 826. Because of the “somewhat
lower” standard for Rule 29.15 relief, see Deck, 68 S.W.3d at 427-28, as discussed, supra,
however, a defendant is somewhat more likely to achieve this result in a subsequent Rule 29.15
proceeding than by Rule 30.20 plain error review on direct appeal.
Here, having reviewed and considered the record on appeal, the parties briefs, the alleged
trial error for which plain error review is requested and its integral involvement with trial
counsel’s failure to object, and the related nature of Rule 30.20 plain error review and Rule 29.15
8
review for ineffective assistance of counsel, we decline to exercise our discretionary authority to
review Defendant’s second and third points for plain error. 5
Decision
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
GARY W. LYNCH, P.J. – OPINION AUTHOR
NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, J. – CONCURS
WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J. – CONCURS
5
Defendant’s requests for plain error review are premised upon and purported to be patterned after the instructional
error found by our Supreme Court in State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. banc 2011). As to such requests,
the Western District of our court has previously observed:
Though Celis-Garcia found plain error, notwithstanding the defendant’s tender of verdict directors
that suffered the same defect as those submitted by the state, defendants in future multiple acts
cases should not presume that they will enjoy a perpetual free pass to secure plain error review in
these cases. Notwithstanding that the right to a unanimous jury verdict is an important
constitutional principle, Celis-Garcia has been settled law for several years, rendering it more and
more difficult to excuse a defendant’s failure to object to, and thus preserve, instructional error in
multiple acts cases.
State v. Adams, 571 S.W.3d 140, 144 n.3 (Mo.App. 2018).
9