State of Missouri ex rel. John Roe, Relator v. Hon. Steven H. Goldman ( 2015 )


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  • am the filtesnurt Court of appeals
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    DiVISION FIVE
    STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel.
    JOHN ROE,
    No. ED103564
    Relator,
    Petition for Writ of Prohibition
    vs. St. Louis County Circuit Court-
    HONORABLE STEVEN H. GOLDMAN
    Respondent.
    wvvvvvvvvvvv
    Date: October 30, 2015
    Before Angela T. Quigless, P. J ., James M. Dowd, J. and Philip M. Hess, J.
    PER CURIAM
    Introduction
    This matter comes before the Court on Relator John Roe’s] petition for writ of
    prohibition asserting that Respondent, the Honorable Steven H. Goldman, improperly
    removed Relator from service on the St. Louis County Grand Jury (“Grand Jury”). We
    issued our preliminary order. Respondent filed an answer. We dispense with further
    briefing and oral argument as authorized by Rule 84.240). The preliminary order as
    modified is made permanent.
    I “John Roe” is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the grand juror at issue.
    The procedural posture reievant to our determination is as follows: Relator was
    summoned for service on the St. Louis County Grand Jury for its September 2015 term.
    Respondent was assigned to preside over the selection, empanelrnent, and subsequent
    supervision of the Grand Jury. During the selection process, Respondent learned that
    Relator was an attorney currently employed by a federal agency. Respondent did not
    learn through his voir dire questioning of Relator that Relator had previously worked for
    the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) or that Relator had been one of the ACLU
    attorneys in a lawsuit (“lawsuit”) against the St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney
    (“Prosecuting AttOrney”) that alleged improper conduct in connection with the handling
    of the grand jury that considered the indictment of police officer Darren Wiison
    following the August 2014 death of Michael Brown in Ferguson.
    At the end of the selection process, Respondent selected Relator to serve on the
    Grand Jury and chose Relator to be the foreperscn. The Grand Jury has met twice and
    has considered over fifty cases thus far.
    On September 28, 2015, Respondent made a record in the presence of Relator in
    which Respondent stated that he had learned from the Prosecuting Attorney of a
    purported “potential conflict of interest” arising out of Relator"s prior role in connection
    with the aforementioned lawsuit. Respondent stated that from what he had observed of
    Relator’s service as Grand Jury foreperson, there “wasn’t any particular problem,” but
    that based on the information from the Prosecuting Attorney, Respondent was concerned
    that Relator’s participation in the lawsuit against the Prosecuting Attorney created an
    appearance of a conflict though not an actual conflict, according to Respondent. On that
    basis, Respondent informed Relator that he was being removed from the Grand Jury.
    When Relator requested an opportunity to respond to Respondent’s statements, he was
    allowed to do so off the record.
    Respondent subsequently entered a written order removing Relator from the
    Grand Jury. in that order, Respondent stated that he removed Relator due to Relator’s
    conflict of interest arising out of Relator’s participation in lawsuits against the
    Prosecuting Attorney that “may have affected his conduct in grand jury proceedings as
    foreperson in his inquiry of a police officer witness about police officers not following
    the law and questioning the Prosecutor’s decision to charge offenses.”
    Analysis
    Prohibition is a discretionary writ that may be issued “to prevent an abuse of
    judicial discretion, to avoid irreparable harm to a party, or to prevent exercise of extra-
    jurisdictional power.” State ex rel. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Dem], 
    432 S.W.3d 764
    , 768
    (Mobanc 2014); State ex rel. Wyeth v. Grady, 
    262 S.W.3d 216
    , 219 (Mobanc 2008). A
    trial court abuses its discretion if its ruiing is “clearly against the logic of the
    circumstances then before the court and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the
    !!
    sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration. Johnson V. McCullough,
    
    306 S.W.3d 551
    , 555 (Mobanc 2010).
    In Missouri, the presiding judge assigned to select and supervise a grand jury has
    the authority to remove a juror under certain circumstances set out by statute. Sections
    540.0452, 540.050, and 494.470.3 Sections 540.045 to 540.070 address the circumstances
    2 All statutory citatiOns are to R.S.Mo. (2000) unless otherwise indicated.
    3 This Court acknowledges that other states’ statutes governing the rules regarding challenging grand jurors
    for cause are clearer and more specific than Missouri’s. The Court encourages the legisiature to address this
    issue to provide needed guidance to the courts. Consideration should be given to recommending or
    3
    and procedures pursuant to which a grand juror may be challenged and removed from
    service. Section 540.070 states that “[n]o challenge to the array of grand jurors, or to any
    person summoned as a grand juror, shall be allowed except as provided in section
    540.045 and in section 540.050.” Section 540.045 further provides that “[t]he provisions
    of sections 494.400 to 494.505 relating to the qualifications and disqualifications of petit
    jurors and exemptions from service as a petit juror are applicable to grand jurors drawn
    and selected under the provisions of [Chapter 540].” One of those incorporated sections,
    Section 494.470, sets forth the bases and procedure to be followed by the circuit judge to
    remove a juror for cause.
    Section 494.470 authorizes the presiding judge to remove a grand juror for cause
    for a number of specific reasons including: (1) if he has already formed an opinion
    concerning the matter or fact in controversy in any case that he considers which may
    influence his judgment in them; or (2) if his opinions or beliefs preclude him from
    following the law in any of those cases. Section 494.470.3 states that a challenge to a
    juror for cause requires testimony of the challenged juror under oath or other evidence
    supporting the challenge.
    Here, our inquiry into whether Respondent abused his discretion is limited to the
    record consisting of the transcript dated September 28, 2015 and Respondent's Order of
    the same date. Despite the extensive competing memoranda and factual assertions
    publicly filed by the parties in connection with this writ petition, those matters are not
    properly before us in our review of Respondent’s decision to remove Relator from the
    Grand Jury. Specifically, the subsequent affidavit filed by Respondent which set forth
    requiring that prospective grand juror voir dire and any post-empaneiment challenges for cause he
    conducted on the record.
    additional material not in the transcript as justification for removal of the grand juror is
    not part of the record that this Court can consider. In re Estate of McCahon, 
    729 S.W.2d 67
    , 70 (Mo.App. 1987). Similarly, the factual matters raised in Relator’s pleadings are
    simply not part of this record. 
    Id. We find
    that the record properly before us is entirely inadequate to justify
    Relator’s removal from the Grand Jury for cause. Among other things, there is no
    indication that the challenged juror provided testimony under oath as required by section
    494.4703. We therefore find that Respondent abused his discretion in removing Relator
    from the Grand Jury because Respondent failed to establish an adequate record that
    Relator’s purported conflict of interest justified his removal for cause under the
    aforementioned statutory provisions.
    Turning to the relief sought by Relator here, it is this Court’s firm opinion that the
    secrecy and independence of this Grand Jury have been compromised in part due to the
    public filings by both parties in connection with this writ petition. In Missouri, grand
    jury proceedings are conducted in secret. See Section 540.320; see also sections 540.080,
    540.110. The original rule of secrecy was adopted to protect and promote the public
    welfare. Mannon v. Frick, 
    295 S.W.2d 158
    , 163 (Mo. 1956). The proceedings are
    conducted in secret to protect the jurors themselves, to promote a complete freedom of
    disclosure, to prevent the escape of a person to be indicted before he may be arrested, to
    prevent the subornation of perjury in an effort to disprove facts testified to, and to protect
    the reputations of persons against whom no indictment may be found. 
    Id. at 162.
    Here, several purposes of the Grand Jury in the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit have
    been compromised as well as its secrecy.4 We determine that the public welfare would
    not be served by allowing this Grand Jury to continue its service. Because the veil of
    secrecy surrounding this Grand Jury has been punctured, there is a significant chance that
    any further proceedings would be improperly influenced by the outcome of this writ or
    would be subject to scrutiny and challenge as a result thereof, whether or not Relator is
    reinstated as a grand juror.
    Importantly, in Missouri, grand jury service is merely an obligation—mot a
    rightwf any legally qualified person summoned by the presiding judge of a circuit
    court, until such person is excused or discharged. Section 540.021; see also Powers v.
    Ohio, 499 US. 400, 409 (1991).
    While we recognize that the relief issued by this Court may be extraordinary, we
    believe it is necessary to protect the integrity of the grand jury process. We also
    acknowledge that this relief was not requested by either party. However, given the
    discretionary nature of the prohibition remedy, this Court may accept limitations on the
    issues or examine new points not offered ab initio. State ex rel. Carver v. Wiggle, 
    608 S.W.2d 410
    , 412 (Mo.banc 1980). Moreover, all appellate court, considering prohibition,
    is not completely circumscribed by the prayer in relator's petition. State ex rel. Boll v.
    Weinsrein, 
    295 S.W.2d 62
    , 67 (Mo.banc 1956);
    Therefore, the preliminary order in prohibition is modified to prohibit the current
    Grand Jury from proceeding further. Respondent is directed to adjourn the current Grand
    4 Kim Bell, Court filings illuminate St. Louis County grandjmy controversy, ST. LOUlS POST DISPATCH,
    October 29, 2015, at 1.
    Jury and empanel a new Grand jury as soon as practicable. The preliminary order as
    modified is made permanent.