State of Missouri v. Christopher P. Humble , 474 S.W.3d 210 ( 2015 )

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
STATE OF MISSOURI, )
Appellant, )
v. ) WD78413
)
CHRISTOPHER P. HUMBLE, ) FILED: November 3, 2015
Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CALLAWAY COUNTY
THE HONORABLE GARY M. OXENHANDLER, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION TWO: MARK D. PFEIFFER, PRESIDING JUDGE,
LISA WHITE HARDWICK AND JAMES E. WELSH, JUDGES
Christopher Humble was charged with possession of a controlled substance
following the warrantless search of the vehicle he was driving. The circuit court
granted Humble’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the trunk of the
vehicle. In this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Section 547.200.1(3),1 the State
contends the court erred in suppressing the evidence because the trunk search was
justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest and under the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement. For reasons explained herein, we find no error and
affirm the suppression order.
1
All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2000, as updated by the 2013
Cumulative Supplement, unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the afternoon of January 20, 2014, Trooper David Fouch of the Missouri
State Highway Patrol received a call that a black Chevrolet Malibu was driving on
Interstate 70 in a careless manner. Shortly thereafter, Fouch observed the vehicle,
driven by Humble,2 following another vehicle too closely. Fouch entered the
highway to initiate a traffic stop. Humble immediately exited the interstate, turned
south on a county road and then turned west on a state highway. Fouch activated
his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle.
Upon approaching the vehicle, Fouch noticed that Humble’s eyes appeared
watery and that he rubbed them continuously. Humble explained that he had
exited the interstate because he was tired and was looking for a place to rest.
Humble complied with the Trooper’s request to exit the vehicle and sit in the front
passenger seat of the patrol car. Suspicious that Humble was driving while
intoxicated based on his watery eyes, mumbling, and “unsteady” movement, Fouch
conducted a series of field sobriety tests inside the patrol car, which Humble
“successfully” completed.
Fouch asked whether Humble had taken any drugs, which Humble initially
denied. Fouch asked whether a canine sniff would reveal the presence of drugs.
Humble admitted that a single strip of Suboxone3 was located in the center console
of the vehicle. He further admitted that he had taken one earlier that day. Fouch
2
The record indicates that Humble did not own the vehicle but had permission to use it.
3
Suboxone is a controlled medication for the treatment of opiate dependence.
2
read Humble his Miranda4 rights, but informed him that he was not under arrest.
Fouch told Humble that he was going to search the vehicle. Humble denied Fouch
permission to search the vehicle but offered to retrieve the Suboxone for him.
When another officer arrived at the scene, Fouch approached the vehicle to
begin a search. Humble rolled down the patrol car’s window and again told Fouch
that he did not grant permission to search the car. Fouch then allowed Humble to
exit the patrol car and retrieve the Suboxone from the center console. Fouch saw
syringes in the console during this retrieval process.
Fouch took Humble back to the patrol car and placed him in handcuffs for
officer safety. He told Humble that he was going to search the rest of the car and
asked if there was anything that he needed to know about before he did so.
Humble told him that syringes were located in the center console. Fouch searched
the center console, finding the syringes and also found a green substance, which
Humble identified as Roxicodone.5 Humble admitted that he used the syringes to
inject the Roxicodone. Fouch searched the remainder of the passenger
compartment and then opened the trunk, where he found approximately eighteen
pounds of marijuana. He returned to the patrol car and placed Humble under
arrest.
Humble was charged with three counts of possession of a controlled
substance arising from the discovery of the Suboxone, Roxicodone, and marijuana.
4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
5
Roxicodone is an immediate-release oral formulation of oxycodone, a controlled substance.
3
He was also charged with possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use
based on the syringes found in the center console. Humble filed a motion to
suppress the physical evidence obtained from his vehicle, arguing that the search
lacked probable cause and was not within any exception to the warrant
requirement.
Following a hearing on the motion and additional briefing by the State, the
court entered an order suppressing the evidence found within the trunk. The order
explained:
After due consideration, notwithstanding Defendant repeatedly
indicating that no consent was given to the search of his vehicle, he
did consent to the search of the passenger compartment. At the time
of the search of Defendant’s trunk, Defendant was secured in the
Trooper’s vehicle – he had no access to weapons, he couldn’t destroy
any evidence. The Trooper searched the trunk without consent and
he had no authority to do so – he should have gotten a warrant. . .
The theory of inevitable discovery is not available as no evidence was
adduced that the vehicle would be impounded, that an impoundment
protocol was in place and that that protocol required an inventory of
any property located in the trunk. Motion to suppress granted as to
items seized in trunk, only.
The State appeals the suppression order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to a
determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision.”
State v. Irvin, 210 S.W.3d 360, 361 (Mo. App. 2006). We review the trial court’s
decision to grant a motion to suppress under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
State v. Selvy, 462 S.W.3d 756, 764 (Mo. App. 2015). We will reverse the
4
ruling only if it is clearly erroneous. Irvin, 210 S.W.3d at 361. The trial court’s
ruling is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm impression that a
mistake has been made. Id. at 361–62. We view all facts and reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 362. “If the
trial court’s ruling is plausible, in light of the record viewed in its entirety, we will
not reverse.” Selvy, 462 S.W.3d at 764. Despite the deference we afford the trial
court’s order, “[t]he ultimate issue of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated
is a question of law . . . which this court reviews de novo.” State v. Ramires, 152
S.W.3d 385, 391 (Mo. App. 2004).
ANALYSIS
In its sole point on appeal, the State contends the circuit court clearly erred
in suppressing the marijuana found in the trunk of the vehicle that Humble was
driving. The State asserts that the search of the trunk was justified as a search
incident to a lawful arrest. The State also argues that Trooper Fouch had probable
cause to believe that drugs were in the vehicle and, therefore, the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement justified the search of the trunk.
At a hearing on a motion to suppress, “[t]he State has the burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the motion to suppress should be
denied.” State v. Avent, 432 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Mo. App. 2014) (citation
omitted). “This includes both the burden of producing evidence and the risk of
non-persuasion.” State v. Emmett, 346 S.W.3d 418, 419 (Mo. App. 2011). In
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, “the trial court may believe or disbelieve
5
all or any part of the testimony presented by the State, even if uncontradicted, and
the court may find that the State failed to meet its burden of proof.” Selvy, 462
S.W.3d at 764.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Williams,
382 S.W.3d 232, 234 (Mo. App. 2012). “This same right is guaranteed by article
I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution.” Id. (citation omitted). Warrantless
searches and seizures are thus deemed presumptively unreasonable, “subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 235
(citation omitted).
The State first argues that the trunk search was a valid search incident to
Humble’s lawful arrest. The State asserts that at the time Fouch searched the
trunk, Humble had already been arrested for possessing the Suboxone and
Roxicodone. The State claims that because it was reasonable to believe that
further evidence relevant to possession of Suboxone and Roxicodone might be
found inside the vehicle, Fouch was authorized to search the trunk. The State
contends the U.S. Supreme Court expressly authorized such a search in Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009).
In Gant, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of allowing the
warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest is to protect the arresting officer
and prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence. Id. at 337–38, 129 S. Ct.
1710. The Court held that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent
6
occupant’s arrest “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710. Thus, a
police officer who has made a lawful arrest of a vehicle occupant may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the vehicle if the officer reasonably
believes evidence of the crime of arrest will be found within the vehicle. State v.
Dickson, 252 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Mo. App. 2008).
We note, however, that the State never argued to the circuit court that the
search of the trunk was a valid search incident to arrest. The circuit court invited
briefing on this issue at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, stating, “The
Court particularly desires the brief to address the issue of the fact that the trooper
had [Humble] secured in his vehicle and didn’t procure a search warrant.” In its
post-hearing briefing, however, the State focused its argument solely on the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, attempting to justify the search
based on probable cause. The State produced no evidence at the hearing to
establish that it was reasonable for Fouch to believe that more evidence relevant to
possession of Suboxone and Roxicodone would be found in the trunk. Fouch
testified that after handcuffing Humble based on the Suboxone found in the center
console, he returned to Humble’s vehicle to “conduct a probable cause search.”
Thus, at the hearing the State attempted to show that the automobile exception
justified further search of the vehicle. Therefore, the State failed to meets its
7
burden of producing evidence and persuading the circuit court that the search
incident to arrest exception applied.
The State also attempts to justify the warrantless search of Humble’s trunk
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Under the automobile
exception, “police may search a vehicle and seize contraband found if there is
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent
circumstances necessitate the search.” State v. Walker, 460 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Mo.
App. 2015) (citation omitted). Exigent circumstances exist whenever an
automobile is involved. Id. at 86. Probable cause exists when the objective facts
at the time of the search would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that
the vehicle contained contraband. Id.
The State argues that the “facts and circumstances [surrounding the stop of
Humble’s vehicle] would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that
[Humble]’s vehicle contained contraband.” (Emphasis added). The State relies on
U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), in
which the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[i]f probable cause justifies the search
of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and
its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Thus, the State argues
that because Trooper Fouch had probable cause to believe that Suboxone was in
the vehicle, he had the authority to search every part of the vehicle, including the
trunk.
8
However, the State’s argument disregards the fact that the scope of a
warrantless search of an automobile is defined by “the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” Id. at
824. Probable cause to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle does not
automatically establish probable cause to search the trunk. As the Fifth Circuit
explained in U.S. v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1107 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993):6
The [United States] Supreme Court has made a distinction between
probable cause to believe that drugs are in a particular section of the
car, and probable cause to believe that drugs are generally within the
car. In Ross, the Court stated, “probable cause to believe that a
container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence
does not justify a search of the entire cab.” Whereas on the next
page, the Court states, “if probable cause justifies a search of a
lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”
Thus, if officers have probable cause to believe that contraband is in
only one part of the car, then they are limited to that area. If, on the
other hand, officers have probable cause to believe that contraband is
located somewhere in the car, but they don’t know exactly where,
then they can search the entire vehicle.
(Emphasis added) (citations omitted).7
The State contends there were several factors that established probable
cause to search Humble’s entire vehicle, including: (1) Humble’s evasive behavior;
(2) Humble’s admission that the center console contained Suboxone; (3) the
discovery of Suboxone, syringes, and Roxicodone in the center console; and (4)
6
The Missouri Supreme Court cited Seals favorably in State v. Lane, 937 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Mo.
banc 1997).
7
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 591, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Ross decision was supported by “practical considerations
that apply to searches in which the police have only generalized probable cause to believe that
contraband is somewhere in a vehicle.”) (emphasis added).
9
Humble’s admission that he used the syringes to inject the Roxicodone. Based on
the record, we find these factors insufficient to meet the State’s burden.
At the time Trooper Fouch initially placed Humble in his patrol car, Fouch had
no suspicion that drugs were in the vehicle. This is apparent from the court’s
questioning of Fouch during the suppression hearing:
[Q]: So at the time you put Mr. Humble in your patrol car, was there
any indication that there were drugs in the car? Any – had you
seen the syringes? Had you – there was nothing there to
indicate there were drugs in the car at that time --
[A]: Correct.
While in the patrol car, Humble admitted that a strip of Suboxone was
located in the center console of his vehicle. The State argued to the circuit court
that “[a]t that point the trooper had probable cause to believe there was a
controlled substance in the vehicle, and therefore, probable cause to search the
vehicle.” However, Fouch had probable cause to believe only that contraband was
in the center console of the vehicle. Because the scope of a warrantless search is
defined by the object of the search (a single strip of Suboxone) and the places in
which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found (the center console),
Fouch did not have authority to search anywhere else within the vehicle based on
the automobile exception.8
8
The State cites State v. Lane, 937 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. banc 1997) and State v. Irvin, 210 S.W.3d
360 (Mo. App. 2006) for the proposition that discovery of contraband in the passenger
compartment of a vehicle automatically provides the necessary probable cause to search the trunk.
However, in neither of those cases had the defendant directed the officer directly to the exact
location within the car in which the contraband was contained before the search. Moreover, unlike
10
Although Fouch lacked probable cause to believe drugs were contained
outside the center console, he placed Humble in handcuffs and told him that he
was going to search the rest of the car. He then asked Humble if there was
“anything else” that he would find that he needed to know about. Humble
admitted that the center console also contained syringes. Fouch searched the
center console and found the syringes along with a small amount of Roxicodone.
Humble admitted that he used the syringes to inject the Roxicodone. Fouch then
resumed his search of the remainder of the passenger compartment and opened the
trunk to find marijuana.
We find that the State failed to establish how the fact that the center
console contained Suboxone and Roxicodone—which was consistent with Fouch’s
original suspicion that Humble was in some way driving while impaired—would lead
a reasonably prudent person to believe that contraband could be found in the trunk
of the car. The circuit court apparently concluded that the State failed to meet its
burden of persuading it that the discovery in the center console of a small amount
of Roxicodone and the syringes used to inject it was indicative of more drugs in the
trunk. At most, Fouch would have had probable cause to believe that more drugs
of which Humble may have been under the influence may be located in the
passenger compartment to which Humble had immediate access. However, the
here, the State in Irvin adduced evidence at the suppression hearing establishing that additional
marijuana was likely to be found in the trunk based on its discovery in the passenger compartment.
210 S.W.3d at 361.
11
circuit court was not persuaded that the circumstances indicated a fair probability
that the trunk would also contain drugs.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling and
disregarding all contrary inferences, the circuit court’s determination that Fouch did
not have probable cause to search the trunk is not clearly erroneous. “The
meaning of ‘probable cause’ is a legal issue; its existence is a factual question,
determined here by the trial court upon a presentation of the facts apparent to the
trooper at the time he made the decision to search” the trunk of Humble’s car.
State v. Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Mo. banc 1990). The State failed to meet
its burden of producing evidence and persuading the circuit court that an exception
to the warrant requirement applied.
We are not left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been
made. The State’s point on appeal is denied.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the circuit court’s suppression order.
__________________________________
LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
ALL CONCUR.
12