In the Interest of: O.J.B., Juvenile Officer v. E.B. and T.B. ( 2014 )


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  •                                              In the
    Missouri Court of Appeals
    Western District
    
    IN THE INTEREST OF: O.J.B.,                      
    RESPONDENT,                              WD76687
    JUVENILE OFFICER,                                
    RESPONDENT,                              OPINION FILED:
    v.                                               
       JULY 22, 2014
    E.B. AND T.B.,                                   
    APPELLANTS.                          
    
    
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri
    The Honorable Justine Elisa Muro, Judge
    Before Division One: Joseph M. Ellis PJ., Karen King Mitchell, Anthony Rex Gabbert, JJ.
    E.B. and T.B. (Parents) appeal pro se the circuit court‟s judgment denying a “Motion For
    Dismissal” filed by E.B. (Father) on July 23, 2013. Parents assert four points on appeal. First,
    they contend that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to dismiss because the court failed
    to review or acknowledge evidence that demonstrated the Juvenile Officer and a Juvenile Officer
    witness knowingly withheld exculpatory evidence, thereby violating their rights to due process.
    Second, Parents contend that the court erred in denying the motion to dismiss because the court
    refused to hear, review, or acknowledge evidence that the Juvenile Officer and a Juvenile Officer
    witness coerced a stipulation, thereby violating Parents‟ rights to due process. Third, Parents
    assert that the court erred in denying the motion to dismiss because the court failed to review or
    acknowledge evidence that the Juvenile Officer knowingly used false and misleading
    information to bias the court, thereby denying Parents the right to a fair trial and procedural due
    process. Finally, Parents contend that the court erred in denying the motion because the court
    refused to hear, review, or acknowledge that the Juvenile Officer lacked standing to bring the
    case because the evidence used to bring the case was manufactured, fabricated, misrepresented,
    and engineered to be destructive to Parents, thereby violating their rights to due process. We
    affirm the circuit court‟s judgment.
    On October 26, 2011, the Juvenile Officer filed a petition alleging O.J.B. to be without
    proper care, custody, or support and subject to the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to Section
    211.031.1, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2005. The petition alleged that Parents neglected O.J.B. The
    petition alleged that O.J.B. had significant developmental delays and a seizure disorder and, at
    seven years of age, was non-verbal, unable to walk, and required twenty-four hour care. The
    petition alleged that, after Parents voluntarily placed O.J.B. in a Department of Mental Health
    (DMH) residential facility in May of 2011, the parents repeatedly inhibited facility staff from
    providing the child with necessary and appropriate medical treatment. The petition alleged that,
    O.J.B. required follow-up with a neurologist in July of 2011 but, as of October 26, 2011, it had
    not been received. The petition alleged that the parents refused to give consent for the child‟s
    treatment at Children‟s Mercy Hospital, the only local hospital with the ability to adequately treat
    the child‟s special medical needs and that accepted the child‟s insurance. The petition alleged
    that Parents failed or refused to regularly visit the child, call to inquire into the child‟s well-
    being, or take part in his care and treatment. The petition alleged that Parents had visited the
    child only twice since his placement at the DMH facility and that the child was at risk of further
    harm or neglect absent court intervention.
    2
    Each parent was appointed separate counsel and Parents and counsel appeared at a case
    management conference on November 16, 2011. The record reflects that, on December 19,
    2011, counsel for each parent filed motions to withdraw. On that same date, Father filed a
    Motion to Dismiss the pending juvenile matters. On December 20, 2011, the court held an
    adjudication hearing. At that hearing, Mother‟s attorney withdrew her motion to withdraw and
    the court denied Father‟s attorney‟s motion. The court stated in its Order Upon Adjudication
    Hearing that both parents stipulated to the allegations in the Juvenile Officer‟s petition and
    further stated: “Testimony being heard and other evidence received by the Court, the Court finds
    that the evidence adduced sustains the allegations in Count 1 by clear, cogent and convincing
    evidence.” A dispositional hearing was held on January 20, 2012, where each parent was
    represented by new counsel. The court entered Findings and Recommendations on that date and
    a final judgment was entered.
    On May 2, 2012, the court held a case review hearing where parents appeared represented
    by their respective counsel. Findings and Recommendations were entered and subsequently
    adopted as a final judgment. Thereafter, on July 27, 2012, October 17, 2012, January 23, 2013,
    and July 29, 2013, additional review/permanency planning hearings were held where the parents
    were either represented by counsel or represented themselves pro se. Final judgments were
    entered after each of those hearings. Just prior to the July 29, 2013 hearing, Father filed a pro se
    “Motion for Dismissal” which was denied by the court in its judgment following that hearing.
    Parents appeal that denial.
    We review juvenile adjudication proceedings under the standard applied in other court-
    tried civil cases and will affirm the judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it,
    it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. In re
    3
    A.G.R., 
    359 S.W.3d 103
    , 108 (Mo. App. 2011). Ordinarily, a denial of a motion to dismiss is not
    considered a final judgment and is not appealable. In re Halverson ex rel. Sumners, 
    362 S.W.3d 443
    , 448 n7 (Mo. App. 2012). However, an order denying a motion to dismiss can be considered
    as part of the appeal from a final judgment. 
    Id. Here, Parents
    appeal the court‟s July 29, 2013
    judgment which contained the denial of Father‟s motion to dismiss. “This Court‟s review of a
    trial court‟s denial of a motion to dismiss under Rule 67.03 is limited to an abuse of discretion.”
    Stine v. Stine, 
    401 S.W.3d 567
    , 570 (Mo. App. 2013).
    Preliminarily, we address the Juvenile Officer‟s various motions that were taken with the
    case and deny each. The Juvenile Officer moves to strike Parents‟ amended pro se brief and/or
    dismiss the appeal on the grounds that Parents‟ points in the appeal brief fail to contain the
    applicable standard of review, that the table of contents of the brief fails to comply with Rule
    84.04(a), and that Parents failed to provide a transcript of the evidentiary hearing. The Juvenile
    Officer additionally moves to strike the Questions Presented section of Parents‟ brief.
    Pro se appellants are held to the same standards as attorneys and an appellate court is
    prohibited from acting as a party‟s advocate. Maskill v. Cummins, 
    397 S.W.3d 27
    , 30 (Mo. App.
    2013). However, we “prefer to resolve an appeal on the merits of a case rather than to dismiss an
    appeal for deficiencies in the brief.” Payne v. Markeson, 
    414 S.W.3d 530
    , 545 (Mo. App. 2013).
    As we can ascertain Parents‟ arguments despite any deficiencies and can decide the matter
    without advocating for the appellant, we decline to dismiss the appeal for the deficiencies alleged
    in the Juvenile Officer‟s motions.
    Parents‟ four points purport to challenge the circuit court‟s denial of Father‟s motion to
    dismiss which was filed prior to the July 29, 2013, permanency hearing that resulted in a final
    judgment. Pursuant to Section 210.720, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2013, permanency hearings are
    4
    statutorily required to be held by the court and are for the purpose of determining, in accordance
    with the best interests of the child, a permanent plan for the placement of the child. Pursuant to
    Section 207.020.1(17), RSMo 2000, the juvenile court must have first acquired jurisdiction
    pursuant to Section 211.031 in order for permanency hearings under Section 210.720 to be
    applicable. Thus, an adjudication hearing pursuant to Section 211.031 to determine whether the
    juvenile court has grounds to acquire jurisdiction because, for example, the parents of a child are
    alleged to be neglecting the child, is different in content and purpose from a permanency hearing
    conducted after jurisdiction has been acquired.1 Here, Parents appeal a judgment from a
    permanency hearing. However, none of Parents‟ points on appeal reference or relate to
    permanency planning issues determined in the judgment from which they appeal. Rather, all
    issues and points raised either attack the court‟s assumption of jurisdiction or raise issues related
    to the adjudication that are immaterial to the judgment from which they appeal.
    Parents‟ first point alleges that the court failed to review or acknowledge evidence that
    demonstrated the Juvenile Officer and a Juvenile Officer witness knowingly withheld
    exculpatory evidence. Parents argue that they have requested the return of medical records that
    have not been returned and that the Children‟s Division and other entities withheld significant
    evidence from them until after “a stipulation was coerced.” This clearly relates to the
    adjudication and Parents‟ stipulation to that adjudication. Similarly, Parents‟ second point
    1
    Rule 124.06c states that, at the adjudication hearing, the court shall determine what allegations in the
    petition or motion to modify are admitted and receive evidence on the allegations that have not been admitted. Rule
    124.07a states that, after the adjudication hearing, a dispositional hearing must be held. At the dispositional hearing,
    the court shall make findings on the legal and physical custody of the juvenile, on whether the children‟s division is
    required to engage in reasonable efforts to reunify the family, the services required to reunify the family, and shall
    schedule a future dispositional review hearing or, when appropriate, a permanency hearing. Rule 124.07c and e4.
    Rule 124.09 sets forth the permanency hearing requirements and guidelines. Rule 124.10 addresses permanency
    review hearings. Of note, the dispositional review hearings, permanency hearings, and permanency review hearings
    may be as formal or informal as the court considers appropriate and only in the adjudication hearings do the rules of
    evidence apply. Rule 124.06c; Rule 124.08a; Rule 124.09a; Rule 124.10a.
    5
    references the adjudication by alleging that the court refused to hear, review, or acknowledge
    evidence demonstrating that the Juvenile Officer knowingly coerced the Parents‟ stipulation to
    the allegations. Parents‟ third point on appeal focuses on the adjudication by alleging that the
    court failed to review or acknowledge evidence that the Juvenile Officer used false and
    misleading information to bias the court. Parents charge that the Juvenile Officer falsely accused
    Father of having a restraining order against him for threatening a social worker. This was in
    reference to what appears from the file to be an Ex Parte Order of Protection obtained by a social
    worker on October 27, 2011. The adjudication hearing was held two months afterward on
    December 20, 2011. Parents‟ fourth point on appeal also argues pre-adjudication matters and
    alleges that “what evidence was used to bring the case was manufactured, fabricated,
    misrepresented and engineered to be destructive to the appellants . . . by fabricating a false
    jurisdiction for the court.”
    “Generally, the validity of a judgment can only be attacked by direct appeal, not by
    collateral attack.” Reid v. Steelman, 
    210 S.W.3d 273
    , 282 (Mo. App. 2006). “The need for
    certainty and finality of judgments compels this rule.” 
    Id. Section 211.261,
    RSMo 2000,
    provides that “[a]n appeal shall be allowed to a parent from any final judgment, order or decree
    made under the provisions of this chapter which adversely affects him.” The appeal “shall be
    filed within thirty days after the final judgment, order or decree has been entered[.]” § 211.261.
    Parents did not appeal the January 20, 2012 judgment.2 If Parents were to attempt to directly
    2
    We note that, although the adjudication occurred on December 20, 2011, the adjudication order was not
    appealable until the dispositional hearing on January 20, 2012, and the judgment thereafter. “Once the trial court
    issues a judgment that includes the disposition or treatment of the juvenile, „all the issues before the . . . court have
    been disposed and nothing has been left for future determination, and the judgment is final and appealable.‟”
    Juvenile Officer v. A.S.M., 
    423 S.W.3d 824
    , 829 (Mo. App. 2014) (quoting In re C.A.D., 
    995 S.W.2d 21
    , 26 (Mo.
    App. 1999).
    6
    appeal that judgment now, we would have no authority to review the merits as the time for
    appeal has long lapsed. 3 See Spicer v. Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Trust, 
    336 S.W.3d 466
    , 471 (Mo. banc 2011). Instead, Parents attempt to indirectly attack that judgment via an
    appeal of the July 29, 2013 judgment. All four of Parents‟ points on appeal relate back to the
    January 20, 2012 judgment and are unrelated to permanency planning issues determined in the
    July 29, 2013 judgment. This is an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment. As
    Parents‟ points on appeal arise from Father‟s motion to dismiss, we conclude that the circuit
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion. All points on appeal are denied and we
    affirm the circuit court‟s judgment.
    Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge
    All concur.
    3
    Although Rule 74.06 allows for relief from a judgment for, among other things, fraud, motions for relief
    pursuant to this rule must be made no more than one year after the judgment or order was entered. Rule 74.06(c).
    Thus, even if Father‟s motion to dismiss might have been considered a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 74.06, the
    motion would have still been untimely under the rule. Parents do not argue Rule 74.06 applicability.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WD76687

Judges: Ellis, Mitchell, Gabbert

Filed Date: 7/22/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024