DANNY HARNESS and FAYE SAVAGE, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. JIM RICHARDSON, HAZEL THOMAS, BETTY NICHOLS, MIKE PRITCHETT, and RODNEY SANFORD ( 2014 )


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  • DANNY HARNESS and FAYE SAVAGE, )
    )
    Plaintiffs-Respondents,  )
    )
    vs.                            )                 No. SD32585
    )
    JIM RICHARDSON, HAZEL THOMAS, )                  Filed: January 14, 2014
    BETTY NICHOLS, MIKE PRITCHETT, )
    and RODNEY SANFORD,            )
    )
    Defendants-Appellants.   )
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TANEY COUNTY
    Honorable Mark E. Orr, Circuit Judge
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
    This is an appeal from the trial court's decision in a declaratory judgment
    case. Danny Harness ("Harness") and Faye Savage ("Savage") (collectively,
    "Plaintiffs") sued Betty Nichols ("Nichols"), Mike Pritchett ("Pritchett"), Rodney
    Sanford ("Sanford"), Jim Richardson ("Richardson"), and Hazel Thomas
    ("Thomas") (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiffs alleged (1) Defendants were
    members of the board of directors of Treasure Lake R.V. Resort and Camping
    Club, Inc. ("Treasure Lake") and (2) Defendants' actions removing Harness and
    Savage from Treasure Lake's board of directors were illegal and unauthorized.
    Among other things, Plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the removals were
    null and void and (2) reinstatement to the Treasure Lake board of directors. The
    defendants were all sued as individuals and not as members of the board of
    directors of Treasure Lake. Even though the corporation, Treasure Lake, was
    never made a party to this action, the trial court granted the request to reinstate
    Plaintiffs to the board of directors of the corporation. Defendants appeal,
    arguing, inter alia, that the trial court's judgment must be reversed based on the
    failure to join the corporation as a party. We agree with the argument and
    reverse the trial court's judgment.
    Standard of Review
    "When reviewing a declaratory judgment, the standard of review is the
    same as other court-tried cases." Jones v. Jones, 
    285 S.W.3d 356
    , 359 (Mo.
    App. S.D. 2009). "We will affirm the trial court's judgment unless there is no
    substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it
    erroneously declares or applies the law." Sterling Inv. Group, LLC v. Board
    of Managers of Brentwood Forest Condominium Ass'n, 
    402 S.W.3d 95
    ,
    97 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Treasure Lake is a Missouri not-for-profit corporation organized to
    operate a property for camping and recreation in Taney County, Missouri. The
    management of Treasure Lake is vested in the board of directors by Treasure
    Lake's bylaws. The bylaws provide for seven directors who are elected by a vote
    of the members to serve three year terms.
    Harness was elected to be a member of the board of directors. Savage was
    appointed by the board of directors to fill the vacant position of an elected
    2
    director. The five Defendants and the two Plaintiffs comprised the board of
    directors during the relevant time periods.
    On October 8, 2012, Richardson called a special meeting of the board of
    directors to be held on October 15, 2012. At the meeting the board voted five to
    one to remove Harness for cause and voted five to zero to remove Savage for
    cause.
    Harness filed a petition for declaratory relief on October 17, 2012. The
    petition was later amended to add Savage as an additional plaintiff. In the
    amended petition, Plaintiffs alleged Defendants' actions to remove them from the
    board were illegal and unauthorized. Plaintiffs sought (1) a temporary
    restraining order prohibiting action by the Treasure Lake board of directors
    based on the removal of Plaintiffs, (2) a declaration that the removals were null
    and void, (3) reinstatement on the board of directors, (4) damages, (5) attorney's
    fees, and (6) costs. The petition was brought against the Defendants solely in
    their individual capacities. Treasure Lake was not included at any time as a
    defendant.
    On October 19, 2012, Treasure Lake filed a motion to intervene. The trial
    court never granted the corporation leave to intervene. A temporary restraining
    order against the Defendants, individually and acting as board members of
    Treasure Lake, was entered on October 25, 2012. On October 26, 2012, the board
    appointed two new members to replace Harness and Savage. Because of the
    temporary restraining order, those board members attended meetings but did
    not vote.
    3
    A trial was held on January 16, 2013. Testimony was elicited that at the
    time of trial Nichols, Pritchett, and Sanford were no longer serving on the board.
    The only defendants who were still members of the board at the time of trial were
    Richardson and Thomas. Other individuals had either been elected or appointed
    to fill the vacancies caused by the departure of Nichols, Pritchett, and Sanford.
    No attempt was made to amend the amended petition to include these new
    members of the board of directors.
    On February 14, 2013, the trial court entered judgment against
    Defendants, concluding:
    the vote taken by the Defendants as the [b]oard of [Treasure Lake]
    on 10/15/12 to remove Danny Harness was of no effect and did not
    remove him from the board. The vote taken by the Defendants as
    the [b]oard of [Treasure Lake] on 10/15/12 to remove Faye Savage
    was of no effect and did not remove Faye Savage from the board.
    Costs were assessed against Defendants, and all other relief was denied.
    Defendants appealed.
    Discussion
    While Defendants stated several points for reversal, the final point is
    dispositive. In Defendants' fourth point, they argue "[t]he trial court erred by
    ruling that the votes to remove Harness and Savage were void and of no effect,
    because an indispensable party is absent, in that [Treasure Lake] has a vital
    interest in the determination of who are and are not members of its [b]oard of
    [d]irectors, but it was never made a party to the lawsuit." In support, they cite
    Rule 52.041 and Jones, 
    285 S.W.3d 356
    . This argument has merit.
    1   All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2013).
    4
    Rule 87 governs declaratory actions. Rule 87.04 provides "[w]hen
    declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim
    any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
    prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceedings." Rule 87.04.
    Furthermore, the joinder requirements of Rule 52.04 apply to declaratory
    judgment actions. Saladin v. Jennings, 
    111 S.W.3d 435
    , 435 (Mo. App. E.D.
    2003).
    Analysis of joinder questions involves a two-part inquiry. See 
    Sterling, 402 S.W.3d at 98
    (noting the appellants had conflated the two inquiries). First,
    the court must determine if the missing party is a necessary party. Id.; Heitz v.
    Kunkel, 
    879 S.W.2d 770
    , 771 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994). If the missing party is a
    necessary party, the court must then determine whether the party is
    indispensable. 
    Sterling, 402 S.W.3d at 97
    . If the missing party is a necessary
    party but has not been joined, the remedy is to join the missing party. State ex
    rel. Mayberry v. City of Rolla, 
    970 S.W.2d 901
    , 908 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998).
    If the missing party is both necessary and indispensable, the action must be
    dismissed. Bauer v. Board of Election Com'rs, 
    198 S.W.3d 161
    , 164 (Mo.
    App. E.D. 2006). Failure to join a party that is both necessary and indispensable
    is reversible error. Epstein v. Villa Dorado Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 
    316 S.W.3d 457
    , 461 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010).
    Thus, the first issue that must be addressed in this case is whether a not-
    for-profit corporation is a necessary party in an action seeking a declaration that
    two directors be reinstated to the corporation's board of directors. "A person is a
    necessary party if that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
    5
    action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence
    may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the person's ability to protect that
    interest." 
    Heitz, 879 S.W.2d at 771
    . "An 'interest' demanding joinder is not
    merely consequential, remote, or conjectural, but rather a direct claim on the
    subject of the action such that the joined party will win or lose by operation of the
    judgment." 
    Sterling, 402 S.W.3d at 97
    . Whether a party is necessary is
    governed by the test laid out in Rule 52.04(a). 
    Id. Rule 52.04(a)
    states:
    A person shall be joined in the action if: (1) in the person's absence
    complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
    (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
    and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's
    absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the
    person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
    persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
    double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
    the claimed interest.
    Rule 52.04(a).
    Rule 52.04 was applied to a contest regarding who was the president of a
    not-for-profit corporation in Jones. In Jones, one putative president of the
    corporation filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the other putative
    president of the 
    corporation. 285 S.W.3d at 358
    . The plaintiff wanted the trial
    court to declare (1) the defendant had been removed from her position and (2)
    that all the acts defendant had taken in that position were void. 
    Id. at 359.
    The
    trial court granted the petition. 
    Id. The defendant
    appealed and argued the trial
    court did not have authority to enter its judgment because the corporation was
    not a party to the action. 
    Id. The appellate
    court found the corporation was a
    necessary party because it claimed an interest in the subject of the action "in that
    the judgment determines the identity of its directors and officers and the
    6
    judgment has the possibility of affecting the [c]orporation's dealings with third
    parties." 
    Id. at 361.
    Treasure Lake, like the corporation in Jones, is a Missouri not-for-profit
    corporation. Also, as in Jones, the result of this litigation, if determined
    favorably to Plaintiffs, could alter the composition of the group of people
    authorized to act on behalf of the corporation. Treasure Lake has a vital interest
    in the identity of its board of directors, so it is a necessary party to this litigation.
    See 
    id. The next
    question to be determined, then, is whether a not-for-profit
    corporation is an indispensable party in an action seeking a declaration that two
    directors should not have been removed from the corporation's board of directors
    and should be reinstated. The test for indispensability is stated in Rule 52.04(b).
    
    Sterling, 402 S.W.3d at 98
    . That rule states:
    If a person as described in Rule 52.04(a)(1) or Rule 52.04(a)(2)
    cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity
    and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties
    before it or should be dismissed, the absent party being thus
    regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the
    court include: (i) to what extent a judgment rendered in the
    person's absence might be prejudicial to that person or those
    already parties; (ii) the extent to which by protective provisions in
    the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
    prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (iii) whether a judgment
    rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; and (iv) whether
    the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed
    for nonjoinder.
    Rule 52.04(b). Again, the Jones case is instructive. In Jones, the appellate
    court found the corporation was an indispensable party because the ruling
    impacted who controlled the corporation and its interactions with third parties.
    
    285 S.W.3d 361-62
    .
    7
    Here, the board of directors is responsible for the management and affairs
    of Treasure Lake. Hence, just as the identity of the officers in Jones could affect
    the corporation's duties and relationships with third parties, Treasure Lake's
    relationship with third parties and with its members could be affected by the
    composition of its board of directors. Treasure Lake was an indispensable party.
    Conclusion
    The trial court erred in failing to join Treasure Lake as a party to the
    litigation. The trial court's judgment is reversed in all respects, including the
    assessment of costs against Defendants. The case is remanded, and the trial
    court is instructed to either join Treasure Lake as a party or to dismiss the action.
    MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. - OPINION AUTHOR
    JEFFREY W. BATES, P.J. - CONCURS
    DON E. BURRELL, J. - CONCURS
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SD32585

Judges: Sheffield, Bates, Burrell

Filed Date: 1/14/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024