In the Interest of S.Y.B.G, Minor , 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 1038 ( 2014 )

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION TWO
) No. ED100739
In the interest of: )
S.Y.B.G., ) Appeal from the St. Louis County
) Circuit Court
Minor. )
) Honorable Ellen L. Siwak
)
) Filed: September 23, 2014
)
Introduction
L.G. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to her
daughter, S.Y.B.G. (Child). Mother claims there was insufficient evidence supporting the
grounds for termination and the court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest.
We affirm.
Factual Background
L.G. is the natural mother of S.Y.B.G., born on July 11, 2007. At the time, Mother was
in a relationship with the biological father, who is now deceased.1 In September 2011, police
responded to a 911 call from Mother stating that she was in distress and hallucinating from using
methamphetamine and marijuana. When officers arrived, they found Mother unable to function.
1
The record indicates that the biological father passed away in July 2012.
Child was home alone with Mother at the time. On December 13, 2011, the Children’s Services
Division of St. Louis County (Division) filed a petition alleging that Mother had failed to provide
care and custody for the minor child. The Division took protective custody of Child on
December 23, 2011, and she was placed in foster care. On January 24, 2012, the child was
adjudicated abused or neglected. On January 27, 2012, Mother entered into a written service
plan agreement with the Division, whereby she agreed to obtain psychological and drug/alcohol
evaluations, as well as attend and participate in counseling, recommended programs and classes,
and submit to drug screens upon request. Mother was also required to attend weekly visits with
Child and obtain suitable housing and employment. On February 1, 2013, the juvenile officer
filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 211.447.5(2) 2 (“abuse and
neglect) and § 211.447.5(3) (“failure to rectify”).
On June 28, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition. On September 28,
2013, the court entered its judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights, finding that the Child
had been under the court’s jurisdiction for a period of at least one year, that Mother suffers from
a chemical dependency that prevents her from consistently providing the necessary care, custody
and control over Child, and which is not likely to be remedied in the near future, and that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes Child’s prospects for early
integration into a stable and permanent home. The court further found that termination of
Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interest. Mother appeals.
Standard of Review
We will affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating a party’s parental rights unless there
is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously
declares or applies the law. In re C.J.G., 75 S.W.3d 794, 797 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002). The
2
All statutory references are to the Missouri Revised Statutes (Supp. 2012), unless otherwise indicated.
2
judgment will be reversed only if we are left with a firm belief that the judgment is wrong. Id.
The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and we defer to
the court’s determination regarding credibility of witnesses. In re J.M.S., 83 S.W.3d 76, 82 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2002). The party seeking termination bears the burden of proof in a termination of
parental rights proceeding. Id.
The termination of a party’s parental rights requires a two-step analysis. First, the trial
court must find by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” that one or more grounds for
termination of parental rights exists. In re G.G.B., 394 S.W.3d 457, 472 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
“Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” is evidence that instantly tilts the scales in favor of
termination when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the trier of fact is left with an
abiding conviction that the evidence is true. In re E.F.B.D., 245 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Mo. App.
S.D. 2008). This standard may be satisfied even when evidence contrary to the trial court’s
finding is presented or the evidence might support a different conclusion. Id.
If the trial court finds that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination exists, the
court must then determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the termination of
parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In re K.A.C., 246 S.W.3d 537, 543 (Mo. App. S.D.
2008). The “best interest” determination is a subjective assessment based on the totality of the
circumstances. In re G.G.B., 394 S.W.3d at 472. We review the trial court’s best interest
determination for an abuse of discretion. In re P.L.O., 131 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Mo. banc 2004).
An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s ruling is “clearly against the logic of
the circumstances and so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and
indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” In re S.R. J., Jr., 250 S.W.3d 402, 406
(Mo. App. E.D. 2008).
3
Discussion
Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights
In her first and second points, Mother challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support
the grounds for termination pursuant to § 211.447.5(2) (“abuse and neglect”) and § 211.447.5(3)
(“failure to rectify”).
As an initial matter, we note that under Point I of her brief, Mother misconstrues the basis
for the termination of her parental rights, in that, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support termination pursuant to § 211.447.5(2) (“abuse and neglect”). Although the court makes
reference to both § 211.447.5(2) and § 211.447.5(3), as alleged in the petition, it is apparent that
the court’s findings (and subheadings) track the basis for termination set out in § 211.447.5(3),
not § 211.447.5(2).3 Indeed, it is evident from the judgment that the court’s findings were
specifically tailored to address the factors in subsections (a) through (d) of § 211.447.5(3). As
such, we address only Mother’s challenge to the grounds for termination based on §
211.447.5(3), as set forth in Point II. Point I is denied.
Section 211.447.5(3) - Failure to Rectify
In her second point, Mother claims the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights
under § 211.447.5(3) because there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings.
For parental rights to be terminated based on § 211.447.5(3), the child must have been
under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction for a period of one year, and it must be determined that:
[T]he conditions which led to the assumption of jurisdiction still persist, or
conditions of a potentially harmful nature continue to exist; and that there is little
likelihood that those conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child
can be returned to the parent in the near future, or the continuation of the parent-
3
Even assuming arguendo, that the basis for termination of Mother’s parental rights included both § 211.447.5(2)
and § 211.447.5(3), as alleged in the petition, proof of just one of these grounds is sufficient to support the
termination. See In re N.M.J., 24 S.W.3d 771, 777 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).
4
child relationship greatly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration
into a stable and permanent home.
Section 211.447.5(3).
In determining whether to terminate parental rights under § 211.447.5(3), the court must
consider and make findings on the following four factors:
a) The terms of a social service plan entered into by the parent and
the division and the extent to which the parties have made progress in
complying with those terms;
b) The success or failure of the efforts of the juvenile officer, the
division or other agency to aid the parent on a continuing basis in
adjusting his circumstances or conduct to provide a proper home for the
child;
c) A mental condition which is shown by competent evidence either
to be permanent or such that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
condition can be reversed and which renders the parent unable to
knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody and control;
d) Chemical dependency which prevents the parent from consistently
providing the necessary care, custody and control over the child and which
cannot be treated so as to enable the parent to consistently provide such
care, custody and control[.]
The four factors are not separate grounds for termination by themselves, but rather
categories of evidence, that the court may consider along with all other relevant evidence in
determining whether grounds for termination exist under § 211.447.5(3). In re G.G.B., 394
S.W.3d at 468. Any one of the factors is a condition or act that may have a negative impact on a
child, and if found to exist, should be considered in determining whether grounds for termination
exist. Id. Although the court is required to consider and make findings as to all four factors, the
proof of just one is sufficient for termination. In re N.M.J., 24 S.W.3d at 778.
“A parent’s conduct after the filing of the termination petition cannot constitute the sole
consideration of the trial court’s decision.” In re T.E., 35 S.W.3d 497, 504 (Mo. App. E.D.
2001). “The court must look to the totality of the parent’s conduct, both prior to and after the
filing of the petition[.]” In re J.W., 11 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (quotations and
5
citations omitted). “All grounds for termination must to some extent look to past conduct
because the past provides vital clues to present and future conduct.” In Interest of T.T., 954
S.W.2d 429, 432 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). “Otherwise, a parent may argue that he has reformed
since the filing of the petition; reformation having occurred while the child was away.” Id.
(a) Social Service Plan Compliance
With respect to the first factor, Mother’s compliance with the terms of the social service
plan, the court found that Mother had entered into a written service plan agreement on January
27, 2012. The service plan required Mother to obtain a mental health evaluation and parenting
assessment, obtain a drug/alcohol evaluation, submit to drug screens as requested, attend
scheduled visits with Child, write letters and/or cards to Child, obtain suitable housing and
maintain employment, or otherwise provide sufficient income to support herself and Child. The
service plan further required Mother to cooperate with and utilize the services offered by the
Division, comply with all court orders, and attend and participate in recommended programs and
classes. The court found that Mother understood the service plan’s requirements and that
violating terms of the plan could result in the termination of her parental rights.
With regard to scheduled visits, the court found that Mother had weekly visits with Child
beginning in February 2012 through January 2013. Mother missed seven of these visits, due
either to cancellation, failing to confirm, forgetting about the visit, or due to Mother’s
hospitalization. After Mother relapsed in January 2013, these visits were modified to every other
week. Thereafter, Mother had only five visits with Child. Mother also cancelled a scheduled
visit with Child in June 2013. Thereafter, Mother did not contact the Division to schedule any
additional visits prior to the termination hearing. The court also found that while at times
6
Mother had fairly consistent telephone contact with Child, the child would go weeks without any
telephone contact.
The court further found that Mother failed to provide any financial support for Child
while the child was in foster care. Mother did provide small gifts for holidays and the Child’s
birthday, as well as a birthday cake, Easter basket, candy, stickers, and meals from McDonalds.
Mother reported to the Division that she was employed part-time as a bookkeeper in February
2012, but failed to provide verification. Mother also said that she worked for an accountant
approximately 9 hours per week, making $12 per hour, preparing meals and assisting with files,
but provided no documents or pay stubs to verify this employment.
With regard to addressing her chemical dependency, the court found that Mother failed to
successfully complete substance abuse treatment. In July 2012, Mother was unsuccessfully
discharged from the “Bridgeway” outpatient treatment program, after completing inpatient
treatment. After beginning treatment through the court-sponsored “SAFETI” program, Mother
tested positive for marijuana in August 2012. At the time, Mother refused to admit that she had
used marijuana. In September 2012, Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from the SAFETI
program. After being discharged from the SAFETI program, the Division required Mother to
submit drug screens upon request. Mother began attending the “BASIC” drug treatment program
until December 2012, at which point she stopped going to treatment. On January 15, 2013,
Mother tested positive for methamphetamines. Mother initially denied using the drug, but later
admitted ingesting a capsule of methamphetamines that she found while cleaning her basement.
After re-engaging in the BASIC treatment program in January 2013, Mother relapsed in
February 2013, and stopped going to treatment and was discharged from the program.
7
In April 2013, two months after the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights,
Mother entered substance abuse treatment through Preferred Family Healthcare (PFH). Mother
indicated that she attended several NA/AA meetings in March and April 2013, the bulk of which
occurred during inpatient treatment. After transferring to outpatient treatment in May 2013,
Mother indicated that she attended five NA/AA meetings. However, Mother stopped attending
NA/AA meetings because she was not comfortable and felt that she was “not like the others” in
attendance. The court found that Mother had a poor attitude about attending classes and prior to
complete cessation, failed to go for weeks at a time.
With respect to court-ordered drug screens, the court found that in addition to testing
positive for marijuana in August 2012, Mother completed four drug screens in September
through November 2012, three of which were diluted. From November 27, 2012 through
January 9, 2013, Mother missed four drug screens. On January 15, 2013, Mother tested positive
for amphetamines, despite the sample being diluted.
The court further found that Mother submitted drug screens while receiving treatment
through PFH. According to letters from PFH, Mother tested negative for three drug screens.
However, copies of those test results were not provided to the court, nor was there any indication
of the protocol or methods used for the drug-testing, or whether the samples were diluted.
Moreover, the dates of these drug screens coincided with Mother’s outpatient sessions and, as a
result, the court found that these drug test results were not “random.” On June 18, 2013 (ten
days before the termination hearing), Mother failed to comply with the Division’s request for a
drug screen.
In summary, the court found that Mother had failed to acknowledge her drug problems
and made excuses for failing to attend and/or complete drug treatment programs. The court
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further found that Mother’s chemical dependency/abuse treatment had been, and continued to be,
inconsistent and there was no likelihood that Mother’s chemical dependency would be suitably
addressed in the reasonably foreseeable future so as to enable reunification of Mother and Child.
(b) Agency Efforts
With respect to the Division’s efforts to assist Mother, the court found that despite the
Division’s reasonable efforts to fulfill their responsibilities under the service plan, including
offering services on multiple occasions to address Mother’s chemical dependency and substance
abuse issues, Mother had failed repeatedly to adjust her circumstances and conduct with respect
to her chemical usage in order to provide a proper home for the child. The court also found that
although the Division had initially made attempts to work with Mother informally, Mother did
not enter inpatient treatment until after Child was taken into protective custody. The court
further found that the Division’s efforts to assist Mother have been hindered by her refusal to
recognize the significance of her chemical usage “by concocting excuses of why she could not
attend and or complete programs and/or treatment.” Finally, the court found that to the minimal
extent that Mother complied with the service plan, her efforts and those of the Division proved
unsuccessful in providing a continuing relationship between Mother and Child and in reunifying
them.
(c) Mental Condition
With regard to this factor, the court found there was no evidence that Mother suffered
from a mental condition that could not be reversed or that rendered her unable to knowingly
provide Child with the necessary care, custody, and control. The court also noted that although
Mother had been hospitalized in May 2012 due to mental health issues, it appeared that these
issues were being treated adequately with psychiatric services.
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(d) Chemical Dependency
With respect to Mother’s chemical dependency issues, the court made numerous findings
which, in large measure, track and augment the findings previously noted under subsection (a)
regarding compliance with the service plan agreement. To restate all of the court’s considerable
findings with regard to this factor would be unnecessarily repetitive.
We note, however, that the court specifically found there was substantial evidence that
Mother suffers from a chemical dependency that cannot be successfully treated and that prevents
her from consistently providing the necessary care, custody and control over Child. The court
further found that Mother’s inconsistent chemical abuse/dependency treatment is, in part,
controlled by her lack of acknowledgment of her substance abuse and dependency problems as
well as her lack of commitment to addressing and treating these issues.
Mother does not dispute that Child has been under the court’s jurisdiction for over a year
or that she has chemical dependency issues that have prevented her from being able to provide
the necessary care, custody, and control of Child. Instead, Mother takes issue with the court’s
finding that she complied with the service plan to a “minimal extent,” claiming this finding is not
supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Specifically, Mother complains that the
court “ignored or minimized” the provisions of the service plan that she completed, i.e.,
attending visits with Child, providing small gifts and meals, obtaining psychological and
substance abuse evaluations, as well as psychiatric treatment and counseling. Mother claims the
court should have considered the progress and “significant strides” she has made towards
completing the service plan requirements,4 pointing out that at the time of the hearing, she had
re-engaged in substance abuse treatment on an outpatient basis.
4
In support, Mother relies on In the Interest of S.J.H., 124 S.W.3d 63 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). In that case, the
appellate court reversed a judgment, in concluding that the trial court’s findings were against the weight of the
10
Contrary to Mother’s assertions, the court’s findings are supported by the evidence
presented at the termination hearing. At the hearing, Michael Aitch, a case manager with the
Division, who was initially assigned to work with Mother beginning in September 2011 until
February 1, 2012, testified that he met with Mother after the police were contacted due to her
using methamphetamines and marijuana. Aitch testified that while Mother admitted to
previously using marijuana, she denied continued use of the drug. Aitch said that he arranged
visits for Mother and Child, provided referrals for treatment and arranged drug screens for
Mother. Aitch also said that he explained the service plan agreement to Mother and her
obligations under the plan, and informed her that non-compliance with the plan’s requirements
could result in Child being removed from her custody. Despite the efforts of the Division to
assist Mother by offering services and treatment, Aitch believed that Mother still had chemical
dependency issues that would prevent her from providing adequate care, custody and control of
the child, which he based, in part, on Mother’s inconsistency in successfully completing drug
treatment programs. Aitch did not believe that Mother’s recent progress indicated that she
would be able to resume custody of Child within a reasonable time in the near future. Aitch also
testified that in his opinion, the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best
interest.
Lori Epley, a children’s services worker and supervisor with the Division, who worked
with Mother from February 2012 through February 2013 also testified. Epley said that her duties
included providing services for parents to assist them in resolving their issues in order that they
might be reunified with their children. Epley indicated that weekly visits were arranged
between Mother and Child, until Mother relapsed in January 2013, at which point visits were
evidence as to parental compliance with the service plan, and the evidence was insufficient to establish grounds for
termination. Id. at 70. In contrast, in this case, the trial court’s findings with regard to compliance with the service
agreement are amply supported by the evidence, and are not against the weight of the evidence.
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modified to every other week. Epley said that Mother had cancelled and/or missed several
scheduled visits with Child. She also indicated that although arrangements were made for
weekly phone contact between Mother and Child, at times the child would go weeks without
phone contact from Mother. Aside from small gifts and meals, Epley said that Mother did not
contribute any financial support for Child after being taken into protective custody. Epley
indicated that Child was adjusting well in her foster home.
Epley also completed a social study and investigative report which was admitted into
evidence. The report included information regarding Mother’s visits with Child, compliance with
the service plan, evaluations and assessments, drug treatment, drug screens, and
recommendations. The report also reflected that the foster parent had expressed interest in
adopting Child. With respect to Mother’s substance abuse treatment, Epley said that Mother
tested positive for marijuana in August 2012 and was unsuccessfully discharged from treatment
in September 2012. Epley also testified that Mother stopped attending substance abuse treatment
in December 2012 and was unsuccessfully discharged from drug treatment in February 2013.
Epley also confirmed that Mother had missed drug screens and also diluted some of them.
Epley testified that Mother has a chemical dependency issue which prevents her from
providing adequate care, custody, and control for the Child. Epley further testified that in her
opinion, she did not think that Mother’s chemical dependency issues would be rectified in the
near future, nor did she believe there was any likelihood that Mother’s chemical dependency
condition could be remedied at an early date so the Child could be returned to Mother in the near
future.
Testifying on her own behalf, Mother admitted testing positive for methamphetamines in
January 2013, five months before the termination hearing. Mother said that she had not used
12
marijuana since 2011, but admitted testing positive for the drug in August 2012. Mother said
that she was trying to “stay clean” and was reengaged in substance abuse treatment. Mother
also said that she needed more time in order to continue with her substance abuse treatment.
Mother believed that she would need at least “365 days” of continued treatment to address her
substance abuse issues. Mother acknowledged that she was not ready to resume custody of
Child.
“Partial compliance with a service plan does not prevent a court from finding grounds for
termination as a result of a failure to rectify conduct or conditions.” In re B.L.H., 158 S.W.3d
269, 279 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005). Moreover, evidence of short-term improvements in a parent’s
circumstances which occur after the filing of the termination petition is not necessarily
compelling. In re N.M.J., 24 S.W.3d 771, 780 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000). A parent’s conduct after
the filing of the termination petition cannot constitute the sole consideration of the trial court’s
decision. Id.
Much of the progress that Mother claims the court “minimized” with respect to her
substance abuse treatment occurred after the termination petition was filed. Moreover, in relying
solely on testimony and evidence in her favor, Mother misunderstands our standard of review.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision and may ignore
evidence to the contrary. See In re B.J.K., 197 S.W.3d 237, 247 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). We
also defer to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. In re C.A.M., 282 S.W.3d 398,
409 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009). We will not disregard the trial court’s judgment merely because
there was some evidence favorable to Mother.
The record shows that Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from substance abuse
treatment programs at least three times between 2012 and 2013 while Child was in foster care.
13
After entering substance abuse treatment, Mother tested positive for marijuana and
methamphetamines and missed or diluted several required drug screens. The reasons for being
discharged from drug treatment included noncompliance, attendance issues, and positive drug
screens. Mother’s noncompliance was also evident when she failed to submit a drug screen
requested by the Division just ten days before the termination hearing. By Mother’s own
admission, she was not ready to resume custody of the child and would need at least an
additional year of continued substance abuse treatment to address her chemical dependency
issues.
Based on the record presented, there was substantial evidence from which the court could
conclude that Mother has chemical dependency issues that could not be successfully treated so as
to enable her to consistently provide adequate care, custody and control over Child within an
ascertainable period of time in the near future. The record also supports the court’s finding that
Mother has only been able to adjust her conduct for negligible periods of time. By repeatedly
failing to successfully complete drug treatment programs, Mother has demonstrated
inconsistency as well as a lack of commitment in addressing her chemical dependency issues.
There was substantial evidence that Mother’s chemical dependency issues could not be
adequately remedied in the near future so as to enable reunification with Child. The court’s
findings were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Hence, the court did not err
in finding that grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights existed pursuant to §
211.447.5(3). Point II is denied.
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Best Interest Determination
For her third point, Mother claims there was insufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s findings under § 211.447.7, in determining that termination of her parental rights was in
Child’s best interest.
The “best interests” determination is a subjective assessment based on the totality of the
circumstances. In re A.A.T.N., 181 S.W.3d 161, 167 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005). Section 211.447.7
contains no mandatory language directing the court to make specific findings with respect to
each of its subparagraphs, In re G.G.B., 394 S.W.3d at 472, except where appropriate and
applicable. In re N.M.J., 24 S.W.3d at 783. Findings under this section are discretionary and
our review is only for an abuse of discretion. Id. Section 211.447.7 directs the court to evaluate
the following seven factors when considering whether termination of parental rights is in the
child’s best interest:
1) Emotional ties to the birth parent;
2) The extent to which the parent has maintained regular visitation or other
contact with the child;
3) The extent of payment by the parent for the cost of care and maintenance
of the child when financially able to do so including the time that the child
is in the custody of the division or other child-placing agency;
4) Whether additional services would be likely to bring about lasting parental
adjustment enabling a return of the child to the parent within an
ascertainable period of time;
5) The parent’s disinterest in or lack of commitment to the child;
6) The conviction of the parent of a felony offense that the court finds is of
such a nature that the child will be deprived of a stable home for a period
of years; provided, however, that incarceration in and of itself shall not be
grounds for termination of parental rights;
7) Deliberate acts of the parent or acts of another of which the parent knew or
should have known that subjects the child to a substantial risk of physical
or mental harm.
Based on the evidence presented at the termination hearing, the trial court found that (1)
Child had emotional ties to Mother and was bonded to her; (2) Mother had maintained fairly
15
regular visitation or contact with Child, although her excuses for missed visits and telephone
contact were “incomprehensible;” (3) Mother, although financially able, failed to contribute to
the cost of care and maintenance of the child and has provided no financial support for Child
since the child was placed into protective custody in December 2011; (4) it is unlikely that
additional services would bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of Child to
Mother within an ascertainable period of time; (5) although visits with Child were appropriate
and Mother demonstrated an interest in Child, Mother “clearly demonstrated a disinterest and/or
lack of commitment to the child by either providing mostly inane excuses for not being available
for visits or telephone contact, or not providing any excuse at all.” Mother’s lack of commitment
in addressing her substance abuse and chemical dependency is also demonstrative of her
disinterest and /or lack of commitment to Child; (6) Mother has no felony convictions; and (7)
Mother has not subjected Child to deliberate acts of abuse by herself, or another. Based on the
evidence presented, the court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s
best interest.
Mother disputes several of the court’s findings in this regard, arguing that the court’s
ruling was against the logic of the circumstances and an abuse of discretion. Specifically,
Mother claims the court erred in finding that (1) she made excuses for missing visits with Child
because she had “legitimate and understandable” reasons for the missed visits; (2) that Mother
provided no financial support for Child because she provided small gifts and meals for Child,
and Mother did not know she was supposed to contribute financially while Child was in foster
care, and she purchased a house; (3) that additional services would not likely bring about lasting
parental adjustment enabling return of Child to Mother within an ascertainable period of time;
and (4) that Mother demonstrated a disinterest and/or lack of commitment to child because she
16
had regular visits with child and participated in drug treatment programs. Mother also asserts
that because the court found that Child had emotional ties and was bonded with her, the
termination of her parental rights was not in Child’s best interest.
Contrary to Mother’s assertions, the evidence presented at the hearing supports the trial
court’s determination that termination is in Child’s best interest. In addition to the evidence
already discussed, there was also evidence that Mother failed to provide for the cost of care and
maintenance of Child while in foster care. Mother made no financial contributions to Child other
than small gifts and meals during scheduled visits. Although Mother indicated that she was
employed part-time, she failed to provide any verification of her employment to the Division.
The record indicates that the Division has offered Mother numerous opportunities,
referrals, and services to rectify her situation. Despite the efforts by the Division to aid Mother,
the case workers did not believe that Mother would be able to adjust her circumstances so that
she could provide a proper home for Child, nor did they believe that Mother’s substance abuse
issues could be remedied in the near future to enable reunification with Child. The court was
not required to make negative findings based on all seven factors under § 211.447.7. In re
C.A.M., 282 S.W.3d at 409. Likewise, there is no minimum number of negative factors
necessary for termination. Id. The record supports the court’s finding that Mother continues to
have chemical dependency issues that prevent her from providing proper care and custody of
Child. There was also substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that additional services
would not likely bring about lasting parental adjustment to enable the return of Child within an
ascertainable period of time. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interest. Point III is
denied.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
________________________________
Philip M. Hess, Judge
Sherri B. Sullivan, P.J. and
Mary K. Hoff, J. concur.
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