JOHN MICK and TERESA MICK v. WAYNE MAYS and CONNIE MAYS, Defendants-Respondents , 459 S.W.3d 924 ( 2015 )


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  • JOHN MICK and TERESA MICK,                       )
    )
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,                   )
    )
    vs.                                              )        No. SD33149
    )
    WAYNE MAYS and CONNIE MAYS,                      )        Filed: May 11, 2015
    )
    Defendants-Respondents.                  )
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUTLER COUNTY
    Honorable Michael M. Pritchett, Circuit Judge
    AFFIRMED
    Mike Mick and Teresa Mick appeal from the trial court's judgment in favor
    of Wayne Mays and Connie Mays.1 The judgment was entered after a bench trial
    regarding the petition filed by Mike and Teresa, which sought an accounting and
    windup of a partnership, damages for breach of fiduciary duty, and rescission of a
    buy-sell agreement. The arguments raised by Mike and Teresa ignore the
    standard of review, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
    Standard of Review
    In a court-tried matter, this Court will "affirm the trial court's judgment
    unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the
    1
    Because some of the parties have the same last name, first names are used for the sake of clarity.
    No disrespect is intended.
    evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." State Resources
    Corp. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp, 
    224 S.W.3d 39
    , 41 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007).
    When reviewing factual questions, "this Court accepts 'as true the evidence and
    inferences therefrom that support the trial court's judgment and disregard[s]
    contrary evidence.'" 
    Id. (quoting Vaughn
    v. Willard, 
    37 S.W.3d 413
    , 415 (Mo.
    App. S.D. 2001)).
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Teresa and Connie were the daughters of farmer Glen Harrison. In 2000,
    Mr. Harrison retired from farming. Teresa and her husband, Mike, and Connie
    and her husband, Wayne, formed a farming partnership to continue the family
    farming business under the name Glenco Farms.
    While the partnership was engaged in the farming business, a company
    called Bayer Crop Science ("Bayer") planted genetically modified rice in the area
    near the Glenco Farms operation. In 2006 the genetically modified rice spread
    into other rice operations and caused the price of rice to drop. Other farmers in
    the area considered suing Bayer, but Mike was convinced a lawsuit would not
    "amount to anything."
    Wayne, however, agreed to meet with one of the lawyers bringing suit
    against Bayer and with another farmer on September 6, 2006, to discuss the
    Bayer litigation. Wayne hired the lawyer to represent Glenco Farms in the Bayer
    litigation.
    Wayne had notified Mike of the meeting, but Mike did not arrive until the
    conclusion of the meeting. Mike drove up to the Glenco Farms office as the
    others were leaving. Wayne told Mike about the meeting. Mike swore, told
    2
    Wayne "it wasn't worth [messing] with[,]" rolled up his window, and drove off.
    At that time Wayne believed Glenco Farms would get "little to nothing" from the
    Bayer litigation.
    During the following years, Mike and Wayne did not discuss the Bayer
    litigation. Glenco Farms received letters about the progress of the suit, and, as
    was their usual partnership procedure, Wayne put the letters on the desk in the
    office with the other mail for Glenco Farms. Mike came to the office daily and
    would look through the mail. Wayne provided information to the lawyer when
    required for the Bayer litigation. There was no indication that any of the
    approximately 19 letters received from Bayer were hidden or undisclosed.
    In 2010, Mike decided to retire from farming for health reasons. Mike
    wanted to liquidate the business, but Wayne wanted to continue farming.
    Around this same time, Glenco Farms received information by letter that Bayer
    had indicated an interest in settling the claims in the Bayer litigation. This letter
    was also put on the desk for review.
    Mike, Teresa, Wayne, and Connie entered into a buy-sell agreement on
    December 17, 2010. That agreement provided that "Seller shall deliver to Buyer
    at closing a Bill of Sale to transfer said undivided one-half interest in the
    Partnership, including all assets and equipment, free of all encumbrances, except
    as otherwise disclosed in this agreement." The agreement did not mention the
    Bayer litigation.
    On December 20, 2010, Glenco Farms received a letter indicating Bayer
    was recommending a settlement amount of $310 per acre. According to Wayne,
    the information regarding the settlement "was in every paper in the [s]tate of
    3
    Missouri," but Wayne and Mike were not talking at that time, and they did not
    discuss it. Wayne put this letter on the desk in the Glenco Farms office for Mike
    to examine with the rest of the mail. No money was paid to Glenco Farms at that
    time, nor was the settlement final.
    On January 31, 2011, Mike and Teresa executed a bill of sale that conveyed
    an "undivided one-half interest in Glenco Farms" to Wayne and Connie. The
    consideration paid was $825,000 and included some land. Mike and Teresa also
    resigned from the Glenco Farms Partnership on that date.
    In July 2011, Teresa received a mailing regarding the finalized Bayer
    settlement from Bayer. She confronted Wayne with the mailing. He refused to
    give Mike and Teresa a portion of the settlement. Ultimately, Glenco Farms
    received over $177,000 in settlement of its claims against Bayer.
    Mike and Teresa sued Wayne and Connie seeking an accounting and
    winding up of the partnership, damages for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to
    disclose the Bayer litigation, rescission of the buy-sell agreement based on
    mutual mistake and unilateral mistake, and punitive damages. The trial court
    held a bench trial and issued a judgment including detailed findings. First, the
    trial court found the partnership was dissolved on January 31, 2011, and was a
    sale of the partnership interest with all the assets divided, so there was no basis
    for an accounting and winding up. The trial court noted it did not believe Mike's
    testimony that he did not know about the Bayer litigation and denied the claim
    for breach of fiduciary duty. Finally, the trial court determined there was no
    mistake justifying recession of the buy-sell agreement because Mike knew about
    4
    the Bayer litigation. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Wayne and
    Connie on all counts. Mike and Teresa appeal.
    Discussion
    Mike and Teresa raise three points on appeal. For ease of analysis, we first
    address Point I and Point III together.
    Mike Knew About the Bayer Litigation
    In their first point, Mike and Teresa argue the trial court erred when it
    found Wayne did not breach his fiduciary duty to Mike and Teresa by failing to
    disclose the Bayer litigation. In their third point, Mike and Teresa argue the trial
    court erred in denying their request for rescission of the buy-sell agreement
    based on unilateral mistake because Wayne failed to disclose the Bayer litigation.
    Both of these points fail because the trial court found Wayne did notify Mike
    regarding the Bayer litigation, and there was substantial evidence to support that
    finding.
    Mike and Teresa correctly state the nature of the duty between partners.
    With respect to their claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Mike and Teresa are
    correct that Wayne owed them a fiduciary duty because they were partners and
    that the duty continued through the sale of Mike and Teresa's partnership
    interests. See State Auto. and Cas. Underwriters v. Johnson, 
    766 S.W.2d 113
    , 124 (Mo. App. S.D. 1989). Nevertheless, Mike and Teresa's argument
    overlooks the other elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and the trial
    court's explicit credibility findings regarding the facts relevant to those elements.
    To succeed on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, "the proponent must establish
    that a fiduciary duty existed between it and the defendant party, that the
    5
    defending party breached the duty, and that the breach caused the proponent to
    suffer harm." Zakibe v. Ahrens & McCarron, Inc., 
    28 S.W.3d 373
    , 381 (Mo.
    App. E.D. 2000). In the context of this case, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty
    was the failure to inform Mike and Teresa about the Bayer litigation. If Wayne
    informed Mike and Teresa about the Bayer litigation there was no breach. The
    claim for rescission was based on an allegation of mistake, which may be, under
    appropriate circumstances, a ground for rescission. See R & R Land Dev.,
    L.L.C. v. American Freightways, Inc., 
    389 S.W.3d 234
    , 239 (Mo. App. S.D.
    2012). However, if Mike knew about the Bayer litigation, there was no mistake.
    Despite the attempt by Mike and Teresa to treat these points as errors of
    law, the trial court's judgment must be affirmed if the trial court's finding that
    Mike and Teresa knew about the Bayer litigation is supported by substantial
    evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence. "A claim that there is no
    substantial evidence to support the judgment or that the judgment is against the
    weight of the evidence necessarily involves review of the trial court's factual
    determinations." Pearson v. Koster, 
    367 S.W.3d 36
    , 43 (Mo. banc 2012). "A
    court will overturn a trial court's judgment under these fact-based standards of
    review only when the court has a firm belief that the judgment is wrong." 
    Id. "In reviewing
    of questions of fact, the reviewing court will defer to the trial court's
    assessment of the evidence if any facts relevant to an issue are contested." 
    Id. at 44.
    "Once contested, 'a trial court is free to disbelieve any, all, or none of th[e]
    evidence,' and 'the appellate court's role is not to re-evaluate testimony through
    its own perspective.'" 
    Id. (quoting White
    v. Director of Revenue, 
    321 S.W.3d 298
    , 308-09 (Mo. banc 2010)).
    6
    When the facts are viewed as they must be, in the light most favorable to
    the trial court's judgment, it is clear Wayne provided Mike and Teresa notice of
    the Bayer litigation and the progress of the Bayer litigation. When the Bayer
    litigation started in 2006, Wayne informed Mike of the initial meeting with the
    lawyer, but Mike chose not to attend. By late December 2010 and early January
    2011, Mike and Wayne were not on speaking terms. Wayne communicated with
    Mike and Teresa by leaving documents and letters on the desk in the partnership
    office. When Wayne received documents informing him that Bayer might settle
    the Bayer litigation, he placed them on the desk in the partnership office. Mike
    was in the office and looked through the mail. Teresa, as a partner, had the right
    and responsibility to do the same. Thus, Wayne gave Mike and Teresa notice of
    the Bayer litigation and the potential settlement, and the trial court's conclusion
    to that effect was supported by substantial evidence.
    Mike and Teresa implicitly acknowledge that conclusion and focus their
    factual arguments on an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge. In
    support of their contention that the finding was against the weight of the
    evidence, Mike and Teresa discuss the fact that Mike did not attend the meeting
    where Wayne retained counsel for the Bayer litigation, that Wayne did not have a
    verbal conversation with Mike about the Bayer litigation, and that Mike was
    meticulous in identifying assets to be divided in the buy-sell agreement, but did
    not include the Bayer litigation. The problem with these arguments is that they
    ignore the trial court's credibility findings and do not explain why those
    circumstances are more probative than Wayne's testimony. Even in an against-
    the-weight-of-the-evidence argument, this Court must resolve all conflicts in the
    7
    evidence "in accordance with the trial court's credibility determinations[.]"
    Houston v. Crider, 
    317 S.W.3d 178
    , 187 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010). The trial court
    found Mike's testimony that he did not know about the litigation to be unworthy
    of belief. The circumstantial evidence on which Mike and Teresa rely does not
    have more probative value than Wayne's testimony regarding the partnership
    practice for sharing information.
    Point I and Point III are denied.
    No Assets Were Omitted from the Buy-Sell Agreement
    In their second point, Mike and Teresa argue the trial court erred in
    denying their request for an accounting and winding up of the partnership
    because "as a matter of law, the partnership continued as it related to the Bayer
    Rice Litigation partnership asset[.]" As with their other points, this point is
    without merit because it rests on factual allegations contrary to the trial court's
    findings.
    Mike and Teresa are correct that the Uniform Partnership Law provides
    any partner with a right to a formal accounting of partnership affairs under
    certain circumstances. § 358.220, RSMo (2000). However, this right does not
    extend to former partners after the completion of an agreement regarding the
    sale of the partnership interest. Pupillo v. Pupillo, 
    863 S.W.2d 631
    , 632 (Mo.
    App. E.D. 1993). This is because, after the completion of such an agreement, the
    business belongs to the remaining partners alone. 
    Id. On December
    17, 2010, the parties entered into an agreement regarding
    the sale of Mike and Teresa's partnership interests. Wayne testified that this
    agreement was to be a sale of Mike and Teresa's partnership interests in Glenco
    8
    Farms. The written agreement provided that any partnership assets not
    mentioned in the agreement were transferred as part of the partnership interest.
    The parties finalized the agreement on January 31, 2011. Mike and Teresa
    formally withdrew from the partnership on that date. Thus, as the trial court
    correctly found, after January 31, 2011, Mike and Teresa were not partners and
    had no right to demand an accounting.
    Mike and Teresa attempt to avoid this conclusion by characterizing the
    potential proceeds of the Bayer litigation as an asset that was omitted from the
    agreement regarding the winding up of the partnership affairs. They make two
    primary arguments in support of this characterization. First, they analyze the
    property division in the buy-sell agreement in an effort to demonstrate that the
    transaction completed on January 31, 2011, was an equal division of the
    partnership assets rather than a sale of their partnership interests. They cite
    Johnson in support of the proposition that "[w]here partners attempt to strike a
    settlement of partnership property and accounts in winding up the partnership,
    but omit certain partnership property or accounts therefrom, the partnership
    continues as to those properties or accounts." Both of these arguments are
    incorrect.
    Mike and Teresa's discussion of the property division ignores the standard
    of review. The trial court credited Wayne's testimony that the agreement was
    intended to be a sale of the partnership interest. The text of the buy-sell
    agreement is in accord with that understanding. The inferences Mike and Teresa
    attempt to draw from the other terms of the agreement are contrary to the plain
    language of the parties' written agreement.
    9
    Mike and Teresa's reliance on Johnson is misplaced because the terms of
    the agreement in Johnson were different from the terms of the agreement in
    this case. In Johnson the agreement explicitly provided the new partnership
    had to pay rent to the old partnership for use of an 
    asset. 766 S.W.2d at 115
    . That
    fact indicated the parties in that case did not intend to transfer all the assets to
    the new partnership. 
    Id. Here, in
    contrast, the agreement provided for the sale
    of an undivided one-half interest in the partnership and all its assets. The
    agreement specifically stated that any assets not mentioned in the agreement
    were transferred with the partnership interest. The agreement contemplated that
    there were other assets not stated in the agreement and provided that any
    unidentified assets would be transferred to Wayne and Connie.
    As the trial court correctly found, there were no omitted assets. Point II is
    denied.
    Decision
    The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
    MARY W. SHEFFIELD, P.J. – OPINION AUTHOR
    NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, J. – CONCURS
    DON E. BURRELL, J. – CONCURS
    10