Robert J. Bell v. Paula Phillips , 2015 Mo. App. LEXIS 771 ( 2015 )

IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
WESTERN DISTRICT
ROBERT J. BELL, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) WD77464
)
PAULA PHILLIPS, et al., ) FILED: July 28, 2015
Respondents. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County
The Honorable Daniel R. Green, Judge
Before Division Four: Alok Ahuja, C.J., and Lisa White Hardwick
and Mark D. Pfeiffer, JJ.
Robert Bell, an inmate in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections, appeals
the dismissal of his petition, which asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of access
to the courts. We reverse, and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Factual Background
In his second amended petition, filed pro se, Bell alleged a host of civil rights violations
by employees at the Southeast Correctional Center in Charleston. Only Bell’s allegations against
defendant Paula Phillips, identified as a “Functioning Unit Manager,” are relevant to this appeal.
Bell’s second amended petition alleged that he “had to go to Phillip’s [sic] office because that
was the only way that I could get a law library pass or get legal supplies.” In the same
paragraph, Bell’s petition alleged that “I was denied access to the law library and legal supplies
like copies of my legal work and postage to mail my habeas corpus applications and to file this
instant civil rights complaint.”
Bell’s petition continued by alleging that
MS. PAULA PHILLIPS, she did everything she could do to deny me
access to the law library and . . . she also refused me any type of legal resources,
like pens and envelopes for my legal documents and the other officers followed
her lead. [A]lthough they all knew that I was an indigent prisoner, Phillips, she
even went so far as to demand her officers to not allow me anything and to put me
in the hole if I asked for anything. So I filed a grievance against her because legal
access for indigents (like myself) constitutionally are suppose[d] to be supplied
with legal materials like postage, pens and paper should be given to me “FREE
OF CHARGE.” Ms. Phillips retaliated by forcing me to work in the chow hall on
February 17 thru [sic] the 20th[, 2010,] against my doctor’s orders. See, the
Grievance Appeal Tracking No. SECC10-305, 305, 2115 and SECC-11-570.
Bell’s petition alleged that, in the grievance proceeding, “the officers said, ‘they will not provide
me with the needed legal materials, (free or otherwise).”
Bell’s petition also alleged that, as a result of the denial of necessary postage, he had been
unable to timely file his federal habeas corpus petition:
[T]he dept. of corrections refuse[s] to provide indigent inmates like myself
reasonable access to legal materials like photocopies and postage “FREE OF
CHARGE,” which is part of receiving reasonable access to the courts. . . . Due to
the fact that I did not have the $5.10 to mail my Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus
and the accompanying exhibits during the early months of 2010 the Court ruled
that my petition was untimely. . . . [T]he Dept’s policy denies me the first
amendment right to have reasonable access to the courts. See, Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977) and Gluth v. Kangas, 951
F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1991).
(Emphasis added.)
Phillips attacked Bell’s court-access claim in a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The motion argued a single basis for dismissing Bell’s claim: that “Mr. Bell does not plead any
facts to suggest he has suffered actual injury, such as missing a court imposed deadline.”
(Emphasis added.)
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In response to Phillips’ motion, Bell filed an affidavit which reiterated that he had been
denied the $5.10 in postage necessary to timely file his federal habeas corpus petition. In reply
suggestions, Phillips argued that “[t]his factual assertion does not appear in Mr. Bell’s Second
Superseding Amended Petition. In fact, this is the first time Mr. Bell has ever claimed he did not
receive $5.10 to mail a petition for habeas corpus.” (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
Following a hearing, the trial court granted Phillips’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and dismissed Bell’s petition with prejudice. The court’s judgment stated that it
issued its ruling “[f]or the reasons set out in the respondents’ . . . motion for judgment on the
pleadings.” Bell appeals.
Standard of Review
“A court's grant of judgment on the pleadings is reviewed de novo.” Seay v. Jones, 439
S.W.3d 881, 887 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (citation omitted).
On appeal from the trial court’s grant of Respondents’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings, we review the allegations of Appellants’ petition to
determine whether the facts pleaded therein are insufficient as a matter of law.
The party moving for judgment on the pleadings admits, for purposes of the
motion, the truth of all well pleaded facts in the opposing party’s pleadings. The
position of a party moving for judgment on the pleadings is similar to that of a
movant on a motion to dismiss; i.e., assuming the facts pleaded by the opposite
party to be true, these facts are, nevertheless, insufficient as a matter of law. A
trial court properly grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings if, from the face
of the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
State ex rel Nixon v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 34 S.W.3d 122, 134 (Mo. banc 2000) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).1 “The facts alleged in the petition are . . . construed liberally
in favor of the plaintiff,”2 and we give the plaintiff “the benefit of all reasonable inferences
1
Although Bell’s petition asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983, “[w]hen an action under
Section 1983 is filed in state court, the state’s rules of civil procedure apply, not the federal rules.”
Charron v. Holden, 111 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (citations omitted).
2
Conway v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 438 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting Ward v.
W. Cnty. Motor Co., 403 S.W.3d 82, 84 (Mo. banc 2013)).
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drawn” from the petition’s allegations. Seay, 439 S.W.3d at 887 (quoting Emerson Elec. Co. v.
Marsh & McLennan Cos., 362 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Mo. banc 2012)).
In this case, the circuit court stated that it was dismissing Bell’s claim “[f]or the reasons
set out in the respondents’ . . . motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Therefore, unless we can
sustain the dismissal on the basis asserted in Phillips’ motion, we must reverse. See In re Estate
of Austin, 389 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Mo. banc 2013); Zinke v. Orskog, 422 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2013).
Analysis
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that that the United States Constitution
requires state prison officials to give inmates “the capability of bringing contemplated challenges
to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356
(1996) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)).
Inmates undeniably enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts and the
legal system. To protect that right, prisons must provide inmates with some
access to legal materials or to legal assistance so that inmates can prepare and
pursue complaints, and with some ability to mail these complaints and related
legal correspondence once prepared.
Myers v. Hundley, 101 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Casey, 518 U.S. at 350-51, and
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821, 824-28).
Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized “[t]he [United States] Constitution
requires that inmates be provided . . . the tools needed ‘to attack their sentences, directly or
collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement.’” Bromwell v. Nixon,
361 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting Casey, 518 U.S. at 355). “To succeed on an
‘access to the courts’ claim, [inmates] must show (1) that they were denied ‘a reasonably
adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
courts’ and (2) that they suffered actual injury.” Id. at 400 (quoting Casey, 518 U.S. at 351).
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Bell’s petition sought to assert a claim against Phillips under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial
of his constitutional right of access to the courts. “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal
link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v. Mo., 442 F.3d 1128,
1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990)). To
state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must “allege facts supporting any individual defendant’s personal
involvement or responsibility for the violations.” Ellis v. Norris, 179 F.3d 1078, 1079 (8th Cir.
1999); see also State ex rel. Hill v. Travers, 602 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980) (finding
“it is necessary to establish actual personal knowledge or involvement” to support a § 1983
claim).
Phillips’ motion for judgment on the pleadings contended that Bell’s petition had failed
to allege actual injury from any denial of access to the courts. The Missouri Supreme Court has
recognized that actions which frustrate an inmate’s ability to file a habeas corpus petition satisfy
the actual injury requirement. In Bromwell, the Court stated that the inmates in that case had not
adequately alleged actual injury “[b]ecause [they] have not pleaded that they have been unable to
file petitions for writs of habeas corpus due to any or all of the . . . alleged insufficiencies” in the
legal resources made available to them. 361 S.W.3d at 399; see also id. 400 (noting that petition
failed to allege that “any inmate has been unable to file a habeas petition as a result of”
insufficient legal resources). Similarly, Casey held that inmates are entitled to the resources
reasonably necessary “to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally.” 518 U.S. at 355.
Although Phillips inaccurately claimed otherwise in the circuit court, Bell’s petition
expressly alleged that “[d]ue to the fact that I did not have the $5.10 to mail my Federal Writ of
Habeas Corpus and the accompanying exhibits during the early months of 2010 the Court ruled
that my petition was untimely.” Bell’s allegation that the failure to provide him with necessary
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postage resulted in the dismissal of his federal habeas petition is precisely the sort of actionable
injury contemplated in Casey and Bromwell. Indeed, in her briefing in the trial court, Phillips
herself acknowledged that “missing a court imposed deadline” would constitute a sufficient
injury to support Bell’s claim.
In this Court, Phillips acknowledges (despite her contrary representations to the circuit
court) that Bell’s petition adequately alleged that he had been denied the postage necessary to
file his federal habeas petition. On appeal, Phillips shifts her focus. She now argues that Bell’s
petition fails to adequately allege that she was involved in denying Bell the postage he needed.
Phillips did not make this argument in the circuit court. But it is unpersuasive anyway. Bell’s
petition alleged that going to Phillips’ office “was the only way that I could . . . get legal
supplies.” Bell alleged that Phillips “refused me any type of legal resources,” and instructed “her
officers” to do likewise, and to discipline Bell if he “asked for anything.” Bell alleged that he
filed a grievance against Phillips because she had violated his right “to be supplied with legal
materials like postage, pens and paper” without charge, and that she retaliated against him for
filing this grievance. Bell alleged that, in the grievance proceeding, the officers stated that they
would “not provide [Bell] with the needed legal materials, (free or otherwise).” Bell’s petition
also alleged that “the dept. of corrections refuse[s] to provide indigent inmates like myself
reasonable access to legal materials like photocopies and postage ‘FREE OF CHARGE,’ which
is part of receiving reasonable access to the courts,” and that “due to the fact that I did not have
the $5.10 to mail my Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus[,] . . . the Court ruled that my petition was
untimely.”
Phillips focuses on the last two quoted statements, and emphasizes that those allegations
only assert that the Department of Corrections, rather than Phillips personally, denied Bell the
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postage he needed. Phillips reads the petition too technically. The petition alleges that Phillips
was Bell’s “only” source of access to necessary legal materials during the time period (early
2010) in which his federal habeas petition was filed, that she “refused [him] any type of legal
resources” during that time, and that she instructed “her officers” to do likewise. Construing the
allegations of the petition liberally, as we must, Bell’s later references to the Department of
Corrections’ refusal to provide him with necessary postage are reasonably read to refer to
Phillips herself, and/or other officers acting according to her instructions. While it may have
been preferable for Bell to have alleged additional details concerning the denial of the necessary
postage, “[a] petition does not have to plead operative or evidentiary facts, so it will survive
dismissal if it pleads ultimate facts and not conclusions.” LeBlanc v. Research Belton Hosp., 278
S.W.3d 201, 207 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008); see also First Nat’l Bank of Ft. Smith v. Kansas City S.
Ry. Co., 865 S.W.2d 719, 728 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993) (“A party must plead only ultimate facts in
his petition. Evidentiary facts supporting ultimate facts are not requisites.”).
We therefore conclude that Bell’s petition adequately alleged that Phillips refused to
provide him with access to the materials, including postage, which he required in order to
prosecute his federal habeas corpus petition, and that as a result his habeas petition was
dismissed as untimely. These allegations were sufficient to state a claim against Phillips for
denial of access to the courts under Casey, Bromwell, and related cases. The dismissal of Bell’s
court-access claim must accordingly be reversed, and the case remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings on that claim. This opinion only addresses the argument for dismissal which
Phillips advanced in her motion for judgment on the pleadings; our opinion should not be read to
address any other issues, or the ultimate merits of Bell’s claim.
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Conclusion
The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
__________________________________
Alok Ahuja, Chief Judge
All concur.
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