Cynthia Knight v. Con-Agra Foods, INC. and Treasurer of the State of Missouri- Custodian of the Second Injury Fund ( 2015 )

IN THE MIISSOUR
RI COURRT OF AP
PPEALS
S
WESTER
W RN DIST
TRICT
CYNTH
HIA KNIGH
HT, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) WD78 591
)
CON-AG
GRA FOOD DS, INC. and ) FILED: Decemberr 8, 2015
TREASU
URER OF THE
T STATE E OF )
MISSOU
URI - CUST
TODIAN OF F THE )
SECOND
D INJURY FUND, )
Resspondents. )
Appeal from thee Labor and
d Industriall Relations C
Commission
n
Beforee Division 4: Alok Ahujja, C.J., Tho
omas H. Neewton, J., an
nd David M. Byrn, Sp.JJ.
On
O August 21
1, 2013, Cyn
nthia Knight filed a Claim
m for Comppensation witth the
Department of Laborr and Industrrial Relation
ns’ Division oof Workers’ Compensattion. Knightt’s
workers’ compensatiion claim rellated to an in
njury she sufffered on Jannuary 13, 20009, during hher
employm
ment with Reespondent Co
on-Agra Foo
ods, Inc. Th e Labor andd Industrial R
Relations
Commisssion dismissed Knight’s claim as unttimely on tw
wo grounds. Knight appeeals. Becauuse
she challenges only one
o of the tw
wo reasons fo
or the Comm
mission’s advverse ruling,, we affirm.
Factua
al Backgrou
und
Cynthia
C Knig
ght was emplloyed at Con
n-Agra’s plaant in Marshaall. She wass injured at w
work
on January 13, 2009,, when she feell, hit her heead, and sufffered a conccussion. Kniight was treaated
at a hospital emergen
ncy room and
d released th
he same day..
Con-Agra filed a Report of Injury with the Division of Worker’s Compensation the
following day. Con-Agra and its workers’ compensation insurer authorized Knight’s emergency
room visit, and paid all medical bills associated with that visit. These are the only payments
made directly by Con-Agra or by its workers’ compensation insurer on account of the injury
Knight suffered on January 13, 2009.
Knight claims that she continued to experience medical problems related to her January
2009 injury, and she requested that Con-Agra authorize additional medical treatment. Con-
Agra’s in-house nurses denied those requests, concluding that Knight’s later medical complaints
were not work-related. Knight sought treatment on her own. Payments to the health-care
providers Knight selected were made by her employer-provided health insurance, which was
administered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield.
On August 21, 2013, Knight filed a Claim for Compensation with the Division of
Workers’ Compensation for her injuries arising out of the January 2009 incident. Con-Agra, its
insurer, and the Second Injury Fund all raised a statute of limitations defense. They asserted that
Knight’s claim was untimely under § 287.430,1 which provides in relevant part that a claim for
compensation must be filed “within two years after the date of injury or death, or the last
payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death.” Knight responded that her
Claim for Compensation was timely because the payments made by Blue Cross/Blue Shield for
her later medical treatment, including payments made within two years of the filing of her claim,
constituted payments “made under this chapter on account of the injury.” Knight argued that
these later payments tolled the running of the statute of limitations because her later medical
treatment was related to the January 2009 workplace injury, and because her health insurance
1
Statutory citations refer to the 2000 edition of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, as
supplemented through the 2008 Cumulative Supplement.
2
was fully self-funded by Con-Agra, meaning that the later payments were in reality made by
Con-Agra directly.
Following an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) agreed with Con-
Agra that Knight’s claim was untimely. The ALJ’s decision explained:
Claimant’s assertion that the Blue Cross/Blue Shield payments were made “under
this chapter (Ch. 287) on account of the injury” fails on two counts. First, there is
no medical evidence whatsoever that the medical treatment of November 14, 2011
for which Blue Cross/Blue Shield made payments, was medical treatment
rendered “on account of the injury” (i.e., an injury incurred by Claimant in the
January 13, 2009 accident). Second, Dungan v. Fuqua Homes, Inc., 437 S.W.3d
807 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) held that payments made by a health insurance carrier
do not constitute “payments made under this chapter”, and thus do not toll the
running of the statute of limitations. Dungan is clearly on point and is dispositive
of the issue.
On review, the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission adopted the ALJ’s decision as
its own.2 Knight now appeals.
Analysis
Knight contends, for two reasons, that the Labor and Industrial Commission erred in
concluding that her workers’ compensation claim was untimely. First, she argues that “payments
made by [Knight]’s Employer-provided fully self-funded health insurance plan constituted
payments made under chapter 287 for the purposes of tolling the statute of limitations contained
in § 287.430.” Second, she claims that the Commission, following Dungan, erroneously “added
the requirement that ‘payments made under this chapter’ in that section be made by an obligation
of the employer when no such requirement is found in § 287.430.”
In order for later payments to delay the running of the statute of limitations, those
payments must satisfy at least two requirements: the payments must be “[1] made under this
2
“When, as here, the Commission affirms or adopts the findings of the ALJ, we review the
decision and findings of the ALJ as adopted by the Commission.” Dungan, 437 S.W.3d at 809.
3
chapter [2] on account of the injury or death.” § 287.430. The Commission in this case found
that the payments on which Knight relied failed to satisfy either criteria: they were not payments
“made under this chapter” because those payments were made by Knight’s health insurer, not by
Con-Agra or its workers’ compensation insurer; and they were not payments “on account of the
injury” because there was no medical evidence that Knight’s November 2011 medical treatment
was related to her January 2009 injury. Yet, despite the fact that the Commission relied on two
separate and independent rationales to find Knight’s claim to be untimely, she challenges only
one of those rationales: both of Knight’s Points argue that Blue Cross/Blue Shield’s payments
for her November 2011 medical care constituted payments “made under this chapter.”
Because Knight has failed to challenge each of the grounds on which the Commission
relied to find her claim untimely, we have no option but to affirm the Commission’s decision.
While it may not be stated explicitly in Rule 84.04, the fundamental
requirement for an appellate argument is that it demonstrate the erroneousness of
the basis upon which a lower court or agency issued an adverse ruling. Unless an
appellant challenges the grounds on which an adverse ruling depends, he has
shown no entitlement to appellate relief.
Rainey v. SSPS, Inc., 259 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008). As a corollary to this
principle, if a trial court or administrative agency relies on multiple, independently sufficient
grounds in issuing an adverse ruling, the appellant must challenge each of those independent
grounds of decision. This Court addressed this precise situation in City of Peculiar v. Hunt
Martin Materials, LLC, 274 S.W.3d 588 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009):
[Appellants’] points on appeal attack only two of the circuit court's five
grounds for denying their petition for a declaratory judgment. . . . [Appellants’]
points do not attack the circuit court’s three other grounds for denying their
petition. To reverse the circuit court’s judgment, however, [Appellants] would
necessarily have to establish that all of the reasons that the circuit court articulated
in its judgment were wrong. This is because, even if we agreed with [Appellants]
that the circuit court erred in making those two conclusions, we would have no
choice but to presume, in the absence of arguments to the contrary, that the circuit
court's other three reasons for denying their petitions were correct. Alleged errors
4
by the trial court must be prejudicial and affect the merits of the action. Rule
84.13(b). Thus, by failing to assert that all of the circuit court’s grounds were
incorrect, [Appellants] have failed to carry their burden on appeal of establishing
that the circuit court erred in denying their petition.
City of Peculiar v. Hunt Martin Materials, LLC, 274 S.W.3d 588, 590-91 (Mo. App. W.D.
2009); see also, e.g., STRCUE, Inc. v. Potts, 386 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012);
Chastain v. Kansas City Mo. City Clerk, 337 S.W.3d 149, 155 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
The reasoning of City of Peculiar is fully applicable here. Even if we were to agree with
Knight that the payments made by Blue Cross/Blue Shield were payments “made under this
chapter,” this would not alter the result: those payments would still not toll the running of the
statute of limitations, because of the Commission’s separate – and unchallenged – determination
that the payments were not made “on account of the [January 2009] injury.” We will not
separately address the Commission’s finding that the Blue Cross/Blue Shield payments were not
made “on account of the [January 2009] injury,” where Knight has made no argument
challenging that finding.3 Presuming that unchallenged finding to be correct, we have no option
but to affirm the Commission’s decision.
3
At oral argument, Knight’s counsel argued that the question whether her November 2011
medical treatment related to her January 2009 injury should be remanded to the Commission, because that
issue was not fully litigated in the prior evidentiary hearing. Knight did not argue in her briefing,
however, that the Commission’s express finding that the payments were not made “on account of the
[January 2009] injury” was improper, because it addressed an issue that had not been fully litigated. We
will not consider an issue raised for the first time at argument. McGuire v. Kenoma, LLC, 375 S.W.3d
157, 182 n. 20 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). In any event, Knight’s characterization of the scope of the prior
evidentiary hearing appears to be incorrect. At the outset of that hearing the ALJ stated his understanding
that “the issue to be decided by virtue of today’s hearing is whether the Claim for Compensation was filed
within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, Section 287.430,” and all counsel affirmatively
indicated their agreement with the ALJ’s statement. As explained in the text, one of the essential issues in
determining the application of § 287.430’s statute of limitations in this case is whether the payments
made for Knight’s November 2011 medical treatment were “on account of the [January 2009] injury.”
Because Knight had a full opportunity to address this issue in the Commission proceedings which have
already occurred, a remand to permit that issue to be re-litigated is unwarranted.
5
Conclusion
We
W affirm thee Commissio
on’s Final Award
A Denyi ng Compenssation.
Alokk Ahuja, Chhief Judge
All concu
ur.
6