James Dye, DDS v. Missouri Department of Social Services, Missouri Medicaid Audit and Compliance Unit ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                            In
    I the
    Misssouri Court
    C     off Appeaals
    Westeern Disttrict
    JAMES
    S DYE, DDS, ET AL.,,                        )
    )
    App
    pellants,                     )    D78352
    WD
    )
    v.                                              )   OPIINION FIL
    LED: Deceember 8, 2015
    )
    MISSOURI DEPA
    ARTMENT T OF                        )
    L SERVIC
    SOCIAL      CES, MISSOURI                       )
    MEDIC
    CAID AUDIT AND                              )
    COMPLLIANCE UNIT,
    U                                   )
    )
    Resp
    pondent.                     )
    App
    peal from thhe Circuit Court of C
    Cole Countty, Missourri
    Thee Honorablee Jon E. Beeetem, Judgee
    Before Division One:
    O    Anthon
    ny Rex Gab
    bbert, Presidding Judge,, Victor C. Howard, Juudge
    and Cynthiia L. Martinn, Judge
    Jaames Dye, DDS ("Dy
    ye") and Brrenda Herrm
    man, DDS ("Herrmann") (collectively
    gment in favor of the Missoouri Mediccaid Audit and
    "Appellaants") appeal a judg
    Compliaance Unit ("MMAC"). Appellantts argue thaat the trial ccourt lackedd jurisdictioon to
    enter thee judgment because theey filed a motion
    m      to vooluntarily diismiss theirr case beforre the
    judgmen
    nt was enterred, renderiing the judg
    gment a nulllity. Findinng no error,, we affirm..
    Factual and Procedural History
    In May 2013, the MMAC informed Dye that it would be conducting an audit of
    Medicaid claims Dye and his dentist office, All About Smiles, LLC, had filed with the
    MMAC.       In June 2013, the MMAC informed Dye that it was sanctioning Dye by
    requiring him to file Medicaid claim forms by mail, rather than electronically, permitting
    the MMAC to review all claims prior to payment ("Sanction"). Dye and All About
    Smiles, LLC appealed this administrative decision by filing a petition for review with the
    Administrative Hearing Commission.
    On June 25, 2013, Dye and All About Smiles, LLC separately filed a petition in
    the Greene County Circuit Court. The petition sought a temporary restraining order to
    prevent the MMAC from enforcing the Sanction "until such time as the Administrative
    Hearing Commission can conduct a review of" the MMAC's decision. The petition
    alleged, among other things, that Dye's due process rights had been violated by the
    imposition of the Sanction without prior notice and a hearing.          The lawsuit was
    transferred to the Circuit Court of Cole County on July 3, 2013, based on a change of
    venue.
    The docket sheet reflects that an amended petition was filed on July 26, 2013,
    again seeking a temporary restraining order, and that a second amended petition seeking a
    temporary restraining order was filed on August 21, 2013.
    A hearing was conducted on September 5, 2013, regarding Dye's request for a
    temporary restraining order. During the hearing, the parties argued about whether Dye
    had administrative remedies available, whether Dye's amended petition properly invoked
    2
    the trial court's authority to conduct judicial review of a noncontested agency decision
    under section 536.150,1 and whether the amended petition properly sought a temporary
    restraining order pursuant to Rule 92.2 The trial court expressed reservations about
    whether Dye's petition was sufficient to request judicial review pursuant to section
    536.150. A September 5, 2013 docket entry indicates that the trial court denied Dye's
    request for a temporary restraining order "without prejudice," and dismissed Dye's
    petition "with leave granted to file an amended pleading within the next twenty (20) days
    and failing to do so, the cause will be dismissed."
    On September 17, 2013, the docket sheet indicates that Dye filed an "amended
    petition for judicial review and preliminary injunction." The amended petition is not
    included in the record on appeal. According to the docket sheet, MMAC filed a motion
    to dismiss the amended petition with respect to All About Smiles, LLC, suggesting that
    All About Smiles, LLC was also named as a plaintiff in the amended petition.3 MMAC
    also filed a motion opposing the request for preliminary injunctive relief.
    On September 24, 2013, the parties appeared for a hearing, presumably to address
    MMAC's pending motions. The docket sheet indicates that on October 2, 2013, the trial
    court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the petition for preliminary
    injunction and dismissing the amended petition as to plaintiff All About Smiles, LLC. A
    copy of the trial court's written order addressing these rulings has not been made a part of
    1
    All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 as supplemented unless otherwise indicated.
    2
    All citations to the Rules are to Missouri Court Rules Volume I--State (2015).
    3
    Because Herrman is an Appellant, we assume she was also named as a plaintiff in the amended petition.
    There had been discussion during the September 5, 2013 hearing about whether Herrman was properly before the
    court as a plaintiff since she was not named in the caption of the several petitions filed by Dye before the September
    5, 2013 trial court order dismissing his petition with leave to refile.
    3
    the record on appeal. And no transcript from the September 24, 2013 hearing has been
    provided. We thus cannot discern from the record on appeal the extent to which evidence
    was taken at the hearing to support the trial court's subsequent entry of a preliminary
    injunction--primary relief sought by the Appellant's amended petition.4
    According to the docket sheet, on January 7, 2014, Appellants sought leave to file
    a second amended petition. MMAC opposed the motion. According to the docket sheet,
    on January 23, 2014, MMAC filed a motion to amend the trial court's October 2, 2013
    preliminary injunction order.
    The trial court conducted a hearing on January 23, 2014, the transcript for which
    has been made a part of the record on appeal. The trial court addressed MMAC's motion
    to amend the preliminary injunction. The docket sheet indicates that an amended order
    granting and denying in part Appellants' petition for preliminary injunction was entered
    on January 23, 2014. A copy of this order is not included in the record on appeal.
    During the same hearing the parties also discussed the remaining matters to be
    determined as framed by Dye and Hermann's amended petition and the best way to
    resolve those matters. Appellants' counsel advised the trial court that he "think[s] we
    should just set it for trial." The parties agreed on a trial date of April 18, 2014.
    4
    Because we otherwise conclude that the Appellants had no right to voluntarily dismiss their lawsuit
    without prejudice without an order from the trial court, we need not resolve whether the introduction of evidence to
    secure a preliminary injunction constitutes the submission of evidence at trial pursuant to Rule 67.02(a) when a
    preliminary (and not a permanent) injunction is the principle relief sought by a petition. Cf. Cook v. McElwain, 
    432 S.W.3d 286
    , 290 (Mo. banc 2014) (noting that "[g]enerally, a preliminary injunction hearing is not . . . considered a
    'trial',' meaning a trial on the merits," in a case where a permanent injunction was sought by the petition) (citation
    omitted).
    4
    On April 18, 2014, the parties appeared for trial. At that time, Appellants' counsel
    advised the trial court that because of developments in proceedings before the
    Administrative Hearing Commission, he no longer needed the trial court to review
    documentation involving claims that remained subject to the Sanction and only needed
    the court to determine whether his due process rights had been violated by the denial of a
    pre-deprivation hearing before imposition of the Sanction. Appellants' counsel advised
    the trial court that he had "a trial brief and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [and]
    associated exhibits, that I would like to offer to the court." [Tr. 91] Counsel then advised
    the court that "[t]he only thing that I intend to put on today is evidence with regard to the
    question of notice, what notice and what opportunity to be heard, the due process issue,
    that is all I intend to put on." [Tr. 92] The pleadings and exhibits submitted by the
    Appellants to the trial court have not been included in the record on appeal.
    After receiving the materials submitted by the Appellants, and hearing argument
    from both parties regarding the Appellants' due process claim, the trial court reiterated
    that it would only be deciding whether the Appellants' due process rights were violated
    and then stated: "I'll show the cause submitted on that basis." Docket entries for April 18,
    2014, show that evidence was taken and that the cause was taken under advisement.
    On July 9, 2014, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss their lawsuit without
    prejudice. The motion made no reference to Rule 67.02(a) and instead argued that the
    trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the due process issue submitted to it for
    decision. MMAC opposed the motion. The trial court did not rule on the motion.
    5
    On December 31, 2014, the trial court entered a judgment ("Judgment") ruling that
    the Appellants' due process rights were not violated by imposition of the Sanction.
    The Appellants timely appeal.
    Analysis
    In their sole point on appeal, the Appellants argue that the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction to enter the Judgment because they filed a motion to dismiss their case
    without prejudice pursuant to Rule 67.02(a) before the Judgment was entered, rendering
    any subsequent action by the trial court a nullity.
    Rule 67.02(a) provides that "a civil action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
    without order of the court anytime . . . [i]n cases tried without a jury, prior to the
    introduction of evidence at the trial." "A voluntary dismissal is effective on the date it is
    filed with the court." State ex rel. Frets v. Moore, 
    291 S.W.3d 805
    , 812 (Mo. App. S.D.
    2009) (internal citation omitted). "Consequently, a trial court loses jurisdiction to enter
    any subsequent orders regarding the dismissed action." 
    Id. "The circuit
    court may take
    no further steps as to the dismissed action, and any step attempted is viewed a nullity."
    
    Id. Thus, the
    dispositive question presented in this case is whether the Appellants'
    motion to dismiss was filed "prior to the introduction of evidence at the trial." We
    conclude that it was not.
    We note at the outset that the motion to dismiss without prejudice filed by the
    Appellants did not purport to be based on Rule 67.02(a) but instead argued a substantive
    basis for dismissal--that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the due process
    6
    issue submitted to it for decision on April 18, 2014. We are not persuaded, therefore, that
    the Appellants ever attempted to exercise their rights pursuant to Rule 67.02(a).5
    Even if we view the motion to dismiss without prejudice as having been filed
    pursuant to Rule 67.02(a), the Appellants' claims not already resolved by the grant of a
    preliminary injunction were set for trial at the Appellants' request on April 18, 2014. The
    parties appeared on that date prepared to proceed to trial. The Appellants' announced that
    given intervening developments before the Administrative Hearing Commission, the
    Appellants were withdrawing all remaining issues framed by their petition except
    whether imposition of the Sanction without prior notice and a hearing violated their due
    process rights. The Appellants submitted the materials they deemed essential to the trial
    court's determination of this issue. Those materials included a trial brief, a motion for
    judgment on the pleadings, and related exhibits. The trial court's docket entries reflect
    that "evidence" was taken on April 18, 2014, and that the case was taken under
    advisement. This was a trial.
    The Appellants argue that no "evidence" was submitted to the court, and that no
    trial occurred on April 18, 2014, because the trial court needed only resolve an issue on
    the pleadings.         The limited record on appeal we have been provided refutes both
    assertions.6 The case was set for trial on April 18, 2014. The docket sheet states that
    5
    During oral argument, the Appellants took the position that they are alternatively claiming error on appeal
    because the Judgment is legally erroneous, as the trial court had no legal authority to determine the due process issue
    framed by the Appellants' amended petition, and submitted to the trial court for decision on April 18, 2014.
    Appellants' point on appeal does not raise this claim of error, and no such claim of error is preserved for our review.
    6
    We are aided in our conclusion that the record refutes the Appellants' contentions by what the Appellants
    have failed to include in the record on appeal. The Appellants have not provided us with the version of their petition
    giving rise to the Judgment; with preliminary injunction orders affording the Appellants the primary relief sought in
    their lawsuit; or with the pleadings and exhibits submitted to the trial court on April 18, 2014. Rule 81.12(a)
    7
    evidencee was taken
    n on April 18, 2014. The transccript reflectts that Apppellants' couunsel
    offered exhibits
    e        to the
    t trial cou
    urt on Aprill 18, 2014, and that Apppellants' ccounsel inteended
    o the due process issue. Howevver narrow
    to offer evidence on                                     w the remainning issue tto be
    determin                                  d set for trial and prrovided thee trial court with
    ned, the parrties appearred on the date
    all the information
    n they deem
    med necessaary to perm
    mit the triall court to ffully and finnally
    determin
    ne the substtantive righ
    hts and liabiilities of thee parties. SSee Washinggton Univ. M
    Med.
    Ctr. Red
    developmen
    nt Corp. v. Komen,
    K      
    637 S.W.2d 551
    , 53 (Moo. App. E.D
    D. 1982) ("O
    Once
    evidencee is submittted at the trrial on the merits
    m      the ssubstantive rights and liabilities oof the
    parties are                              ve of court is requiredd for dismisssal.").
    a at stake. Beyond this point leav
    Because
    B       the Appellantss filed theirr voluntary dismissal aafter evidennce was enttered
    at trial, they weree not entitleed to voluntarily dism
    miss their lawsuit wiithout prejuudice
    without leave of the
    t trial court. The trial
    t     court retained its jurisdiction to enterr the
    Judgmen
    nt.
    Point
    P     one is denied.
    Co
    onclusion
    We
    W affirm th
    he Judgmen
    nt of the triaal court.
    _____________________________
    _________
    Cynthia L. Martin, Juudge
    All conccur.
    requires th
    he record on app  peal to "contaiin all of the reccord, proceedinngs and evidence necessary too the determinaation
    of all questtions to be pressented, by either appellant orr respondent, too the appellate court for decission." Where
    pleadings, transcripts, or exhibits are no ot made a part of the record oon appeal, suchh "omissions w  will be taken as
    favorable to
    t the trial courrt's ruling and unfavorable
    u             to the appellant." Saturn of Tifffany Springs vv. McDaris, 
    331 S.W.3d 704
    , 712 (Mo. Ap     pp. W.D. 2011 1) (citation omiitted).
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WD78352

Judges: Gabbert, Howard, Martin

Filed Date: 12/8/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024