In the Interest of R.H. Juvenile Office v. L.J.A. (Mother) , 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 474 ( 2016 )

In the
Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District

IN THE INTEREST OF R.H., 
 WD79098
JUVENILE OFFICE,  OPINION FILED:
Respondent, 
 MAY 10, 2016
v. 

L.J.A. (MOTHER), 
Appellant; 

A.H. (FATHER),
Defendant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri
The Honorable Kathryn Elizabeth Davis, Judge
Before Division Three: Gary D. Witt, P.J., James E. Welsh, Anthony Rex Gabbert, JJ.
L.J.A. (Mother) appeals the circuit court’s judgment assuming jurisdiction over her child,
R.H., and placing the child in the care and custody of the Department of Social Services,
Children’s Division (Children’s Division). Mother asserts two points on appeal. She contends
that the circuit court erred in assuming jurisdiction over R.H. pursuant to Section 211.031.1,
RSMo Cum. Supp. 2015, for the reasons that: (1) The court’s judgment was not supported by
substantial evidence because the court received no evidence that the child was presently in need
of any care or support that was not being provided to her, and (2) The court’s judgment
misapplied the law because the court relied on its presumption that the use of drugs by a parent
creates a condition leaving the child in need of care under the statute with no evidence of lack of
parental care or support for the child. We affirm.
R.H. was born March 29, 2012, in Kansas City. At the time of her birth, testing of the
child’s meconium indicated the presence of marijuana. Consequently, the Children’s Division
was contacted and a Newborn Crisis Assessment was completed by an investigator with that
agency. Upon completing the Newborn Crisis Assessment, the Children’s Services investigator
concluded that a Family Centered Services case would not be opened.
Three years later on June 7, 2015, the Children’s Division received a report of concern
alleging that R.H. had “unsafe/inadequate shelter and meth lab exposure” and that the parents
had been observed manufacturing methamphetamine (or “meth”). The Children’s Division
investigator and the police made an unannounced visit to the family home. The investigator
reported that they “were made to wait outside for an extended period of time before being
permitted to enter the home.” Once in the home, the investigator and law enforcement “observed
nothing indicative of manufacturing meth.” During the visit, however, Mother admitted to
marijuana use. The investigator reported that Father indirectly admitted to “use,” although it is
unclear what type of “use” he indirectly admitted to. A drug test performed on Mother the
following day was positive for the presence of meth. Mother then admitted to using meth.
Mother and Father admitted a need for treatment and agreed to treatment. Mother, Father, and
the investigator arrived at an agreement with regard to a “safety plan” for R.H. wherein the
parents agreed to allow R.H. to live with her maternal grandfather until the parents “could get the
appropriate help.”
On July 2, 2015, approximately three and a half weeks after receiving the report of
concern, the Children’s Division requested Juvenile Court intervention alleging that both parents
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had failed to follow through with agreed upon drug treatment and had declined additional
services. The Children’s Division expressed concern that, although R.H. was still residing with
her grandfather, the “safety plan” would become null and void at the close of the investigation.
The Children’s Division explained that a pattern of drug use within the family was evident
because of R.H.’s prenatal exposure to marijuana and because her “primary caregivers are
abusing the highly addictive drug, Meth.” The request for intervention expressed that R.H.’s
young age, complete dependence on caregivers, and inability to verbalize her needs placed her in
need of the court’s protection.
On July 30, 2015, the Juvenile Officer filed a petition alleging R.H. to be in need of the
care and protection of the court because the parents neglected or refused to provide proper
support, medical, surgical or other care necessary for her well-being. The Petition further alleged
that: 1) At the time of R.H.’s birth on March 29, 2012, her meconium tested positive for
marijuana; 2) On June 8, 2015, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines and has admitted
to using marijuana and methamphetamines; 3) Parents admitted the need for drug treatment and
had been offered services but had failed to obtain treatment or engage in services; 4) The
Children’s Division and Juvenile Office had attempted to work with and offer services to the
family but the parents had been uncooperative and unwilling to participate in those services and
had failed to submit to all requested urine analysis; 5) During a welfare check conducted by the
police and Juvenile Officer on July 29, 2015, Mother refused to sign consent to have her home
searched and refused to take a urine analysis offered by the police, and; 6) Reasonable efforts
had been made to prevent removal of the child from the home or, in the alternative, reasonable
efforts would have been futile or an emergency existed.
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On August 4, 2015, a protective custody hearing was held and the court took protective
custody of R.H. On September 10, 2015, the court heard evidence on the Juvenile Officer’s
petition. Three witnesses testified: the Children’s Division investigator who investigated the
meth allegations, a supervisor from Northland Dependency Services whose agency performed
urinalysis testing on Mother, and the Deputy Juvenile Officer who followed up on the Children’s
Division’s request for intervention. Along with these witnesses and in support of the allegations
in the petition, the Juvenile Officer introduced as exhibits the 2012 Newborn Crisis Assessment,
the 2012 Research Hospital medical records from R.H.’s birth, the June 8, 2015 urinalysis results
showing Mother positive for methamphetamine, and the July 2, 2015 letter from the Children’s
Division to the Juvenile Office requesting intervention.
At the close of the hearing the court verbally expressed that it had found no evidence
against Father and judged Father to be a non-offending parent. The court concluded that
Mother’s admitted meth use, however, made her incapable of being a good parent. The court’s
written judgment found all allegations in the Juvenile Officer’s petition to be true with regard to
Mother. The court found that the Children’s Division had made reasonable efforts to prevent
removal of the child and ordered that R.H. be placed in the care and custody of the Children’s
Division for placement with Father on a trial home visit. Father and Mother were ordered to
cooperate with Written Service Agreements provided by the Children’s Division. Mother
appeals.
We review juvenile adjudication proceedings under the standard applied in other court-
tried civil cases and will affirm the judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it,
it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. In re
A.G.R., 359 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo.App.2011). We consider the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the circuit court’s ruling and ignore any evidence to the contrary. In re A.M.S., 272
S.W.3d 305, 307 (Mo. App. 2008); In re B.J.K., 197 S.W.3d 237, 247 (Mo. App. 2006).
To assert jurisdiction under Section 211.031.1(1), the juvenile or family court
must find clear and convincing evidence that the child needs care because the
parent has neglected to provide the care necessary for the child’s well-being.
Evidence is clear and convincing when it instantly tilts the scales in the
affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition, and the fact finder’s
mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true. Furthermore,
‘substantial evidence,’ as used in Murphy v. Carron, means clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence when that standard of proof applies.
In re J.M., 328 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Mo. App. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
In her first point on appeal, Mother contends that the circuit court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over R.H. under Section 211.031.1 because the court’s judgment was not supported
by substantial evidence in that the court received no evidence that the child was presently in need
of any care or support that was not being provided to her. We disagree.
“Direct evidence of abuse or neglect is not required to support a finding of abuse or
neglect” and “[t]he juvenile court, as a fact finder, may draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence and may base its findings upon such inferences.” In re M.N.J., 291 S.W.3d 306, 311
(Mo. App. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the child was born with
traces of marijuana in her meconium which allows for a reasonable inference that Mother
knowingly exposed her unborn child to that drug. The Children’s Division investigated and,
although no case was opened, it can be inferred that the investigation put Mother on notice that
illegal parental drug use is highly concerning and may warrant State intervention. Three years
later an allegation of meth lab exposure caused the Children’s Division to again investigate the
child’s welfare. Upon investigation, while Mother initially admitted to using marijuana, she only
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admitted to using methamphetamines after her urinalysis revealed the presence of meth. Mother
then agreed to pursue treatment. However, the evidence at trial showed that she failed to follow
through with this agreement. After completing an “initial intake” for treatment, Mother
cancelled follow-up visits and failed to complete a full assessment or undergo treatment. One
urinalysis submitted by Mother in July was rejected by the testing agency on the belief that it had
been tampered with. On July 29, 2015, almost two months after Mother first tested positive for
meth, Mother refused a request for a urinalysis. A reasonable inference can be drawn that
Mother refused to submit to the test because she was concerned about the outcome and that
Mother was continuing to abuse illegal substances. The record reflects that, because R.H.’s
father worked outside of the home and Mother stayed home with R.H., Mother was R.H.’s sole
caregiver during the time that Father was working. Consequently, we find substantial evidence
in the record to support the court’s judgment that R.H. was in need of care and support due to
Mother’s admitted drug use, Mother’s admitted need for treatment during such time as Mother
was the primary caregiver of three-year-old R.H., and Mother’s failure to follow through with
treatment. Point one is denied.
In her second point on appeal, Mother contends that the circuit court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over R.H. pursuant to Section 211.031.1, because the court’s judgment misapplied
the law in that the court relied on its presumption that the use of drugs by a parent creates a
condition leaving the child in need of care under the statute with no evidence of lack of parental
care or support for the child.
As discussed above, the evidence before the court was that a report of concern to the
Children’s Division regarding the child’s alleged exposure to drugs resulted in Mother, the
child’s primary caregiver, being deemed in need of treatment for her use of methamphetamines.
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That primary caregiver, Mother, admitted her need for treatment and agreed to pursue treatment
but failed to follow through with treatment. Mother’s positive urine test for methamphetamines
during such time as the child was in Mother’s care, Mother’s lack of candor regarding her
methamphetamine use, Mother’s failure to follow through with treatment for that use, and
Mother’s avoidance of drug testing two months after Children’s Services first investigated the
allegations of concern, allow for a reasonable inference that the child was being cared for by
Mother during such times as Mother was under the influence of an addictive, dangerous, and
illegal drug. Consequently, it also allows for an inference that the child was without proper care
and support while in Mother’s care and that, without court intervention, the child was at further
risk of harm. We disagree that the court’s judgment was based solely on a general presumption
that the use of drugs by a parent creates a condition leaving the child in need of care under the
statute. Point two is denied.
We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in assuming jurisdiction of R.H.
pursuant to 211.031.1 as the judgment was supported by substantial evidence and the court did
not misapply the law. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge
All concur.
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