ERIC VIMONT v. CHRISTIAN COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT ( 2016 )

ERIC VIMONT, )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. SD34414
)
CHRISTIAN COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT, ) FILED: Oct0ber 11, 2016
)
Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHRISTIAN COUNTY
Honorable Laura J. Johnson, Judge
AFFIRMED
Questing to sell and distribute raw milk from any Christian County location of
his choosing, Eric Vimont cited Missouri’s constitutional right to farm (MO. CONST. art
I, § 35) in seeking judicial relief from Respondent’s order to abate such activity. He
lost on summary judgment and appeals. We affirm. 1
1 We find scant case law or commentary on the 2014 “Right to Farm Amendment” and purposely
limit our pronouncements because we lack the benefit of lawyer-briefing from both sides. Indeed,
we could have granted Respondent’s motion to strike Vimont’s pro se brief for Rule 84.04
violations, but instead will address the first point as we understand it. Point II, charging trial
court bias, fails summarily for lack of support in the argument section of Vimont’s brief (Reese
v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouses, Inc., 19 S.W.3d 749, 751 (Mo.App. 2000)) and our review of
the record reveals no basis therefor in any event.
Background
RSMo § 192.300 empowers county commissions and boards of county health
centers to promulgate orders and ordinances to enhance public health and combat
disease, provided such enactments do not conflict with state rules or regulations.
Citing this statutory authority, the Christian County Commission (“County
Commission”) enacted an amended Food Order ordinance (“CCFO”) regulating raw
milk sale and distribution effective January 30, 2012, § 2.05(D) of which stated that:
Producers of retail raw dairy products may sell and take orders for
their product at the physical farm location where the products are
produced and may deliver the product to the clients [sic] domicile.
The CCFO also authorized Respondent to issue orders to abate conditions that might
transmit or promote disease, and provided an appeal process.
In June 2012, Respondent ordered Vimont to abate his off-premise sale and
distribution of raw milk in violation of CCFO § 2.05. Vimont did not pursue the CCFO
appeal procedure.
In 2014, Missouri voters adopted a “Right to Farm” constitutional amendment
(now MO. CONST. art I, § 35), which states:
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and
security is the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s
economy. To protect this vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the
right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching
practices shall be forever guaranteed in this state, subject to duly
authorized powers, if any, conferred by article VI of the
Constitution of Missouri. [our emphasis]
Vimont cited this in suing Respondent, in 2015, for relief from the order to abate and
CCFO § 2.05. The trial court eventually granted Respondent summary judgment on
multiple grounds, including that the constitutional right to farm is not unlimited, but
2
subject to duly authorized article VI powers, and the CCFO provision at issue was
within the duly authorized powers of the County Commission under article VI and
RSMo § 192.300.
Vimont’s Complaint and Analysis
Vimont claims the trial court erred “by upholding Respondent’s Order to Abate,
allowing it to overrule [Vimont’s] Right to Farm, guaranteed by Article I, Section 35
of the Missouri Constitution ….” 2 On this record, we cannot agree.
As repeatedly noted above, Vimont’s constitutional farming rights, whatever
they may be, are subject to local-government powers duly authorized and conferred
by article VI of Missouri’s constitution. MO. CONST. art I, § 35. As relevant here, article
VI directs that county commissions 3 “shall manage all county business prescribed by
law” (§ 7) and for county powers to be defined by “general laws” (§ 8).
Thus, under article VI, the County Commission was authorized to manage all
legal county business, exercising such powers as the legislature saw fit to delegate or
those fairly implied by powers expressly granted. See Greene County v. Pennel,
992 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Mo.App. 1999)(citing, among others, article VI). The legislature
saw fit to delegate to county commissions, via RSMo § 192.300, power to promulgate
public-health rules and ordinances. Exercising that power and citing it specifically,
the County Commission adopted the CCFO.
2 He also cites “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution,” but
abandons that claim by failing to develop it whatsoever. Reese, 19 S.W.3d at 751.
3 Formerly called county courts, see RSMo § 49.010; Am. Aberdeen Angus v. Stanton, 762
S.W.2d 501, 502 (Mo.App. 1988).
3
Because the CCFO was within the County Commission’s duly authorized article
VI powers, Vimont’s theory of right-to-farm supremacy fails, mooting our need to
address the trial court’s other bases for decision. 4 We deny all motions taken with the
case and affirm the judgment.
DANIEL E. SCOTT, J. – OPINION AUTHOR
GARY W. LYNCH, P.J. – CONCURS
WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J. – CONCURS
4Nearly all of Vimont’s argument questioned the County Commission’s wisdom regarding the
CCFO’s raw milk provisions. These legislative criticisms are outside the scope of Vimont’s point,
but almost certainly would fail anyway. See, e.g., Borron v. Farrenkopf, 5 S.W.3d 618, 622
(Mo.App. 1999)(county ordinance was “rationally related” to health problems “and therefore
expressly authorized under § 192.300”).
4