STATE OF MISSOURI v. GARRY L. FILBECK ( 2016 )


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  • STATE OF MISSOURI,                          )
    )
    Respondent,                   )
    )
    vs.                                  )       No. SD33951
    )
    GARRY L. FILBECK,                           )       FILED: November 17, 2016
    )
    Appellant.                    )
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STONE COUNTY
    Honorable Alan M. Blankenship, Judge
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
    (Before Scott, P.J., Bates, J. and Sheffield, J.)
    PER CURIAM.         Garry Filbeck appeals his bench-tried convictions on two
    counts of felony stealing. The state’s theory was that Filbeck aided and abetted
    Howard Perryman’s theft of six cattle from Danny Vaughn on February 12, 2012, and
    that the thefts were felonies per § 570.030.3(3)(j), 1 which provided that “any offense
    in which the value of property or services is an element is a class C felony if … [t]he
    property appropriated consists of … [a]ny animal considered livestock ….”
    1Statutory citations are to RSMo 2000 as amended through 2012. Rule references are to
    Missouri Court Rules (2016).
    This court affirmed Filbeck’s convictions pursuant to Rule 30.25(b) on April 6,
    2016. On October 6, 2016, our supreme court took transfer and retransferred the
    case to this court to reconsider in light of State v. Bazell, 
    497 S.W.3d 263
    (Mo.
    banc August 23, 2016).
    We invited the parties to file further suggestions. In response, the State opines
    that Bazell entitles Filbeck “to a remand to be resentenced to class A misdemeanors
    for his two counts of stealing” because
    Under Bazell, the sentencing enhancement for the enumerated
    list of types of property set out in § 570.030.3(3) does not apply to
    the crime of stealing those types of property. 
    Id. [Filbeck] was
              similarly charged with an enhancement under § 570.030.3(3). The
    enhancement provision for livestock relied on in this case,
    § 570.030.3(3)(j), is not in any meaningful way distinguishable from
    the enhancement provision for firearms relied on in Bazell.
    We agree. See State v. McMillian, No. WD 79440, slip op. at 5 (Mo.App.
    Oct. 18, 2016) (“Bazell made no distinction between the various ways the
    enhancement provision could be triggered….           The specific character of the
    enhancement sought under section 570.030.3 is irrelevant ….”).
    Although we must reverse and remand for resentencing per Bazell, Filbeck’s
    arguments for further relief fail.
    Limitations Defense Waived
    On retransfer, Filbeck argues from McMillian, slip op. at 6, that his charges
    should be dismissed with prejudice because they were not filed within the one-year
    statute of limitations for misdemeanors (§ 556.036.2). Because Filbeck did not raise
    this defense in the trial court (contrast McMillian, slip op. at 2-3), he has waived
    any such complaint. State v. Cotton, 
    295 S.W.3d 487
    , 488-92 (Mo.App. 2009).
    2
    Proof Sufficient
    There is no real issue as to Perryman’s longtime, extensive stealing network;
    Filbeck’s participation for years prior to the Vaughn theft; or that Filbeck committed
    crimes here as Filbeck’s counsel effectively conceded in the trial court:
    Mr. Perryman had a network. I don’t dispute that at all. I think all
    the reports from Sergeant (sic) Bracker very clearly support that. Mr.
    Perryman was all over creation 24 hour a day stealing stuff, but he
    was put it everywhere, and Mr. Filbeck got caught. And, for that, Mr.
    Filbeck is going to come out of this with five felony convictions [three
    in Webster County, two on appeal here] ….
    and
    Had he [Filbeck] been charged with possession of stolen cattle, he
    would have pled guilty, just like we did in Webster County.
    Possession of stolen cattle is the appropriate charge in this case.
    Despite his involvement with Perryman’s theft network generally, Filbeck
    claims the State did not show that Filbeck aided and encouraged Perryman before or
    during this Vaughn cattle theft. A sufficient reply is that one “who embarks upon a
    criminal course of conduct with another is responsible for crimes he could reasonably
    anticipate would be part of the conduct.” State v. Johnson, 
    456 S.W.3d 521
    , 526
    (Mo.App. 2015); see also State v. Whittemore, 
    276 S.W.3d 404
    , 407 (Mo.App.
    2009). “The evidence need not establish a defendant’s specific knowledge of which
    particular crime his co-participant will commit.” 
    Whittemore, 276 S.W.3d at 407
    .
    The trial court could fairly conclude from the evidence that Filbeck willingly
    participated in a cattle-rustling enterprise that victimized many, eventually including
    Danny Vaughn; that Filbeck knew Perryman was a cattle thief and knew Perryman’s
    modus operandi; that they worked together for years prior to the Vaughn theft; that
    3
    Perryman had no land of his own, and thus depended on Filbeck to keep, feed, and
    care for stolen cattle until they could be sold without arousing suspicion; 2 that with
    Filbeck’s permission, Perryman for years used Filbeck’s barn as a place to remove
    identifying ear tags, placed stolen cattle with Filbeck’s herd, and retrieved stolen
    cattle to sell at a later date; and that Perryman had the lock and only key to one of
    Filbeck’s leased properties. It is telling, as well, that Filbeck initially lied or was not
    forthcoming with investigators, not only about the presence of stolen cattle on his
    property, but also about his relationship with Perryman.
    We deny Filbeck’s claims of insufficient evidence to support the convictions.
    No Double Jeopardy
    Filbeck’s double jeopardy complaint, as first posed, essentially called for a
    return to the old single-larceny rule (i.e., stealing several items from the same owner
    at the same time and place is only a single crime) that our supreme court nullified in
    State v. Heslop, 
    842 S.W.2d 72
    , 75 (Mo. banc 1992). He adjusts his theory on
    retransfer, urging that the legislature meant for a single-larceny rule to govern
    misdemeanors notwithstanding Heslop. We find neither assertion persuasive and
    thus reject both.
    Conclusion
    We reverse the judgment of felony conviction and remand for the circuit court
    to enter judgment of conviction and sentences on two counts of class A misdemeanor
    stealing.
    2 Given the scope of Perryman’s enterprise, the trial court expressed doubt that all thefts were
    funneled through Filbeck or that he was the lone accomplice. Nonetheless, the court stated that
    the evidence “certainly demonstrated” Filbeck’s participation.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SD33951

Judges: Scott, Bates, Sheffield

Filed Date: 11/17/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024