STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. RICARTE SOLIBEN ( 2021 )

STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
v. ) No. SD36600
) Filed: February 1, 2021
RICARTE SOLIBEN, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY
Honorable David Jones, Circuit Judge
AFFIRMED
Ricarte Soliben (Defendant) appeals from his convictions of the class E felony of
domestic assault in the third degree and the class A misdemeanor of domestic assault in
the fourth degree, after a jury found him guilty of both offenses. See § 565.074; § 565.076.1
Defendant is representing himself on appeal, as he did below. While that is his right, he is
required to follow the same rules of procedure as an attorney. Kline v. Casey’s General
Stores, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Mo. App. 1999). Though we recognize the problems
1
All statutory references are to RSMo (2016). All rule references are to Missouri
Court Rules (2020).
faced by self-represented litigants, we cannot relax our standards for non-lawyers. Gibson
v. Rice, 571 S.W.3d 232, 233 (Mo. App. 2019). “It is not for lack of sympathy but rather
it is necessitated by the requirement of judicial impartiality, judicial economy and fairness
to all parties.” Sutton v. Goldenberg, 862 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Mo. App. 1993). Defendant
presents four points on appeal. Finding no merit in any of them, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Procedural Background
In July 2019, the State filed a two-count information alleging that Defendant
committed the following offenses:
Count 1: the class D felony of domestic assault in the second degree, in
violation of § 565.073, by knowingly causing “physical injury” to family or
household member T.S. by choking her; and
Count 2: the class A misdemeanor of domestic assault in the fourth degree,
in violation of § 565.076, by recklessly causing “physical pain” to family or
household member K.C. by shoving him.
A public defender was appointed to represent Defendant. Thereafter, Defendant filed a
motion asking leave to proceed pro se. After conducting a hearing and receiving
Defendant’s written waiver of counsel, the trial court granted the motion and permitted
appointed counsel to withdraw.
Defendant’s jury trial commenced in January 2020. At the instruction conference,
the trial court decided to give Instruction No. 6. This instruction, which was requested by
the State, submitted the lesser-included offense of domestic assault in the third degree. See
§ 565.074. In relevant part, this instruction hypothesized that Defendant committed the
offense by “knowingly caus[ing] physical pain to T.C. by grabbing [her] neck[.]”
The jury found Defendant: (1) not guilty of second-degree domestic assault; (2)
guilty of the lesser-included third-degree domestic assault; and (3) guilty of fourth-degree
2
domestic assault. Thereafter, the trial court imposed the jury’s recommended sentences of
two years in prison for third-degree domestic assault and six months in jail for fourth-
degree domestic assault.
For ease of analysis, we will include the facts relevant to each of Defendant’s four
points in our discussion and disposition of the issues presented.
Point 1
Defendant’s first point challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions for third-degree and fourth-degree domestic assault. On appeal, sufficiency of
the evidence is reviewed on the merits, regardless of whether that issue was raised at trial.
State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 361-62 (Mo. banc 2015). “Appellate review of
sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the State has introduced adequate evidence
from which a reasonable finder of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Mo. banc 2016).2 An
appellate court considers all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and grants
the State all reasonable inferences. Id. Contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded.
Id. “This is not an assessment of whether the Court believes that the evidence at trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of whether, in light of the
evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509
2
In Defendant’s point, he also contends the jury could not find him guilty of either
submitted offense unless the State proved the existence of probable cause to arrest him or
obtain an arrest warrant. Defendant cites no authority supporting this contention, and we
are aware of none. Based upon our review of § 565.074 and § 565.076, the existence of
probable cause to arrest is not an element of either offense. Therefore, we need not address
that issue to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support each of Defendant’s
convictions. See Lammers, 479 S.W.3d at 632.
3
(Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d
681, 687 (Mo. banc 2010). We defer to the fact-finder’s “superior position to weigh and
value the evidence, determine the witnesses’ credibility and resolve any inconsistencies in
their testimony.” State v. Lopez-McCurdy, 266 S.W.3d 874, 876 (Mo. App. 2008).
Viewed from this perspective, the following evidence was adduced at trial.
Defendant and T.C. were married in November 2018. T.C. had three children from
a previous marriage: a 22-year-old son, K.C.; a 19-year-old daughter; and a 17-year-old
daughter. T.C. resided in Springfield, Missouri, with Defendant and the 17-year-old
daughter. On December 23, 2018, T.C. drove to Lawrence, Kansas, to pick up K.C. from
the University of Kansas so he could spend Christmas at home.
As soon as T.C. got home, she and Defendant got into an argument because
Defendant no longer wanted to remain married. Defendant gathered up his things and
exited through a kitchen door that led to the garage. He came back and started pounding
on the locked interior door. T.C. unlocked the door and told Defendant that he needed to
leave. Defendant came inside the house, pushed T.C. against the nearest wall, and pressed
his forearm against her throat. Defendant lifted T.C. up, pushed her backwards over a half-
wall railing, and started choking her. T.C.’s feet were off the ground, and she struggled to
breathe. T.C. was in pain while this was happening.
K.C. heard his mother screaming, so he came up the stairs from the basement to see
what was happening. Defendant pushed K.C. against a wall. As K.C. and Defendant
struggled, they ended up on a loveseat. Defendant began choking K.C. T.C. yelled at
Defendant to let K.C. go. When Defendant did not stop, T.C. called 911. Once T.C. started
talking to the police on the telephone, Defendant finally let go of K.C.
4
Springfield Police Officer Caleb Meyers (Officer Meyers) arrived and saw the
garage door and the interior door open. He heard yelling from the house and walked inside.
T.C. was in the kitchen, and K.C. and Defendant were in the living room. Defendant was
yelling and told Officer Meyers that he needed permission to enter the home. Defendant
took up a “confrontational body position” and refused to let Officer Meyers investigate.
Defendant was handcuffed and taken to Officer Meyers’ vehicle by a back-up officer.
Officer Meyers interviewed T.C. and K.C. Officer Meyers saw red marks on the
left side of T.C.’s neck and on her back, that were consistent with her description of what
had happened. The officer also saw marks on K.C.’s face, neck and back. Officer Meyers
requested that photos be taken of the marks on both T.C. and K.C.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for
third-degree domestic assault. “A person commits the offense of domestic assault in the
third degree if he or she attempts to cause physical injury or knowingly causes physical
pain or illness to a domestic victim, as the term ‘domestic victim’ is defined under section
565.002.” § 565.074.1.3 “Physical injury” is defined as “slight impairment of any function
of the body or temporary loss of use of any part of the body[.]” § 556.061(36).4 Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he did not cause
physical injury to T.C. This argument lacks merit. As noted above, Instruction No. 6
hypothesized that Defendant committed the offense of third-degree domestic assault by
knowingly causing “physical pain” to T.C. by grabbing her neck. Viewed most favorably
3
As a spouse, T.C. was a “domestic victim” as used in this statute. See
§ 565.002(6); § 455.010(7).
4
Prior to January 1, 2017, physical injury was defined to mean “physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition[.]” See § 556.061(20); State v. Jones, 519
S.W.3d 818, 824 (Mo. App. 2017).
5
to the jury’s verdict, there was evidence that Defendant knowingly caused physical pain to
T.C. While arguing with T.C., Defendant pushed T.C. against a wall and started choking
her. Her feet were off the ground. She was in pain while this was occurring. Defendant’s
assault left red marks on the left side of T.C.’s neck and on her back. There was sufficient
evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for third-degree domestic assault.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for
fourth-degree domestic assault. In relevant part, “[a] person commits the offense of
domestic assault in the fourth degree if the act involves a domestic victim, as the term
‘domestic victim’ is defined under section 565.002, and: (1) The person attempts to cause
or recklessly causes physical injury, physical pain, or illness to such domestic victim[.]”
§ 565.076.1(1).5 Once again, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction because he did not cause physical injury to K.C. This argument
lacks merit. Viewed most favorably to the jury’s verdict, there was evidence that
Defendant recklessly caused physical pain to K.C. Defendant pushed K.C. up against a
wall and over to a loveseat, where Defendant began choking K.C. This did not stop until
T.C. was talking to police on the 911 call. K.C. had abrasions and scratches on his face,
neck and back. The jury could reasonably infer that K.C. suffered physical pain while
being assaulted by Defendant. There was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s
conviction for fourth-degree domestic assault. Point 1 is denied.
Point 2
Defendant’s second point challenges the denial of Defendant’s motion for new trial.
The motion alleged that Defendant was entitled to a new trial based on prosecutorial
5
As a family or household member, K.C. was a “domestic victim” as used in this
statute. See § 565.002(6); § 455.010(7).
6
misconduct of counsel involving, inter alia, false testimony and spoliation of evidence.
The following facts are relevant to this point.
The prosecutorial misconduct ground appears to involve statements made by one
of the prosecutors during the trial. Defendant did not object to anything said by this
prosecutor during her five-page opening statement. The first time Defendant raised this
issue was in a sidebar conference after T.C. had completed her testimony. Defendant
argued that the prosecutor lied during opening statement because her description about
what K.C. observed was untruthful. He asked that the prosecutor be required to disqualify
herself. The trial court deferred a ruling on that request because K.C. had not yet testified,
so what he observed was not even in evidence. The proceedings returned to open court,
and K.C. testified. After his testimony concluded, the trial court denied the motion to
disqualify because “it does appear that [the prosecutor’s] depiction of [K.C.’s] testimony
was accurate.” During the State’s closing argument, Defendant made no objections. The
same is true during the State’s four-page closing argument in the sentencing phase of the
proceedings.
Defendant’s spoliation of evidence ground relates to his home security system
video. The system was motion-activated and recorded for approximately one minute after
each activation. The system belonged to and was installed by Defendant. T.C. had access
to the system. Sometime after the incident occurred, Defendant provided the original
security video to the State. The prosecutor returned a copy to Defendant, which he later
marked for identification as Defendant’s Exhibit B (Ex. B).
The State did not mention the security system video in its opening statement.
During Defendant’s opening statement, he asked the jurors to “[p]ay attention to the video
that I have of the whole incident.”
7
During T.C.’s direct examination, she testified that Defendant had installed the
security system when he moved into T.C.’s house. After T.C. was assaulted, a police
investigator asked T.C. to check the security video footage. T.C. did not find any recording
of the assault. She identified State’s Exhibit 3 as a photo of the kitchen that had been taken
from the home security video, and it was admitted in evidence.
The State called Springfield Police Officer Tommy Nguyen, who investigated the
incident at T.C.’s home. During Defendant’s cross-examination, Officer Nguyen was
discussing the evidence collected at the scene. Defendant asked whether Officer Nguyen
had seen the home security video because “there’s video that shows it all.” Officer Nguyen
then provided the following testimony:
Video is just a supplemental to help you out. You brought it up that there
was video; so I had requested it. You said you wanted to review it first. I
gave you my card so that, when you got out, you could provide it. In the
meantime, I contacted [T.C.], and she said she had access to the video. But
then she reviewed it and said it’s pretty much no physical recording on it;
so, therefore, she didn’t think it was important to provide it.
After the State rested, the trial court advised Defendant that he had the right to
present evidence, but it was his decision whether to do so. Defendant did not offer Ex. B
or present any other evidence.
During Defendant’s closing argument, he asked the jury to “[p]lease just look at all
the evidence. They have the pictures, the videos. If you’re questioning where are the
security videos, that’s reasonable doubt. I’ll bet you, if they had shown something, they
would have been here. It’s my system. They’re out there.” In rebuttal argument, the
prosecutor responded to Defendant’s argument this way:
Ladies and gentlemen, there is no video or security camera conspiracy. The
defendant told you himself it’s his security system. If there was a video that
showed what he is saying happened, don’t you think you would have seen
8
it already? There isn’t a video. It didn’t get captured. It’s his system.
There’s no video.
The jury found Defendant guilty of third-degree and fourth-degree domestic assault.
During the jury sentencing phase of the trial, Defendant offered Ex. B, a compact
disc, in evidence. It contained seven, one-minute video clips, none of which included a
time-stamp. These clips showed the living room and kitchen of T.C.’s home. Defendant
claimed that the copy of the video he received back from the prosecutor had “five minutes
missing.” This alleged “gap” involved the time period between the video clip that showed
Officer Meyers putting his hands on Defendant and the next video clip of T.C. and K.C.
standing in the kitchen after Defendant had been placed in Officer Meyers’ vehicle. Ex. B
was admitted and the seven video clips were played for the jury. None of the clips captured
the physical altercations between Defendant and T.C. or K.C. In Defendant’s closing
argument, he said that “the prosecutor yesterday was telling us all that video did not exist.
I got that video from him. I got a hand receipt saying I signed it out from him.” In rebuttal,
the prosecutor argued:
[A]s I just told you, this is a case about domestic violence and domestic
abuse. It is not about a video. … The defendant told you, when he testified,
he provided those videos to the State. Afterwards, he downloaded those
videos and he provided them. There was not a video of this incident
occurring. That’s what I’ve told you from the very beginning.
Ex. B and a video player were sent back with the jury for use during deliberations on
recommended sentencing. The jury provided sentencing recommendations, which the trial
court followed.
After the trial concluded, Defendant filed his motion for new trial. At the hearing,
the trial court announced that it had reviewed the motion. Defendant was asked if there
9
was anything further he wished to present, and he replied: “Not at this time, Your Honor.”
Defendant’s motion for new trial was denied.
In Defendant’s brief, he argues that the prosecutor made improper comments to the
jury during opening statement, closing argument and the sentencing-phase closing
argument. For an allegation of error to be preserved and receive more than plain error
review, it must be objected to during the trial and presented to the trial court again in a
motion for new trial. State v. Loper, 609 S.W.3d 725, 732 (Mo. banc 2020). Because
Defendant asserted no contemporaneous objections during the prosecutor’s opening
statement or closing arguments, these complaints are not preserved for appellate review
and can only be reviewed for plain error. See State v. Ellmaker, 611 S.W.3d 320, 330-31
(Mo. App. 2020); Rule 30.20.
“[A]ll errors – whether statutory, constitutional, structural, or based in some other
source – are subject to the same treatment under this Court’s plain error framework.” State
v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 529 (Mo. banc 2020). The threshold issue in plain error
review is whether the trial court’s error was facially “evident, obvious, and clear.” State
v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 579 (Mo. banc 2019) (citation omitted). If there was evident
error, only then will this Court consider whether that error “resulted in a manifest injustice
or miscarriage of justice.” Id. To obtain a new trial on direct appeal based on a claim of
plain error, the defendant must show that the error was “outcome determinative.” Id.; State
v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. banc 2006). An appellate court should not engage in
plain error review pursuant to Rule 30.20, unless the defendant meets his or her burden of
establishing facially substantial grounds for believing that the alleged error resulted in a
manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 525-26; State v.
Pulliam, 606 S.W.3d 243, 245 (Mo. App. 2020).
10
After reviewing Defendant’s argument in Point 2 of his brief, we decline to engage
in plain error review of his complaints about the prosecutor’s statements. Defendant has
not demonstrated that the trial court committed any evident, obvious and clear errors. More
importantly, Defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating facially substantial
grounds for believing the alleged errors resulted in a manifest injustice or miscarriage of
justice. See State v. Crider, 611 S.W.3d 904, 908 (Mo. App. 2020).
Defendant’s motion also asserted that he was entitled to a new trial because of the
State’s alleged spoliation of evidence contained on the home security system video. This
issue was presented to the trial court during the trial and carried forward in the motion for
new trial, so it was preserved for appellate review. Ellmaker, 611 S.W.3d at 330-31. We
review the denial of this aspect of Defendant’s motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Henry, 568 S.W.3d 464, 477-78 (Mo. App. 2019). We will find an
abuse of discretion only when a trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic of the
circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the
sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration. State v. Shinn, 420 S.W.3d
619, 627 (Mo. App. 2013).
Defendant’s point argues spoliation of evidence by the State’s: (1) “intentional
negligent withholding” of the video; and (2) “altering” the video. The first argument is
based upon his assertion that the State had to admit the security video footage for the jury
to see during the guilt phase of the trial. Both T.C. and K.C. provided direct testimony
about Defendant’s assaults on them. T.C. testified that the home security video did not
record those events. Defendant has cited no authority, and we are aware of none,
supporting the argument that the State was required to admit the home security video to
prove its case. Moreover, as the transcript reveals, Defendant had a copy of the home
11
security video and could have offered it himself, as he later did during the jury sentencing
phase of the trial.
Defendant’s second argument about “altering” the video fares no better. This
appears to be based on his claim that the prosecutor returned to him a “different copy” of
the video with “five minutes missing.” The trial court was aware of the events relating to
how the home security video was generated and preserved. The jury and the court heard
T.C.’s testimony that the actual incidents were not captured on the video. When the video
was played during the jury sentencing phase of the trial, there is no indication from the
transcript that T.C.’s testimony was incorrect. Defendant’s complaint about the alleged
five-minute “gap” in the recording only related to the time after Officer Meyers arrived.
Based on the circumstances before the trial court, we discern no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in denying Defendant’s motion for new trial. Accordingly, Point 2 is denied.6
Point 3
Defendant’s third point contends the trial court erred by giving Instruction No. 6,
which submitted the lesser-included offense of third-degree assault for the jury to consider.
The following facts are relevant to this point.
During the instruction conference, the prosecutor asked the court to give an
instruction submitting third-degree domestic assault to the jury. Defendant “was adamant
that he did not want any lesser included offenses to be given to the jury.” The prosecutor
responded that the court was required to give a third-degree domestic assault instruction if
6
In Point 2, Defendant further contends that the spoliation of evidence “shifted the
burden of proof” denying him a fair trial and due process. Defendant, however, fails to
develop that contention with any authority or argument, and as such, it is deemed
abandoned and will not be addressed. State v. Wolford, 590 S.W.3d 324, 328 n.2 (Mo.
App. 2019) (“failure to support a contention raised in a point relied on with authority and
argument beyond conclusions is deemed abandonment of that contention”).
12
one was requested by the State. Citing MAI-CR 4th 404.11G (2019), the prosecutor argued
that Defendant would only have a right to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy if the State
failed to request a lesser-included offense instruction. The trial court decided to give
Instruction No. 6 over Defendant’s objection. As noted above, this instruction
hypothesized that Defendant committed the offense by “knowingly caus[ing] physical pain
to T.C. by grabbing [her] neck[.]” The jury found Defendant not guilty of second-degree
domestic assault and guilty of third-degree domestic assault.
In Point 3, Defendant contends the trial court erred by giving Instruction No. 6. He
argues that: (1) he was entitled to pursue an all-or-nothing defense on the second-degree
domestic assault count; and (2) third-degree domestic assault is not a nested lesser-included
offense of second-degree domestic assault. There is no merit to either prong of his
argument.
Our analysis begins with a review of the lesser-included offense rules contained in
§ 556.046. In relevant part, this statute states:
1. A person may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged
in the indictment or information. An offense is so included when: …
(2) It is specifically denominated by statute as a lesser degree of the
offense charged ….
3. The court shall be obligated to instruct the jury with respect to a particular
included offense only if there is a basis in the evidence for acquitting the
person of the immediately higher included offense and there is a basis in the
evidence for convicting the person of that particular included offense.
Id. Missouri statutes create four degrees of the offense of domestic assault: (1) first-degree
domestic assault, § 565.072; (2) second-degree domestic assault, § 565.073; (3) third-
degree domestic assault, § 565.074; and (4) fourth-degree domestic assault, § 565.076.
The State charged Defendant with committing the offense of second-degree domestic
13
assault, in violation of § 565.073. Third-degree domestic assault is specifically
denominated by statute as a lesser degree of the offense charged in the information. See,
e.g., State v. Brown, 524 S.W.3d 44, 48 (Mo. banc 2017) (third-degree assault is a lesser-
included offense of first-degree assault because it is specifically denominated as such by
statute); State v. Greer, 348 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Mo. App. 2011) (second-degree and third-
degree assault are lesser-included offenses of first-degree assault because they are
specifically denominated by statute as lesser degrees of the offense charged, per
§ 556.046.1(2)).
A trial court must give a lesser-included offense instruction when: (1) “a party
timely requests the instruction”; (2) “there is a basis in the evidence for acquitting the
defendant of the charged offense”; and (3) “there is a basis in the evidence for convicting
the defendant of the lesser included offense for which the instruction is requested.” State
v. Smith, 522 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Mo. banc 2017); see also MAI-CR 4th 404.11G (2019).
All these requirements were met here. The State, a party to this proceeding, timely
requested Instruction No. 6 at the instruction conference. There was a basis for acquitting
Defendant of the second-degree domestic assault charge, which was the immediately
included higher offense, because the jury could (and apparently did) disbelieve the State’s
evidence. See State v. Roberts, 465 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Mo. banc 2015). As we held in our
discussion of Defendant’s first point, there was a basis for convicting him of third-degree
domestic assault. Therefore, the trial court’s decision to overrule Defendant’s objection
and give Instruction No. 6 was correct. Because the State timely requested the instruction,
Defendant no longer had the option to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy. Third-degree
domestic assault is specifically denominated by statute as a lesser degree of the charged
offense of second-degree domestic assault. Therefore, the State could request the
14
submission of a third-degree domestic assault instruction, regardless of whether it is a
nested lesser-included offense of second-degree domestic assault. For these reasons, Point
3 is denied.
Point 4
Defendant’s fourth point contends the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s
motion to dismiss for fraud upon the court, his motion for judgment of acquittal, and his
motion for new trial. Defendant argues that these were motions for post-conviction relief
that required an evidentiary hearing and an opinion for disposition. This argument fails for
at least two reasons.
First, Defendant’s argument rests on a false premise. In relevant part, Rule 29.15(a)
authorizes the filing of a post-conviction relief motion under the following circumstances:
A person convicted of a felony after trial claiming that the conviction or
sentence imposed violates the constitution and laws of this state or the
constitution of the United States, including claims of ineffective assistance
of trial and appellate counsel, that the court imposing the sentence was
without jurisdiction to do so, or that the sentence imposed was in excess of
the maximum sentence authorized by law may seek relief in the sentencing
court pursuant to the provisions of this Rule 29.15.
Id. Defendant’s motions sought relief from the trial court while the criminal case was still
pending, and prior to the imposition of any convictions or sentences. Because Defendant’s
motions did not seek post-conviction relief, there was no requirement that the trial court
hold an evidentiary hearing or issue an opinion.
Second, none of the motions filed by Defendant asked the trial court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing or write an opinion. Defendant did not make either request at the
hearing on the motion for new trial, even when asked by the trial court whether there was
anything else Defendant wished to present. “We cannot convict the trial court of
15
committing error with respect to an issue the court was not asked to decide.” Byrne v.
Moore, 332 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Mo. App. 2011). Point 4 is denied.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – OPINION AUTHOR
NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, P.J. – CONCUR
WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J. – CONCUR
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