State of Missouri, ex rel., Terry Upshaw, Relator v. Hon. Troy Cardona ( 2020 )


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  •                 In the Missouri Court of Appeals
    Eastern District
    Writ Division Two
    STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel.,                            )       ED108935
    TERRY UPSHAW,                                          )
    )
    Relator,                                    )
    )       Writ of Mandamus
    v.                                                     )       Circuit Court of Jefferson County
    )       Cause Nos. 15JE-CR02881;
    HON. TROY A. CARDONA,                                  )       17JE-CR02214
    )
    Respondent.                                 )       Filed: August 4, 2020
    Introduction
    Terry Upshaw (Relator) seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the Honorable Troy
    A. Cardona (Respondent) to release Relator from the Missouri Department of Corrections
    and place him on probation pursuant to Section 217.362 1 in light of Relator’s successful
    completion of the long-term substance abuse treatment program outlined therein.
    Respondent has filed suggestions in opposition, and the State has filed suggestions in
    support. In the interest of justice as permitted by Rule 84.24(e) and (i), this Court dispenses
    with issuance of a preliminary order, answer, further briefing, and oral argument, and issues
    a peremptory writ of mandamus.
    Background
    1
    All statutory references are to RSMo. Cum. Supp. 2018 unless otherwise indicated.
    On July 18, 2018, Relator pled guilty to one count of driving while intoxicated
    (DWI) and one count of resisting arrest for a felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the
    State, Respondent sentenced Relator as a chronic DWI offender to concurrent terms of
    fifteen years for DWI and four years for resisting arrest. Respondent also sentenced Relator
    pursuant to Section 217.362, which allows a nonviolent offender to be released on
    probation upon successful completion of a long-term substance abuse treatment program
    (long-term program), during which time the execution of the offender’s sentence is
    suspended.
    Relator entered the long-term treatment program on May 7, 2019. The Missouri
    Department of Corrections Board of Probation and Parole (Board) submitted its Court
    Report Investigation (Report) regarding Relator’s participation in and completion of the
    long-term program, which noted the following:
    [Relator] has demonstrated the ability to self[-]correct his
    behaviors when addressed. He received no violations or
    interventions while in treatment. His attitude and participation
    are appropriate for a successful completion of the program. . . .
    [He c]ompleted all treatment objectives and upheld all
    expectations of treatment[.]
    The Board recommended a release date of May 8, 2020.
    On March 18, 2020, Respondent denied Relator’s release and ordered execution of
    Relator’s sentences “based upon [two] conduct violations as listed in the [Board’s]
    report[.]” In an order responding to a letter from Relator requesting reconsideration,
    Respondent stated that the “conduct violations were after [the] court sentenced [Relator]
    to long term and before he entered the program[,] but the violations included in the report
    convince the court [Relator] is not amenable to probation[.]”
    2
    Relator subsequently filed the present application for writ of mandamus. In the interest of
    justice as permitted by Rule 84.24(e) and (i), we dispense with issuance of a preliminary
    order, answer, further briefing, and oral argument, and issue a peremptory writ of
    mandamus.
    Standard of Review
    “Mandamus is a discretionary writ that is appropriate when a court has exceeded
    its jurisdiction or authority, and where no remedy exists through appeal.” 2 State ex rel.
    Cullen v. Cardona, 
    568 S.W.3d 492
    , 494 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (quoting State ex rel. Kizer
    v. Mennemeyer, 
    421 S.W.3d 558
    , 559 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014)). While mandamus does not
    ordinarily lie to control a lower court’s exercise of discretion, if the court’s action is
    “incorrect as a matter of law, then [it] has abused any discretion [it] may have had, and
    mandamus is appropriate.”
    Id. (quoting State ex
    re. Valentine v. Orr, 
    366 S.W.3d 534
    , 538
    (Mo. banc 2012)) (internal quotations omitted). We must defer to the lower court’s factual
    findings where they are supported by competent and substantial evidence, but we review
    legal questions de novo.
    Id. Discussion Relator argues
    Respondent’s decision to deny him probation was unsupported by
    competent evidence in the record. The State of Missouri, by and through the prosecuting
    attorney of Jefferson County, also filed a response in the present action, conceding its
    agreement with Relator “that the relief sought by Relator should be granted,” and
    2
    Respondent argues that Relator has another means of appeal through his pending motion for post-conviction
    relief, which alleges that Respondent erred in denying him probation. However, denial of probation is not a
    cognizable claim in a motion for post-conviction relief or on direct appeal. Prewitt v. State, 
    191 S.W.3d 709
    ,
    711 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (citing State v. Williams, 
    871 S.W.2d 450
    , 452 (Mo. banc 1994); Green v. State,
    
    494 S.W.2d 356
    , 357 (Mo. banc 1973)). Rather, “[t]he procedural means for challenging the denial of
    probation is through a writ of mandamus.” 
    Cullen, 568 S.W. at 494
    .
    3
    requesting “an Order that this Court finds just and reasonable.” Relator seeks release on
    probation pursuant to Section 217.362. We agree.
    Section 217.362.3 states the following:
    Upon successful completion of the program, the [Board] shall
    advise the sentencing court of an offender’s probationary release
    date . . . . If the court determines that probation is not appropriate
    the court may order the execution of the offender’s sentence.
    Thus, Section 217.362.3 leaves the final decision regarding a particular offender’s release
    to the discretion of the trial court. While the trial court is no longer required by Section
    217.362 to conduct a hearing on this issue, 3 the trial court’s decision must be supported by
    competent evidence. 
    Cullen, 568 S.W.3d at 495
    (citing State ex rel. Salm v. Mennemeyer,
    
    423 S.W.3d 319
    , 322 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014)).
    Here, Respondent argues that Relator’s two conduct violations prior to entering the
    long-term program constitute sufficient evidence that probation is not appropriate for
    Relator. Respondent did not hold an evidentiary hearing regarding Relator’s conduct
    violations. 4 The information in the record is that Relator received one violation on March
    17, 2018 for failure to comply with an order, and one on September 11, 2018 for conduct
    that interferes with operations.           For each violation, Relator received a “living area
    3
    Prior to 2003, Section 217.362.3 directed the sentencing court to “hold a hearing to make a determination
    as to the fitness of the offender to be placed on probation. The court shall follow the recommendation of the
    board unless the court makes a determination that such a placement would be an abuse of discretion.” Section
    217.362.3, RSMo. 2000.
    4
    Respondent states he is ready to grant an evidentiary hearing on Relator’s motion for post-conviction relief,
    which has been continued pending the outcome of the present mandamus proceeding, and that he may grant
    Relator relief after such hearing. However, as 
    noted, supra
    , Relator’s claim is not cognizable in a post-
    conviction proceeding. Further, Relator does not have the burden to show that probation is appropriate in a
    post-conviction proceeding. Rather, upon recommendation for probation by the Board, Section 217.362
    places the onus on trial courts to base their discretionary decisions that probation is not appropriate on
    substantial evidence on the record.
    4
    restriction.” Both violations occurred prior to Relator’s entry into the long-term program
    on May 7, 2019.
    We find this evidence insufficient to support Respondent’s conclusion that Relator
    would not be amenable to probation. While Relator’s conduct while awaiting entry into
    the long-term program is certainly relevant to the court’s determination of whether
    probation would be appropriate, the evidence in the record of Relator’s conduct that led to
    these violations and its impact on his potential success on probation is nonexistent.
    Moreover, the Board’s Report highlighted the facts that Relator had received no conduct
    violations during the pendency of the long-term program, showed an ability to self-correct
    behaviors when addressed, and had met all objectives and expectations of the long-term
    program.
    As it stands, the evidence relied on by Respondent consists solely of the Report’s
    line-item recitation, with no further description, of two seemingly minor violations taking
    place well before Relator began the long-term program. 5 Notably, the Board did not
    consider these violations significant enough to affect its recommendation that Relator be
    placed on probation in light of his incident-free and successful completion of the long-term
    program. The Report’s summary notation of these two pre-program, minor conduct
    5
    A trial court’s concerns about conduct violations listed in an offender’s Report would be more appropriately
    addressed at an evidentiary hearing. While we reiterate Section 217.362 does not explicitly require an
    evidentiary hearing; where a Report does not clearly delineate facts upon which the trial court can rely to
    find probation inappropriate, the trial court must either grant probation or hold a hearing. See State ex rel.
    Salm v. Mennemeyer, 
    423 S.W.3d 319
    , 321 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (noting that upon successful completion
    of long-term program, Section 217.362.3 requires courts to either release offender on probation or determine
    that probation is inappropriate). Though we doubt that a hearing in the present case regarding two pre-
    program, minor conduct violations would produce evidence showing that probation was inappropriate for
    Relator, it was within the trial court’s discretion to hold one. Cf. State ex rel. Beggs v. Dormire, 
    91 S.W.3d 605
    , 607 (Mo. banc 2002) (holding that pre-sentence conduct alone does not make an offender unfit for
    probation); 
    Cullen, 568 S.W.3d at 495
    (noting that even evidence of one minor conduct violation during
    long-term program was insufficient to support trial court’s denial of probation upon successful completion
    of program).
    5
    violations alone does not support Respondent’s conclusion under the circumstances here
    that probation is not appropriate for Relator.
    Conclusion
    We find that Respondent’s denial of probation upon Relator’s successful
    completion of the long-term program was unsupported by competent evidence. In the
    interest of justice as permitted by Rule 84.24(e) and (i), a peremptory writ of mandamus is
    ordered to issue directing Respondent to enter an order placing Relator on probation,
    pursuant to Section 217.362.
    _________________________________
    Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., Presiding Judge
    Robin Ransom, J., and
    Angela T. Quigless, J., concur.
    6