Lisa Hearn and Daniel Hearn v. ABF Freight System, Inc. ( 2020 )

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION TWO
LISA HEARN AND DANIEL HEARN, ) No. ED108315
)
Appellants, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the City of St. Louis
vs. )
) Honorable Annette Llewellyn
ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., )
)
Respondent. ) FILED: August 11, 2020
Introduction
Lisa and Daniel Hearn (“the Hearns”) appeal from the trial court’s judgment following a
jury verdict in favor of ABF Freight System, Inc. (“ABF”) on the Hearns’ claims for negligence
and loss of consortium arising out of a motor vehicle accident. In Point One, the Hearns allege
the trial court erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict given ABF’s vicarious liability
under the doctrine of logo-liability. In Point Two, the Hearns argue the trial court erred by
instructing the jury that the Hearns had the burden of proving the agency relationship between
ABF and the truck driver causing the accident because such instruction was inconsistent with the
logo-liability doctrine. Because the logo-liability doctrine only applies to carrier-lessees and the
record reveals no evidence that ABF operated as a carrier-lessee, the doctrine is inapplicable in
this case, and the trial court correctly denied the motion for a directed verdict and correctly
declined to instruct the jury on the logo-liability doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural History
Lisa Hearn was seriously injured in a car accident after she was struck by a vehicle being
driven by Paulette Anthony (“Anthony”). Both the Hearns and Anthony alleged that Anthony
struck Lisa Hearn due to the negligent operation of a truck bearing ABF signage. Specifically,
the truck was alleged to have crossed into Anthony’s lane, either striking Anthony or causing her
to swerve to avoid the truck, at which time Anthony collided head-on with Lisa Hearn. Lisa
Hearn claimed to have interacted with the truck driver following the accident. However, the
truck driver left the scene before police arrived, and the truck and driver were never identified
beyond the claim that the truck bore ABF signage.
Both the Hearns and Anthony sued ABF for negligence, and the cases were tried
together. The evidence presented by the Hearns, Anthony, and ABF at trial predominantly
concerned whether the truck was an ABF truck and whether the driver of the truck was an
employee of ABF.
At the close of evidence, the Hearns moved for a directed verdict in their favor.
Specifically, the Hearns asked the trial court to direct the jury to enter a verdict against ABF
under the logo-liability doctrine if the jury found the truck in question bore ABF’s signage. The
trial court treated the Hearns’ motion as a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, a
motion for directed verdict. ABF countered that the logo-liability doctrine was inapplicable and
that the traditional principles of agency and vicarious liability applied. In particular, ABF
maintained that the logo-liability doctrine did not apply because ABF owned its trucks rather
than leasing them and that the logo-liability doctrine applied only to carrier-lessee relationships.
ABF also moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the Hearns had not submitted evidence to
establish ABF’s vicarious liability for the actions of the truck driver. The trial court denied both
motions and ruled that the issue of agency would be submitted to the jury.
2
During the jury-instruction conference, the Hearns objected to Instructions No. 9, 11, and
15, each of which addressed the issue of agency. Specifically, Instruction No. 9 provided:
Operating the truck was within the “scope and course of employment” as
that phrase is used in these instructions if:
1. it was performed by the driver to serve the business of [ABF],
according to an express or implied agreement with [ABF], and
2. [ABF] either controlled or had the right to control the physical
conduct of the driver.
Instruction No. 11 provided that the jury must find the driver was driving the truck “within the
scope and course of employment by [ABF], at the time of the collision,” in order to find ABF
liable for negligence against the Hearns. Instruction No. 15 mirrored Instruction No. 11 but
concerned Anthony rather than the Hearns. The Hearns specifically objected to the interjection
of a traditional agency analysis through these proposed jury instructions. The Hearns tendered
alternative instructions based upon the logo-liability doctrine, instructing the jury that it need
only find the truck bore ABF’s signage, was negligent, and caused damage to the Hearns in order
to find in favor of the Hearns and against ABF. The trial court overruled the Hearns’ objections
and rejected their proposed instructions, reasoning that logo-liability doctrine applied only to a
carrier-lessee relationship, evidence of which was lacking in the present case.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of ABF and against the Hearns. On Anthony’s claim,
the jury also returned a verdict for ABF, specifically finding that neither Anthony nor ABF were
at fault. The Hearns now appeal.
Points on Appeal
In Point One, the Hearns contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a
directed verdict on agency because consideration of traditional agency principles was precluded
under the logo-liability doctrine. In Point Two, the Hearns allege that the trial court erred in
3
instructing the jury that the Hearns had to prove the traditional requirements of agency because
the less demanding doctrine of logo-liability applied.
Discussion
I. The History of the Logo-Liability Doctrine in Missouri Courts
Both parties offer the public policy doctrine of logo-liability as support for their positions
on appeal. Generally, the doctrine of logo-liability provides a means of imposing vicarious
liability over carriers for the negligence of truck drivers other than through established agency
principles. See Parker v. Midwestern Distribution, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Mo. App. E.D.
1990) (citing Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 240, 246 (Mo. banc
1983)). Because the parties’ arguments largely focus on the significance—or lack thereof—of
factual distinctions between past cases addressing the applicability of logo-liability, we will first
examine the precise facts and holdings at issue and articulate a clear framework for the
application of the logo-liability doctrine under Missouri law.
The doctrine of logo liability was first addressed by the Supreme Court of Missouri in
Brannaker v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. 1968). Examining the
history of carrier-lessee arrangements and related legislation, Brannaker noted that carrier-
lessees would enter into leases with “often unreliable” independent contractors to haul cargo for
single trips or short durations, allowing carrier-lessees to “evad[e] their public responsibilities.”
Id. at 528–29. Some tractor-trailer truck owners would lease their trucks to common carriers
who assumed control over transporting the goods being hauled. Under traditional agency
principles, the common carrier was relieved of liability on return trips because the lessor had
performed its one-way contract and was no longer engaged in business on behalf of the carrier.
Duke v. Thomas, 343 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Mo. App. St. Louis 1961) (internal citation omitted).
4
As a result of the increasing use of lease arrangements by common carriers, the United
States Congress passed legislation authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission (“the
I.C.C.”) to enact regulations to assure that carrier-lessees “be fully responsible for the operation”
of the motor vehicles they lease. Brannaker, 428 S.W.2d at 528 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 304(e)(2)
(1964)). The I.C.C. subsequently passed regulations establishing such full responsibility,
requiring vehicles bear the I.C.C. identification numbers of the carrier-lessee for whom they are
hauling and that such identification be removed when the lease is terminated. Id. at 529 (citing
49 C.F.R. § 207.4 (1964)). As a result of the I.C.C. regulations, authorized carriers would
remain liable for the negligence of those who operated and drove the tractor-trailers on our roads
and highways.
Under the relevant facts in Brannaker, a tractor-trailer driver leased his tractor to the
defendant carrier-lessee for two years. Id. at 527. The defendant then supplied the trailer for the
driver to haul. Id. When a disagreement arose between the driver and defendant, the driver
returned the trailer and stopped hauling on behalf of the defendant. Id. However, although the
driver began hauling a trailer provided by someone other than the defendant, the name of the
defendant’s company remained affixed to the driver’s tractor, as did the numbers of the relevant
certificates and permits associated with the I.C.C. and Missouri Public Service Commission. Id.
A motor vehicle accident occurred in which the driver of the tractor-trailer struck a vehicle,
which then struck the plaintiff. Id. The injured plaintiff successfully brought suit and obtained a
verdict against the defendant whose name remained affixed to the tractor. Id. On appeal, the
defendant maintained the trial court should have granted its requested directed verdict because
the plaintiff had not adduced substantial evidence that the driver of the tractor was acting within
the scope of employment on behalf of the defendant at the time of the accident. Id. at 533.
5
 Brannaker held that the trial court did not err in declining to enter a directed verdict
because factual questions remained as to the lessee relationship at the time of the accident. Id. at
535–36. In particular, the lease arrangement made the defendant “liable for the negligence of the
owner-driver of the leased equipment to the same extent it was responsible for the negligence of
one of the lessee’s own drivers when operating the carrier’s own equipment.” Id. at 534 (internal
citations omitted). Thus, the defendant would not be held vicariously liable for the tortious
conduct of one of their drivers, absent a finding that the driver was acting in the scope of
employment at the time of the accident. Id. (internal citations omitted). Because there was
evidence from which the jury could have concluded either that the driver was or was not acting
in the scope of his employment with the defendant, Brannaker ultimately concluded the issue of
vicarious liability could not be decided as a matter of law and that the issue was appropriately
submitted to the jury. Id. at 534–35.
The Court later addressed the issue of logo-liability in Johnson, 662 S.W.2d 237. In
Johnson, the defendant appealed a jury verdict in favor of the deceased victim of a motor vehicle
accident in which “[t]here [was] no claim, and no evidence, that the truck was on a mission for
[the defendant carrier-lessee] at the time of the fatal accident.” Id. at 242. Because the evidence
clearly showed that the truck was hauling regulated freight for an entity other than the defendant
at the time of the accident, the plaintiff sought to establish liability solely through the logo-
liability doctrine. Id. at 240, 242. The relevant issue on appeal was the propriety of the trial
court’s instructions that the jury find the defendant liable if it determined both that the defendant
had provided signs identifying the defendant to the driver for display on the driver’s truck and
that the defendant had failed to remove the signs from the truck before the accident. Id. at 242.
6
Relying on “statutory policy rather than a conventional respondeat superior theory[,]”
Johnson broadly recognized that the logo-liability doctrine may establish liability “based on
appearances, not actualities[,]” with the purpose of “increasing the likelihood that a substantial
entity will be available to respond to any judgment rendered” in favor of a plaintiff. Id. at 243,
245, 246. Johnson explained that the “maximum effect” of the logo-liability doctrine as
described in Brannaker “would be to make the [defendant] liable as [the] owner, and that the
owner would not be responsible for the employee’s use of the vehicle in a purely personal
mission.” Id. at 243 (citing Brannaker, 428 S.W.2d 524). It is noteworthy to any discussion of
the logo-liability doctrine to acknowledge the material factual differences between Johnson and
Brannaker. Unlike the posture of Brannaker, there was no factual dispute in Johnson that the
truck involved in the accident was hauling regulated freight at the time of the accident as
opposed to being on a mission personal to the driver. Id. Johnson explained that:
Brannaker does support the proposition that the mere presence on a vehicle of a
placard furnished by a carrier is not conclusive of the carrier’s vicarious liability,
but it involves two factual possibilities not here present, as follows: (1) the carrier
may have made reasonable efforts to terminate the lease and to reclaim its
identifying signs; or (2) the vehicle may have been used on a mission personal to
the driver, not involving the hauling of freight for the benefit of the lessee carrier
or anyone else, at the time of the accident.
Id. at 244 (emphasis added). Johnson concluded the following as to the parameters of the logo-
liability doctrine:
[The defendant] may be held liable for the truck driver’s negligence, without regard
to the continuing force of the lease, if the jury finds: (1) that a sign or identifying
legend was furnished by the carrier in connection with a lease; (2) that the sign was
on the truck at the time of the accident; and (3) that the truck was hauling regulated
freight at the time of the accident.
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Id. at 245. While the contested jury instructions did not specify the third element, Johnson
determined the jury necessarily believed the third element was met based on its other findings
and found no error in the instructions. Id.
This Court revisited the logo-liability doctrine in Parker, 797 S.W.2d 721. Parker
broadened the application of the logo-liability doctrine by interpreting Johnson to have abrogated
a critical requirement announced in Brannaker—the requirement of proving that the driver of the
truck was acting within the scope of their employment with the defendant. Id. at 723. Parker
explained this evolution of the logo-liability doctrine noting that Johnson emphasized the nature
of constructive agency and the importance of appearances over actualities. Id. at 724 (citing
Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 240, 246). Specifically, Parker focused on the language in Johnson that
“the mere presence on a vehicle of a placard furnished by a carrier is not conclusive of the
carrier’s vicarious liability[.]” Id. (quoting Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 244). Parker reasoned
therefrom that the display of a carrier-lessee’s logo created a presumption of the carrier’s
vicarious liability which a defendant could overcome by presenting “evidence that the carrier
attempted unsuccessfully to destroy the appearance of a relationship” or “evidence that the driver
was engaged in an enterprise unrelated to the apparent relationship purpose, i.e. the hauling of
freight.” Id. at 723 (citing Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 244). Parker’s reasoning would allow the
presumption to be rebutted by evidence that the driver was not authorized to operate the vehicle
at all. Id. at 723–24. Accordingly, Parker rejected the defendant’s contention on appeal that the
plaintiff failed to make a submissible case because the plaintiff did not establish that the driver
was an agent of the defendant.1 Id. at 722, 724.
1
We reversed the award of punitive damages on other grounds. Parker, 797 S.W.2d at 725.
8
Missouri courts next considered the issue of logo-liability in Robertson v. Cameron Mut.
Ins. Co., 855 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993). More closely aligned with the facts in this
appeal, the plaintiff in Robertson argued on appeal that the jury should have been instructed that
vicarious liability over the defendant was established by a simple finding that the truck bore
defendant’s placard—nothing more. Id. at 449. Rejecting this argument, the Western District
reaffirmed plaintiffs’ burden of proving each of the three elements enumerated in Johnson in
order to impose vicarious liability on a defendant under the logo-liability doctrine. Id. at 450
(citing Parker, 797 S.W.2d at 724).
Our courts most recently addressed the issue of logo-liability in Horner v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys. Inc., 258 S.W.3d 532 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008). In Horner, the truck involved in the
accident bore the defendant carrier-lessee’s logo, the defendant’s Department of Transportation
registration number, and was under an exclusive lease-agreement to provide trucking services to
the defendant. Id. at 534. The trial court ruled that an irrebuttable presumption of vicarious
liability was established when a certified carrier’s placards are on a truck at the time of the
accident and that evidence showing the presence of the placards on the truck at issue required
that the defendant be held vicariously liable for any negligence of the truck driver as a matter of
law. Id. at 535, 537. The jury subsequently found in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 534. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in holding the defendant was vicariously
liable as a matter of law. Id. The defendant countered that the logo-liability doctrine, even
where applicable, creates only a rebuttable presumption of vicarious liability. Id. at 537.
Although declining to answer whether the presumption raised by the logo-liability doctrine is
rebuttable or irrebuttable, the Western District explained that “Johnson suggests that the
presumption of vicarious liability can be rebutted, but only (1) where the [I.C.C.] carrier-lessee
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has attempted to end the lease and reclaim its placards, or (2) where the driver has embarked
upon a personal mission.” Id. at 539 (emphasis added) (citing Parker, 797 S.W.2d at 723–24).
The Western District held that the undisputed material facts of the case clearly showed the driver
had acted in the course and scope of his employment for the defendant on the defendant’s behalf.
Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant was liable under the logo-liability doctrine,
regardless of whether the logo-liability presumption is rebuttable or irrebuttable. Id.
II. The Framework for the Logo-Liability Doctrine
Our examination of the development of the logo-liability doctrine in Missouri reveals the
following framework for imposing vicarious liability upon a defendant under the doctrine.
First, Johnson clearly identifies three elements required to apply logo-liability: “(1) that a
sign or identifying legend was furnished by the carrier in connection with a lease; (2) that the
sign was on the truck at the time of the accident; and (3) that the truck was hauling regulated
freight at the time of the accident.” Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 245. Johnson further clarifies that,
regarding the first element, it is not a requirement that the lease be in continuing effect. Id. at
245–46.
Second, Parker explicitly holds that the logo-liability doctrine creates a rebuttable
presumption in favor of imposing vicarious liability on the defendant once the elements of logo-
liability are established. Parker, 797 S.W.2d at 723. This holding has not been overruled.
Indeed, Horner declined to consider whether the presumption raised by the logo-liability doctrine
is rebuttable or irrebuttable. Horner, 258 S.W.3d at 539. Relying on Parker, the Horner court
opined only that Johnson seemed to create such a rebuttable presumption. Id. (citing Parker, 797
S.W.2d at 723–24).
Third, consistent with the above, the presumption of vicarious liability may be rebutted
by the defendant upon a showing of facts that either 1) the carrier-lessee attempted to end the
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lease and reclaim its signage; or 2) that the driver was engaged on a personal mission not
concerning the hauling of regulated freight when the accident occurred. Horner, 258 S.W.3d at
539 (citing Parker, 797 S.W.2d at 723–24). Additional grounds may also exist that would serve
to rebut the presumption, such as evidence that the driver was not authorized to operate the
vehicle at all. See Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 243; Parker, 797 S.W.2d at 723–24.
Importantly, the preceding framework diverges from the principles of traditional
respondeat superior vicarious liability in two critical respects. First, under the logo-liability
doctrine, the defendant has the burden of rebutting the imposition of vicarious liability by
showing that the driver was on a personal mission, as opposed to the plaintiff’s burden of
proving that the driver’s tortious conduct was within the course and scope of the driver’s
employment. Compare Horner, 258 S.W.3d at 539 (internal citation omitted), with Ewing-Cage
v. Quality Prods., Inc., 18 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
Second, vicarious liability under the logo-liability doctrine may be established even when a truck
is hauling regulated freight for an entity other than the carrier-lessee defendant, as opposed to
when the truck is being driven only in furtherance of the interests of the defendant. Compare
Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 242, 245, with Ewing-Cage, 18 S.W.3d at 150. These two differences
broaden the application of vicarious liability from the traditional principles of agency, thereby
reinforcing the acknowledged public policy of the logo-liability doctrine to “increas[e] the
likelihood that a substantial entity will be available to respond to any judgment rendered” and to
ensure that carrier-lessees be responsible for the conduct of the independent contractors with
which they choose to contract. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 243; see also Brannaker, 428 S.W.2d at
528–29 (internal citations omitted).
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Having established a framework for the application of the logo-liability doctrine that
reconciles precedential authorities and is consistent with the underlying purposes of the doctrine,
we now apply this legal framework to the present case.
III. Analysis of the Present Case
We opt to review the Hearns’ second point on appeal first. Point Two focuses on the jury
instructions, specifically alleging that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the Hearns
had the burden of proving the traditional principles of agency required to impose vicarious
liability on ABF. The Hearns posit that the jury instructions should have reflected the logo-
liability doctrine, tasking the jury only with finding whether the truck bore ABF’s signage,
whether the truck driver was negligent, and whether the truck driver’s negligence damaged the
Hearns.
We review whether a jury was properly instructed de novo. Edgerton v. Morrison, 280
S.W.3d 62, 65 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal citation omitted). We will only reverse due to
instructional error if the party alleging error on appeal establishes that the instructions at issue
misdirected, misled, or confused the jury. Dhyne v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 188 S.W.3d
454, 459 (Mo. banc 2006) (internal citation omitted). The party alleging the error also bears the
burden of proving they were prejudiced by the contested instructions. SKMDV Holdings, Inc. v.
Green Jacobson, P.C., 494 S.W.3d 537, 559 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (citing Fleshner v. Pepose
Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 90–91 (Mo. banc 2010)).
Instruction No. 11 placed the burden upon the Hearns to show that “the driver was
operating [ABF]’s motor vehicle within the scope and course of employment by [ABF] at the
time of the collision[.]” Conversely, a jury instruction applying the logo-liability doctrine would
not require the Hearns to make such a showing, but instead would place the burden on ABF to
rebut the presumption of liability by proving the truck driver was on a personal mission not
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concerning the hauling of regulated freight. See Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 245; Horner, 258
S.W.3d at 539 (citing Parker, 797 S.W.2d at 723–24). We agree that, if the logo-liability
doctrine applied in the case at hand, the jury was wrongly instructed on the burden of proof
concerning agency, as the Hearns now argue. See Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 245; Horner, 258
S.W.3d at 539 (internal citation omitted). However, the Hearns have failed to meet their burden
on appeal of establishing the jury was erroneously instructed because we are not persuaded that
the logo-liability doctrine applies given the undisputed facts of the present case. See Dhyne, 188
S.W.3d at 459 (internal citation omitted).
“An issue submitted by an instruction must be supported by the evidence.” Edgerton,
280 S.W.3d at 65 (internal citation omitted). In considering whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the giving of an instruction, “[we view] the evidence in the light most
favorable to its submission.” Spence v. BNSF Ry. Co., 547 S.W.3d 769, 777 (Mo. banc 2018)
(internal quotation omitted).
Here, the Hearns objected to the trial court’s agency instructions and instead submitted
instructions for vicarious liability under the logo-liability doctrine in which the jury had to find
only that the truck bore ABF’s signage, was negligent, and damaged the Hearns. The trial court
rejected the proffered instruction in favor of instructing the jury on the traditional principles of
agency. Critically, the record lacks evidence supporting the submission of jury instructions
premised upon the logo-liability doctrine. See id.; Edgerton, 280 S.W.3d at 65. Specifically, the
first element required to establish liability under the logo-liability doctrine is “that a sign or
identifying legend was furnished by the carrier in connection with a lease[.]” Johnson, 662
S.W.2d at 245 (emphasis added). Here, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the giving of the Hearns’ requested instructions, the record on appeal is void of any evidence that
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ABF ever operated as a carrier-lessee. See Spence, 547 S.W.3d at 777. To the contrary, the
testimony at trial uniformly concerned ABF employees, consistent with ABF’s statements during
motion arguments that all of its truck drivers are employees. Accordingly, the trial court would
have committed error had it instructed the jury consistent with the logo-liability doctrine because
the record lacks any evidence to support the first required element that ABF signage was
furnished in connection with a lease. See Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 245; Edgerton, 280 S.W.3d at
65.
Despite established precedent consistently repeating the “in-connection-with-a-lease
requirement,” the Hearns nevertheless argue that the logo-liability doctrine is not limited to
carrier-lessee arrangements. The Hearns’ argument is unavailing and they fail to cite to a single
case in which a Missouri court applied the logo-liability doctrine in the absence of a carrier-
lessee relationship. The Hearns reason that the application of the logo-liability doctrine by
Missouri courts in previous cases involving runaway trucks that could not be identified supports
instructing the jury on the logo-liability doctrine even absent evidence of a carrier-lessee
relationship. However, the facts of those cases do not support the Hearns’ invitation for us to
extend the application of the logo-liability doctrine. In Johnson, contrary to the Hearns’
assertion, the specific truck involved in the accident was identified.2 Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at
238. In Robertson, the jury found in favor of the defendant only after being instructed that they
had to find the defendant’s signage was furnished to the unidentified truck in connection with a
lease, instructions which were affirmed on appeal. Robertson, 855 S.W.2d at 444, 449–50.
Finally, in Parker, although the specific truck was never identified, evidence was introduced that
2
The Hearns cite Horner for the proposition that the truck in Johnson was unidentified. Horner, 258 S.W.3d at 541
n.15 (internal citations omitted). From context, it is clear to us that Horner was referring to the unidentified truck in
Parker. See id. (citing Parker, 797 S.W.2d at 724) (erroneously stating the truck in Johnson was unidentified
immediately after citing Parker).
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the truck in question bore the defendant’s signage and that the defendant was a carrier-lessee.
Parker, 797 S.W.2d at 722. Ultimately, none of the cases proffered by the Hearns support a
holding that the logo-liability doctrine applies even in cases where, as here, the record lacks
evidence that the defendant is a carrier-lessee.
Additionally, the Hearns contend that applying the logo-liability doctrine to cases only
involving carrier-lessee cases runs contrary to the logic of the development of the doctrine. We
disagree. History is clear that the logo-liability doctrine developed from a fundamental concern
regarding the relationship between carrier-lessees and independent contractors, not concerns
about employers and their truck-driver employees. See Brannaker, 428 S.W.2d at 528–29. The
doctrine of logo-liability developed as large trucking interests used the carrier-lessee relationship
to escape the imposition of vicarious liability under traditional principles of agency. See Duke,
343 S.W.2d at 658–59. Without question, the public policy supporting the creation of the logo-
liability doctrine stemmed from a concern over a very specific issue that had arisen—and not to
supplant the general rules of vicarious liability as developed under common law. See Brannaker,
428 S.W.2d at 528–29. The Hearns’ contention fundamentally undermines the very foundation
of the logo-liability doctrine. See id. Furthermore, the policy concerns about plaintiffs having a
substantial entity from which they can recover are not implicated when the truck driver involved
in an accident is the long-term employee of the trucking company as opposed to an independent
contractor not tied to a given carrier-lessee on an ongoing basis. See Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at
243.
Because the Hearns adduced no evidence that ABF operated as a carrier-lessee, they
failed to present the requisite facts allowing the jury to be instructed on imposing vicarious
liability on ABF under the logo-liability doctrine. See Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 245; Edgerton,
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280 S.W.3d at 65. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it refused Hearns’ proffered
vicarious liability instructions and instead submitted vicarious liability instructions to the jury
based upon the traditional principles of agency law. See Edgerton, 280 S.W.3d at 65. Point Two
is denied.
In Point One, the Hearns contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a
directed verdict because the logo-liability doctrine required the jury enter a verdict in favor of the
Hearns if the jury found the truck bore ABF’s signage. We review denials of directed verdicts de
novo when the denial is based on a matter of law.3 Bailey v. Hawthorn Bank, 382 S.W.3d 84, 92
(Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (internal citation omitted). Point One must also fail because it is
premised upon the applicability of the logo-liability doctrine, which we have already rejected due
to the in-connection-with-a-lease requirement. See Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 245. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict. See Bailey, 382 S.W.3d at
92 (internal citation omitted). Point One is denied.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
_______________________________
KURT S. ODENWALD, Judge
Philip M. Hess, P.J., concurs.
Lisa P. Page, J., concurs.
3
Given that this point on appeal might be more properly understood as an allegation that the jury was improperly
instructed, we note again that such claims are subject to de novo review. Edgerton, 280 S.W.3d at 65 (internal
citation omitted). Similarly, we note that the trial court alternatively treated the Hearns’ motion as a motion for
summary judgment, which we also review de novo. Gavan v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 242 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Mo.
banc 2008) (internal citation omitted).
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