State of Missouri, ex rel: Department of Social Services, Family Support Division and Laura L. Gibbs v. Michael Shipley ( 2020 )

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
STATE OF MISSOURI, Ex rel: )
DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, )
FAMILY SUPPORT DIVISION and ) WD83053
LAURA L. GIBBS, )
Respondent, )
v. ) FILED: March 24, 2020
)
MICHAEL SHIPLEY, )
Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY
THE HONORABLE JALILAH OTTO, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION THREE: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, PRESIDING JUDGE,
THOMAS H. NEWTON AND ALOK AHUJA, JUDGES
Michael Shipley appeals the judgment denying his application to transfer his
motion for judgment on the pleadings from the family court to the circuit court. For
reasons explained herein, we dismiss Shipley’s appeal for non-compliance with Rule
84.04(e) and deny his motion for attorney’s fees.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2013, the Department of Social Services, Family Support Division (“the
Division”) filed a request for registration of a Kansas court order (“the Kansas order”)
commanding Shipley to pay child support. The Jackson County Circuit Court confirmed
the registration of the Kansas order and issued a final judgment of contempt against
Shipley for failure to pay child support. During the registration proceedings, Shipley
attempted to register two procedural orders entered by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals for the United States in an earlier pro se 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action filed by
Shipley (“the Eighth Circuit orders”). The orders stated that Shipley’s motions – for an
order requiring the Division to cease and desist and for a default judgment awarding
$66.675 million in damages against the Division – would be taken with Shipley’s appeal.
The Eighth Circuit eventually denied both motions. Accordingly, the circuit court denied
his attempt to register the procedural orders as operative foreign judgments.
Shipley appealed the registration of the Kansas order in Department of Social
Services v. Shipley, 457 S.W.3d 371, 372 (Mo. App. 2015) (mem.) (“Shipley I”), but did
not allege any error to the circuit court’s denial of his motion to register the Eighth
Circuit orders. We subsequently affirmed the decision of the circuit court. After that
initial appeal, Shipley filed three separate actions in the circuit court attempting to
register the Eighth Circuit orders. Those attempts were denied by the circuit court and,
on appeal, were rebuked by this court in Shipley v. Trustee for Child Support Payment,
472 S.W.3d 609, 610-14 (Mo. App. 2015) (“Shipley II”). In Shipley II, we stated that
“Shipley is now on plain and clear notice that any further efforts to register either of the
Eighth Circuit Orders as a foreign judgment, or to collect or execute on either of the
Eighth Circuit Orders as if either is a money judgment, will be viewed as frivolous and in
willful disregard of the law.” Id. at 613 n.11.
Nevertheless, Shipley made repeated efforts to register the Eighth Circuit orders
following Shipley II and was eventually sanctioned and temporarily prohibited from any
further filings in the circuit court. In 2018, Shipley mounted another attempt, filing a
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memorandum that purported to be a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court
subsequently treated the filing as a petition before dismissing it with prejudice for failure
to state a claim. Shipley appealed, and we affirmed the dismissal in Shipley v.
Department of Social Services, 568 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Mo. App. 2019) (“Shipley III”). In
Shipley III, we explained, ex gratia, that Shipley did not have an operative foreign
monetary judgment, and we awarded the Division damages pursuant to Rule 84.19. Id.
In May 2018, the Division filed a motion for sanctions against Shipley. The circuit
court overruled the motion. In April 2019, Shipley filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 55.27(b). In the motion, Shipley asserted that the circuit
court’s act of denying the Division’s motion for sanctions overruled our opinions in
Shipley II and Shipley III and reopened all of his previous motions for a grant of
summary judgment determining that the Eighth Circuit orders were operative foreign
judgments. The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that there were no open
pleadings before the court and, therefore, no pleadings upon which to grant judgment.
The court also noted that Shipley’s assertion that the denial of one motion for sanctions
“is somehow an acknowledgement by the Court that his prior claim had merit, is patently
erroneous” before ruling that the doctrine of law of the case foreclosed any relief for
Shipley.
Shipley subsequently filed a motion purporting to be an “APPLICATION FOR
TRANSFER AND REASSIGNMENT . . . OF CIVIL CASE . . . FROM FAMILY COURT
DIVISION TO CIRCUIT COURT DIVISION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADING. RULE 55.27(b)” with the family court. The family court denied the motion
for transfer, ruling that Shipley’s motion was untimely under Rule 51.05 and Sixteenth
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Judicial Circuit Court Rule 6.8 (“Local Rule 6.8”) and that Shipley had failed to present
any new legal or factual assertion warranting review under Rule 130.13. The circuit
court adopted the ruling and entered judgment accordingly. Shipley appeals.
ANALYSIS
Shipley appears pro se in this appeal. “We hold pro se appellants to the same
procedural rules as attorneys, and we do not grant them preferential treatment
regarding compliance with those rules.” Kim v. Kim, 431 S.W.3d 524, 525 (Mo. App.
2014). “Compliance with Rule 84.04 briefing requirements is mandatory in order to
ensure that appellate courts do not become advocates by speculating on facts and on
arguments that have not been made.” Summers v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrs., 459 S.W.3d
922, 923 (Mo. App. 2015) (citation and quotations omitted). Consequently, the failure to
substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for review
and establishes grounds for dismissal. Wallace v. Frazier, 546 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.
App. 2018).
Shipley’s sole point on appeal asserts that the family court’s denial of his
application for transfer to the circuit court for an entry of a judgment on the pleadings
deprived him of his “due process of law.” He further contends, “These legal contentions
are warranted by exiting [sic] law and are protected by the due process clause of the
14th Amendment and does support the claim of reversible error.” Shipley, however, fails
to develop this contention throughout his argument. “To develop a point relied on, the
‘argument should show how the principles of law and the facts of the case interact.’” Id.
at 628 (citing Kim, 431 S.W.3d at 526). Shipley does not explain how the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Local Rule 6.8 interact; instead,
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Shipley copies long portions of docket entries and orders and makes repeated,
conclusory assertions that Local Rule 6.8 confers “a fundamental and procedural right
that’s protected by the due process clause.” “When an appellant fails to support
contentions with relevant law and analysis beyond conclusory statements, we deem the
point abandoned.” Id. Accordingly, the point on appeal is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
We dismiss Shipley’s appeal and deny his motion for attorney’s fees.
________________________________
LISA W HITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
ALL CONCUR
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