Eric Branson v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri ( 2020 )

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION TWO
ERIC BRANSON, ) No. ED108237
)
Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Osage County
vs. )
) Honorable Robert D. Schollmeyer
DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF )
MISSOURI, )
)
Appellant. ) FILED: May 12, 2020
Introduction
The Director of Revenue (“DOR”) appeals from the judgment of the circuit court
granting the petition of Eric Branson (“Branson”) to reinstate his driving privileges under
Section 302.060.1(10).1 In its sole point on appeal, the DOR claims the circuit court erred in
reinstating Branson’s driving privileges because Branson was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance within the preceding five years of his petition and therefore was ineligible
for reinstatement. Section 302.060.1(10) provides no exceptions to the requirement that a
petitioner for reinstatement not have been found guilty of an offense related to alcohol,
controlled substances, or drugs during the preceding five years. Because Branson was found
guilty of possession of a controlled substance eleven days prior to filing his petition for
1
All Section references are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2018).
reinstatement, the circuit court erred in granting Branson’s petition. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand to the circuit court to issue its judgment consistent with this opinion.
Factual and Procedural History
The DOR revoked Branson’s driving privileges for a five-year period under Section
302.060.1(10) following his conviction on June 2, 2009, for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).
On October 24, 2015, the State charged Branson with possession of a controlled
substance and unlawful use of drug paraphernalia. After numerous continuances and alleged
abandonment by defense counsel, on April 5, 2019, Branson pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance. Branson received a suspended imposition of sentence and was placed on
supervised probation for five years.
On April 16, 2019, Branson petitioned the circuit court to reinstate his driving privileges.2
Branson averred he was eligible for reinstatement on June 2, 2014, five years following the
revocation of his driving privileges. Branson attested in his petition that he “has not been
convicted, pled guilty to or been found guilty of—and has no pending charges for—any offense
related to alcohol, controlled substances or drugs and has no other alcohol-related enforcement
contacts as defined in [S]ection 302.525 during the preceding five years.”
The DOR countered Brandon’s petition with a motion to dismiss, alleging that Branson
could not establish that he had not been found guilty of any offense related to controlled
substances during the preceding five years because he pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance on April 5, 2019—eleven days prior to the filing of his petition for
reinstatement. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on August 27, 2019. At the
2
The petition initially identified subsection 9 of Section 302.060.1 as the governing subsection, which applies to
revocations for ten-year periods, but the petition went on to clarify that the relevant time period was five years as
found in subsection 10.
2
hearing, Branson did not deny the facts in the motion to dismiss but contended there were
extenuating circumstances. Namely, Branson maintained that his recent guilty plea to possession
of a controlled substance should not make him ineligible for reinstatement because the felony
charge had been pending for the past five years as a result of multiple continuances and
abandonment by his defense attorney. The DOR argued that the law provides no exceptions and
that if Branson had entered his plea earlier, the plea still would have occurred within the
preceding five years of Branson filing his petition. The circuit court denied the DOR’s motion.
Branson testified that he was eligible for a license, had no pending charges, and believed
his habits and conduct showed he no longer posed a threat to the safety of the state. The circuit
court issued its judgment reinstating Branson’s driving privileges. The circuit court’s judgment
did not offer detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law but noted that Branson had become
eligible for reinstatement effective June 2, 2014, and that his habits and conduct since that time
showed Branson no longer reasonably posed a threat to public safety. The DOR now appeals.3
Point on Appeal
In its sole point on appeal, the DOR argues that the circuit court erred in ordering
Branson’s driving privileges reinstated under Section 302.060.1(10) because there was no
substantial evidence that Branson was eligible for reinstatement in that Branson was found guilty
of possession of a controlled substance eleven days before he filed his petition for reinstatement.4
Standard of Review
We review a circuit court’s judgment reinstating driving privileges the same as any court-
tried case by determining whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence, is against
3
Branson declined to file a respondent’s brief.
4
The DOR only appealed the judgment in its Point Relied On but notes that the circuit court’s rulings denying the
motion to dismiss and granting the reinstatement present the same legal issue.
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the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. White v. Dir. of Revenue,
321 S.W.3d 298, 307–08 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing Murphy v. Caron, 563 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo.
banc 1976)). “When, as here, the facts of a case are uncontested and the resolution of the issue
turns solely on the interpretation of pertinent statutes,” we review any question of statutory
interpretation de novo. Nelson v. Dir. of Revenue, 498 S.W.3d 545, 546 (Mo.App. S.D. 2016)
(internal citation omitted); see also Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Mo. banc
2016) (internal citation omitted); Mayfield v. Dir. of Revenue, 335 S.W.3d 572, 573 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2011) (internal citation omitted). In statutory interpretation, “the primary goal is to give
effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute.” Stiers, 477 S.W.3d at
615 (quoting State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515, 520 (Mo. banc 2010)).
Discussion
Section 302.060.1 governs a circuit court’s authority to reinstate a petitioner’s driving
privileges following revocation by the DOR. The subsection applicable to five-year revocations
following multiple DWIs provides that the DOR shall immediately deny any driving privilege:
To any person who has been found guilty of acting with criminal negligence while
driving while intoxicated to cause the death of another person, or to any person who
has been convicted twice within a five-year period of violating state law, county or
municipal ordinance of driving while intoxicated, or any other intoxication-related
traffic offense as defined in section 577.001, except that, after the expiration of five
years from the date of conviction of the last offense of violating such law or
ordinance, a person who was so convicted may petition the circuit court of the
county in which such last conviction was rendered and the court shall review the
person’s habits and conduct since such conviction, including the results of a
criminal history check as defined in section 302.010. If the court finds that the
petitioner has not been found guilty of, and has no pending charges for any
offense related to alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs and has no other
alcohol-related enforcement contacts as defined in section 302.525 during the
preceding five years, and that the petitioner’s habits and conduct show such
petitioner to no longer pose a threat to the public safety of this state, the court shall
order the director to issue a license to the petitioner if the petitioner is otherwise
qualified pursuant to the provisions of sections 302.010 to 302.540[.]
4
Section 302.060.1(10) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of the statutory provision for
reinstatement of driving privileges disqualifies a petitioner who, within the past five years, was
“found guilty of . . . any offense related to . . . controlled substances[.]” Section 302.060.1(10).
Here, it is undisputed that eleven days before petitioning for reinstatement of his driving
privileges, Branson pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The offense of
possessing a controlled substance is clearly an offense that is “related to alcohol, controlled
substances, or drugs[,]” and Branson’s conviction was within “the preceding five years” of filing
his petition. See Section 302.060.1(10). Thus, no substantial evidence could support finding
that Branson “ha[d] not been found guilty of, and has no pending charges for any offense related
to alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs . . . during the preceding five years[.]” See id.
Because Branson’s recent guilty plea made him ineligible for reinstatement of his driving
privileges under Section 302.060.1(10), the circuit court erred in granting Branson’s petition.
See id.; see also Mayfield, 335 S.W.3d at 573, 575 (finding a petitioner’s drug-paraphernalia
conviction three years prior was an offense related to controlled substances or drugs within the
preceding ten-year denial period under Section 302.060.1(9) requiring reversal of the circuit
court’s grant of the petition for reinstatement).
Further, we agree that the circuit court lacked statutory authority to disregard Branson’s
guilty plea. Branson identified no exception to the requirements for reinstatement under Section
302.060.1(10) and we find none. Section 302.060.1(10) is remedial in nature and aims to protect
public safety, thus we must “liberally interpret this statute to fully accomplish this legislative
intent.” See Mayfield, 335 S.W.3d at 575 (discerning the legislative intent of the similarly-
worded Section 302.060.1(9) for ten-year revocations). We cannot add language nor create an
exception to the statutory requirements where none exists. See Li Lin v. Ellis, 594 S.W.3d 238,
5
244 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal quotations omitted) (noting “courts cannot add statutory language
where it does not exist; rather, courts must interpret the statutory language as written by the
legislature”); see also Nelson, 498 S.W.3d at 548 (citing Hagan v. Dir. of Revenue, 968 S.W.2d
704, 706 (Mo. banc 1998)); Mayfield, 335 S.W.3d at 575. The record of the hearing reflects that
the circuit court considered Branson’s habits and conduct in the preceding five years (other than
Branson’s October 2015 felony charge) as well as the fact that Branson had no pending charges.
However, that is not the test set forth in the statute. Section 302.060.1(10) unambiguously
disqualifies a petitioner seeking reinstatement of his driving privileges who has “been found
guilty of” an offense related to alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs within the preceding five
years. Section 302.060.1(10). Branson had been found guilty of possession of a controlled
substance only eleven days before he petitioned the court to reinstate his driving privileges.
Thus, the circuit court erred in ordering the DOR to reinstate Branson’s driving privileges. See
id.
While Branson supplied a reasonable explanation as to why there was a delay between
the State charging him with possession of a controlled substance in October 2015 and his
pleading guilty to the charge on April 5, 2019, he has not alleged any facts nor cited any law
affording him relief under the plain language of Section 302.060.1(10). Further, even if Branson
had pleaded guilty earlier to the 2015 charge, the conviction would still have occurred within the
preceding five years of Branson filing this petition, and thus would still have made him ineligible
for reinstatement. See Section 302.060.1(10). In Nelson, the petitioner argued that, despite the
plain language of the statue for reinstatement of limited driving privileges, it was unfair to
restrict his ability to gain limited driving privileges based on remote conduct for which he had
already served a suspension. 498 S.W.3d at 548. In denying the petitioner’s appeal, the
6
Southern District recognized the alleged unfairness but noted that it must adhere to the policy of
the legislature as set forth in the statute. Id. (citing Hagan, 968 S.W.2d at 706). Even though
applying the plain language of Section 302.060.1(10) requires Branson to wait longer than he
otherwise would in order to be eligible for reinstatement of his driving privileges, that is the
correct result. We have “no authority to interfere with [the legislature’s] policy decision under
the guise of statutory interpretation.” Id. (citing Hagan, 968 S.W.2d at 706); see also Stiers, 477
S.W.3d at 615, 617 (internal citations omitted); Mayfield, 335 S.W.3d at 575.
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in granting Branson’s petition for
reinstatement of his driving privileges. See White, 321 S.W.3d at 307–08 (internal citation
omitted). We therefore reverse and remand to the circuit court to issue a new judgment
consistent with this opinion.
Conclusion
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and remanded.
_______________________________
KURT S. ODENWALD, Judge
Philip M. Hess, P.J., concurs.
Lisa P. Page, J., concurs.
7