ANGELA KOELLER and JEFF HASKENHOFF v. MALIBU SHORES CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant-Respondent ( 2020 )


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  • ANGELA KOELLER and                            )
    JEFF HASKENHOFF,                              )
    )
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,                 )
    )
    v.                                            )       No. SD36129
    )       Filed: May 22, 2020
    MALIBU SHORES CONDOMINIUM                     )
    ASSOCIATION, INC.,                            )
    )
    Defendant-Respondent.                  )
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMDEN COUNTY
    Honorable Aaron G. Koeppen, Associate Circuit Judge
    AFFIRMED
    Angela Koeller and Jeff Haskenhoff appeal from the trial court’s judgment in favor
    of Malibu Shores Condominium Association, Inc. (Condo Association). Randall Koeller
    was originally a plaintiff in this case. He died during the pendency of the action. His wife,
    Angela Koeller, was substituted as a party plaintiff. To avoid confusion, we refer to
    Randall Koeller, Angela Koeller and Jeff Haskenhoff individually by their first names. We
    refer to Angela and Jeff collectively as Plaintiffs. Presenting three points, Plaintiffs
    contend the trial court erred by deciding that the Condo Association’s lien on their unit was
    valid and that Plaintiffs were barred from recovery pursuant to the voluntary payment
    doctrine. Finding no merit in Plaintiffs’ contentions, we affirm.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    This appeal involves a lien placed on Unit 3, Building 15 of the Malibu Shores
    Condominium (the Unit) in favor of the Condo Association. Before Randall and Jeff
    purchased the Unit, Michael and Wendy Halliday (the Hallidays) were the owners. The
    Hallidays also leased boat slip number 11 on dock C (the boat slip) from the Condo
    Association. Monthly maintenance fees for the Unit and the boat slip were billed by the
    Condo Association as unit assessments and dock assessments on the statements provided
    to the Hallidays.
    The Hallidays became delinquent in the payment of their unit and dock assessment
    fees and charges. The Condo Association sued the Hallidays for past-due assessments and
    sought forfeiture of the boat slip pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. In March
    2016, the Condo Association obtained a judgment against the Hallidays in the amount of
    $6,156.46 for assessments, late-payment penalties and interest. Pursuant to the judgment,
    the lease for the boat slip was terminated, and the Condo Association took possession of
    the boat slip. The judgment stated that it constituted a lien on the Unit.1 At the time this
    judgment was obtained, Angela and Jeff were members of the Condo Association Board.
    In May 2016, Randall and Jeff purchased the Unit at a sheriff’s sale for $52,000.
    Randall and Jeff knew they were not purchasing the boat slip.
    1
    Additionally, paragraph 23 of the Condominium Declaration states that, if any
    owner fails or refuses to make a payment of the common expenses when due, the amount
    thereof shall constitute a lien on the interest of such owner.
    2
    In June 2016, Randall and Jeff asked the Condo Association about the amount of
    the lien on the Unit. The Condo Association informed Randall and Jeff that they owed
    $8,154 for the lien. This amount reflected unpaid assessments against the Unit, finance
    charges, late fees, lien charges and attorney fees.      The amount also included dock
    assessment fees for May and June 2016. While Randall questioned the amount, Jeff
    insisted that the entire amount was correct and owed by them. In July 2016, Randall and
    Jeff separately and voluntarily wrote checks in the amount of $4,077 to satisfy the lien. At
    that time, Angela and Jeff were still members of the Condo Association Board.
    In November 2016, Randall and Jeff sold the Unit. Before selling the Unit, they
    obtained a “Release of All Liens” on the Unit from the Condo Association. They sold the
    Unit free of any liens or other encumbrances and made a profit.
    Randall and Jeff later filed suit against the Condo Association for, inter alia,
    negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation with respect to the validity
    and amount of the lien. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the
    Condo Association and against Randall and Jeff. One of the factual findings by the trial
    court stated that the “lien asserted against [the Unit] was satisfied after receipt of the
    voluntary payment” by Randall and Jeff. Another factual finding was that Randall and Jeff
    “offered no credible evidence as to any material misrepresentations made by any of the
    Board Members of [the Condo Association].” The trial court concluded, inter alia, that
    “the lien against [the Unit] was valid and owed by [Randall and Jeff] after they purchased
    [the Unit], but even if it were not, [Randall and Jeff’s] claims still fail because of the
    voluntary payment rule.” This appeal followed.
    3
    Standard of Review
    In this court-tried case, our review is governed by Rule 84.13(d) and Murphy v.
    Carron, 
    536 S.W.2d 30
    , 32 (Mo. banc 1976).2 We are required to affirm the trial court’s
    judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the
    evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. 
    Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32
    . “We
    review issues of law de novo.” Denny v. Regions Bank, 
    527 S.W.3d 920
    , 925 (Mo. App.
    2017). With respect to factual determinations, we defer to the trial court’s credibility
    determinations and assessment of the weight of witness testimony. Metzger v. Franklin,
    
    496 S.W.3d 547
    , 549 (Mo. App. 2016). “The trial court is free to believe all, none, or part
    of the testimony of any witness.”
    Id. Discussion and
    Decision
    Points 1 and 2
    In Points 1 and 2, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court misapplied the law by finding
    that the lien was valid and by including dock assessment and attorney fees in the amount
    of the lien. Those arguments are meritless because the trial court correctly applied the
    voluntary payment doctrine.
    The voluntary payment doctrine “provides that a person who voluntarily pays
    money with full knowledge of all the facts in the case, and in the absence of fraud and
    duress, cannot recover it back, even though the payment is made without sufficient
    consideration and under protest.” Damon v. City of Kansas City, 
    419 S.W.3d 162
    , 192
    (Mo. App. 2013). In Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc., 
    290 S.W.3d 721
    (Mo. banc
    2009), our Supreme Court stated:
    2
    All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2020).
    4
    When evaluating the rationale behind this rule of law, courts emphasize that
    a person who, induced thereto solely by a mistake of law, has conferred a
    benefit upon another to satisfy in whole or in part an honest claim of the
    other to the performance given, is not entitled to restitution. The underlying
    reason for those requirements is that it would be inequitable to give such
    person the privilege of selecting his own time and convenience for litigation
    short of the bar of the statute of limitations, and thereby subject the payee
    to the uncertainties and casualties of human affairs likely to affect his means
    of defending the claim.
    Id. at 726
    (internal quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added).
    None of the arguments advanced by Plaintiffs in Points 1 and 2 involve fraud or
    duress. Instead, the arguments are directed solely at the validity of the lien and its amount.
    These involve only a mistake of law by Randall and Jeff in voluntarily paying a sum they
    now claim they did not owe. A mistake of law occurs when a person is truly acquainted
    with the existence or nonexistence of facts, but is ignorant of, or comes to an erroneous
    conclusion as to, their legal effect. Edwards v. City of Ellisville, 
    426 S.W.3d 644
    , 666
    (Mo. App. 2013). As members of the Condo Association Board, Angela and Jeff were
    fully aware of all material facts giving rise to the assessment of the lien. Their alleged
    mistake of law falls within the voluntary payment doctrine and precludes their attempt to
    recover funds they voluntarily paid to the Condo Association. Therefore, Points 1 and 2
    are denied.
    Point 3
    In Point 3, Plaintiffs argue the trial court’s finding that the Condo Association did
    not misrepresent the lien amount is “not supported by substantial evidence, is against the
    weight of the evidence and misapplies the law.” Because this point does not comply with
    Rule 84.04(d), it preserves nothing for appellate review.
    5
    Point 3 presents three different legal challenges to the judgment. A point relied on
    should contain only one issue, so multiple contentions about different issues should not be
    combined into a single point. See City of Joplin v. Wallace Bajjali Dev. Partners, L.P.,
    
    522 S.W.3d 327
    , 330 (Mo. App. 2017). The reason is each challenge involves a distinct
    analysis. A not-supported-by-substantial-evidence and an against-the-weight analysis are
    distinctly different. Smith v. Great Am. Assur. Co., 
    436 S.W.3d 700
    , 703-04 (Mo. App.
    2014). Each of these, in turn, is different from a claim that the trial court erroneously
    declared or applied the law.
    Id. “[T]his means
    each Murphy ground is proved differently
    from the others and is subject to different principles and procedures of appellate review.”
    Id. at 704.
    A point that includes multiple issues is multifarious and preserves nothing for
    appellate review. State ex rel. Schmitt v. Schier Co., Inc., 
    594 S.W.3d 245
    , 253 n.15 (Mo.
    App. 2020).
    Additionally, Plaintiffs’ contention that the judgment is not supported by
    substantial evidence fails because they had the burden of production and persuasion on
    their claim.
    When the burden of proof is placed on a party for a claim that is denied, the
    trier of fact has the right to believe or disbelieve that party’s uncontradicted
    or uncontroverted evidence. If the trier of fact does not believe the evidence
    of the party bearing the burden, it properly can find for the other party.
    Generally, the party not having the burden of proof on an issue need not
    offer any evidence concerning it. Consequently, substantial evidence
    supporting a judgment against the party with the burden of proof is not
    required or necessary.
    Adoption of K.M.W., 
    516 S.W.3d 375
    , 382 (Mo. App. 2017) (internal quotations and
    citations omitted).
    Plaintiffs’ contention that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence is
    governed by Houston v. Crider, 
    317 S.W.3d 178
    (Mo. App. 2010):
    6
    [A]n against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge requires completion of
    four sequential steps:
    (1) identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is
    necessary to sustain the judgment;
    (2) identify all of the favorable evidence in the record supporting the
    existence of that proposition;
    (3) identify the evidence in the record contrary to the belief of that
    proposition, resolving all conflicts in testimony in accordance with the trial
    court’s credibility determinations, whether explicit or implicit; and,
    (4) demonstrate why the favorable evidence, along with the reasonable
    inferences drawn from that evidence, is so lacking in probative value, when
    considered in the context of the totality of the evidence, that it fails to induce
    belief in that proposition.
    Id. at 187.
    Plaintiffs have not followed these mandatory requirements because they have
    not identified the favorable evidence supporting the trial court’s finding or acknowledged
    the trial court’s decisions about the credibility of the evidence presented. Instead, Plaintiffs
    have only cited the evidence favorable to their position. “Failure to follow the applicable
    framework means the appellant’s argument is analytically useless and provides no support
    for his or her challenge.” In re Marriage of Adams, 
    414 S.W.3d 29
    , 34 (Mo. App. 2013).
    For all of these reasons, Point 3 is denied.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    JEFFREY W. BATES, C.J. – OPINION AUTHOR
    DON E. BURRELL, J. – CONCUR
    MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCUR
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SD36129

Judges: Judge Jeffrey W. Bates

Filed Date: 5/22/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/22/2020