In the Estate of Bessie Marie Rich, M. Warren Rich v. Jeri Leigh Hibler Caskey ( 2020 )

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
IN THE ESTATE OF BESSIE MARIE )
RICH, Deceased; M. WARREN RICH, ) WD82884
Appellant,
)
v. )
) FILED: May 26, 2020
JERI LEIGH HIBLER CASKEY, )
Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BATES COUNTY
THE HONORABLE JULIE A. HIGHLEY-KEUTZER, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION ONE: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, PRESIDING JUDGE,
CYNTHIA L. MARTIN AND THOMAS N. CHAPMAN, JUDGES
M. Warren Rich (“Rich”), personal representative of the Estate of Bessie Marie
Rich, appeals the circuit court’s docket entry finding that expenses and attorney fees
incurred by Jeri Leigh Caskey (“Caskey”) d/b/a Caskey Law Office were reasonable and
directing Caskey to submit a claim for reimbursement of those expenses and attorney
fees for the court’s approval. Rich contends Caskey lacked standing to assert a claim
against the estate. Because the court’s docket entry was not an appealable
interlocutory order under the probate code, the appeal is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rich’s wife, Bessie, died on April 6, 2015. On May 18, 2015, Rich filed an
application for letters of administration in the probate division of the Bates County
Circuit Court requesting that he be appointed personal representative of Bessie’s
estate. The next day, the court granted the letters of administration, appointed Rich as
personal representative of Bessie’s estate, and issued the notice of letters of
administration granted. On May 21, 2015, Rich filed an inventory and appraisement of
the estate’s property.
The application for letters of administration and inventory and appraisement were
prepared by Caskey. Caskey was a sole practitioner, and her firm was Caskey Law
Office. Caskey occasionally worked of counsel, on a case-by-case basis, for The
Caskey Law Firm, which was a solo practice belonging to her brother-in-law, Harold
Caskey (“Harold”). Harold’s firm asked Caskey to do the legal work on Rich’s estate
case. After Caskey prepared the application for letters and of administration and the
inventory and appraisement, she emailed them to secretaries at Harold’s firm, who then
had Rich sign them. Caskey, on behalf of Harold’s firm, electronically signed the
application for letters as Rich’s attorney. Harold’s firm electronically filed the documents
and paid the filing fee and the fee for publication of the notice of letters of administration
granted.
Over a year later, Rich contacted Caskey and asked her to withdraw as counsel
for the personal representative because he planned to obtain other counsel. On June
30, 2016, Caskey filed a motion to withdraw and a petition for reimbursement of
expenses and for attorney fees. In her petition, she asked that her firm, Caskey Law
Office, be reimbursed $397.10 in expenses for the filing and publication fees and that
she be paid $500 in attorney fees. Caskey sent a copy of her motion to withdraw and
her petition for reimbursement to Rich, along with a letter advising him to have his new
counsel enter his appearance right away. On July 12, 2016, Rich’s new counsel, Todd
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Wilhelmus, entered his appearance on behalf of Rich. That same day, the court
granted Caskey’s motion to withdraw and entered an order allowing Caskey Law Office
$397.10 as reimbursement of expenses and Caskey $500 in attorney fees.
On January 18, 2017, Rich filed a motion for summary judgment on Caskey’s
petition for reimbursement of expenses and attorney fees. In his memo in support of
the motion, Rich asserted that Caskey Law Office lacked standing to file the petition
because the expenses were incurred, and the attorney fees were generated, by
Harold’s firm and not by Caskey’s firm. The court ruled that Rich’s motion was moot
because the court had already entered an order on July 12, 2016, granting Caskey’s
petition.
Rich filed a motion to set aside the July 12, 2016 order. In his motion, he argued
that his motion was not moot because the order was interlocutory and was entered
without notice and an opportunity to be heard, in violation of his due process rights. In
response, Caskey filed her consent to setting aside the order on the basis that the order
was granted without notice. The court subsequently entered a consent judgment setting
aside the July 12, 2016 order.
On June 6, 2019, the court held a hearing on Caskey’s petition for
reimbursement of expenses and attorney fees, during which Caskey and Rich testified.
Caskey testified that she worked of counsel for Harold’s firm because Harold had
Parkinson’s disease, which made it difficult for him to work full time. Caskey testified
that she took this case at the request of Harold’s firm and that she was seeking
reimbursement of the filing and publication fees paid by the firm on the estate’s behalf.
She testified that she made the request for reimbursement in her firm’s name and not
Harold’s firm’s name because Harold died in October 2015, and “[w]hen he died, the
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firm died.” She further testified that the amount of attorney fees she was requesting
was $500, which was the minimum she would charge and an amount that she believed
to be appropriate for the work she had done on behalf of the estate.
Caskey testified that she sought reimbursement and payment of attorney fees in
a petition, rather than in a claim against the estate, because “the attorney for the estate
typically does it by petition.” On cross-examination, Caskey acknowledged that her
petition did not include a statement that it was made under oath, as required by Section
472.080, RSMo 2016,1 for all documents filed under the probate code. After her
testimony, Caskey offered to refile her petition to include the statement that it was made
under oath.
Rich testified that, when Bessie died, he sought representation to assist him in
administering her estate. He testified that he went to the place that used to be the law
firm of Caskey, Hopkins and Wilhelmus. Rich testified that he was unaware that the
Caskey, Hopkins and Wilhelmus firm had dissolved and that only Harold’s firm was at
that location. According to Rich, he asked Kay Caskey if Bill Hopkins, who had
represented Rich and Bessie in a personal injury matter, was there. After Kay told him
Hopkins was not there, he “asked about representation on the estate of Bessie Rich.”
Kay told Rich that she needed to get information from him about Bessie’s relatives, so
Rich and Kay sat down and filled out paperwork. Rich never met with or spoke on the
telephone with either Harold or Caskey.
According to Rich, no one explained to him that he was hiring Harold to represent
him, he never intended to hire Harold or Caskey, and he did not sign a contract for
either (or both) of them to represent him. Rich testified that he intended to hire Hopkins.
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All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016.
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Rich admitted that he returned twice to Harold’s firm, first to sign the application for
letters of administration and a second time to sign the inventory. Nevertheless, Rich
testified that he was unaware that Hopkins was not representing him in the estate case
until a year later, when he talked to Hopkins. At that point, he asked Caskey to
withdraw. Rich testified that he had no issue or problem with the quality of Caskey’s
work; he just thought Hopkins was representing him.
After Caskey’s and Rich’s testimony, the court stated that it was “well aware of’
the state of Harold’s health at the end of his life and was “very well aware” that Caskey
and some other attorneys, including the court, “had stepped in at times to assist and be
of counsel and help clients of the Caskey Law Firm.” The court would not “speak to”
“[w]hether there was some misrepresentation to Mr. Rich or not,” but found that there
was “certainly some confusion.” The court stated that it did not hear any evidence “that
Ms. Caskey had any intent or was trying to deceive [Rich] in any way.” The court found
that, as Rich acknowledged, Caskey’s work was “very satisfactory” and was “just what
would have been done had Mr. Hopkins done the same work.” The court also found,
“Clearly, the Caskey Law Firm was out the publication fee and was out the filing fee,
and that would have happened whether it was Bill Hopkins working on the case through
them or Bill Hopkins as a private attorney.” The court further found that there was “good
work that was done on the estate by an attorney. And that would have been money you
would have paid to Mr. Hopkins or Ms. Caskey, whoever it was that you contracted with.
There’s just a question of who you contracted with.”
The court explained:
So – So given that I would allow a claim against the estate for the
attorney’s fees as well as reimbursement for the fees that the Caskey Law
Firm was out, and if we want to re-characterize that as a claim against the
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estate, I would allow it in that capacity. I do think that having it as a
petition, given some confusion about whether Mr. Rich understood that
you were doing legal work on behalf of himself as a personal
representative, I do think that’s a fair issue. But I don’t think there’s any
issue as to the work that was done and the expenses that were – that
were created on behalf of the estate.
So – So I would grant the claim but ask that it be re-characterized
as – instead of a petition, that it be re-characterized as a claim against the
estate.
Rich’s counsel then stated:
Judge, I’m sorry, I was hoping [for] an oral argument on the issue.
So if you would just permit me to say that the relationship between an
attorney and a client is one of principal-agent contract and there has to be
a meeting of the minds, and there obviously wasn’t. He never intended to
hire Harold. He didn’t know he was hiring Harold. He never intended to
hire Jeri Leigh Caskey. He never did hire her. Regardless of what they
did, there was no principal-agent contract between Mr. Rich and Harold
Caskey or Jeri Leigh Caskey to form an attorney-client relationship.
In response, the court stated, “I appreciate that, and because of that, I am not granting
the petition, but I’m indicating that I will grant the claim.”
After the hearing, the court made the following docket entry:
PR by atty Todd Wilhelmus; Claimant Jerri [sic] Leigh Caskey appears;
Court hears evidence and approves request previously made in
Claimant’s Petition for Reimbursement and for Attorney Fees. Court finds
that Petitioner’s objection regarding the claim to be in the form of a
Petition is valid but also determines that the expenses and fees sought
are/were reasonable. The Court requests Claimant to submit her claim for
reimbursement for expenses incurred by the Caskey Law Firm and her
fees for approval by the Court. JAH 6/06/19.
Rich filed this appeal.
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JURISDICTION
Before reaching the merits of an appeal, we must determine whether we have
jurisdiction. In re Kraus, 318 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Mo. App. 2010). “The right to appeal
from a judgment of the probate division is purely statutory.” Id. “While probate orders
are generally interlocutory and not subject to appeal until final disposition, the orders
enumerated in § 472.160.1 are subject to immediate appeal.” Id.
In the jurisdictional statement of his brief, Rich states that the court’s June 6,
2019 docket entry constituted an immediately appealable interlocutory order under
Section 472.160.1(1), which provides:
1. Any interested person aggrieved thereby may appeal to the appropriate
appellate court from the order, judgment or decree of the probate division
of the circuit court in any of the following cases:
(1) On the allowance of any claim against an estate exceeding one
hundred dollars[.]
Rich asserts that, in the docket entry, the court entered a “judgment in favor of [Caskey]
allowing the claim in an amount greater than $100.00.” We disagree.
While the court stated in its docket entry that it was approving Caskey’s request
in her petition for reimbursement of expenses and attorney fees and that the requested
amounts were reasonable, the court also stated that Rich’s objection to the form of her
request – a petition instead of a claim – was valid. The court, therefore, directed
Caskey “to submit her claim for reimbursement for expenses incurred by the Caskey
Law Firm and her fees for approval by the Court.” (Emphasis added.) That the court
was not granting Caskey’s request for reimbursement of expenses and attorney fees at
that time is supported by the court’s statements at the end of trial, made in response to
Rich’s counsel’s contention that Rich did not have attorney-client relationship with either
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Harold or Caskey: “I appreciate that, and because of that, I am not granting the petition,
but I’m indicating that I will grant the claim.” (Emphasis added.)
The court’s docket entry advised the parties that Caskey’s request was
reasonable and that it would grant the request if she submitted it in the form of a claim
for the court’s approval, which has not been done. The court did not grant her claim in
the docket entry and, furthermore, did not include the amount of any such claim in the
docket entry. The docket entry was not an order allowing a claim in excess of $100.00
against Bessie’s estate. Because the June 6, 2019 docket entry was not an
immediately appealable interlocutory order under Section 472.160.1(1), we have no
jurisdiction to hear Rich’s appeal.
CONCLUSION
Appeal dismissed.
____________________________________
LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
ALL CONCUR.
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