State v. R. Adsit, Jr. ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                           02/22/2022
    DA 20-0423
    Case Number: DA 20-0423
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    2022 MT 39N
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    RICHARD EDWARD ADSIT, JR.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Judith Basin, Cause No. DC-2018-07
    Honorable Jon A. Oldenburg, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Meghan Lulf Sutton, Law Office of Meghan Lulf Sutton, PLLC,
    Great Falls, Montana
    For Appellee:
    Austin Knudson, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss,
    Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Heather Perry, Judith Basin County Attorney, Jean Adams, Special
    Deputy County Attorney, Stanford, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: February 2, 2022
    Decided: February 22, 2022
    Filed:
    r--6ta•--df
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
    Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
    serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
    Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
    Reports.
    ¶2     Richard Edward Adsit, Jr., appeals a March 18, 2020 order and judgment and a
    November 2, 2020 amended final judgment and sentence from the Tenth Judicial District
    Court in Judith Basin County. He also appeals the District Court’s June 21, 2019 and
    February 21, 2020 orders denying his motions for change of venue and to dismiss the case
    against him. The State charged Adsit with five counts of sexual assault and two counts of
    sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC). A jury in Judith Basin County convicted
    Adsit on the two SIWOC charges and on two of the five sexual assault charges. Adsit’s
    appeal raises numerous issues with the trial below: he argues that he was deprived of his
    constitutional right to a speedy trial; that the District Court should have granted his motion
    to change venue; that the State entered improper testimony meant to bolster a witness’s
    credibility; that the jury instructions erroneously defined “without consent”; and that, if
    any one of these issues is insufficient for reversal on its own, then the doctrine of
    cumulative error should warrant a new trial. We affirm.
    ¶3     In 2012, Adsit worked as a schoolteacher and basketball coach in Geyser, Montana.
    He began a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old student, an athlete on the basketball team
    2
    he coached. The relationship continued for years, and in 2018, the student began to reach
    out to others about the impact it had on her and ultimately contacted law enforcement. The
    charging documents the State filed in May 2018 pointed to six specific instances of sexual
    contact in 2012: four occurrences of alleged assault and two occurrences of penetration
    arising to SIWOC. Closer to trial, as the State prepared its case, it amended the information
    to add another instance of sexual assault.
    ¶4     Adsit pleaded not guilty, and the parties prepared for trial. The initial trial was set
    for March 11, 2019, a date 297 days after the filing of charges. When the District Court
    suggested this schedule at a hearing held about a month after Adsit’s arraignment, his
    counsel said, “That looks fine to us[.]” In December 2018, Adsit filed a motion for a
    continuance. He cited “issues concerning the discovery process in which both parties will
    need additional time to fulfill their obligations.” According to Adsit, the State’s hand-over
    of discovery materials had been too sluggish given its ongoing investigation of the case.
    ¶5     Following Adsit’s unopposed motion, the District Court rescheduled trial for July
    2019. It was about three weeks before this trial date that the State amended its information
    to add another count of sexual assault. Adsit subsequently moved for another continuance,
    again citing discovery problems, and stating a need to prepare for the additional charge.
    At the arraignment hearing on the amended information, the parties indicated their mutual
    agreement to a new trial date in March 2020.
    ¶6     In February 2020, Adsit moved to dismiss the charges as a speedy trial violation.
    He noted the 656-day gap that had accrued between the charges and the trial and argued
    that much of the delay should be attributed the State. After reviewing briefing on the matter
    3
    from Adsit and from the State, the District Court denied the motion. Adsit appeals that
    decision to this Court, and we affirm.
    ¶7     Both the United States Constitution, in its Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
    the Montana Constitution, in Article II, Section 24, guarantee criminal defendants a right
    to a speedy trial. We have set forth a comprehensive framework for assessing alleged
    speedy trial violations. See State v. Ariegwe, 
    2007 MT 204
    , 
    338 Mont. 442
    , 
    167 P.3d 815
    .
    The Ariegwe approach involves balancing four factors: the length of the delay, the reasons
    for the delay, the defendant’s response to the delay, and how the delay has prejudiced the
    defendant. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 106-11. When we review a district court order on a speedy trial
    motion, this Court reviews the district court’s findings of fact to determine whether they
    are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law for correctness.           State v. Huffine,
    
    2018 MT 175
    , ¶ 9, 
    392 Mont. 103
    , 
    422 P.3d 102
    .
    ¶8     The District Court’s Ariegwe balancing in Adsit’s case led it to conclude that no
    speedy trial violation had occurred. The District Court noted that the first almost-year of
    delay happened according to the initial agreed-upon trial schedule. We have noted that
    “institutional delay,” i.e., that which is “inherent in the criminal justice system,” weighs
    less heavily against the State. State v. Stops, 
    2013 MT 131
    , ¶ 27, 
    370 Mont. 226
    , 
    301 P.3d 811
    . The District Court also credited the period after Adsit’s second continuance, when
    the parties again agreed to a new date, to institutional delay. Adsit’s first continuance
    motion cited “discovery issues” that “both parties” would need time to resolve. Adsit
    argues that the discovery delays and the amendment to the information should render all
    the time the fault of the State because its continued investigation after filing charges lacked
    4
    due diligence. Adsit’s assertions in this regard are largely conclusory, but the District
    Court did note in its order that the State should have amended its information sooner and
    that the State bore some blame for the slow pace of trial preparation.
    ¶9     The other factors in the balancing test consider the defendant’s response to the delay
    and what kind of prejudice it caused. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 110-11; State v. Steigelman, 
    2013 MT 153
    , ¶¶ 18, 21, 
    370 Mont. 352
    , 
    302 P.3d 396
    . Here, the District Court noted that Adsit was
    not incarcerated prior to trial, that the delay did not materially impact his defense by
    impairing evidence, and that Adsit’s reference to resolution by “both parties” and his own
    pace of discovery motions indicated an ability by the parties to work out the process with
    no significant harm to Adsit. Although Adsit asserted that the extent of the delay unduly
    prolonged his anxiety and concern, the District Court noted that he provided no affidavit
    or evidence detailing such an effect. On balance, therefore, the District Court concluded
    that the State had not violated Adsit’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.
    ¶10    We agree with the District Court. Adsit’s arguments for reversal largely rely on the
    prejudice of his delayed trial only in the abstract. He stresses the raw number of days of
    delay, notes the general effect that trial preparation had on his life, and complains that there
    would have been less delay had the State’s assembly of witnesses gone more smoothly.
    But Adsit posits little to demonstrate why the circumstances of his case in particular rise to
    a speedy trial violation when its facts are balanced according to the Ariegwe factors. There
    is no question that the initial ten-month time set between charging and trial was a typical
    and agreed-upon institutional schedule. Adsit’s trial was delayed for an additional year
    following his own motions to continue and his own agreement to schedule modifications.
    5
    Although issues with the State’s preparation may have predicated these requests, Adsit has
    not shown that the State’s actions were intentional or in bad faith or that any of the delay
    prejudiced the preparation of his defense, which is “the most important factor in our
    prejudice analysis.” Steigelman, ¶ 29. The District Court’s February 21, 2020 order
    denying Adsit’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.
    ¶11    Prior to trial, Adsit also filed a motion requesting a change of venue. Adsit argued
    that in an area as small as Judith Basin County—population 2,072 at the time—news and
    chatter about his case would taint the jury pool. The District Court denied Adsit’s motion.
    It noted that our standard for considering when “community sentiment” warrants a change
    of venue depends on a citizenry being so “enraged or inflamed” that it is unlikely to contain
    jurors “who can render a decision free from bias.” State v. Kingman, 
    2011 MT 269
    , ¶ 42,
    
    362 Mont. 330
    , 
    264 P.3d 1104
    . Although Adsit described the existence of general
    knowledge about the circumstances that led to his criminal charges, from rumors to news
    reporting, the District Court noted that the mere presence of publicity is insufficient
    grounds for a change of venue. State v. Kaarma, 
    2017 MT 24
    , ¶ 43, 
    386 Mont. 243
    , 
    390 P.3d 609
     (“Informed jurors are not biased jurors.”). Adsit had not demonstrated that the
    publicity was prejudicial or led to hostile attitudes that dictated the community’s thoughts
    on guilt or innocence. Kaarma, ¶ 43; Kingman, ¶ 24.
    ¶12    We review a district court’s order on such a motion for abuse of discretion. Section
    46-13-203(1), MCA; State v. Devlin, 
    2009 MT 18
    , ¶ 15, 
    349 Mont. 67
    , 
    201 P.3d 791
    . On
    appeal, Adsit’s brief argument on this matter suffers the same flaws as below. He says that
    given the “close-knit” community, it is likely at least one juror was biased against him, but
    6
    he raises no argument sufficient to satisfy the standards we have set forth in cases like
    Kingman and Kaarma. See Kaarma, ¶ 43; Kingman, ¶ 24 (“an irrepressibly hostile attitude
    pervad[ing] the community”). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Adsit’s change-of-venue motion, and the court’s June 21, 2019 order is affirmed.
    ¶13    At trial, the State’s case relied primarily on the testimony of the victim, and the State
    presented testimony from numerous other members of the community who could
    corroborate certain facts she described and other details about the dynamic between Adsit
    and the victim. The State also called an expert witness who, with no knowledge of this
    particular case, provided the jury information on childhood sexual abuse to add context
    that might help the jury understand the victim’s testimony and things like her delay in
    reaching out for help. Adsit’s approach in defense was to rebut the State’s narrative about
    grooming and abuse with one describing a purely consensual relationship—“inappropriate,
    not illegal,” his counsel argued at closing, “a fatal attraction perpetrated by a smart
    beautiful girl.”
    ¶14    Adsit argues on appeal that the District Court should not have let the State’s expert
    witness testify. According to Adsit, the effect of the expert’s testimony was to improperly
    bolster the credibility of the victim. We do not permit a witness to “comment on the
    credibility of the alleged victim,” nor do we allow a prosecutor to bolster a witness’s
    credibility by offering personal opinions on a witness’s truthfulness. State v. Reams, 
    2020 MT 326
    , ¶ 11, 
    402 Mont. 366
    , 
    477 P.3d 1118
    ; State v. Green, 
    2009 MT 114
    , ¶ 33, 
    350 Mont. 141
    , 
    205 P.3d 798
    . Before trial began, Adsit raised a general, “standing” objection
    7
    with the District Court to any improper bolstering testimony, but he did not object at trial
    to any of the specific prosecutorial comments or witness testimony he describes on appeal.
    ¶15    We review a district court’s decision on the admissibility of expert testimony for
    abuse of discretion. Reams, ¶ 9. We generally will not address arguments about a
    prosecutor’s statements if they are not objected to at trial, unless they rise to plain error, a
    standard we have held is typically not met by allegations of improper comments on
    credibility in closing arguments. State v. Walton, 
    2014 MT 41
    , ¶¶ 10, 15, 
    374 Mont. 38
    ,
    
    318 P.3d 1024
    ; State v. Aker, 
    2013 MT 253
    , ¶ 30, 
    371 Mont. 491
    , 
    310 P.3d 506
    . Here, we
    find that the District Court acted within its discretion in allowing the State’s expert to testify
    and that no improper bolstering occurred that would rise to reversible error.
    ¶16    We have established a rule whereby an expert may testify about child sexual abuse
    because it is “a topic that many or most jurors have no common experience with.”
    Reams,¶ 15. We have “repeatedly upheld the use of experts to explain complexities of
    child sexual abuse and to give guidance, which will help jurors understand and judge the
    victim’s testimony,” but we will not permit them to “comment on the credibility of the
    alleged victim” or to present statistics that would bolster an inference by the jury of the
    victim’s truthfulness. Reams, ¶¶ 11, 15; State v. Grimshaw, 
    2020 MT 201
    , ¶¶ 25-28, 
    401 Mont. 27
    , 
    469 P.3d 702
    .
    ¶17    At Adsit’s trial, the State’s expert described typical patterns of “school predator”
    abuse and explained to the jury the typical process by which an adult may groom a student
    victim, disarming their discomfort, encouraging secrecy, exploiting vulnerabilities, and so
    forth. The expert also testified about the typical behavior of victims, whose shame, guilt,
    8
    or emotional dependency can prolong the time until they reckon with what has happened.
    During closing arguments, the prosecutor encouraged the jury to “compare [the victim’s]
    testimony to what [the expert] said about reporting, testimony, and disclosure.” Adsit
    argues that this presentation amounts to using the expert to bolster the victim’s
    credibility—although the expert spoke generally of abuse in schools, Adsit argues that the
    subject matter discussed was so similar to the facts of his case as to amount to an opinion
    on him and the victim specifically.
    ¶18    However, other than infer that it might make the jury more likely to believe the
    victim, Adsit offers no detail regarding any of the expert’s statements being too specific to
    the case. Adsit does point out one misstatement by the prosecutor in closing, describing
    the expert’s testimony about a troubled home life making a victim susceptible to grooming.
    The prosecutor said that the expert “testified these issues may have contributed” to the
    victim’s susceptibility, and the prosecutor used the victim’s name instead of saying, more
    generally, “a victim.” But Adsit raised no objection to this comment at trial, and we do not
    see this remark as rising to plain error or anything about the expert’s testimony as improper
    “bolstering.” Nothing the expert said reached beyond her general studies of school abuse,
    and none of her testimony opined on the victim’s credibility. Nor did the prosecutor’s
    statement offer an opinion on the victim’s credibility. In context, this comment was more
    similar to those about “inferences to be drawn from various phases of evidence” that we
    have previously held do not amount to plain error. State v. Smith, 
    2021 MT 148
    , ¶¶ 43-46,
    
    404 Mont. 245
    , 
    488 P.3d 531
    . And the presentation of the expert falls squarely within the
    9
    parameters we established in cases like Reams. It was well within the District Court’s
    discretion to permit this testimony.
    ¶19    Adsit’s next issue regards the meaning of “without consent.” Here, we must take a
    step back and review this concept under the applicable laws. Adsit’s five sexual assault
    charges arose under § 45-5-502, MCA (2011). This statute makes it a felony to “knowingly
    subject[] another person to any sexual contact without consent.” The statutory scheme at
    the time contained no definition of “without consent” for this provision, so we applied a
    standard of instructing juries on the “ordinary meaning” of that phrase. State v. Stevens,
    
    2002 MT 181
    , ¶ 59, 
    311 Mont. 52
    , 
    53 P.3d 356
    .
    ¶20    Adsit’s two other charges fell under § 45-5-503, MCA (2011), criminalizing “sexual
    intercourse without consent” (SIWOC). The Legislature did provide a definition of
    “without consent” for this statute, at § 45-5-501, MCA (2011). This definition includes
    that a victim is incapable of consent if they are less than 16 years old. Thus, as long as the
    jury found that the two instances of penetration occurred as the State alleged, it could
    convict Adsit on these charges because the victim was categorically unable to consent. The
    jury did so.
    ¶21    In 2017, the Legislature modified the definitional statutes to align the concept of
    “consent” under both sexual assault and SIWOC. See § 45-5-501(1), MCA (2017). But
    for Adsit’s case, the two definitions differed. The jury had to consider whether the
    incidences of sexual contact underlying the assault charges occurred “without consent”
    according to the “ordinary meaning” of that phrase. Age alone was insufficient; the sexual
    10
    assault statute at the time only invalidated consent for victims under 14 with perpetrators
    more than three years older. Section 45-5-502(5)(a)(ii), MCA (2011).
    ¶22     Adsit and the State offered the District Court competing versions of how to instruct
    the jury on this “ordinary meaning.” Adsit’s definition would have limited the meaning to
    “compelled to submit by force . . . . Force, fear, or threat is sufficient[.]” The State’s
    suggestion defined consent as “a concurrence of wills” and used language from Black’s
    Law Dictionary that described this concurrence as either express or implied and as
    “[v]oluntarily yielding the will to the proposition of another.” The District Court instructed
    the jury using the definition the State proposed, and Adsit challenges that decision on
    appeal.
    ¶23     We review a district court’s decision on jury instructions for abuse of discretion and
    to determine whether the instructions, as a whole, fully and fairly related the law applicable
    to the case. State v. Resh, 
    2019 MT 220
    , ¶ 10, 
    397 Mont. 254
    , 
    448 P.3d 1100
    . Adsit argues
    that the instructions the District Court gave here were an abuse of discretion because they
    did not accurately describe the law on consent. Adsit essentially contends that prior to
    2017, the type of relationship he established with his 15-year-old student was legal and
    could not be viewed as sexual assault by any jury considering the meaning of “consent.”
    Adsit appears to assert that only after the Legislature added language about youth and
    teacher/coach power imbalances did such conduct become assault-worthy.1 But Adsit’s
    1
    See § 45-5-501(1)(b)(x), MCA (2017) (“[T]he victim is incapable of consent because the
    victim is . . . a student of an elementary, middle, junior high, or high school . . . and the perpetrator
    is not a student . . . and is an employee . . . who has ever had instructional, supervisory, disciplinary,
    or other authority over the student in a school setting.”).
    11
    position is a misreading of what this Court meant when we described instructions on the
    ordinary meaning of “without consent.” There is plenty of room within such meaning for
    a jury to discern that a student groomed by a teacher did not, in fact, consent to sexual
    contact, and willful agreement is certainly—as the dictionary quote offered by the State
    reveals—part of the ordinary understanding of consent. Under the instructions the District
    Court gave, the jury was free to consider the evidence and decide whether the victim’s will
    concurred with Adsit’s, and they were free to fully consider Adsit’s arguments that she had
    consented. In fact, one could infer that the jury was in part swayed by Adsit’s arguments
    because the jury acquitted Adsit on three of the five sexual assault charges.
    ¶24    Adsit’s argument on appeal also relies on the non sequitur that the District Court’s
    instruction defining “consent” failed to inform the jury what “without consent” means. The
    instructions did define only the former, as “a concurrence of wills.” Adsit argues that it
    was improper for the jury to infer that “without consent” would mean “[without] a
    concurrence of wills,” rather than be instructed as to the definition of the negative phrase
    direct from the statute. But the legislative comments on the statute at the time noted
    explicitly that “without consent” should have “its normal grammatical meaning.” Section
    45-5-502, MCA (2011) (Annotator’s Note). Understanding “without consent” through a
    definition of “consent” perfectly encapsulates the application of “normal grammar,” and
    no jury should need to be hand-held through the logic required to comprehend this step.
    We affirm and find the District Court’s instructions were fair and within its discretion.
    ¶25    Finally, Adsit argues that the doctrine of cumulative error entitles him to a new trial.
    Under this doctrine, we have held that when one or more individual errors would be
    12
    insufficient alone to require reversal, their accumulated effect may prejudice a defendant’s
    right to a fair trial sufficiently to warrant reversal. State v. Smith, 
    2020 MT 304
    , ¶ 16, 
    402 Mont. 206
    , 
    476 P.3d 1178
    . However, as explained above, most of the errors Adsit alleges
    were not error at all. We therefore decline this final invitation to reverse.
    ¶26    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
    Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
    Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
    applicable standards of review.
    ¶27    Affirmed.
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    We Concur:
    /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
    /S/ LAURIE McKINNON
    /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
    /S/ JIM RICE
    13