Grigg v. Beaverhead County EMS ( 2022 )

ORIGINAL 03/08/2022
DA 21-0229
Case Number: DA 21-0229
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2022 MT 48N
PETER C. GRIGG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
MAR 0 8 2022
v. Bowen Greenwood
Court
Clerk of Supreme
Strate of IVIontana
BEAVERHEAD EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV 21-114A
Honorable Amy Eddy, Presiding Judge
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Beaverhead, Cause No. DV 21-14372
Honorable Jennifer B. Lint, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Peter C. Grigg, Self-represented, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellee:
Jill Gannon-Nagle, Law Office of Jill Gannon-Nagle, Dillon, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 16, 2022
Decided: March 8, 2022
Filed:
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Peter C. Grigg (Grigg), a self-represented litigant, appeals the May 4, 2021 Order
of the Montana Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County, dismissing his action
against Beaverhead Emergency Medical Services (BEMS). The court dismissed the action
after Grigg failed to respond to BEMS' M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
¶3 Grigg worked as a pararnedic and manager for BEMS approximately 16 days before
BEMS terminated his employment on January 29, 2021. On February 5, 2021, Grigg filed
a complaint in Flathead County District Court that alleged a bald claim of "unlawful
dismissal," with no further explanation or supporting factual allegations whatsoever. His
Complaint requested relief of "[f]our years of wages under Title 37 of MCA for unlawful
dismissal, retaliation, discrimination [and] workplace harassment." BEMS responded by
filing a motion to change venue to Beaverhead County, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, and an answer to the Complaint. Thereafter, Grigg filed a
document denominated "initial disclosure [and] exhibits" that referenced witnesses and
documents, but he failed to respond to the pending motions.
¶4 On April 1, 2021, the Flathead County District Court granted a change of venue,
noting that Grigg had failed to respond to BEMS' motion and "deeming the motion
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well-taken pursuant to Rule 2(b), U.D.C.R." After the transfer, Hon. Judge Berger,
Beaverhead County District Court, recused himself and called in Hon. Judge Lint, Ravalli
County District Court, to preside over the matter. Judge Lint assumed jurisdiction on April
14, 2021, with venue remaining in Beaverhead County. On April 15, BEMS filed a motion
for surnmary ruling on its pending Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Grigg's
continuing failure to respond to the motion constituted an admission the motion was
well-taken under the Montana Uniform District Court Rules. On May 4, 2021, the District
Court granted the motion, noting Grigg had not responded to BEMS' motion, despite more
than 30 days passing since the response deadline. Grigg filed an appeal with this Court on
May 13, 2021.
¶5 We review a district court's ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo.
Plakorus v. Univ. of Mont., 2020 MT 312, ¶ 8, 402 Mont. 263, 477 P.3d 311 (citation
ornitted).
¶6 Grigg's appellate arguments are unclear, but he asserts that Beaverhead County
"fail[ed] to hold jurisdiction" over the action, and that the Flathead County District Court
should have decided on BEMS' motion to dismiss prior to transferring venue because the
motion was originally filed there. Grigg does not challenge the change of venue itself, and
it is clear that "[t]he court to which an action or proceeding is transferred has and exercises
over the same the like jurisdiction as if it had been originally commenced therein." Section
25-2-204, MCA. Given Grigg's failure to respond to the motion or otherwise object, the
action was properly transferred to Beaverhead County. Beaverhead County District Court
obtained and held jurisdiction over the action as if the pleadings and subsequent motions
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had originally been filed there, including BEMS' motion to dismiss, and properly decided
the motion.
Grigg also appears to argue the District Court could not dismiss his case before
BEMS had responded to his "initial disclosures [and] exhibits" document. However, a
district court looks solely at the complaint when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Meagher v. Butte-Silver Bow City-County, 2007 MT 129, ¶ 15, 337 Mont. 339,
160 P.3d 552. While Grigg's use of a form complaint was not improper, he provided no
explanation or factual allegations whatsoever supporting his clairn, merely stating
"unlawful dismissal," an insufficient statement of his claim. "A claim is subject to
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if it either fails to state a cognizable legal theory for relief or
states an otherwise valid legal claim but fails to state sufficient facts that, if true, would
entitle the claimant to relief under the claim." In re Estate of Swanberg, 2020 MT 153,
¶ 6, 400 Mont. 247, 465 P.3d 1165 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
¶8 Further, Grigg indisputably did not respond to BEMS' motion to dismiss within
applicable time limits, or at all. BEMS served Grigg with the motion on or about March 8,
and a response was required by on or about March 25. MUDCR 2(b); M. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1),
(d). The District Court did not rule until May 4, about 40 days after Grigg's deadline to
respond, but he still had not filed an answer brief. "Failure to file briefs may subject the
motion to summary ruling . . . . Failure to file an answer brief by the opposing party within
the time allowed shall be deemed an admission that the motion is well taken." MUDCR
2(c). The District Court correctly granted BEMS' motion to dismiss Grigg's Complaint.
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We may award sanctions to the prevailing party in an appeal "determined to be
frivolous, vexatious, filed for purposes of harassrnent or delay, or taken without substantial
or reasonable grounds." M. R. App. P. 19(5). Sanctions may include attorney fees. M. R.
App. P. 19(5); Jonas v. Jonas, 2013 MT 202, 11 24-25, 371 Mont. 113, 308 P.3d 33. We
conclude Grigg has pursued an appeal in this matter that is wholly frivolous as being
without any substantial legal grounds, after he failed to properly respond to issues raised
in the litigation before the District Court, which caused unnecessary costs for BEMS. We
award BEMS its reasonable attorney fees on appeal as a sanction against Grigg. Having
so concluded, we do not herein enter a vexatious litigant declaration against Grigg.
¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents
no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent
or modify existing precedent.
¶11 We affirm and remand this matter to the District Court for entry of a judgment
against Grigg including the amount of BEMS' reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
We concur:
Chief Justice
e94 4 16L.
Justices
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