Kent a K a Lindblom v. State , 2017 MT 193N ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                              08/08/2017
    DA 17-0325
    Case Number: DA 17-0325
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2017 MT 193N
    NICOLE LEANNE KENT, a/k/a
    NICOLE LEANNE LINDBLOM,
    Petitioner and Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Respondent and Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the First Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Lewis And Clark, Cause No. CDV-2017-299
    Honorable Kathy Seeley, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Colin M. Stephens, Nick Kirby Brooke, Smith & Stephens, P.C.,
    Missoula, Montana
    For Appellee:
    Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Ryan Aikin, Assistant
    Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Leo Gallagher, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Helena, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: July 12, 2017
    Decided: July 12, 2017
    Issued: August 8, 2017
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
    Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
    serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
    Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
    Reports.
    ¶2     Nicole Kent (Kent) appeals the Montana First Judicial District Court’s order
    denying her petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.
    ¶3     Kent is a Canadian citizen who has lived in Helena, Montana, since childhood. In
    May 2014 Kent was charged with multiple felony and misdemeanor drug-related criminal
    violations. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kent pled guilty to three of the felony charges:
    possession of dangerous drugs, possession with intent to distribute, and child
    endangerment. All remaining charges were dismissed. In November 2014 Kent was
    sentenced to three concurrent, five-year commitments to the Department of Corrections
    (DOC), with two years suspended, and transferred to the “Passages” chemical
    dependency treatment facility in Billings. Either prior to, or shortly after, her sentencing
    hearing, Kent was visited by an agent from Homeland Security who placed an
    immigration detainer on her.     After her transfer to Billings she was interviewed by
    another federal agent regarding immigration. On January 11, 2017, Kent was paroled and
    released into the custody of federal immigration authorities, and shortly thereafter she
    was transferred to an immigration holding facility in Tacoma, Washington. In Tacoma,
    2
    Kent met with an attorney who advised that one of the consequences of her guilty plea to
    the felony drug distribution offense was mandatory deportation. Thereafter, on April 20,
    2017, Kent filed a petition for postconviction relief on the grounds that her attorney, who
    represented her during plea agreement and sentencing, was ineffective because he failed
    to investigate and advise her of the immigration consequences of her guilty plea to a drug
    distribution offense. The District Court denied the petition, without a hearing, on the
    grounds that it was untimely and therefore procedurally barred.          The court further
    concluded that there was no basis for applying an equitable tolling exception to the time
    bar.
    ¶4     Section 46-21-102(1), MCA, requires a petition for postconviction relief be filed
    within one year of the date the conviction becomes final. There was and is no dispute
    that Kent failed to file her petition within one year. Thus, the decisive issue for the
    District Court, and now this Court, is whether the alleged ineffective assistance of
    counsel claim triggered an “equitable tolling” of the statute until Kent learned for certain
    that she was subject to mandatory deportation. The District Court summarized its reasons
    for rejecting Kent’s claim of equitable tolling as follows:
    [T]he threshold consideration here is not whether Kent’s counsel was
    ineffective. Rather, the issue is whether her claim of ineffective assistance
    is procedurally barred. . . . [T]he circumstances in the instant case do not
    warrant a tolling of the time bar. Kent knew early on that there may be
    immigration consequences resulting from a criminal conviction. She
    repeatedly informed her attorney that she was concerned that a felony
    conviction would impact her immigration and residency status. She states
    also that she rejected one plea offer, fearing that a felony conviction would
    result in deportation. Further, she was visited by a Homeland Security
    agent in October 2014 who told her he was placing an immigration detainer
    3
    on her and informed her she would have to appear before an immigration
    judge following completion of her sentence.
    Thus, Kent knew of the immigration detainer in October 2014.
    Further, she recites meetings and communications from ICE in late 2014.
    Nonetheless, she raised no ineffective assistance claim until the instant case
    was filed in April 2017. . . . [S]he provides no adequate explanation for the
    years of delay in filing her petition for postconviction relief.
    The [c]ourt concludes that application of the time bar in this case
    does not work a clear miscarriage of justice so obvious that it compromises
    the integrity of the judicial process. (Citation omitted.)
    ¶5     We review a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief to
    determine whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its
    conclusions of law are incorrect. Marble v. State, 
    2015 MT 242
    , ¶ 13, 
    380 Mont. 366
    ,
    
    355 P.3d 742
    . We review de novo a district court’s decision not to apply the doctrine of
    equitable tolling as it relates to a petition for postconviction relief. Davis v. State, 
    2008 MT 226
    , ¶ 10, 
    344 Mont. 300
    , 
    187 P.3d 654
    .
    ¶6     We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
    our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion
    of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear
    application of applicable standards of review, all of which were appropriately and
    correctly applied by the District Court.
    ¶7     Affirmed.
    /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
    We Concur:
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
    /S/ LAURIE McKINNON
    /S/ JIM RICE
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-0325

Citation Numbers: 2017 MT 193N

Filed Date: 8/8/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/8/2017