Matter of the Estate of Johnson , 2016 MT 274N ( 2016 )

10/25/2016
DA 16-0118
Case Number: DA 16-0118
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 274N
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
DONALD WESLEY JOHNSON,
Deceased.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADP 2015-63
Honorable Mike Menahan, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Margaret E. Miller (Self-Represented), East Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Brand G. Boyar, Boyar Law Offices, PLLC, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 31, 2016
Decided: October 25, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Donald W. Johnson (Decedent), the oldest of 13 siblings, died on April 11, 2015,
at age 67. His Last Will and Testament designated one of his sisters, Lora Johnson, and
his niece, Shauna Helfert, as co-personal representatives (Co-PRs). In May 2015, the
First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, granted Co-PRs’ application for
informal probate of Decedent’s Will. On May 27, 2015, heirs and devisees were notified
of the proceeding and creditors were notified on June 18, 2015.
¶3 On August 19, 2015, Decedent’s sister Margaret Miller, who was four years
younger than Decedent, submitted a claim against Decedent’s estate seeking $75,000 in
emotional and psychological damages, claiming Decedent had sexually abused her when
they were both children and young adults, approximately 50 years earlier. She attached
an affidavit dated August 18, 2015, in which she described, in substantial detail, instances
of physical and sexual abuse by her brother dating back to 1962. Additionally, she
claimed in the affidavit that several years ago she had told two of her sisters that the
Decedent had molested her when they were youths.
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¶4 In September 2015, the Co-PRs disallowed Miller’s claim on the ground that she
had not petitioned the District Court for allowance to assert her claim. In November
2015, Miller submitted her Allowance for Claim to the District Court. In December
2015, Co-PRs moved to have Miller’s claim dismissed on the grounds that the claim was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations and violated Decedent’s constitutional
rights.
¶5 On January 21, 2016, the District Court granted Co-PRs’ motion and dismissed
Miller’s claim. Relying on § 27-2-216, MCA, which establishes the statute of limitations
for tort actions arising from childhood sexual abuse, the court concluded that Miller’s
claim was barred. Section 27-2-216, MCA, provides, in relevant part:
(1) An action based on intentional conduct brought by a person for
recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual
abuse must be commenced not later than:
(a) 3 years after the act of childhood sexual abuse that is alleged to
have caused the injury; or
(b) 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
discovered that the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse.
¶6 Miller filed a timely appeal. We affirm.
¶7 Appearing pro se, Miller argues on appeal that it was not until her brother’s April
2015 death that repressed memories of the abuse began to surface, causing her emotional
and psychological distress. She maintains that the surfacing of these memories qualifies
as “discovery” of the abuse and its injuries under § 27-2-216(1)(b), MCA; consequently,
her claim is timely filed.
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¶8 Statutes of limitations exist to promote fairness and suppress stale claims, ensuring
that the responding party has a reasonable opportunity to put forth an effective defense.
Christian v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2015 MT 255, ¶ 13, 380 Mont. 495, 358 P.3d 131.
¶9 In the case before us, Miller was a child when the alleged abuse began. She
asserts that it continued until Decedent “was in his twenties.” As such, Miller may have
reached the age of majority before the alleged abuse ceased. While Miller argues that her
injury and emotional distress arose when the memories surfaced in 2015, the record
establishes that memories of the events were not suppressed years ago when she
mentioned to her sisters that their brother had abused her, or in 2013, when she told one
of her sisters she did not want to visit their ailing brother because he had been mean to
her and had molested her.
¶10 Miller claims that since her brother’s death, she has suffered traumatic flashbacks,
a severe rash on her legs, and the loss of teeth as a result of a stress-induced exacerbation
of rheumatoid arthritis. However, she has provided no evidence that links these
conditions to her claimed childhood sexual abuse. Moreover, the submitted affidavit of
Miller’s counselor reveals that Miller has experienced low self-esteem, difficulty in
maintaining relationships, and feelings of depression throughout her adult life. Given
Miller’s obvious memories of her brother’s alleged abuse, her statements that she did not
want to embarrass or humiliate her family by making her allegations public, the passage
of 50 years, and her decision to seek compensation just weeks after her brother’s death
and before she commenced counseling, lead us to conclude, as did the District Court, that
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Miller reasonably could or should have discovered the physical and emotional impact of
the alleged abuse much earlier.
¶11 While we appreciate the difficulty of raising such a claim and the ramifications it
could have on a family, the evidence in the record establishes that Miller’s memory of the
alleged events was not suppressed until her brother’s death. It is clear that she had
memories of events at least periodically through the years and knowledge that there may
be reasons to associate those events with the physical and emotional symptoms she was
experiencing. As a result, the applicable statute of limitations bars her claim and the
District Court did not err in so ruling. As we conclude Miller’s claim is barred by
§ 27-2-216, MCA, we need not address the constitutional issue raised before the District
Court.
¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. In
the opinion of this Court, this case presents questions clearly controlled by settled law.
¶13 We affirm.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
We Concur:
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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