King Arthur v. Rosecrance , 2017 MT 251N ( 2017 )

10/10/2017
DA 17-0083
Case Number: DA 17-0083
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 251N
KING ARTHUR PARK, LLP,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
DANIEL W. ROSECRANCE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DV 16-866C
Honorable John C. Brown, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Daniel W. Rosecrance, Self-Represented, Belgrade, Montana
For Appellee:
Paul Grigsby, PLLC, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 26, 2017
Decided: October 10, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Daniel W. Rosecrance and Brenda Carson (together, Rosecrance) appeal an order
of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, dismissing their appeal. We
affirm.
¶3 Defendant Rosecrance rented a mobile home lot (Lot) from Plaintiff King Arthur
Park, LLP (King Arthur). On May 23, 2016, King Arthur filed a complaint against
Rosecrance in Justice Court seeking possession of the Lot and money damages.
Rosecrance was served on June 2, 2016, and thereafter had ten days to respond. Rosecrance
did not respond or otherwise appear. Subsequently, on June 27, 2016, King Arthur asked
the Justice Court to enter default, which it did on June 30, 2016. Approximately three
months later King Arthur filed a Motion for Default Judgment in Justice Court, which was
granted on October 3, 2016. On October 7, 2016, Rosecrance was served with the default
judgment and eviction orders.
¶4 Rosecrance appeared before the Justice Court for the first time on October 14, 2016,
when he filed a document describing alleged agreements made between Rosecrance’s
company, Wolf Song, and King Arthur. Rosecrance also filed a document containing
multiple attachments on November 7, 2016. Both documents made factual allegations and
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cited various statutes, but neither mentioned the June entry of default or the October default
judgment.
¶5 On November 7, 2016, the Justice Court issued writs of assistance to have
Rosecrance removed from the Lot, and the Sheriff removed Rosecrance on November 9,
2016. Rosecrance then filed a notice of appeal on November 13, 2016, and the case was
subsequently transferred to District Court on November 17, 2016. In District Court,
Rosecrance filed an Emergency Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order
(Rule 60(b) Motion) on November 21, 2016. The District Court reasoned, and we agree
from our review of the record, that Rosecrance intended the Rule 60(b) Motion to serve as
an appeal from the Justice Court’s October 3, 2016, entry of default judgment in King
Arthur’s favor. King Arthur responded, asking the District Court to dismiss Rosecrance’s
Rule 60(b) Motion. The District Court dismissed Rosecrance’s appeal on two grounds:
(1) for failure to file a timely appeal pursuant to § 25-33-102, MCA; and (2) because the
Justice Court’s judgment was not appealable pursuant to § 25-33-303, MCA.
¶6 Rosecrance appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his appeal from Justice Court.
Rosecrance raises multiple issues on appeal, including arguments that the District Court
failed to admit or consider offered evidence; King Arthur’s original complaint and
summons were based on fraudulent statements; he was denied discovery; King Arthur
engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices; and Due Process required an evidentiary
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hearing prior to the District Court’s Judgment. King Arthur argues the District Court
properly dismissed Rosecrance’s appeal from Justice Court.1
¶7 This Court does not consider “issues not raised before the trial court and new legal
theories,” State v. Montgomery, 2010 MT 193, ¶ 11, 357 Mont. 348, 239 P.3d 929, and
therefore we focus our decision today on whether the District Court’s dismissal of
Rosecrance’s appeal was proper. First, we consider whether the District Court correctly
dismissed Rosecrance’s appeal from Justice Court pursuant to § 25-33-102, MCA. Section
25-33-102, MCA, requires a party appeal a justice court’s judgment to district court “within
30 days after the rendition of the judgment.” A party’s right of appeal from justice court
to district court is purely statutory. Guethlein v. Family Inn, 2014 MT 121, ¶ 11, 375 Mont.
100, 324 P.3d 1194. Therefore, a district court only has jurisdiction over a matter from
justice court if the matter is appealed within the statutorily prescribed time period.
Guethlein, ¶ 11. The Justice Court entered default judgment on October 3, 2016, and
Rosecrance was served with the judgment on October 7, 2016. Rosecrance filed a notice
of appeal on November 13, 2016, and then filed the Rule 60(b) Motion on November 21,
2016. Rosecrance did not appeal the Justice Court’s judgment to the District Court within
30 days of the Justice Court’s judgment. Therefore, Rosecrance’s appeal was not timely.
The District Court properly dismissed Rosecrance’s appeal pursuant to § 25-33-102, MCA.
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Rosecrance requested a time extension to file his reply brief. This Court granted the time
extension and Rosecrance’s reply brief was due June 16, 2017. Rosecrance did not file his reply
brief by the deadline, but on June 23, 2017, asked for another time extension. This Court denied
the time extension and the case was deemed submitted on Rosecrance’s opening brief and King
Arthur’s answer brief.
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¶8 Second, we consider whether the District Court correctly determined that the default
judgment in Justice Court was not appealable pursuant to § 25-33-303, MCA. Section
25-33-303, MCA, only allows a party to appeal a justice court’s judgment by default “on
questions of law which appear on the face of the papers or proceedings” or when the justice
court “abused its discretion in setting aside or refusing to set aside a default or judgment.”
Upon review of the record, there were no questions of law presented on the face of the
Justice Court’s papers or proceedings. Rosecrance’s factual allegations and citations to
various sections of Montana Code Annotated do not present questions of law that the
District Court can review. Furthermore, the Justice Court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to set aside the default or judgment, because Rosecrance never requested the
Justice Court do so. The District Court properly determined the default judgment was not
appealable pursuant to § 25-33-303, MCA.
¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents
no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent
or modify existing precedent.
¶10 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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