State v. J. Dodge ( 2017 )

12/28/2017
DA 16-0758
Case Number: DA 16-0758
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 318
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN BOYD DODGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC 15-444B
Honorable Robert B. Allison, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Moses Okeyo, Assistant Appellant
Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, John H. Donovan, Kalispell,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 1, 2017
Decided: December 28, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Justin Boyd Dodge (Dodge) appeals from a judgment and sentence of the Eleventh
Judicial District Court, Flathead County, imposing $14,438.44 in restitution following his
guilty plea for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). We reverse and
remand for the District Court to conduct a new restitution hearing and resentence Dodge.
¶2 Dodge presents the following issue for review:
Whether the District Court erred in ordering Dodge pay restitution for damaging a
traffic signal without the State providing an affidavit or testimony specifically
describing its pecuniary loss.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On November 10, 2014, while driving under the influence of methamphetamine in
Kalispell, Montana, Boyd drove off the road and collided with a concrete block and traffic
signal control box. Subsequently, Boyd pleaded guilty to felony DUI. Probation Officer
Rae Baker (Baker) prepared a presentence-investigation report (PSI), in which she
recommended Dodge pay $14,438.44 in restitution to the victim, the Department of
Transportation. Baker attached two documents prepared by the Department of
Transportation to the PSI: an invoice (Invoice) and a “Cost of Repair” ledger entry (Ledger
Entry). Both documents included a total cost of $14,438.44 to repair the damaged traffic
signal.
¶4 On October 27, 2016, the District Court held a sentencing hearing. The parties did
not present testimony at the hearing. The State recommended the District Court sentence
Dodge to a thirteen month commitment to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for
placement in the WATCh program, followed by a suspended five-year probationary term.
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The State also recommended the District Court require Dodge pay $14,438.44 in
restitution. Dodge objected to the restitution recommendation, stating:
The statute [§ 46-18-242, MCA,] says that -- that there should be an affidavit.
The wording says “shall,” so we would ask that the restitution not be imposed
and since there’s nobody here to testify about the suggested restitution we
don’t know if they mitigated damages, if they sold any of the pieces or if they
actually tried to shop around on the employee that charged a decent amount
to do the fixing, so for those reasons we would ask that [the restitution
amount] be stricken.
The District Court imposed the State’s recommended sentence of a thirteen month
commitment to the DOC with a recommendation for placement in the WATCh program,
followed by a suspended five-year term. The District Court also imposed $14,438.44 in
restitution.
¶5 Dodge appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 We review whether a district court had statutory authority to impose a sentence de
novo. State v. McMaster, 2008 MT 268, ¶ 20, 345 Mont. 172, 190 P.3d 302 (citing State
v. Breeding, 2008 MT 162, ¶ 10, 343 Mont. 323, 184 P.3d 313). Restitution awards present
mixed questions of law and fact, which we also review de novo. State v. Patterson, 2016
MT 289, ¶ 9, 385 Mont. 334, 384 P.3d 92 (citing State v. Cerasani, 2014 MT 2, ¶ 11, 373
Mont. 192, 316 P.3d 819).
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DISCUSSION
¶7 Whether the District Court erred in ordering Dodge pay restitution for damaging a
traffic signal without the State providing an affidavit or testimony specifically
describing its pecuniary loss.
¶8 Dodge argues a district court may impose restitution only where the victim submits
an affidavit or provides testimony. Dodge maintains that the District Court lacked
authority to sentence him to pay restitution because the State failed to provide an affidavit
or testimony specifically describing its pecuniary loss. Dodge argues the Invoice and
Ledger Entry do not specifically describe the Department of Transportation’s pecuniary
loss and cannot be considered affidavits. The State responds by arguing that, although the
rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing, the Invoice and Ledger Entry are trustworthy
because they are business records. The State concludes that the District Court can rely on
the Invoice and Ledger Entry as evidence to impose restitution and an affidavit or
testimony is not required. The State argues that concluding otherwise “vaults form over
substance.” The parties agree that, if this Court concludes Dodge’s restitution was
incorrectly imposed, the appropriate remedy is to remand to conduct a new restitution
hearing and resentence Dodge.
¶9 If a person is found guilty of an offense and the sentencing judge finds that a victim
sustained a pecuniary loss, the sentencing judge “shall . . . require payment of full
restitution . . . .” Section 46-18-201(5), MCA. Restitution engrafts a civil remedy into a
criminal proceeding and creates a procedural shortcut for crime victims who are entitled to
a civil recovery against the offender. State v. Aragon, 2014 MT 89, ¶ 16, 374 Mont. 391,
321 P.3d 841. Section 46-18-242, MCA, provides:
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(1) Whenever the court believes that a victim may have sustained a
pecuniary loss or whenever the prosecuting attorney requests, the court shall
order the probation officer, restitution officer, or other designated person to
include in the presentence investigation and report:
(a) a list of the offender’s assets; and
(b) an affidavit that specifically describes the victim’s pecuniary loss
and the replacement value in dollars of the loss, submitted by the victim.
(2) When a presentence report is not authorized or requested, the
court shall accept evidence of the victim’s loss at the time of sentencing.
Thus, § 46-18-201(5), MCA, requires a court to order restitution and § 46-18-242, MCA,
requires a victim who suffered a pecuniary loss to provide evidence of that loss either in
the form of an affidavit or testimony, depending on whether a PSI is prepared. An affidavit
is a written declaration made under oath. Section 26-1-1001, MCA. An affidavit, if
provided, is all that is required to permit the court to award restitution and a victim is not
required to substantiate a restitution amount with documentation. McMaster, ¶ 29. If a
PSI is not prepared, the victim can provide evidence of his or her loss by testifying “at the
time of sentencing.” Section 46-18-242(2), MCA. Testimony is “[e]vidence that a
competent witness under oath or affirmation gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1704 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014).
¶10 Here, although attached to the PSI, neither the Invoice nor the Ledger Entry qualifies
as an affidavit because neither was made under oath. The Invoice is a letter from the
Department of Transportation to Dodge. It identifies a transaction date of June 29, 2015,
and states, “Listed below are the total charges owed to the Montana Department of
Transportation for repairs as a result of your accident on 11-10-14.” The list enumerates
the following expenses:
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Labor 649.72
Equipment 115.28
Material 12,465.51
9.13% Admin 1,207.94
Total Due 14,438.44
The Invoice contains a typed signature: “Sincerely, Administrative Division.” The Ledger
Entry is in spreadsheet form and contains the same totals as the Invoice. The Ledger Entry
provides more detail than the Invoice by itemizing the individual expenses within each
subdivision of labor, equipment, and materials. The Ledger Entry does not indicate when
it was prepared and is not signed. Although each document is a “written declaration,”
neither was made “under oath.” Section 26-1-1001, MCA. Neither document is an
affidavit and, therefore, cannot be considered under § 46-18-242, MCA, as evidence of the
Department of Transportation’s pecuniary loss. The State argues this conclusion exalts
form over substance; however, restitution must be based, at a minimum, on the victim
providing an affidavit.
¶11 We have held that where a PSI was prepared, but the victim failed to include an
affidavit as required by § 46-18-242, MCA, a victim’s sworn testimony may be accepted
by the court instead, if the defendant’s substantial rights are not affected. In McMaster, an
appeal addressing the appropriate measure of restitution following a guilty plea for
embezzlement, we analyzed the State’s failure to include an affidavit from the victim in
the court-ordered PSI. McMaster, ¶ 9. Although not affidavits, McMaster’s PSI referred
to “statements submitted by [the victim] concerning his estimation of an appropriate
amount for restitution.” McMaster, ¶ 9. Instead of providing an affidavit, the victim
testified on both days of a two-day restitution hearing and McMaster cross-examined him
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on both days. McMaster, ¶ 10. We concluded that “any potential failure on the part of the
District Court to order the PSI to include a victim’s affidavit did not affect McMaster’s
substantial rights in light of [the victim’s] extensive and scrutinized testimony at the
hearing . . . .” McMaster, ¶ 25.
¶12 Otherwise appropriate restitution will be upheld if the victim provides testimony at
the restitution hearing instead of attaching an affidavit to the court-ordered PSI. McMaster,
¶ 25. Here, as in McMaster, the State failed to attach an affidavit from the Department of
Transportation to the PSI. Also similar to McMaster, Dodge’s PSI referred to and attached
statements the Department of Transportation submitted concerning its estimation of an
appropriate amount for restitution. However, unlike McMaster, the State also failed to
present testimony at the restitution hearing. The State recognizes its failure to comply with
§ 46-18-242, MCA, but argues that this failure is a defect that does not affect Dodge’s
substantial rights and, therefore, can be disregarded. However, we cannot conclude that
the State’s failure to provide either an affidavit or testimony did not affect Dodge’s
substantial rights. “Although restitution is mandatory, the sentencing court must comply
with ‘detailed procedures and qualifications’ before it is authorized to impose a sentence
of restitution.” State v. Schaeffer, 2014 MT 47, ¶ 27, 374 Mont. 93, 321 P.3d 809 (quoting
State v. Pritchett, 2000 MT 261, ¶ 7, 302 Mont. 1, 11 P.3d 539).
¶13 The requirement of § 46-18-242, MCA, that a victim submit evidence specifically
describing his or her pecuniary loss under oath in an affidavit or by testifying at sentencing
is designed to ensure that restitution awards comply with basic principles of due process;
that is, that an award is reliable. Schaeffer, ¶ 29 (“The affidavit of loss is not the only
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evidence that may be considered when determining the victim’s pecuniary loss. An order
of restitution may also be based upon testimony at the sentencing hearing.” (citing
McMaster, ¶ 35)). An oath, contained in either an affidavit or testimony, ensures reliability.
McDermott v. Carie, 2005 MT 293, ¶ 27, 329 Mont. 295, 124 P.3d 168. “The person who
swears to the accuracy of the enumerated costs [in an affidavit] may be held accountable if
it is later shown that they have knowingly overstated their costs.” McDermott, ¶ 27. Here,
no one attested or swore to the accuracy of either the Invoice or Ledger Entry. Further, no
one provided sworn testimony regarding when either document was prepared; who
prepared it; how the costs were calculated; or why, for example, a 9.13% administrative
surcharge was applied. No specific person was identified who could be held accountable
and address concerns of whether costs were overstated. We conclude that § 46-18-242,
MCA, requires a victim to accurately describe his or her pecuniary loss under oath. Here,
the Department of Transportation’s failure to describe its loss under oath did not comply
with the procedures and qualifications of § 46-18-242, MCA, thus drawing into question
the reliability of the award and Dodge’s substantial right to pay an accurate amount in
restitution.
¶14 The State also argues that the Invoice and Ledger Entry are reliable, and therefore
acceptable under § 46-18-242, MCA, because they are business records. Records kept in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity made at or near the time of the event
can be admitted as evidence. M. R. Evid. 803(6). M. R. Evid. 803(6) is an exception to
the general rule prohibiting hearsay evidence and is commonly referred to as the business
records exception. The reason for accepting this form of evidence is that “business records
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are presumed reliable . . . .” Bean v. Mont. Bd. of Labor Appeals, 1998 MT 222, ¶ 20, 290
Mont. 496, 965 P.2d 256. The Invoice and Ledger Entry may be business records;
however, the rules of evidence do not apply at a sentencing hearing. M. R. Evid. 101(c)(3);
Aragon, ¶ 12. More importantly, § 46-18-242, MCA, imposes specific procedures and
qualifications which must be enforced in lieu of the more general business records
exception to the hearsay rule. We decline to apply evidentiary rules to a sentencing
proceeding or read an additional acceptable form of evidence into § 46-18-242, MCA,
which already specifies the procedures and qualifications that are required.
CONCLUSION
¶15 Section 46-18-242, MCA, requires a victim suffering a pecuniary loss submit either
an affidavit or provide testimony describing his or her pecuniary loss for a district court to
impose restitution. We reverse and remand for resentencing for the limited purpose of
allowing the District Court to consider imposing restitution consistent with this Opinion.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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