Marriage of Burns ( 1982 )

No. 82-35
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA
1982
I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F
PEGGY ANN BURNS,
P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs-
DEWEY JAMES BURNS,
R e s p o n d e n t and R e s p o n d e n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of S i l v e r B o w , T h e H o n o r -
a b l e A r n o l d O l s e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For A p p e l l a n t :
Joseph C. E n g e l , 111, B u t t e , M o n t a n a
For R e s p o n d e n t :
S w e e n e y and B e l k e , B u t t e , M o n t a n a
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : A p r i l 15, 1 9 8 2
Decided: June 1 4 , 1 9 8 2
Filed:
JUN 14 1982
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n delivered the Opinion of
t h e Court.
T h i s a p p e a l r e s u l t s froin t h e d e n i a l o f a p e t i t i o n by
t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and
for the County of Silver Bow, for termination of the
p a r e n t a l r i g h t s o f Dewey B u r n s .
Peggy B u r n s and Dewey B u r n s were m a r r i e d on December
3 1 , 1975. Two c h i l d r e n were b o r n a s i s s u e o f t h e i r m a r r i a g e .
A t t h e time of t h e d i v o r c e Peggy was awarded c u s t o d y
of t h e c h i l d r e n . Dewey B u r n s was o r d e r e d t o c o n t r i b u t e $300
a month t o t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e minor c h i l d r e n . He was t o
make p a y m e n t s t o t h e C l e r k o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h e 6 t h
and 2 1 s t d a y s o f e a c h month b e g i n n i n g April 21, 1978, and
continuing until t h e youngest c h i l d reached t h e age of h i s
majority. A d d i t i o n a l l y , Dewey B u r n s was t o m a i n t a i n h e a l t h
i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e f o r t h e c h i l d r e n and t o c o n t r i b u t e $100 a
month f o r t h e s u p p o r t and m a i n t e n a n c e o f Peggy B u r n s b e g i n -
n i n g on A p r i l 2 1 , 1978.
From t h e o u t s e t , Dewey B u r n s f a i l e d t o make t h e r e -
quired contributions. The r e c o r d s o f t h e C l e r k o f t h e D i s -
t r i c t C o u r t i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e l a s t d a t e on which Dewey B u r n s
made a c o n t r i b u t i o n , p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s
p a r e n t a l r i g h t s , was December 6, 1978.
On November 26, 1980, Peggy Burns petitioned the
District Court to terminate the parental rights of Dewey
Burns to the parties' two children under section 40-8-
111(1) a ) ( v ) , MCA,
( which p r o v i d e s :
" ( 1 ) An a d o p t i o n o f a c h i l d may be d e c r e e d
when t h e r e h a v e been f i l e d w r i t t e n c o n s e n t s
t o a d o p t i o n e x e c u t e d by:
" ( a ) both p a r e n t s , i f l i v i n g , o r t h e surviv-
ing p a r e n t of a c h i l d p r o v i d e d t h a t c o n s e n t
i s n o t r e q u i r e d from a f a t h e r o r m o t h e r :
" ( v ) i f i t is proven t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of
t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e f a t h e r o r mother, i f a b l e ,
h a s n o t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e
c h i l d d u r i n g a p e r i o d of 1 y e a r b e f o r e t h e
f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n ; " (Empha-
sis s u p p l i e d . )
The petition to terminate was filed prior to the
filing of a petition for adoption. See, Commissioners'
N o t e s , c o n t a i n e d i n A n n o t a t i o n s t o s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA.
After the petition was filed, Dewey B u r n s made two
lump s u n p a y m e n t s : one of $2,580 on December 23, 1980,
coincidental with the first hearing on the petition to
terminate h i s parental rights; and t h e s e c o n d o f $ 3 , 2 5 0 on
May 6, 1981, again coincidental with the May 8, 1981,
h e a r i n g c a l l e d by t h e c o u r t on t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s
parental rights.
The appellant, Peggy, argues that these af ter-the-
fact payments should not affect determination of the
petition since the wording of the statute speaks about
nonsupport prior to the petition to terminate. Tlrl e
a p p e l l a n t a l s o a r g u e s s h e was t r e a t i n g $ 2 , 4 0 0 of t h i s money
a s payment o f p a s t - d u e s p o u s e m a i n t e n a n c e , which was d e l i n -
quent i n t h a t amount. It is important to note here that
Dewey B u r n s i s s t i l l s e v e r a l t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s i n a r r e a r s o f
h i s child support obligations.
At the first hearing, held December 19-22, 1980,
Dewey B u r n s a r g u e d t h a t d e s p i t e t h e f a c t h e had n o t made h i s
payments t o t h e c l e r k of c o u r t ' s o f f i c e , a s o r d e r e d by t h e
decree, he had paid $925 in cash, plus $400 through his
m o t h e r , p l u s $ 1 , 4 0 0 t o t h e S t a t e o f Utah t h e y e a r p r e c e d i n g
the petition. Peggy was on w e l f a r e i n Utah and a s s i g n e d h e r
claim to the State of Utah for support given these two
c h i l d r e n by t h e w e l f a r e d e p a r t m e n t i n Utah. Peggy B u r n s ' s
t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e d s h e r e c e i v e d o n l y $670 from Dewey B u r n s
and t h a t Dewey had no e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m s . At
best, by his own testimony, he contributed $2,725 from
December 1 9 7 8 u n t i l December 1980.
The c o u r t found that according t o t h e c l e r k of the
court's records the last child support payment by Dewey
Burns b e f o r e t h e p e t i t i o n to terminate h i s parental rights
was filed on December 6, 1978, and the next payment was
filed on December 22, 1980. The court noted that Dewey
B u r n s had made no c h i l d s u p p o r t payments t h r o u g h t h e c l e r k
of c o u r t ' s o f f i c e f o r t w e n t y - f o u r months. In addition, the
c o u r t f o u n d t h a t Dewey B u r n s f a i l e d t o make s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s
a s o r d e r e d by t h e c o u r t a l t h o u g h f i n a n c i a l l y a b l e t o do s o
and that he had maintained contact with the children and
knew where t h e y w e r e . The c o u r t t h e n , i n a f i n d i n g o f f a c t ,
f o u n d t h a t Dewey B u r n s had paid a t o t a l of $4,750 i n back
payments on a d v i c e o f c o u n s e l a f t e r t h e f i l i n g o f t h e p e t i -
t i o n t o terminate h i s parental rights.
Peggy B u r n s t a k e s e x c e p t i o n t o s e v e r a l o f the t r i a l
court's conclusions of law a s being contradictory to its
f i n d i n g s of fact. The c o u r t c o n c l u d e d : t h a t the s t a t u t e is
t o be i n t e r p r e t e d most s t r i c t l y i n f a v o r o f preserving the
natural parent's rights; that i n viewing the evidence in
that light, the evidence indicates that Dewey Burns,
although financially able to do so, did not support his
c h i l d r e n f o r one y e a r p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s
parental rights; and that Dewey B u r n s ' s neglect i n making
court-ordered c h i l d s u p p o r t payments f o r a p e r i o d o f t w e n t y -
four months justified Peggy's seeking to terminate his
p a r e n t a l r i g h t s and r e p l a c e him a s t h e b o y s ' father with her
second husband who would have provided a more stable and
proper influence. The c o u r t , h o w e v e r , d e c l i n e d t o t e r m i n a t e
t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s o f Dewey B u r n s , The c o u r t a l s o c o n c l u d e d
t h a t because Peggy was j u s t i f i e d i n b r i n g i n g an a c t i o n t o
terminate Dewey's parental rights for nonsupport of the
children, s h e is e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y
f e e s even though t h e c o u r t m u s t hold t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n t o
t e r m i n a t e i s n o t w e l l t a k e n and t h e r e b y d i s m i s s e d .
Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l :
1. Did the District Court err in declining to
terminate the parental r i g h t s of Dewey B u r n s a f t e r i t had
established that he failed to make court-ordered child
s u p p o r t payments f o r a p e r i o d o f t w e n t y - f o u r months p r i o r t o
the petition to terminate h i s parental rights?
2. May after-the-fact payments be treated by the
r e c i p i e n t a s payments o f o t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n s ?
W find the f i r s t issue determinative in t h i s matter.
e
Two r e c e n t c a s e s o f t h i s Court, Matter of Adoption of SLR
(1982) 1 Mont . , 640 P.2d 886, 39 St.Rep. 1 5 6 , and
M a t t e r o f A d o p t i o n o f S m i g a j ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 5 3 7 , 560 P.2d
141, a r e c o n t r o l l i n g ,
Mr. J u s t i c e D a l y , t h e a u t h o r o f t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n
i n - q u o t e d S m i g a j i n p a r t and s t a t e d :
SLR,
"', , we h a v e no d i f f i c u l t y c o n s t r u i n g t h e
p l a i n meaning o f t h e w o r d s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f
t h e consent s t a t u t e s a s r e f e r r i n g t o the
f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t t h a t a paren-t owes a
child.' [Citation omitted,] Here, t h e
f a t h e r was under a d u t y , p u r s u a n t t o t h e
d i s s o l u t i o n decree, t o provide c h i l d support
payments o f $100 p e r month. I t is u n d i s p u t e d
t h a t t h e f a t h e r f a i l e d t o pay a n y c h i l d
support over a year before t h e p e t i t i o n f o r
a d o p t i o n was f i l e d . The p l a i n m e a n i n g
approach of Smigaj r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e f a t h e r
contribute f i n a n c i a l support t o the child.
The f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t
c a n n o t be c u r e d by g i v i n g t h e c h i l d s e v e r a l
a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g .
" S i m i l a r l y , t h e noncustodial parent cannot
s a t i s f y h i s obligation t o provide f i n a n c i a l
s u p p o r t by i n c u r r i n g o r p a y i n g d e b t s which
are unrelated to the child. It . .
SLR, 64PI
P.2d a t 887-888.
'The f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t c a n n o t be c u r e d by
g i v i n g t h e c h i l d s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g .
J u s t i c e D a l y n o t e d a l s o i n M a t t e r o f A d o p t i o n o f SLH,
supra, that the noncustodial parent cannot satisfy his
obligation to provide financial support by incurring or
paying debts unrelated to the child. The e x p r e s s t e r m s o f
the statute, as Justice Daly noted, referred to "support
t h a t a p a r e n t owes a c h i l d . ' ' See a l s o , Smigaj, s u p r a .
Further, i n - t h i s C o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r had
SLR,
no v a l i d reason for f a i l i n g t o make even o n e c h i l d s u p p o r t
payment d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e y e a r preceding the filing of the
petition. He suffered no physical or mental impairment
during that time, and h e p o s s e s s e d s k i l l s t h a t would have
made him employable (carpentry, labor, operator of heavy
equipment) . The f a t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y c h o s e a l i f e s t y l e i n c o n -
s i s t e n t with parental support obligations. That he had a
r i g h t t o choose such a l i f e s t y l e is conceded. T h a t h e had a
legal right to prevent t h e a d o p t i o n of his child, however,
is n o t c o n s i s t e n t with t h e v o l u n t a r y f a i l u r e t o c o n t r i b u t e
to the child's support. In the words of the California
court: "A s t a t u t e s h o u l d n o t be interpreted in f a v o r of a
father who s e e k s t h e b e n e f i t of parental rights but shuns
the burden of parental obligations." In Re Burton's
Adoption ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 1 4 7 Cal. App. 2d 1 2 5 , 305 P.2d 185, 191.
For these reasons, the c o n c l u s i o n s of the District
Court as to the issues of father's contribution to the
s u p p o r t o f t h e c h i l d r e n and h i s a b i l i t y t o s o c o n t r i b u t e a r e
vacated. The rights of the father to the children are
terminated. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s r e v e r s e d and o r d e r e d t o
cornply w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n .
W e concur:
Justices