State v. D. Rounsville ( 2023 )

01/17/2023
DA 21-0132
Case Number: DA 21-0132
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2023 MT 10NSTATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
DUSTIN JAMES ROUNSVILLE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lincoln, Cause No. DC-16-62
Honorable Matthew J. Cuffe, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Deborah S. Smith, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Marcia Jean Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Libby, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 7, 2022
Decided: January 17, 2023
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Dustin James Rounsville appeals from the sentence imposed upon revocation of his
original sentence for felony stalking, challenging conditions of the written sentence as
differing from the oral pronouncement and beyond the District Court’s sentencing
authority. The State partially concedes to Rounsville’s argument, and we reverse and
remand for entry of an amended judgment and sentence.
¶3 In 2016, Rounsville pled guilty to one count of felony stalking. The District Court
sentenced him to a five-year commitment to the Department of Corrections (DOC), with
all but two years suspended, and recommended other conditions if Rounsville was released
on parole or conditional release. One of those recommended conditions included payment
of seven separate costs, fees, and surcharges (financial conditions).
¶4 In 2018, the District Court revoked the two-year suspended portion of Rounsville’s
sentence, and imposed a two-year DOC commitment, with the two years suspended. This
sentence imposed the identical conditions for community release that the original sentence
had merely recommended for parole or conditional release, including the financial
conditions.
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¶5 In 2020, the District Court revoked Rounsville’s two-year suspended sentence, and
imposed a two-year DOC commitment, with no time suspended, less credit for time served
and “street time.” At disposition, the District Court orally stated, “in the event there is any
community supervision or anything like that I am recommending all the terms and
conditions from the November 16, 2018 judgment on the first revocation.” (Emphasis
added.) However, in contrast, the written judgment stated that Rounsville “shall pay” the
financial conditions imposed in the prior 2018 judgment, and that he “shall comply with”
28 listed terms and conditions.
¶6 The oral pronouncement of sentence is the legally effective sentence and controls
in the event there is a conflict between the oral and written judgments. State v. Hammer,
2013 MT 203, 371 Mont. 121, 305 P.3d 843. Rounsville thus argues his written revocation
sentence is illegal because it affirmatively imposes conditions that were merely
recommended in the oral pronouncement. He argues the written sentence substantively
increases his sentence by imposing a financial obligation, even if he is never released to
community supervision, and that the court had no authority to outright impose the other 28
conditions on his unsuspended sentence, rather than as recommendations.
¶7 The State agrees the 28 conditions were unlawfully imposed as probation
conditions, and that remand is necessary to either strike the conditions or redesignate them
as recommended conditions in the event of community release. However, the State argues
the financial conditions were properly imposed because Rounsville was on notice from
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their imposition in his prior 2018 judgment, and they would not substantially increase his
loss of liberty or property.
¶8 We agree with Rounsville’s argument he would have understood from the District
Court’s oral pronouncement that the financial conditions were not a mandatory part of his
sentence, which may have required incarceration for the entire time. While the parties offer
that the conditions may be stricken, it is appropriate for the written sentence to comport
with the oral pronouncement, and that all of the subject conditions, including the financial
conditions and the other 28 conditions, be designated as recommendations for community
release.
¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents
no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent
or modify existing precedent. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question
controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
¶10 Reversed and remanded for entry of an amended judgment in accordance herewith.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
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