Peavler v. Rocky Mtn. Supply ( 2023 )

01/24/2023
DA 22-0216
Case Number: DA 22-0216
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2023 MT 12NMATTHEW PEAVLER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN SUPPLY, INC.,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DV-21-1290B
Honorable Rienne H. McElyea, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Nicholas LeTang, Passamani & LeTang, PLLC, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Daniela E. Pavuk, Pavuk Law, PLLC, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 19, 2022
Decided: January 24, 2023
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Matthew Peavler appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his action against his
former employer, Rocky Mountain Supply, Inc. (RMS), alleging that RMS violated the
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), Title 39, chapter 2, MCA.
¶3 Peavler’s Complaint alleged the following. RMS employed both Peavler and his
wife, Jessica. Peavler worked in an RMS store behind the gun counter. Jessica worked in
RMS’s corporate office. In June of 2020, Jessica took maternity leave; before taking
maternity leave, Jessica and Brad Gjermo, RMS’s CEO, had a disagreement. In August of
2020, while Jessica was still on maternity leave, Gjermo called Jessica into the office and
terminated her.
¶4 Before Jessica’s termination, RMS allowed Peavler to work without a mask that was
otherwise required of employees pursuant to COVID-19 protocols. Although Peavler had
not provided RMS with a written medical exemption, he represented that he could provide
one. Shortly after Jessica’s termination, RMS advised Peavler that he could no longer work
without a mask until he produced a medical exemption. Peavler produced a medical note
in a sealed envelope, but RMS refused to open it. RMS then terminated Peavler for the
stated reason of job abandonment.
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¶5 In his Complaint, Peavler alleged that RMS violated the WDEA when it “terminated
[him] without cause for ‘job abandonment.’”1 Peavler alleged that RMS allowed other
employees to work without a mask when they produced medical notes, and Peavler’s
medical note was the only one that RMS refused to consider. Peavler also alleged that the
reason RMS gave for terminating him was pretextual and that his termination was due to
Jessica’s dispute with RMS.
¶6 RMS moved the District Court to dismiss Peavler’s Complaint, arguing that Peavler
failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge under the WDEA because his allegations
concerned marital discrimination. The District Court granted RMS’s motion and dismissed
Peavler’s Complaint pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The District Court concluded that,
because all of Peavler’s factual allegations related to Jessica, his “[c]omplaint for wrongful
discharge from employment under the WDEA, is premised entirely on underlying
allegations of marital discrimination . . . .”
¶7 “We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).” Barthel v. Barretts Minerals Inc., 2021 MT 232, ¶ 9, 405 Mont. 345, 496 P.3d
541 (internal citation omitted). We take all well-pled factual assertions as true and construe
the complaint “in the light most favorable to the claimant, drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the claim.” Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., 2017 MT 313, ¶ 8, 390
Mont. 12, 407 P.3d 692 (internal citations omitted). Under the notice pleading
requirements of M. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a “complaint must set forth a short and plain statement
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Peavler also filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (HRB) alleging unlawful
discrimination. Peavler’s HRB complaint is not the subject of this appeal.
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of a cognizable legal claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Anderson, ¶ 8
(citing M. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “An asserted claim is facially deficient only if it either fails to
state a cognizable legal theory for relief[] or states an otherwise cognizable legal claim but
fails to state sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the claimant to relief thereunder.”
Babcock v. Casey’s Mgmt., LLC, 2021 MT 215, ¶ 25, 405 Mont. 237, 494 P.3d 322 (citing
Anderson, ¶ 8).
¶8 As pled, Peavler’s Complaint is inartful. As it pertains to the claims that rely on his
marital relationship with Jessica, the District Court correctly held that they are not
cognizable under the WDEA. Independent of his marital relationship, however, Peavler’s
Complaint includes a cognizable claim under the WDEA that, if true, would entitle Peavler
to relief under the WDEA. Relevant only to his WDEA claim, Peavler alleged in his
Complaint:
1. RMS ordered that Peavler could not work until he produced a doctor’s
note that exempted him from wearing a mask.
2. Peavler produced a doctor’s note in a mailed envelope, but RMS refused
to open it.
3. After refusing to acknowledge his doctor’s note, RMS terminated Peavler
without cause for “job abandonment.”
¶9 “A discharge may be wrongful if it was without good cause.” Barthel, ¶ 12 (citing
§ 39-2-904(1)(b), MCA). Under Montana law, good cause for a discharge is “any
reasonable job-related grounds for an employee’s dismissal based on[]” one of four
enumerated reasons. Section 39-2-903(5), MCA. To prove that a discharge was without
good cause, the employee must show either that the employer’s given reason for the
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discharge is not good cause under Montana law “or that the given reason is a pretext and
not the honest reason for the discharge.” Becker v. Rosebud Operating Servs., 2008 MT
285, ¶ 24, 345 Mont. 368, 191 P.3d 435 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
¶10 An employee may not bring a wrongful discharge claim under the WDEA for
marital discrimination. See Vettel-Becker v. Deaconess Med. Ctr. of Billings, Inc., 2008
MT 51, ¶ 30, 341 Mont. 435, 177 P.3d 1034 (citing §§ 39-2-902, -912, MCA). However,
“there can be facts supporting a claim for discrimination and other facts supporting a claim
for wrongful discharge arising from the same case.” Vettel-Becker, ¶ 40. A party may seek
relief from a district court under the WDEA “as long as that claim is not premised upon
underlying allegations of discrimination.” Vettel-Becker, ¶ 40; Saucier v. McDonald’s
Rests. of Mont., Inc., 2008 MT 63, ¶ 75, 342 Mont. 29, 179 P.3d 481. A claim is not
premised upon underlying allegations of discrimination when it does not rest or depend
upon establishing discrimination. Vettel-Becker, ¶ 39.
¶11 RMS contends it had good cause to terminate Peavler because he abandoned his job.
Peavler disputes that contention. Whether or not Peavler did, in fact, abandon his job and
whether or not RMS did, in fact, have good cause to terminate him are, by definition,
factual determinations that are not susceptible to a motion to dismiss. Under our notice
pleading standard, Peavler’s Complaint alleged a cognizable claim under the WDEA. As
noted above, to the extent that Peavler’s claims depend upon his marital relationship with
Jessica, the District Court correctly held that they are not cognizable under the WDEA and
Peavler may not assert those claims within the context of his WDEA suit. But construed
in a light most favorable to Peavler, his Complaint includes factual assertions that support
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a wrongful discharge claim independent of the extraneous factual assertions related to his
marital relationship.
¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents
no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent
or modify existing precedent. We conclude that the District Court erred in granting RMS’s
Motion to Dismiss. We reverse and remand.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
We Concur:
/s/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
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Justice Beth Baker, dissenting.
¶13 Peavler’s Complaint pleaded one claim for wrongful discharge and one claim for
punitive damages. Peavler concluded the factual allegations of the Complaint by alleging
that the stated reason for his termination was “pretextual” and that his termination “is a
direct result of Jessica Peavler’s attempt to enforce public policy, i.e., Governor Bullock’s
COVID mandates.” On that basis, he alleged that he was terminated without cause.
Peavler’s claim for punitive damages again alleged that he “was terminated in direct
retaliation to [sic] Jessica Peavler’s refusal to violate public policy when CEO Brad Gjermo
ignored Governor Bullock’s mandate on quarantining after leaving the State of Montana.”
The Complaint plainly alleged that “the honest reason for the discharge,” rather than the
“pretextual” job-abandonment reason given, was “premised upon underlying allegations of
[marital-status] discrimination.” Vettel-Becker, ¶¶ 40, 43. The punitive damage claim
reinforced the discrimination-rooted nature of Peavler’s Complaint.
¶14 As pleaded, Peavler failed to state a WDEA claim independent of his claim of
discrimination. After RMS moved to dismiss, Peavler did not move for leave to file an
amended complaint to allege a stand-alone wrongful discharge claim without the
discrimination allegations, even though he acknowledged that discrimination-based claims
were improper; he argued instead that his allegations “[did] not preclude alternative
explanations to why Plaintiff was terminated—only that his termination was without cause
and could be a ‘direct result’ of Mrs. Peavler’s decision to uphold public policy.”
(Emphasis in original.) At the same time, he resisted RMS’s alternative motion to strike
from the Complaint the allegations related to Jessica Peavler’s Human Rights Complaint,
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stating that the “Defendant has failed to state how Plaintiff’s allegations amount to
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter under Rule 12(f).” (Emphasis in
original.) Nor did Peavler agree to the Defendant’s request to at least dismiss the punitive
damages claim that alleged only retaliation for his wife’s refusal to violate public policy.
¶15 The Court’s decision will allow Peavler a do-over to correct the defects in his
pleading, despite Peavler’s deliberate choice not to narrow his WDEA claim to bring it
within the reach of the statute. I dissent from that conclusion and would affirm the District
Court’s order of dismissal.
/S/ BETH BAKER
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