State v. Louis Thompson , 381 Mont. 156 ( 2015 )

September 18 2015
DA 13-0565
Case Number: DA 13-0565
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2015 MT 279STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
LOUIS THOMPSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC 12-309A
Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender, Chad R. Vanisko, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Michael S. Wellenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 12, 2015
Decided: September 18, 2015
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Louis Thompson appeals from an order of the Eleventh Judicial District Court,
Flathead County, affirming the Justice Court’s denial of Thompson’s motion to dismiss.
In 2011, the State charged Thompson with driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs. Thompson filed a motion to dismiss in Justice Court under § 46-13-401(2), MCA,
on the basis that he had not been brought to trial within six months of entering his
not-guilty plea. The Justice Court denied the motion, and the District Court affirmed,
both concluding that good cause existed to hold Thompson’s trial past the six-month
deadline provided in § 46-13-401(2), MCA. On appeal to this Court, Thompson
seemingly concedes that pursuant to our decision in State v. Luke, 2014 MT 22, 373
Mont. 398, 321 P.3d 70, the Justice Court correctly denied his motion to dismiss.
However, Thompson requests that we overrule Luke. We decline to do so. We affirm the
decisions of the Justice Court and District Court.
¶2 We address the following issue on appeal: whether good cause existed for the
Justice Court to conduct Thompson’s trial past the six-month deadline provided in
§ 46-13-401(2), MCA.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On October 11, 2011, the State charged Thompson with driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). On the same day, Thompson appeared in Justice
Court and pled not guilty. Thompson’s acknowledgment of rights upon his plea of not
guilty provided, in part: “I understand that I am required to attend an omnibus hearing
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and pretrial conference. I understand that if I fail to attend either the omnibus hearing or
the pretrial conference that I will have waived my right to a jury trial.”
¶4 The Justice Court conducted an omnibus hearing on December 27, 2011.
Thompson and his counsel appeared in person. The omnibus order, which Thompson
and his counsel both signed, stated that “if either party requests a jury trial, the court will
send the parties notice of the jury trial date and will set a pretrial conference a week
before trial.” The order further provided that the party requesting a jury trial shall
“[a]ppear and confirm the party’s intention to proceed to trial by jury.” The order
concluded with the following warning:
If the party requesting a jury trial either fails to appear at the pretrial
conference and to confirm the party’s intention to proceed to trial by jury or
fails to file and serve proposed jury instructions and verdict form at or
before the pretrial conference, the party shall be deemed to have waived the
party’s right to trial by jury and the jury trial shall be vacated and the case
re-set by the Court for a bench trial at the next available time.
Thompson requested a jury trial.
¶5 On December 29, 2011, the Justice Court notified Thompson that a jury trial
would be held on March 22, 2012 and that the pretrial conference would be held on
March 16, 2012. The notice of the pretrial conference stated: “The court hereby orders
the personal attendance of the defendant at this hearing.” Like the omnibus order, the
notice warned Thompson that if he failed to appear at the pretrial conference and confirm
his intention to proceed to trial by jury, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to
trial by jury and the “jury trial shall be vacated and the case re-set by the Court for a
bench trial at the next available time.”
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¶6 Thompson’s counsel appeared at the March 16, 2012 pretrial conference, but
Thompson did not appear. As a result of Thompson’s failure to appear at the conference,
the Justice Court vacated the March 22, 2012 jury trial and reset the case for a bench trial
on April 30, 2012.1
¶7 On May 1, 2012, Thompson filed a motion to dismiss the case on the basis that
trial was being held beyond the six-month deadline imposed by § 46-13-401(2), MCA.
The Justice Court denied Thompson’s motion, concluding that there was good cause for
the delay. The court found that if Thompson had appeared at the pretrial conference, the
scheduled March 22, 2012 jury trial would have occurred and Thompson would have
been brought to trial within six months after pleading not guilty. The court found that
Thompson’s “vacating of the jury trial is what necessitated finding additional time or
other time on the court’s calendar aside from Thursdays . . . which is the day reserved for
jury trials in this court and the next time available on the court’s calendar for a one-hour
bench trial . . . was April 30, 2012.” After the court denied Thompson’s motion, he pled
guilty to DUI and the court sentenced him to a six-month sentence, with all but 24 hours
suspended. Thompson reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss for
lack of a speedy trial.
¶8 Thompson appealed his conviction to the District Court, which affirmed the denial
of his motion to dismiss. The District Court reasoned that the delay in the trial was
attributable to Thompson, because there was a direct connection between Thompson’s
1
The bench trial was later continued to accommodate a material witness. Thompson does not
contend that the Justice Court improperly continued the bench trial beyond the April 30, 2012,
date.
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failure to appear at the pretrial conference and the delay in his trial. The court noted that
Thompson had been clearly advised that if he failed to appear at the pretrial conference,
his jury trial would be vacated and a bench trial would be rescheduled for the Justice
Court’s next available date. The District Court concluded that good cause existed to
justify the delay in Thompson’s trial.
¶9 Thompson appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 Whether the right to a speedy trial under § 46-13-401(2), MCA, has been violated
is a question of law, which we review for correctness. Luke, ¶ 10.
DISCUSSION
¶11 Whether good cause existed for the Justice Court to conduct Thompson’s trial past
the six-month deadline provided in § 46-13-401(2), MCA.
¶12 Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, provides that “[a]fter the entry of a plea upon a
misdemeanor charge, the court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order
the prosecution to be dismissed, with prejudice, if a defendant whose trial has not been
postponed upon the defendant’s motion is not brought to trial within 6 months.” The
statute itself serves as the “sole standard of whether ‘good cause’ for the delay has been
shown.” State v. Bertolino, 2003 MT 266, ¶ 13, 317 Mont. 453, 77 P.3d 543 (citing State
v. Ronningen, 213 Mont. 358, 362, 691 P.2d 1348, 1350 (1984)). “Good cause
necessarily depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”
Luke, ¶ 15.
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¶13 In Luke, we held, under facts that are indistinguishable from the case at bar, that
the justice court had good cause for conducting the defendant’s trial beyond the
six-month deadline provided in § 46-13-401(2), MCA. Luke, ¶ 22. In that case, the State
charged Luke with five misdemeanor offenses in Flathead County Justice Court.2 Luke,
¶ 3. Luke indicated his desire to be tried by a jury and the court warned him that if he
failed to personally appear at the pretrial conference his jury trial would be vacated and a
bench trial would be scheduled. Luke, ¶ 4. Like Thompson, Luke failed to appear at the
conference. Luke, ¶ 5. As a result, the justice court vacated his jury trial and scheduled a
bench trial at the next available date on the court’s calendar, which was eight days past
the six-month deadline. Luke, ¶ 6. On the day of the bench trial, Luke moved to dismiss
his case on speedy trial grounds, arguing that trial was being held beyond the deadline
imposed by § 46-13-401(2), MCA. Luke, ¶ 6. The justice court denied the motion,
reasoning that good cause existed to hold the trial past the deadline, based on Luke’s
failure to appear at the pretrial conference, which necessitated delay. Luke, ¶ 7.
¶14 On appeal to this Court, Luke asserted that his failure to attend the “pretrial
conference did not disrupt the Justice Court’s schedule,” and posited that with the jury
trial already scheduled the court “should have simply converted” the jury trial date into a
bench trial date and heard evidence that day. Luke, ¶ 18. We affirmed the justice court.
We explained that a justice court “must retain a measure of flexibility over scheduling to
hear cases on its docket.” Luke, ¶ 19 (quoting State v. Fitzgerald, 283 Mont. 162, 167,
940 P.2d 108, 111 (1997)). We rejected the rule proposed by Luke that would have
2
The justice court in Luke was the same justice court in this case.
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required a court to convert a scheduled jury trial into a bench trial when the defendant has
waived his right to a jury trial by failing to appear at a mandatory pretrial conference.
Luke, ¶ 19. We reasoned:
In this State, we do not have juries available on standby for one defendant,
waiting to see whether that defendant will plead guilty, request a
continuance, or request a bench trial. Trial courts, therefore, must
maximize the presence of a jury panel by setting several trials on the day
for which it has issued juror summonses. . . . [T]his is, in fact, the only way
in which Montana trial courts can assure defendants that they will receive
the jury trial to which each of them is entitled.
Luke, ¶ 19. Luke also relied heavily on State v. Bertolino, 2003 MT 266, 317 Mont. 453,
77 P.3d 543, in which we held that Bertolino’s passive disregard for court-ordered
deadlines did not constitute good cause for delaying her trial beyond the six-month time
limit. Bertolino, ¶ 15. We distinguished Bertolino by explaining that “[u]nlike Bertolino,
where there was no indication that Bertolino’s failure to comply with court orders
necessitated a continuance of the trial, there is a clear and direct connection between
Luke’s failure to appear punctually for the pretrial conference and his trial date[] being
rescheduled” beyond the six-month deadline. Luke, ¶ 17.
¶15 Here, in arguing the State failed to establish good cause for the delay in his case,
Thompson concedes that Luke is factually indistinguishable, but contends that Luke
should be revisited. To support his contention, Thompson reiterates Luke’s former
arguments. He argues that his absence from the court-ordered pretrial conference “was a
mere technicality,” posits that the court should have simply “conducted a bench trial
during the time scheduled for a jury trial,” and relies heavily on Bertolino. Additionally,
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Thompson relies on this Court’s recent decision in City of Helena v. Broadwater, 2014
MT 185, 375 Mont. 450, 329 P.3d 589, and argues it also supports reversal of Luke.
¶16 We have explained that under the doctrine of stare decisis “principles of law
should be positively and definitely settled in order that courts, lawyers, and, above all,
citizens may have some assurance that important legal principles involving their highest
interests shall not be changed from day to day, with the resultant disorders that of
necessity must accrue from such changes.” Certain v. Tonn, 2009 MT 330, ¶ 19, 353
Mont. 21, 220 P.3d 384 (quoting St. ex rel. Sparling v. Hitsman, 99 Mont. 521, 525, 44
P.2d 747, 749 (1935)) (internal brackets omitted). While stare decisis is not a rigid
doctrine that “forecloses the reexamination of cases when necessary, ‘weighty
considerations underlie the principle that courts should not lightly overrule past
decisions.’” Certain, ¶ 19 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wagner-Ellsworth,
2008 MT 240, ¶ 39, 344 Mont. 445, 188 P.3d 1042).
¶17 We decline to revisit Luke as we continue to find our reasoning there persuasive.
We again reject the adoption of a rule that would require a court to convert a scheduled
jury trial into a bench trial to accommodate the defendant’s right to be brought to trial
within six months when the defendant has waived his right to a jury trial by failing to
appear at a court-ordered pretrial conference. Luke, ¶ 19. A court “must retain a measure
of flexibility over scheduling to hear cases on its docket.” Luke, ¶ 19 (quoting
Fitzgerald, 283 Mont. at 167, 940 P.2d at 111). As we explained in Luke, we do not have
juries available on standby in Montana, and thus trial courts “must maximize the presence
of a jury panel” by holding jury trials on the day for which they have issued juror
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summonses. Luke, ¶ 19. This is “the only way in which Montana trial courts can assure
defendants that they will receive the jury trial to which each of them is entitled.” Luke,
¶ 19.
¶18 We also find Thompson’s reliance on Broadwater to be misplaced. In
Broadwater, we held that the City failed to establish good cause for delaying
Broadwater’s trial beyond the six-month time limit. Broadwater, ¶ 19. There, the City’s
exclusive “good cause” argument for the delay was that the municipal court’s docket was
crowded. Broadwater, ¶ 18. In rejecting the City’s argument, we explained that the City
presented “no evidence of any actions it took in an attempt to ensure that Broadwater’s
trial would be held in a timely manner.” Broadwater, ¶ 18. Broadwater is
distinguishable from the instant case in the same way that we concluded in Luke that
Bertolino was factually distinguishable from that case. Unlike in Broadwater and
Bertolino, where there was no connection between the defendant’s conduct and a delay in
the trial, here the delay, as in Luke, is directly attributable to the defendant. There existed
a “clear and direct connection” between Thompson’s failure to appear at the conference
and the delay in his trial. Luke, ¶ 17. The Justice Court provided Thompson with a jury
date within the six-month statutory period and had Thompson appeared at the
court-ordered pretrial conference he would have received a trial within that period.
Thompson’s failure to appear at the court-ordered pretrial conference directly caused his
trial to be continued past the six-month deadline provided in § 46-13-401(2), MCA.
¶19 The Justice Court “was not required to convert the jury trial into a bench trial in
order to accommodate [Thompson’s] speedy trial right when he had failed to comply
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with the court’s order requiring him to appear at the pretrial conference.” Luke, ¶ 19.
Thompson’s “notice of the pretrial conference, his notice of the consequences of not
appearing personally at the conference, his unexcused absence from the conference, and
the Justice Court’s prompt rescheduling of his trial constituted, together, good cause for
holding his trial” past the six-month deadline. Luke, ¶ 20
¶20 We conclude the Justice Court did not err in denying Thompson’s motion to
dismiss. We accordingly hold the District Court did not err in affirming the Justice
Court’s decision.
¶21 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ JIM RICE
Justice Michael E Wheat, dissenting.
¶22 My dissent in this case conforms to my dissent in State v. Luke, 2014 MT 22,
¶¶ 24-31, 373 Mont. 398, 321 P.3d 70. I conclude once again, under Bertolino, that a
defendant’s passive mistakes or omissions do not constitute “good cause” for purposes of
avoiding dismissal. State v. Bertolino, 2003 MT 266, ¶¶ 14-16, 317 Mont. 453,
77 P.3d 543. Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, requires dismissal of a misdemeanor charge
against a defendant if, after the entry of a plea, the defendant is not brought to trial within
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six months, the State fails to show good cause for the delay, and trial has not been
delayed by any motion of the defendant. Thompson’s failure to personally appear at the
pre-trial hearing in this case is a technicality that did not delay process and, in my
opinion, does not meet the standard for “good cause” because the delay was not “[a
postponement] upon the defendant’s motion. . .”. Section 46-13-401(2), MCA.
¶23 Under Bertolino, the State has the burden of showing good cause for delay to
overcome its statutory obligation to bring the case to trial in six months. The State
cannot point to any motion or action taken by Thompson that delayed the trial date in this
case; it only points to Thompson’s failure to attend a hearing where his attorney was
present. By contrast, I note that this case is not similar to Fitzgerald where we found
“good cause” because Fitzgerald’s motions and conduct clearly delayed the proceedings
beyond the six-month deadline. Here, unlike Fitzgerald, there is no evidence in the
record showing similar conduct that is evidence of good cause. In my view, the State has
not met its burden of showing good cause for the delay sufficient to alleviate its statutory
obligation to bring the case to trial within six months.
¶24 Thompson and Luke both fall within a no man’s land between the clearly set out
rules in Bertolino and Fitzgerald. This situation is created by a justice court rule that the
State uses to the disadvantage of the defendants. Thompson and Luke both violated a
justice court requirement for personal appearance at the pre-trial conference that waived
their right to trial by jury, even though they were represented by counsel at the hearing.
While I respect the Justice Court’s significant workload and need for economy in docket
management, I do not believe it is proper to take away a defendant’s right to a jury trial
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based upon the failure of “personal appearance” at a pre-trial hearing when the
defendant’s attorney is present and can make final trial preparations. Further, the State
should not be using this technicality to its advantage to deprive defendants of a jury trial
and to further delay their trials beyond the six-month deadline.
¶25 The State has not shown “good cause” for its failure to bring Thompson to trial
within the period specified by the statute. I cannot join in the majority’s opinion that the
District Court correctly resolved this matter. I would reverse the District Court’s
determination and grant Thompson’s motion to dismiss.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
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