State v. J. Meacham , 2016 MT 334N ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                                               FILED
    12/20/2016
    12/21/2016
    Ed Smith
    CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
    DA 16-0174                                            STATE OF MONTANA
    Case Number: DA 16-0174
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2016 MT 334N
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    JESSIE WILLIAM MEACHAM,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-2014-298
    Honorable Karen Townsend, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Martin W. Judnich, Vincent J. Pavlish, Judnich Law Office, Missoula,
    Montana
    For Appellee:
    Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant
    Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Kirsten H. Pabst, Missoula County Attorney, Karla Painter, Deputy
    County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: November 16, 2016
    Decided: December 20, 2016
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
    Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
    serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
    Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
    Reports.
    ¶2     Jessie Meacham appeals the Fourth Judicial District Court’s order denying his
    motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss charges relating to his arrest for driving under
    the influence. We affirm.1
    ¶3     Missoula County Deputy Sheriff Rebecca Birket observed Meacham’s vehicle
    stuck in a snowbank behind a local saloon on February 27, 2014, at around 10:30 p.m.
    She approached Meacham’s vehicle to see if she could render aid. Meacham initially
    avoided eye contact with Deputy Birket and stared blankly straight ahead. Deputy Birket
    testified that she got out of her patrol car and approached to within approximately three
    feet of Meacham’s vehicle. She asked Meacham if he needed assistance. Meacham
    opened his car door and responded, “I’m good.” During this brief interaction, Deputy
    Birket noticed that Meacham slurred his words, that he smelled of alcohol, and that his
    eyes were “glossy,” “watery,” and “red.”
    1
    The appendix of appellant’s opening brief contained transcripts from hearings on October 17
    and November 10, 2014. These transcripts were not made part of the District Court record
    according to M. R. App. P. 8(1). Because both parties cited to these transcripts on appeal, and
    because the transcripts appear to constitute authentic records of the proceedings, we rely on them
    in part in our summary of the factual background of this case.
    2
    ¶4     Deputy Birket began looking around the rear of Meacham’s vehicle. As she did,
    Meacham’s tires gained traction and he drove away. Deputy Birket yelled at him to stop.
    He did not respond, so Deputy Birket pursued him in her patrol car. Meacham initially
    eluded Deputy Birket, but another law enforcement officer stopped him. Deputy Birket
    arrived and questioned Meacham, and Meacham admitted that he had been drinking.
    Deputy Birket arrested Meacham.
    ¶5     The State charged Meacham with felony driving under the influence, obstructing a
    peace officer, and driving while license suspended or revoked. Meacham moved to
    suppress the evidence against him and to dismiss the charges. He argued that Deputy
    Birket lacked particularized suspicion to justify her investigative stop of his vehicle.
    ¶6     The District Court denied Meacham’s motion. It reasoned that Deputy Birket
    properly initiated contact with Meacham under the “community caretaker doctrine” and
    that, while acting in her community caretaker capacity, she observed facts sufficient to
    establish particularized suspicion that Meacham had been driving under the influence.
    ¶7     On appeal, Meacham concedes that Deputy Birket properly initiated contact with
    him under the community caretaker doctrine. He contends, however, that her community
    caretaker function ceased at the moment Meacham told her that he did not need her
    assistance.   Meacham argues that Deputy Birket did not, at that point, possess
    particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.         He contends that her subsequent
    interactions with him constituted an unlawful seizure. As a result, all the evidence she
    obtained during that unlawful seizure should have been suppressed.
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    ¶8     We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress to determine
    whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were
    applied correctly as a matter of law. City of Missoula v. Moore, 
    2011 MT 61
    , ¶ 10,
    
    360 Mont. 22
    , 
    251 P.3d 679
    . A district court’s finding that particularized suspicion exists
    is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. City of Missoula, ¶ 10. We review
    the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal proceeding de novo to determine
    whether the district court’s conclusion of law is correct. State v. Kant, 
    2016 MT 42
    , ¶ 11,
    
    382 Mont. 239
    , 
    367 P.3d 726
    .
    ¶9     This Court recognizes the community caretaker doctrine, which serves as an
    exception to the warrant requirement for seizures. State v. Spaulding, 
    2011 MT 204
    ,
    ¶ 18, 
    361 Mont. 445
    , 
    259 P.3d 793
    . The doctrine allows a police officer to stop and
    investigate when the officer reasonably suspects that “a citizen is in need of help or is in
    peril.” State v. Lovegren, 
    2002 MT 153
    , ¶ 25, 
    310 Mont. 358
    , 
    51 P.3d 471
    . Once the
    officer is “assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or
    that the peril has been mitigated, then any actions beyond that constitute a seizure which
    must be justified by something other than the community caretaker doctrine, such as
    particularized suspicion or probable cause.” Spaulding, ¶ 21.
    ¶10    Particularized suspicion requires that an officer possess: “(1) objective data and
    articulable facts from which he or she can make certain reasonable inferences; and (2) a
    resulting suspicion that the person to be stopped has committed, is committing, or is
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    about to commit an offense.” Brunette v. State, 
    2016 MT 128
    , ¶ 17, 
    383 Mont. 458
    ,
    
    372 P.3d 476
    (citing Brown v. State, 
    2009 MT 64
    , ¶ 20, 
    349 Mont. 408
    , 
    203 P.3d 842
    ).
    ¶11   As Meacham acknowledges, the community caretaker doctrine permitted Deputy
    Birket to initiate contact with Meacham to see if he needed assistance. Lovegren, ¶ 25.
    Once Meacham assured Deputy Birket that he did not require her assistance, any further
    actions by Deputy Birket constituted a seizure which needed to “be justified by
    something other than the community caretaker doctrine, such as particularized
    suspicion.” Spaulding, ¶ 21.
    ¶12   Deputy Birket’s testimony establishes that she had developed particularized
    suspicion by the time Meacham assured her that he did not need her help. Deputy Birket
    had observed Meacham’s car stuck in a snowbank behind a saloon at night. Meacham
    avoided eye contact with her and was staring blankly straight ahead when she first
    approached him.     During her conversation with Meacham, Deputy Birket noticed
    numerous objective signs of intoxication. These observations constituted “articulable
    facts” from which Deputy Birket made the reasonable inference that Meacham had
    committed or was committing the offense of driving under the influence. See Brown,
    ¶ 20; Hulse v. DOJ, Motor Vehicle Div., 
    1998 MT 108
    , ¶ 40, 
    289 Mont. 1
    , 
    961 P.2d 75
    (stating that a driver’s smell of alcohol, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and slurred speech
    may establish particularized suspicion that the driver is intoxicated); State v. Marcial,
    
    2013 MT 242
    , ¶¶ 5, 19, 
    371 Mont. 348
    , 
    308 P.3d 69
    (holding that where an officer asked
    defendant driver who nearly crashed his car if he was okay, and where the officer smelled
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    alcohol on defendant among other signs of intoxication, the officer possessed
    particularized suspicion that defendant had been driving under the influence). Deputy
    Birket’s investigation and pursuit of Meacham after Meacham assured her that he did not
    require assistance was thus “justified by something other than the community caretaker
    doctrine”—particularized suspicion. Spaulding, ¶ 21.
    ¶13   The District Court’s conclusion that Deputy Birket possessed particularized
    suspicion was not clearly erroneous. City of Missoula, ¶ 10. Because Deputy Birket
    possessed particularized suspicion, the investigation that followed was lawful.    The
    District Court thus correctly denied Meacham’s motion to suppress evidence and to
    dismiss the charges. City of Missoula, ¶ 10; Kant, ¶ 11.
    ¶14   We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
    our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. This
    appeal presents no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not
    establish new precedent or modify existing precedent. The judgment is affirmed.
    /S/ BETH BAKER
    We concur:
    /S/ LAURIE McKINNON
    /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
    /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
    /S/ JIM RICE
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