State v. Lafield ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                                                12/27/2016
    DA 15-0212
    Case Number: DA 15-0212
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2016 MT 338N
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    JEFFORY A. LAFIELD,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:            District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DC 13-55
    Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Paul Sullivan, Measure, Sampsel, Sullivan & O’Brien, P.C.,
    Kalispell, Montana
    For Appellee:
    Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Madison L. Mattioli,
    Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    William E. Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: November 30, 2016
    Decided: December 27, 2016
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
    Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
    serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
    Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
    Reports.
    ¶2     In October 2013, Jeffory LaField entered into a plea agreement in which he pled
    no contest to felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), fourth or subsequent
    offense, and felony assault on a peace officer.      The Montana Twenty-First Judicial
    District Court, Ravalli County, accepted the plea agreement and entered a Judgment and
    Commitment in December 2013. An Amended Judgment and Commitment was entered
    on January 24, 2014.
    ¶3     For LaField’s felony DUI conviction, the District Court committed LaField to the
    Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) for a period of thirteen months, for
    placement into an appropriate correctional facility, followed by a five-year suspended
    commitment to the DOC. The judgment provided that if LaField completed the WATCh
    program or other residential alcohol treatment program operated or approved by the
    DOC, the court would allow him to serve the remainder of his thirteen-month
    commitment on probation. For LaField’s felony assault conviction, the court committed
    him to the custody of the DOC for a period of five years, all suspended on conditions,
    and set to run concurrently to the felony DUI sentence.
    2
    ¶4     In July 2014, the State filed a petition to revoke LaField’s suspended sentence on
    the grounds that LaField violated conditions of his sentence, including failing to comply
    with the rules and regulations of the WATCh program in January 2014, and disobeying
    the law by assaulting a fellow inmate in June 2014. At the October 6, 2014 scheduling
    hearing, the court released LaField on his own recognizance subject to specific conditions
    of release. The District Court set a revocation hearing for November 24, 2014.
    ¶5     On November 19, 2014, the State filed an amended petition to revoke LaField’s
    suspended sentence. In the amended petition, the State alleged that, in addition to the
    violated conditions set forth in the original Petition, on November 15, 2014, LaField
    violated numerous other conditions including driving a vehicle while under the influence
    of alcohol and assaulting another peace officer.
    ¶6     We note that from April 2013, when the State filed its Information, through the
    revocation proceeding in March 2015, LaField was represented by six attorneys, most of
    whom withdrew. At the revocation hearing, LaField represented himself, with appointed
    stand-by counsel. Just before the hearing commenced, LaField became angry and spit on
    stand-by counsel. The District Court allowed the hearing to commence with warnings to
    LaField. However, shortly into LaField’s cross-examination of the State’s first witness,
    LaField became combative and threatened and cursed the judge. The judge had him
    removed from the courtroom and put into a room with “sight and sound” technology to
    allow him to follow the proceeding. LaField refused to watch or listen.
    ¶7     The District Court conducted the hearing, instructing stand-by counsel to
    cross-examine the State’s multiple witnesses. At the close of the hearing, the District
    3
    Court revoked both suspended sentences and committed LaField to the DOC for five
    years with a strong recommendation for prison placement. The District Court issued its
    written Order of Commitment on March 5, 2015. It is from this Order that LaField
    appeals.
    ¶8    We review a district court’s revocation of a suspended sentence for an abuse of
    discretion. State v. Baird, 
    2006 MT 266
    , ¶ 15, 
    334 Mont. 185
    , 
    145 P.3d 995
    .
    ¶9    LaField, through counsel, argues on appeal that he is entitled to a written
    statement of the evidence upon which the court relied in revoking his suspended
    sentences.   He claims that because he was absent from the courtroom during the
    proceeding, the District Court’s obligation to provide such a written statement was
    critical. He proffers that the court’s failure to do so entitled him to reversal of his
    judgment and a remand for further proceedings.
    ¶10   The State counters that the court’s lack of written findings does not entitle LaField
    to a new revocation hearing. Rather, the State is required to prove, by a preponderance of
    the evidence, that LaField violated the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence
    and the record of the case can provide sufficient support for the court’s revocation.
    Section 46-18-203(6), MCA; Baird, ¶¶ 17, 30.
    ¶11   In Baird, this Court reviewed the district court’s revocation of a deferred sentence
    imposed on Baird following a felony stalking conviction. Baird was present at the
    revocation hearing and testified on his own behalf. He did not deny that he violated the
    order of protection on numerous occasions.       Baird, ¶¶ 10, 12.     The district court
    addressed Baird directly when it pronounced judgment, asking if Baird understood why
    4
    the court was revoking his deferred sentence. Baird answered in the affirmative. Baird,
    ¶ 13.
    ¶12     On appeal, Baird argued that he was denied due process because the court had not
    set forth, in a written statement, the evidence relied upon for the revocation of his
    deferred sentence as required by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
    , 786, 
    93 S. Ct. 1756
    ,
    1761-62 (1973).        “[D]ue process requires that upon revocation of a probation the
    defendant receive a written statement of the evidence relied upon by the arbiter and the
    reason for revoking probation.” Baird, ¶ 24. While acknowledging the rule of Gagnon,
    and a subsequent similar ruling in Black v. Romano, 
    471 U.S. 606
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 2254
    (1985), we noted that the U.S. Supreme Court, in deference to state court systems,
    recognized and sought to preserve flexibility in revocation proceedings, “which does not
    require the full panoply of procedural safeguards associated with a criminal trial.” Baird,
    ¶ 28 (citing 
    Black, 471 U.S. at 613
    , 105 S. Ct. at 2258). Consequently, we concluded
    “that the due process requirements of a written statement by the district court may be
    satisfied by a record that provides adequate factfinding and an adequate basis for
    appellate review.” Baird, ¶ 30. We continued:
    Read as a whole, the oral and written records from the District Court
    provide an adequate basis for this Court’s review, as required by Black and
    Richardson.[1] This Court has no difficulty identifying and evaluating the
    information used by the District Court to revoke Baird’s deferred sentence.
    The record is adequate to determine that the District Court’s revocation of
    Baird’s probation was based on “permissible grounds supported by the
    evidence.” We conclude that the District Court’s written order and hearing
    transcript meet the minimal due process requirements required by Gagnon
    and its progeny.
    1
    State v. Richardson, 
    2000 MT 72
    , 
    299 Mont. 102
    , 
    997 P.2d 786
    .
    5
    Baird, ¶ 32.
    ¶13    Applying Baird to the case before us, the written transcript reveals that the District
    Court heard credible testimony from the security coordinator of the WATCh facility, an
    Anaconda detention officer, a probation and parole district supervisor, and a Missoula
    County sheriff’s deputy. LaField’s stand-by counsel cross-examined these witnesses on
    LaField’s behalf. These witnesses provided evidence and testimony that LaField: (1)
    violated the rules and regulations of the WATCh facility, (2) assaulted a fellow inmate,
    (3) drove a vehicle, consumed alcohol, and drove while under the influence of alcohol,
    (4) assaulted a Missoula County sheriff’s deputy while resisting arrest, (5) gave a false
    name to the Missoula County sheriff’s deputy, and (6) was driving without a valid license
    or proof of insurance. Each of these claims represented a violation of a specific term or
    condition of LaField’s suspended sentences. While the District Court found that the State
    had not established that LaField drove a vehicle that was not equipped with an ignition
    interlock system as required by his suspended sentence conditions and as alleged by the
    State, the court expressly found that the State had proven by a preponderance of the
    evidence that LaField had violated the remaining probation conditions as alleged. It is
    apparent from the hearing transcript the evidence the District Court relied upon to issue
    its order of revocation. While factually distinguishable in that Baird was present in the
    courtroom, Baird nonetheless supports our conclusion that the District Court did not
    abuse its discretion in revoking LaField’s suspended sentences.
    6
    ¶14    Lastly, LaField’s absence from the proceeding and his failure to watch or listen to
    the hearing after his removal for disruptive and abusive behavior does not place a higher
    burden on the District Court in administering the proceeding. It is undisputed that the
    District Court provided LaField with the opportunity to be present and be heard and
    LaField did not avail himself of the opportunity.
    ¶15    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
    our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion
    of the Court, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in revoking LaField’s
    suspended sentences.
    ¶16    Affirmed.
    /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
    We Concur:
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
    /S/ BETH BAKER
    /S/ LAURIE McKINNON
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-0212

Filed Date: 12/27/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/28/2016