Mundel v. Farmers ( 2017 )

01/10/2017
DA 16-0326
Case Number: DA 16-0326
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 6N
JEANNETTE MUNDEL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
THE FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP
OF COMPANIES, and DOES 1-15,
Defendants and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV-11-1252(D)
Honorable Amy Eddy, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Evan F. Danno, Danno Law Firm, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellees:
Mark S. Williams, Nicholas Pagnotta, Amanda Duman, Williams Law
Firm, P.C., Missoula, Montana
Monique P. Voigt, William J. Mattix, Crowley Fleck, PLLP,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 7, 2016
Decided: January 10, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Jeannette Mundel (Mundel) appeals from an April 26, 2016 post-trial order
denying her attorney’s fees and costs, in a case involving litigation of uninsured motorist
insurance coverage. We affirm.
¶3 On September 1, 2011, Mundel was stopped at a traffic light in Kalispell,
Montana, when her vehicle was rear-ended by Zona Bauer (Bauer). Neither Mundel nor
Bauer called the police. Mundel drove herself to the Hospital in Whitefish, Montana,
where she received medical treatment. Bauer’s insurance company, Allstate, paid
Mundel its bodily injury liability limit of $25,000. Mundel was insured by Farmers
Insurance (Farmers) and carried underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) with a $100,000
bodily injury liability limit. Mundel made a claim under her Farmers UIM policy.
Farmers denied her claim. Mundel filed a complaint in District Court alleging breach of
contract and damages.
¶4 After Farmers denied key matters in its answer, Mundel served discovery requests
for admissions on Farmers to admit: the accident was caused solely by Bauer, Mundel
was injured in the accident, and Mundel’s medical bills compilation may be admitted into
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evidence as a summary of her medical expenses. Farmers denied her requests for
admissions noting the police were not called, Bauer and Mundel’s versions of the
accident differed, Mundel failed to cooperate with the injury investigation, and Farmers
believed the summary of medical expenses called for a legal conclusion. At trial, these
matters were resolved in Mundel’s favor.
¶5 The jury awarded Mundel $19,731.02 for bodily injury damages. As such,
Mundel did not qualify for UIM coverage under her Farmers’ policy because Bauer was
not underinsured. Allstate had paid her more than the jury awarded. The District Court
denied Mundel’s post-trial motion for attorney’s fees and costs and entered judgment in
favor of Farmers.
¶6 A trial court has authority to impose discovery sanctions pursuant to M. R. Civ. P.
37. The Montana Supreme Court reviews sanctions imposed pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 37
for an abuse of discretion. Maloney v. Home & Inv. Ctr., Inc., 2000 MT 34, ¶ 27, 298
Mont. 213, 994 P.2d 1124; Kraft v. High Country Motors, Inc., 2012 MT 83, ¶ 23, 364
Mont. 465, 276 P.3d 908. We generally defer to the trial court’s judgment on the
decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations because “the trial court is in the best
position to know whether parties are disregarding the rights of opposing parties in the
course of litigation and which sanctions for such conduct are most appropriate.”
McKenzie v. Scheeler, 285 Mont. 500, 506, 949 P.2d 1168, 1172 (citing Smith v.
Butte-Silver Bow County, 276 Mont. 329, 332, 916 P.2d 91, 93 (1996)). See also Linn v.
Whitaker, 2007 MT 46, ¶ 13, 336 Mont. 131, 152 P.3d 1282.
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¶7 Mundel argues the District Court should have granted her attorney’s fees and costs
pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2) when Farmers failed to admit matters in requests for
admissions thus needlessly requiring litigation of those issues. Mundel bases her
argument on the assumption that after a party fails to admit what is later proven true,
M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2) requires a district court to order payment of attorney’s fees
incurred in proving the fact. M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2) provides:
(2) Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit what is requested
under Rule 36 and if the requesting party later proves a document to be
genuine or the matter true, the requesting party may move that the party
who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
incurred in making that proof. The court must so order unless:
(A) the request was held objectionable under Rule 36(a);
(B) the admission sought was of no substantial importance;
(C)the party failing to admit had a reasonable ground to believe that
it might prevail on the matter; or
(D) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
¶8 Mundel argues the District Court completely failed to apply the factors in
M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2) to her request for attorney’s fees. Under M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2) the
district court must order sanctions unless, among other things, “there was other good
reason for the failure to admit.” M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2)(D); Tempel v. Benson, 2015 MT
84, ¶ 21, 378 Mont. 401, 346 P.3d 342. “When it is not possible for this Court to make a
ready, confident, and accurate determination of a party’s good faith in the discovery
process, we presume the correctness of the District Court's action under Rule 37.” Owen
v. F. A. Buttrey Co., 192 Mont. 274, 280-81, 627 P.2d 1233, 1237 (1981).
¶9 The District Court denied Mundel’s post-trial motion for attorney’s fees and costs
stating, “upon review of the discovery requests in this matter, the Court does not find it
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appropriate to award sanctions to Ms. Mundel under Rule 37, Mont. R. Civ. P.” The
District Court found it was not appropriate to award sanctions, and we defer to the
District Court.
¶10 Mundel further argues, citing Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brewer,
2003 MT 98, ¶ 36, 315 Mont. 231, 69 P.3d 652, that she is entitled to attorney’s fees as
the prevailing party in the action. Here, Mundel was not the prevailing party. As the
District Court noted, “because Ms. Mundel failed to prove that her total damages
exceeded Ms. Bauer’s available bodily injury limit, the Court concludes that Farmers is
the prevailing party.” As she remains the non-prevailing party, Mundel is not entitled to
attorney’s fees under Brewer.
¶11 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion
of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear
application of applicable standards of review.
¶12 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
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