State v. Maloney , 2015 MT 215 ( 2015 )

July 28 2015
DA 14-0615
Case Number: DA 14-0615
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2015 MT 215STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RYAN PATRICK MALONEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and For the County of Silver Bow, Cause No. DC-13-50
Honorable Kurt Krueger, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Carolynn M. Fagan, Fagan Law Office, P.C.; Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Mardell Ployhar, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Eileen Joyce, Silver Bow County Attorney, Ann M. Shea, Deputy
County Attorney; Butte, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 3, 2015
Decided: July 28, 2015
Filed:
__________________________________________
1
Clerk
2
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Ryan Patrick Maloney (Maloney) appeals from the order of the Montana Second
Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, denying his motion to dismiss the criminal
charges against him for lack of a speedy trial. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
¶2 During the pendency of this case, Maloney was also involved in concurrent
prosecutions or disciplinary proceedings in Jefferson County and in Butte-Silver Bow
DUI Court. The disposition of those proceedings is relevant to our speedy trial and due
process analyses. Therefore, we will first describe the facts of the instant case and then
explain the circumstances of the concurrent proceedings.
The Instant Case
¶3 On April 2, 2013, Maloney was arrested following an incident at his house in
Butte-Silver Bow County where he made a number of suicidal threats while intoxicated.
Maloney’s children were at the house at the time and contacted their mother, who alerted
law enforcement. Following the arrival of law enforcement officers, Maloney’s children
and brother left the house, leaving Maloney alone inside. The children informed the
officers that Maloney was armed. The officers attempted to convince Maloney to exit the
house, but he refused and threatened to kill himself if officers approached. Later,
Maloney fired a shot through the wall of his house which struck an officer, causing minor
injuries. Eventually, Maloney agreed to exit the house. When he did so he had a knife
embedded in his abdomen. The officers arrested Maloney.
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¶4 That same day, April 2, 2013, Maloney was charged in Butte-Silver Bow County
Justice Court with five counts of felony criminal endangerment in violation of
§ 45-5-207, MCA, and two counts of felony assault on a peace officer in violation of
§ 45-5-210, MCA.
¶5 An information was filed in Butte-Silver Bow County District Court on May 1,
2013. Trial was scheduled for October 7, 2013. On August 27, 2013, Maloney filed a
motion to re-schedule the trial date due to a conflict. Maloney requested the trial take
place at the “earliest possible date” after October 7, 2013. The District Court
re-scheduled the trial for November 18, 2013. On November 8, 2013, Maloney pleaded
guilty to one count of criminal endangerment and one count of assaulting a peace officer.
¶6 On November 15, 2013, the court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report
(“PSI”) prepared. The PSI was assigned to a probation officer in Lewis and Clark
County, who requested documents from the State including the case file, victims’ contact
information and victim impact statements. The State provided the requested documents
to the probation officer in January 2014. In February and March, 2014, Maloney
provided the probation officer with two letters of support. An Affidavit of Pecuniary
Loss dated April 17, 2014, was provided to the probation officer for the purposes of
determining restitution.
¶7 On April 25, 2014, the probation officer delivered the prepared PSI to the State’s
prosecutors. On May 5, 2014, the State filed a motion asking the court to set a sentencing
hearing. That same day, Maloney filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.
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The District Court denied Maloney’s motion in an order dated June 2, 2014. On July 17,
2014, the District Court sentenced Maloney to a total of 30 years with five years
suspended. Maloney appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.
Concurrent Proceedings
¶8 On March 26, 2013, approximately one week before his arrest in the instant case,
Maloney was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI),
Fourth Offense, in Jefferson County. He was released on bond on March 27, 2013. At
the time of the Jefferson County offense, Maloney was participating in Butte-Silver Bow
DUI Court.
¶9 Following the Jefferson County charge and the April 2, 2013 incident in the
instant case, the DUI Court issued a warrant for Maloney’s arrest. He was held without
bond until his sentencing on May 17, 2013. He was sentenced to six months
incarceration at the Butte-Silver Bow Detention Center with 38 days credit for time
served. On February 26, 2014, the Fifth Judicial District Court in Jefferson County
sentenced Maloney to thirteen months incarcerated followed by a five year suspended
sentence.
¶10 Serving these sentences concurrently, Maloney was incarcerated or scheduled to
be incarcerated from April 9, 2013 through November 9, 2014. Thus, his scheduled
incarceration in the concurrent proceedings encompassed almost the entire duration of the
relevant procedural portion of the instant case – pre-sentencing – which began with his
April 2, 2013 arrest and ended with his July 17, 2014 sentencing. Throughout the time
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Maloney argues his rights were being violated by prosecutorial delay, he was serving
time for other charges.
ISSUES
¶11 Maloney presents the question of whether his right to a speedy trial was violated
by pre-trial and pre-sentencing delays. However, as discussed below, we recently
adopted a new standard for analyzing post-trial, pre-sentencing delays that is distinct
from our pre-trial delay analysis. We therefore reframe the issues presented as follows:
1. Was Maloney’s right to a speedy trial violated as a result of excessive pre-trial
delays caused by the State?
2. Was Maloney’s right to due process violated as a result of excessive post-trial,
pre-sentencing delays caused by the State?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶12 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case de
novo for correctness. State v. Betterman, 2015 MT 39, ¶ 11, 378 Mont. 182, 342 P.3d
971. We will affirm a district court if it reached the correct result, even if it reached that
result for an incorrect reason. Betterman, ¶ 11.
DISCUSSION
¶13 In State v. Mooney, 2006 MT 121, ¶ 15, 332 Mont. 249, 137 P.3d 532 (overruled
on other grounds by State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶ 102, n.9, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d
815), we held that the right to a speedy trial continues through sentencing. Later, in
Ariegwe, we laid out in detail a four factor balancing test that courts should use to
analyze whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated. Ariegwe, ¶ 113.
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The four factors consisted of: 1) the length of the delay, 2) the reasons for the delay,
3) the accused’s responses to the delay, and 4) prejudice to the accused caused by the
delay. It its order denying Maloney’s motion to dismiss, the District Court applied this
four-part analysis and concluded that Maloney’s speedy trial right had not been violated.
¶14 Subsequent to the District Court issuing its order, we reconsidered the question of
whether the right to a speedy trial applies to the period of time between the disposition of
a case and sentencing. Betterman, ¶¶ 17-24. We concluded that the right to a speedy
trial does not apply to the sentencing period, thus overruling Mooney. Betterman, ¶ 25.
Instead, we held that due process protects a defendant from unreasonable delay in
sentencing. Betterman, ¶ 27. We went on to articulate a balancing test for due process
violations in sentencing delay, stating:
if a sentencing delay is purposeful and oppressive, then we must determine
that there has been a constitutional due process violation. The
determination of whether a delay is oppressive incorporates considerations
of whether the defendant has suffered prejudice and the degree and nature
of that prejudice. Neither factor is to be considered dispositive. Though
the reasons for a delay may be less than purposeful, or the prejudice caused
by the delay less than oppressive, there may still be a constitutional
violation when these two considerations are balanced against one another.
Each case requires an independent analysis with consideration of all of the
circumstances.
Betterman, ¶ 32.
¶15 The District Court issued its order based on Mooney and Ariegwe on June 2, 2014.
Maloney filed his opening brief on appeal on January 5, 2015. On February 10, 2015, we
published our Betterman opinion. On March 31, 2015, the State filed its appellee brief,
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addressing the case in the context of Betterman. A rule affecting criminal procedure is
retroactively applied to cases pending on direct review. State v. Reichmand, 2010 MT
228, ¶ 12, 358 Mont. 68, 243 P.3d 423. Because this case was pending on direct review
when Betterman was decided, our holding in Betterman retroactively applies.
Furthermore, we note that Maloney did not seek to supplement his opening brief after we
released our Betterman decision. Presumably this was due to the fact that the factors we
enunciated in Betterman for analyzing a due process violation for sentencing delay
(whether the delay was purposeful and oppressive, including consideration of prejudice to
the defendant) are substantially similar to the four factor balancing test for speedy trial
violation set forth in Ariegwe and relied upon by the District Court (the length of the
delay, the reasons for the delay, the accused’s responses to the delay, and prejudice to the
accused caused by the delay). Given the record and relevant legal standards, we are able
to analyze Maloney’s claim under the Betterman test based on his arguments advanced
for the Ariegwe test without further briefing or fact-finding.
¶16 Having determined that Betterman applies, we now face a two-part inquiry. First,
we examine whether Maloney’s right to a speedy trial was violated due to post-arrest,
pre-conviction delay. Second, we consider whether Maloney’s right to due process was
violated due to post-conviction, pre-sentencing delay.
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Speedy Trial
¶17 1. Was Maloney’s right to a speedy trial violated as a result of excessive pre-trial
delays caused by the State?
¶18 The four factors a court must consider when determining whether a defendant’s
right to a speedy trial has been violated are: a) the length of the delay, b) the reasons for
the delay, c) the accused’s responses to the delay, and d) prejudice to the accused caused
by the delay. Ariegwe, ¶ 113. The District Court considered each issue and concluded
that Maloney’s speedy trial right had not been violated. However, the District Court
applied these factors to the entire delay – from arrest to sentencing – not the narrower
delay between arrest and disposition that is the proper subject of a speedy trial analysis.
We will therefore address each factor in turn, focusing our inquiry on the time between
the date the State arrested Maloney and the date of his guilty plea.
a) The Length of the Delay
¶19 Delay in bringing a defendant to trial is measured from the date of accusation to
the date the case is disposed of, either by the beginning of trial or by plea. Ariegwe, ¶ 43.
The first step in determining whether a defendant’s speedy trial right has been violated is
to determine whether that delay was more than 200 days. We have held that 200 days is
a threshold. If the delay was less than 200 days, then no further analysis is necessary to
conclude that the right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Ariegwe, ¶ 107. If the
delay was more than 200 days we must consider and balance all four speedy trial factors.
Ariegwe, ¶ 107. The longer the delay past the 200 day mark, the stronger the
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presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and the greater the burden on the State to
justify the delay. Ariegwe, ¶ 107.
¶20 Maloney was arrested and charged on April 2, 2013. His trial was originally
scheduled for October 7, 2013, 188 days later. The trial date was continued at Maloney’s
behest until November 18, 2013. However, Maloney pleaded guilty on November 8,
2013, 220 days after he was arrested. Because his guilty plea marked the disposition of
the case, pre-trial delay must be calculated to that day. The 220 day delay exceeds the
200 day threshold for speedy trial analysis. We therefore proceed to consider the
remaining factors.
b) The Reasons for the Delay
¶21 Under this factor, a court must identify each period of delay and attribute that
delay to the appropriate party. Ariegwe, ¶ 108. All delays not demonstratively caused by
the defendant are attributed to the State. Ariegwe, ¶ 108. Institutional reasons for delay,
such as crowded court dockets, weigh less heavily against the State than lack of diligence
or bad faith delay tactics. Ariegwe, ¶ 108.
¶22 Maloney does not contest the fact that, of the 220 days between arrest and
pleading, 32 of those days are attributable to his motion to continue the trial date.
Maloney contends that the remaining 188 days are attributable to the State, but does not
argue that the State was not diligent or acted in bad faith during that period.
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c) The Accused’s Responses to the Delay
¶23 Under this third factor, a court considers the defendant’s conduct with respect to
the delays, specifically as regards the defendant’s objection or acquiescence to pre-trial
delays. Ariegwe, ¶ 110. A court must examine such circumstances as:
the timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of the objections, the reasons for
the acquiescence, whether the accused was represented by counsel, the
accused’s pretrial conduct (as that conduct bears on the speedy trial right),
and so forth. The sum of this evaluation--i.e., the totality of the accused’s
various responses to the delays in bringing him or her to trial--is indicative
of whether he or she actually wanted a speedy trial, which in turn informs
the inquiry into whether there has been a deprivation of the right.
Ariegwe, ¶ 110. In making this examination, a court should not presume that the
defendant did not wish to have a speedy trial solely because he or she acquiesced to
delays or did not object early and often. Ariegwe, ¶ 82.
¶24 There is little in the record to indicate Maloney’s responses to the delays prior to
his guilty plea. Maloney points out that, in moving the District Court for a continuance,
he requested the trial be rescheduled for the soonest possible date. Thus, on the one hand
Maloney was consenting to extend the duration of the pre-trial period, while on the other
hand requesting the court to make the extension as brief as possible. “[C]onduct
evidencing a sincere desire to be brought to trial promptly weighs in favor of the accused
in the overall balancing, whereas conduct demonstrating a desire to avoid trial weighs
against the accused in the overall balancing.” Ariegwe, ¶ 85. Maloney’s pre-trial
conduct falls squarely in the middle and does not weigh strongly one way or the other.
We are satisfied, however, that Maloney did not actively demonstrate an intent to waive
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his right to a speedy trial. Courts “should not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights.” Ariegwe, ¶ 83 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525-526,
92 S. Ct. 2182, 2189 (1972)). Furthermore, the State does not argue that Maloney waived
his speedy trial right. Based on the record, it appears Maloney neither waived his right to
a speedy trial nor was particularly active in enforcing that right before filing his motion to
dismiss just prior to sentencing.
d) Prejudice to the Accused Caused by the Delay
¶25 The fourth prong of the speedy trial test requires a court to consider whether the
defendant has been prejudiced by the delay. This question must be resolved in light of
the interests the speedy trial right is designed to protect. Ariegwe, ¶ 86. The United
States Supreme Court has identified three interests fundamental to speedy trial protection:
i) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, ii) minimization of anxiety and concern
of the accused, and iii) preservation of the accused’s ability to mount an effective
defense. Ariegwe, ¶ 88 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193). We will
address each in turn.
i) Oppressive Pretrial Incarceration
¶26 Maloney argues that his pretrial incarceration was oppressive both for the length
of time involved and because he was unable to participate in the Warm Springs Addiction
Treatment and Change (WATCh) program while incarcerated in the Butte-Silver Bow
Corrections Facility. Maloney also points out that we have referred to time in jail as
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“dead time” and catalogued some of the detrimental effects of incarceration, including
loss of employment, disruption of family life, and idleness. Ariegwe, ¶ 89.
¶27 The District Court found that Maloney’s pretrial incarceration was not oppressive
because Maloney was earning time served for his six month DUI Court sentence while
awaiting trial in this matter. We agree with the District Court. A speedier trial would not
have meant Maloney’s release. Furthermore, we note, as did the District Court, that
Maloney was receiving chemical dependency treatment while incarcerated. Maloney
speculates that the WATCh program would serve him better. However, speculative
claims are insufficient to establish prejudice. Betterman, ¶ 35.
ii) Minimization of Anxiety and Concern
¶28 Here, Maloney essentially restates his arguments regarding oppressive
incarceration. He argues that he was in need of alcohol and mental health treatment, that
the treatment provided to him was insufficient, and that as a result of the trial delay he
suffered anxiety and concern.
¶29 We reiterate that speculative claims are insufficient to establish prejudice.
Maloney admits that he presented no evidence on this issue at the hearing on his motion
to dismiss. Rather, he asks us to infer his anxiety and concern. This we are unable to do
given the record before us, especially considering that Maloney was, while awaiting trial,
serving a six month sentence from the DUI Court with a thirteen month sentence from
Jefferson County to follow. Without further evidence on the record we cannot infer from
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the circumstances that Maloney’s concern and anxiety over the pre-trial delay amounted
to prejudice.
iii) Preservation of Accused’s Defense
¶30 The District Court properly found that, because Maloney pleaded guilty, pre-trial
delay did not prejudice his ability to mount a defense. Maloney does not contest this
finding.
e) Balance of Speedy Trial Factors
¶31 On balancing the factors above we agree with the District Court that the State did
not violate Maloney’s right to a speedy trial. We find the length of the delay and the
reasons for the delay to be most compelling in reaching this conclusion. Specifically, we
consider it very significant that, had Maloney himself not moved for a continuance, trial
would have occurred within the 200 day threshold and there would have been no need for
a full speedy trial inquiry.
¶32 Furthermore, though we recognize that Maloney did not waive his right to a
speedy trial, nothing in the record evidences a particular urgency on Maloney’s part
which would weigh in favor of finding that he was prejudiced by a delay of 20 days
beyond the speedy trial threshold, especially when the delay was due in part to his own
continuance. Finally, the record does not support Maloney’s claims of prejudice through
oppressive incarceration or undue anxiety and concern. Primarily this is due to the fact
that Maloney was scheduled to be incarcerated up to and well beyond the trial date, and
while incarcerated Maloney was being credited with time served. Maloney’s claim that
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he was prejudiced because he was prevented from entering the WATCh program is
overly speculative. Maloney presented no evidence as to why the available chemical
dependency program was deficient or why WATCh would be a more satisfactory
alternative. While we applaud Maloney’s desire to receive treatment, his wish to
participate in a different treatment program alone is insufficient to show prejudice such
that we could conclude that his right to a speedy trial was violated.
Due Process
¶33 2) Was Maloney’s right to due process violated as a result of excessive post-trial,
pre-sentencing delays caused by the State?
¶34 Having determined that the pre-trial delay was insufficient to support Maloney’s
claim that his speedy trial rights were violated, we turn to the question of whether his due
process rights were violated by the delay in sentencing.1
¶35 In Betterman we explained that in order to determine whether a sentencing delay
violates due process, we balance two factors. First, whether the delay was purposeful.
Betterman, ¶ 32. Second, whether the delay prejudiced the defendant such that it was
oppressive. Betterman, ¶ 32.
¶36 Here, because the facts in Betterman closely align with the facts in this case, we
will rely on that opinion as a useful template for analysis. In Betterman, the defendant,
1
We recognized in Betterman, ¶ 28, that reasonable timeliness of sentencing is a due process
guarantee expressed by the Montana Legislature in several statutory provisions.
See §§ 46-18-101(3)(a), 46-18-102(3)(a), and 46-18-115, MCA. Maloney, however, has failed
to raise a statutory claim under code provisions mandating that a defendant be sentenced in a
“timely” manner, without “unreasonable delay.”
15
Betterman, pleaded guilty to a bail jumping charge on April 19, 2012. At the time he was
serving a multi-year sentence for felony partner-family member assault. Betterman was
finally sentenced 434 days later, on June 27, 2013. He moved the District Court to
dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial. The court denied the motion and Betterman
appealed to this Court.
¶37 We first considered whether the delay was purposeful. We concluded that all but
a very small number of days of delay must be attributed to the State, and that the delays
were institutional in nature, rather than intentional or done in bad faith. Betterman, ¶ 33.
We cautioned, however, that even though the delays were institutional, 434 days of
sentencing delay was an unacceptable overreach on the part of the State.
Betterman, ¶ 33.
¶38 We then considered whether Betterman was prejudiced by the delay. Betterman
argued that he was prejudiced because a quicker sentencing would have provided him
access to various correctional programs and services. Betterman, ¶ 35. We concluded,
however, that such claims were overly speculative and did not have a sufficient causal
link to Betterman’s sentencing delay for us to conclude that the delay caused him
prejudice. Betterman, ¶ 35. We stated that any prejudice resulting from the delayed
sentencing was not “substantial and demonstrable.” Betterman, ¶ 36. We also noted that
the fact that Betterman was already serving time for a different crime and would have
been in jail whether or not the sentencing had been faster weighed against his claim of
prejudice. Betterman, ¶ 35.
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¶39 Balancing the two factors, we determined that Betterman’s delayed sentencing,
though unacceptably long, did not prejudice Betterman sufficiently to constitute a due
process violation.
¶40 Maloney’s situation is similar to Betterman’s. Maloney pleaded guilty on
November 18, 2013 and was sentenced on July 17, 2014. Maloney’s sentencing delay,
therefore, was 241 days. Though not as long as Betterman’s sentencing delay, 241 days
strikes us as excessive. However, nothing in the record indicates that the delay was
perpetuated intentionally or in bad faith. The delay appears to have been entirely
institutional, and mostly comprised of waiting for completion of the PSI report. The
record indicates that the State’s attorneys provided information to the probation officer
preparing the PSI promptly. Even attributing the entirety of the delay to the State, as in
Betterman, the delay appears to have been of the unintentional, institutional variety.
¶41 As for prejudice, Maloney’s claims of prejudice closely mirror Betterman’s.
Maloney claims that the sentencing delay prevented him from participating in the
WATCh program and from receiving other mental health services. Maloney did,
however, have access to treatment while awaiting sentencing. As in Betterman, the
supposed prejudice in this case is overly speculative to be substantial and demonstrative.
¶42 Like Betterman, Maloney also argues that the sentencing delay increased his
anxiety and concern to an extent that supports a finding of prejudice. We have stated,
“the anxiety of an accused is not to be equated for constitutional purposes with anxiety
suffered by one who is convicted, in jail, unquestionably going to serve a sentence, and
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only waiting to learn how long that sentence will be.” Betterman, ¶ 35. We find that to
be the case especially when the accused was concurrently serving time for another
offence, as was Maloney. Based on the facts before us we cannot conclude that
Maloney’s anxiety rose to the level of substantial and demonstrative prejudice.
¶43 Because Maloney was not substantially and demonstrably prejudiced by the
sentencing delay, and because the sentencing delay was not purposeful, we conclude that
Maloney’s due process rights were not violated by the post-conviction, pre-sentence
delay.
CONCLUSION
¶44 The State did not violate Maloney’s right to a speedy trial through excessive
pre-trial delay. Furthermore, the State did not violate Maloney’s due process rights
through sentencing delay. Though the sentencing delay was perhaps excessive, Maloney
did not suffer substantial and demonstrative prejudice as a result of the delay. Despite the
fact that the District Court’s analysis was rendered incorrect by our Betterman decision,
the court’s conclusion was correct.
¶45 Affirmed.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
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Justice James Jeremiah Shea, concurring.
¶46 I concur in the Court’s result and analysis. I write separately because I believe
much of the analysis is unnecessary. In cases such as this—where the total delay is
greater than 200 days but it is uncontested that the delay attributable to the State is less
than 200 days—I would conclude it is unnecessary to carry out the Ariegwe analysis
beyond the second factor.
¶47 In Ariegwe, we held that 200 days is a threshold for a speedy trial analysis and, if
the delay is less than 200 days, no further analysis is necessary. Ariegwe, ¶ 107. If the
delay is more than 200 days, we move on to the second factor and assess the reasons for
the delay. All delays not demonstrably caused by the defendant are attributed to the
State. Ariegwe, ¶ 108. In this case, Maloney conceded, “that, of the 220 days between
arrest and pleading, 32 of those days are attributable to his motion to continue the trial
date. Maloney contends that the remaining 188 days are attributable to the State, but
does not argue that the State was not diligent or acted in bad faith during that period.”
Opinion, ¶ 22. Once Maloney conceded that the State was responsible for less than 200
days of the delay, any analysis considering his response to the delay or any prejudice he
may have suffered from the delay, as would otherwise be required by the third and fourth
Ariegwe factors, becomes moot. I therefore would not require the analysis.
¶48 The 200-day threshold triggering a speedy trial analysis is nothing more than
that—a threshold; it’s not the Rubicon. Just because a defendant crosses the threshold in
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factor one does not preclude him from crossing back in factor two. In cases in which that
occurs, I contend an analysis of the remaining Ariegwe factors is superfluous.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
Justice Jim Rice joins in the concurring Opinion of Justice Shea.
/S/ JIM RICE
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