Stoican v. Wagner , 378 Mont. 281 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                               February 24 2015
    DA 14-0310
    Case Number: DA 14-0310
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2015 MT 54
    IN RE ESTATE OF DENNIS LAWLOR
    ----------------------------------------------
    AUDREY STOICAN, JOHN L. STOICAN,
    and JOHN WILLIAM LAWLOR,
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,
    v.
    JOHN WAGNER, MARK WAGNER,
    and JOHN DOES 1-5,
    Defendants and Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM:               District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DP-12-220C
    Honorable Heidi J. Ulbricht, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellants:
    Lee C. Henning, Rebecca J. Henning-Rutz, Henning, Keedy & Lee, P.L.L.C.;
    Kalispell, Montana
    For Appellee John Wagner:
    Mikel L. Moore, Jinnifer Jeresek Mariman, Moore, Cockrell, Goicoechea &
    Axelberg, P.C.; Kalispell, Montana
    For Appellees Mark Wagner and John Wagner:
    James M. Ramlow, Karl Rudbach, Ramlow & Rudbach, PLLP; Whitefish,
    Montana
    For Antoinette Wagner:
    Kristin L. Omvig, Kalvig Law Firm, P.C.; Kalispell, Montana
    For Mary Ann McPherson:
    Gregory J. Hatley, Maxon R. Davis, Davis, Hatley, Haffeman & Tighe, P.C.;
    Great Falls, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: December 31, 2014
    Decided: February 24, 2015
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    2
    Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Audrey Stoican, John Stoican, and John Lawlor appeal from the order of the Montana
    Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, determining that Audrey and John lacked
    standing to contest Denis Lawlor’s will and to petition to remove the personal representative
    of Dennis Lawlor’s estate. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
    ISSUES
    ¶2     We review the following issues:
    1. Did the District Court err when it determined that Audrey Stoican lacked
    standing to contest Dennis’ will?
    2. Did the District Court err when it determined that Audrey Stoican lacked
    standing to petition for the removal of the personal representative for cause?
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶3     Dennis Lawlor executed a will (“the Will”) on December 6, 2012. He died the
    following day, leaving no issue. Dennis was survived by three of his siblings, Antoinette
    Wagner, Mary McPherson, and John Lawlor. Joan Voise, an additional sibling, predeceased
    Dennis. However, Dennis was survived by Joan’s daughter, Audrey Stoican, and Joan’s
    grandson, John Stoican. The only other family members of relevance to this appeal that
    survived Dennis are Antoinette’s children, Mark and John Wagner (“the Wagners”).
    ¶4     The Will devised all of Dennis’ estate (“the Estate”) to his living sisters, Antoinette
    and Mary. It did not mention his deceased sister, Joan, and it “specifically and intentionally
    and entirely exclude[d]” his brother, John Lawlor. The Will also appointed Mark to be the
    personal representative of the Estate.
    3
    ¶5       On December 11, 2012, Mark submitted the Will to the District Court, asking for
    informal probate and his appointment as personal representative of the Estate. The clerk of
    court granted these requests. The Will was admitted to informal probate and Mark was
    appointed personal representative of the Estate. Letters were issued and filed, and notice was
    given to Dennis’ heirs, the devisees of the Will, and the creditors of the Estate.
    ¶6       On May 16, 2013, Audrey filed a petition asking the court to convert informal
    probate to formal probate. In support of this request, she filed a brief questioning the
    competence of Dennis at the time he executed the Will and claiming that the Will was
    invalid. Mark, in his capacity as personal representative, consented to conversion from
    informal to formal probate. The motion was granted on January 3, 2014, and formal probate
    began.
    ¶7       On October 18, 2013, Audrey and John Stoican filed a complaint contesting the Will.
    They claimed that Dennis lacked testamentary capacity at the time the Will was executed;
    that he was subject to undue influence from the Wagners, among others; that the Wagners,
    among others, tortiously interfered with a contractual and business relationship made
    between Dennis and John Stoican; and that the Wagners breached fiduciary duties they had
    owed to Dennis. The complaint asked that the Will be set aside, that probate be conducted in
    intestacy, and that damages and fees be awarded to Audrey and John Stoican. The complaint
    did not ask for removal of Mark as personal representative. The Wagners opposed the
    complaint, moving to dismiss the will contest.
    ¶8       On October 21, 2013, Audrey and John Stoican filed a motion asking the court to
    remove Mark as personal representative and John Wagner as the Estate’s attorney. Citing
    4
    § 72-3-526, MCA, the sole grounds upon which they based this motion were conflicts of
    interest the Wagners allegedly had with the Estate. They did not ask for removal based on
    any change of testacy status that might result from the resolution of the will contest.
    ¶9     On February 11, 2014, following a motion for leave to do so, the District Court
    allowed an amended will contest complaint to be filed. The amended complaint was entered
    on March 3, 2014. It added John Lawlor as a plaintiff.
    ¶10    On March 11, 2014, John Wagner moved the District Court to determine whether
    Audrey, John Stoican, and John Lawlor (“the Plaintiffs”) had standing to bring their motion
    to remove the personal representative and the Estate’s attorney. The motion alleged that
    under § 72-3-526, MCA, only “person[s] interested in the estate” have standing to move for
    removal of the personal representative for cause, and that each of the Plaintiffs lacked
    standing because they were not “person[s] interested in the estate.” The Plaintiffs opposed
    this motion. Mark joined the motion on March 13, 2014.
    ¶11    On April 28, 2014, the District Court entered an order on the motion to determine
    standing. It decided that Audrey and John Stoican lacked standing to contest the will or to
    petition for the removal of the personal representative or the Estate’s attorney.
    ¶12    The Plaintiffs appealed the order to this Court, contending that the District Court erred
    when it determined that Audrey did not have standing to contest the Will or seek the removal
    of the personal representative.1
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    5
    ¶13    The conclusion that a party lacks standing to bring a claim is a conclusion of law.
    In re Charles M. Bair Family Trust, 
    2008 MT 144
    , ¶ 86, 
    343 Mont. 138
    , 
    183 P.3d 61
    . We
    review a district court’s conclusions of law for correctness. In re Estate of Glennie,
    
    2011 MT 291
    , ¶ 11, 
    362 Mont. 508
    , 
    265 P.3d 654
    .
    DISCUSSION
    ¶14 1. Did the District Court err when it determined that Audrey Stoican lacked standing
    to contest Dennis’ will?
    ¶15    Both parties agree that the District Court erred when it determined that Audrey would
    not be a successor to the Estate if it passed in intestacy, and, accordingly, that it erred when it
    determined that Audrey was not an “interested person” with standing to contest the Will. We
    agree with the parties.
    ¶16    To have standing to contest a will, a party must be an “interested person” as defined
    by the Montana Uniform Probate Code. Section 72-3-302, MCA; Glennie, ¶ 13. We have
    determined that a party may be an “interested person” for the purposes of contesting a will if
    he or she has a pecuniary interest in setting aside that will. That is, a party has standing to
    contest a will if he or she stands to gain from a successful contest. Glennie, ¶ 13.
    ¶17    Here, Audrey is not a devisee under the Will, but she is an heir that would take if the
    will contest was successful and the Estate passed by intestacy. In Montana, if a decedent
    leaves no issue and is predeceased by his parents, then his parents’ descendants take by
    representation. Section 72-2-113(1)(c), MCA. This means that the estate is divided based
    1
    The Plaintiffs do not appeal the District Court’s decision that John Stoican also did not have
    standing to pursue these claims. As that decision is not appealed to this Court, we do not consider it
    here.
    6
    on the composition of the generation containing at least one surviving descendant that is
    nearest to the generation of the decedent’s deceased parents. Section 72-2-116(3)(a), MCA.
    In this case, that is the generation of Dennis and his siblings, since three siblings survived
    Dennis.
    ¶18    At this generation, the estate is divided into as many equal shares as there are
    surviving generation-members and deceased generation-members that left surviving
    descendants. Section 72-2-116(3)(a), MCA. In this case, there are three surviving siblings–
    John Lawlor, Mary, and Antoinette – and one deceased sibling that left surviving
    descendants – Joan. Thus, if it was to pass by intestacy, the Estate would be divided into
    four shares. Joan’s share would pass to her heir, Audrey. Section 72-2-116(3)(b), MCA.
    Thus, Audrey would stand to gain from invalidation of the Will and probate in intestacy. For
    this reason, she is an interested person with standing to contest the Will. Glennie, ¶ 13. The
    District Court erred when it determined otherwise.
    ¶19 2. Did the District Court err when it determined that Audrey Stoican lacked standing
    to petition for the removal of the personal representative for cause?
    ¶20    The Plaintiffs argue that because Audrey has standing to contest the Will, she also has
    standing to petition for removal of the personal representative for cause. We do not agree.
    The will contest and the petition for removal in this case are two separate actions. That a
    party has standing to bring one does not necessarily mean that the party has standing to bring
    the other. Standing for each action is controlled by separate statutory provisions and must be
    analyzed separately and independently from the other in light of the statute controlling the
    action. See §§ 72-3-302 and -526, MCA.
    7
    ¶21    As an initial matter, it is important to note that Audrey’s petition for removal of the
    personal representative was a petition for removal for cause. Audrey alleged that removal
    was appropriate based on a conflict of interest and specifically cited § 72-3-526, MCA.
    Importantly, she did not allege that removal was appropriate, for example, based on any
    change of testacy that might result from the will contest. The code makes specific provision
    for bringing such a petition at the same time as a will contest. See §§ 72-3-302(4), -313(2),
    -319, and -523, MCA. No similar provision is made for bringing a petition for removal for
    cause concurrently with a will contest.
    ¶22    Section 72-3-526(1), MCA, controls who may petition for removal of a personal
    representative for cause. For this reason it controls our decision here. That statute reads, in
    part: “A person interested in the estate may petition for removal of a personal representative
    for cause at any time.” Section 72-3-526(1), MCA. Thus, the question of whether Audrey
    has standing to petition for the removal of the personal representative for cause turns on
    whether she is a “person interested in the estate.”
    ¶23    We have not yet had the opportunity to consider the meaning of “person interested in
    the estate” as it is used in the Montana Uniform Probate Code. However, several courts in
    other states that have also adopted the Uniform Probate Code have considered the meaning
    of the term as used in their versions of § 72-3-526, MCA. In doing so, they have treated the
    term “person interested in the estate” as synonymous with “interested person.” Valer v.
    Bartelson (In re Estate of Bartelson), 
    833 N.W.2d 522
    , 526 (N.D. 2013); see Flamme v.
    Flamme (In re Estate of Dickie), 
    623 N.W.2d 666
    , 671 (Neb. 2001). The Montana Uniform
    Probate Code also treats the terms synonymously. See §§ 72-3-105 and -514, MCA. The
    8
    plain meaning of the terms also indicates that they are synonymous. The plain meaning of
    the term “person interested in the estate” is, after all, an “interested person” whose interest is
    in an estate. For these reasons, we will treat “person interested in the estate” synonymously
    with “interested person” for the purposes of § 72-3-526, MCA.
    ¶24    While we have determined that Audrey is an interested person for the purposes of a
    will contest, as discussed above, this does not mean she is also an interested person for the
    purposes of a petition for removal for cause. As § 72-1-103(25), MCA, states: “The meaning
    [of interested person] as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and must
    be determined according to the particular purposes of and matter involved in any
    proceeding.” (emphasis added).
    ¶25    To be an “interested person,” a person must have “a property right in or claim
    against” the estate. Section 72-1-103(25), MCA; In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of
    Anderson, 
    2009 MT 344
    , ¶¶ 22-23, 
    353 Mont. 139
    , 
    218 P.3d 1220
    (rejecting an argument
    that “devisees, children, spouses, creditors, and beneficiaries” can be interested persons
    without having a property right in or claim against the estate); Estate of Miles v. Miles, 
    2000 MT 41
    , ¶¶ 44-46, 
    298 Mont. 312
    , 
    994 P.2d 1139
    . The term also includes “persons having
    priority for appointment as personal representative.” Section 72-1-103(25), MCA. Audrey,
    however, does not have a claim against or property interest in the Estate, she does not have
    priority for appointment as personal representative, and she has no other interest in the
    outcome of the petition for removal for cause. Thus, Audrey does not have standing to
    petition for removal for cause.
    9
    ¶26    Audrey does not have a claim against the Estate. The Montana Uniform Probate Code
    defines “claims” as including “liabilities of the decedent . . . whether arising in contract, in
    tort, or otherwise, and liabilities of the estate that arise at or after the death of the decedent or
    after the appointment of a conservator, including funeral expenses and expenses of
    administration.” Section 72-1-103(6)(a), MCA. Audrey does not contend that she is a
    creditor of the Estate or that she is otherwise entitled to property based upon a liability of the
    Estate. For this reason, she does not have a claim against the Estate upon which standing can
    be based.
    ¶27    Audrey also does not have a property right in the Estate. When the Will was admitted
    to informal probate, a presumption of testacy arose. Section 72-3-215(2), MCA. Under this
    presumption, the Estate will pass according to the terms of the Will, leaving Audrey without
    any property interest in the Estate.        The pending will contest does not change this
    presumption of testacy, § 72-3-215(2), MCA, and does not otherwise create a property right
    upon which standing can be based.
    ¶28    Indeed, we have already recognized in at least one instance that standing to bring a
    separate action cannot be predicated upon the successful outcome of a pending will contest.
    See Glennie, ¶¶ 24-26. In Glennie, a petitioner contested the validity of a will and
    simultaneously petitioned to set aside contracts entered into by the decedent before his death.
    The will contest was made following a motion to admit the will to informal probate and
    before the will was actually admitted. Glennie, ¶ 7. We determined that the petitioner had
    standing to contest the validity of the will since he would be a successor to the estate if the
    will was invalidated. However, we determined that the petitioner had only “conditional”
    10
    standing to petition to set aside the contracts. We reasoned that the petitioner would only
    have an interest in the outcome of the contract challenge if he had an interest in the estate.
    Thus, we determined that the petitioner would not have standing unless the will contest was
    successful and the petitioner proved himself to be a successor to the estate. Glennie,
    ¶¶ 24-26.
    ¶29    Similarly, Audrey only has a property interest in the Estate if the will contest is
    successful. Like the petitioner in Glennie, any property interest Audrey might have is
    contingent upon the outcome of the will contest. As that contest is pending, Audrey has not
    yet proven that she has a property interest in the Estate. She, therefore, does not have
    standing.
    ¶30    “Conditional” standing is not appropriate in Audrey’s case, because unlike in Glennie,
    the Will was admitted to informal probate before Audrey petitioned to set aside the Will. As
    such, the presumption of testacy arose before Audrey brought her will contest, and we must
    presume that Audrey is not a successor to the Estate. “Conditional” standing was only
    appropriate in Glennie because no such presumption arose, and it was unclear which parties
    had property rights in the estate while the will contest was pending. See Glennie, ¶¶ 7, 24-
    26. For these reasons, Audrey does not have a property interest in the Estate sufficient for
    standing.
    ¶31    Audrey also does not have priority for appointment as personal representative.
    Section 72-3-502, MCA, states that priority is first given to persons nominated by a probated
    will. Priority is next given to spouses, custodial parents, and devisees of the decedent.
    Sections 72-3-502(1) through -502(4), MCA. Audrey is none of these. Mark was the
    11
    personal representative nominated in the Will, and the Will specified that Antoinette should
    be made personal representative if Mark was unwilling or unable to do so. As a devisee
    under the Will, Mary would have priority for appointment as a personal representative
    following Mark and Antoinette. Because these parties have priority and because Audrey was
    neither nominated by nor a devisee of the Will, Audrey does not have priority for
    appointment as personal representative upon which standing can be based.
    ¶32    In addition to not having a claim against the Estate, a property interest in the Estate, or
    priority for appointment as a personal representative, Audrey has no interest in the outcome
    of the petition for removal for cause. According to Section 72-3-526(2), MCA:
    (2) Cause for removal exists:
    (a) when removal would be in the best interests of the estate; or
    (b) if it is shown that a personal representative or the person seeking
    the personal representative’s appointment intentionally misrepresented
    material facts in the proceedings leading to the appointment or that the
    personal representative has disregarded an order of the court, has become
    incapable of discharging the duties of the office, or has mismanaged the estate
    or failed to perform any duty pertaining to the office.
    Thus, removal for cause is appropriate primarily where the estate has been harmed or where
    the personal representative has not fulfilled his obligations as a fiduciary. E.g., In re Estate
    of Hannum, 
    2012 MT 171
    , ¶ 27, 
    366 Mont. 1
    , 
    285 P.3d 463
    ; In re Estate of Anderson-
    Feeley, 
    2007 MT 354
    , ¶¶ 9-10, 
    340 Mont. 352
    , 
    174 P.3d 512
    ; Hanson v. Estate of Bjerke,
    
    2004 MT 200
    , ¶¶ 13-14, 
    322 Mont. 280
    , 
    95 P.3d 704
    . Because Audrey is not a successor to
    the Estate, the personal representative owes Audrey no fiduciary duties. See § 72-3-610,
    MCA; see also § 72-1-103(48) (defining “successors” to the estate). Nor is Audrey, without
    a property interest in the Estate, interested in the Estate’s management. For these reasons
    12
    and based upon the causes for removal, there is no “particular purpose” for a petition for
    removal for cause that would grant Audrey standing.
    ¶33    For these reasons, Audrey lacked standing to petition for removal for cause. Although
    the District Court’s reasoning was incorrect, it reached this conclusion. As such, we affirm
    the District Court’s order insofar as it decided that Audrey did not have standing to bring a
    petition for removal of the personal representative for cause. Dewey v. Stringer, 
    2014 MT 136
    , ¶ 16, 
    375 Mont. 176
    , 
    325 P.3d 1236
    (stating that we “will not reverse a district court
    when it reaches the right result, even if it reached that result for the wrong reason”).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶34    The District Court erred when it determined that Audrey would not succeed to the
    Estate if the Estate passed by intestacy. For this reason, it erred when it determined that
    Audrey lacked standing to contest the Will. The District Court also decided that Audrey was
    not a “person interested in the estate” with standing to petition for removal of a personal
    representative for cause. Although its reasoning was incorrect, this was the correct
    conclusion. For these reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
    /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
    We Concur:
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    /S/ BETH BAKER
    /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
    /S/ JIM RICE
    Justice Laurie McKinnon, dissenting.
    ¶35    I cannot subscribe to the Court’s analysis under Issue One, although I agree that
    Appellants have stafnding to contest the decedent’s will. Further, the Court’s resolution of
    13
    Issue Two is inconsistent with its resolution of Issue One. I fail to understand how an
    “interested person” with standing to contest a will does not similarly have standing to
    petition for removal of a personal representative so designated because of provisions of that
    contested will. The Court’s analysis is flawed: first, in its failure to correctly apply statutory
    distinctions between informal and formal probate; and second, in its attempt to distinguish
    “interested person” for purposes of a will contest from “person interested in the estate” under
    the removal statute.
    ¶36    These proceedings began on December 11, 2012 as an informal probate when Mark
    Wagner submitted a will to the Clerk of the District Court requesting that the Clerk issue a
    statement of informal probate, § 72-3-215, MCA, and that the Clerk informally appoint him
    as personal representative pursuant to the provisions of the will, §§ 72-3-221 through -225,
    MCA. After reviewing the will, finding that the application was complete, and determining
    that Mark Wagner was nominated as personal representative in the will, the Clerk granted
    both requests. As a result, the “[i]nformal probate [was] conclusive as to all persons until
    superseded by an order in a formal testacy proceeding.” Section 72-3-215(2), MCA.
    (Emphasis added.)
    ¶37    On May 16, 2013, pursuant to the provisions of § 72-3-301, MCA, allowing for
    formal testacy, Appellants filed a petition to convert the informal probate to a formal probate
    and requested that “the Court restrain the personal representative’s further administration of
    this estate in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-304.” Appellants’ petition for formal
    probate requested relief pursuant to § 72-3-301(1)(a), MCA: that the court issue an “order as
    14
    to the testacy of the decedent in relation to a particular instrument . . . and determin[e] the
    heirs.” As a basis for their petition, Appellants stated:
    Petitioner requests to convert it to formal and set aside the informal probate
    proceedings for the reason that she questions the validity of the Last Will and
    Testament of Dennis Lawlor as it was executed less than thirty-six (36) hours
    before his passing. The Will was executed on December 6, 2012 and Dennis
    Lawlor died on December 7, 2012. In addition, Dennis was under the
    supervision of co-guardians and co-conservators, one of which drafted the
    Will and one of which is a witness to the Will as well as named Personal
    Representative. Petitioner does not believe that the decedent was competent at
    the time of executing said Will as the decedent suffered from, amongst other
    things, dementia, delirium and delusions, as set forth in the Petition for the
    Appointment of Guardianship and Conservatorship filed by John Wagner and
    Mark Wagner on June 14th, 2011 in Flathead County District Court and as
    further set forth in a letter from Dr. Michael R. Butz, licensed Psychologist,
    dated June 15, 2012. The Petition and letter are attached hereto as Exhibit A
    and B to this Brief.
    The petition for formal probate, which may only be filed by an “interested person,” was
    uncontested. Appellants specifically requested relief pursuant to § 72-3-304, MCA. On
    October 21, 2013, Appellants filed their motion to remove Mark Wagner as personal
    representative of the estate.
    ¶38    Section 72-3-302, MCA, explains that “[a] formal testacy proceeding is litigation to
    determine whether a decedent left a valid will.” As a result of an order granting formal
    probate, an informally probated will no longer “is conclusive as to all persons,”
    § 72-3-215(2), MCA, and a “previously appointed personal representative, after receipt of
    notice of the commencement of a formal probate proceeding, shall refrain from exercising
    the personal representative’s power to make any further distribution of the estate during the
    pendency of the formal proceeding,” § 72-3-304, MCA.
    15
    ¶39    On January 3, 2014, the District Court, after noting there was no objection from the
    personal representative or other devisees, issued an order converting the proceeding from an
    informal probate to formal probate. The court also restrained the personal representative
    from exercising his power to make further distributions pursuant to § 72-3-304, MCA.
    ¶40    With these statutory provisions in mind, we must consider whether Appellants had
    standing to contest the will and standing to request removal of the Mark Wagner as the
    personal representative. The Court correctly applies rules of intestacy to conclude that
    Audrey is an heir of the Estate if the will is invalidated. As the Court observes, “Audrey
    would stand to gain from invalidation of the Will and probate in intestacy . . . [therefore] she
    is an interested person with standing to contest the Will.” Opinion, ¶ 20.
    ¶41    However, the Court’s reasoning that follows is flawed, and its subsequent conclusion
    that Appellants may not petition for removal is incorrect. Despite the Court having found
    that Audrey “would stand to gain” as an heir, Opinion, ¶ 20, the Court finds that she “does
    not have a . . . property interest in the Estate,” Opinion, ¶ 25. The Court concludes, in
    violation of the above statutory provisions, that “[t]he pending will contest does not change
    this presumption of testacy, § 72-3-215(2), MCA, and does not otherwise create a property
    right upon which standing can be based.” Opinion, ¶ 27. Not only does this misconstrue
    statutory provisions as explained above, but it is inconsistent with the Court’s conclusion that
    Audrey has standing to contest the will. The Court states that “Audrey has no interest in the
    outcome of the petition for removal for cause,” and that she has stated “no ‘particular
    purpose’ for a petition for removal for cause that would grant Audrey standing.” Opinion,
    ¶ 32. However, Audrey has alleged causes of action against the Wagners that include
    16
    tortious interference with a business relationship and constructive fraud, that the Wagners
    exercised undue influence over the decedent in the Will’s execution, that the Wagners gave
    themselves $180,000 of the estate prior to the decedent’s death, and that the Wagners deeded
    half the estate’s real and personal property to themselves. The Appellants assert that Mark
    Wagner cannot investigate the claims against himself and will not investigate the claims
    against his brother.
    ¶42    Cause for removal pursuant to § 72-3-526(2), MCA, exists when, among other things,
    the personal representative has a conflict of interest with the Estate. In re Estate of Peterson,
    
    265 Mont. 104
    , 108-09, 
    874 P.2d 1230
    , 1232-33 (1994); In re Estate of Jones, 
    93 P.3d 147
    ,
    156 (Wash. 2004) (citing In re Estate of Rohrback, 
    952 P.2d 87
    , 89 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) and
    Genins v. Boyd, 
    305 S.E.2d 391
    , 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)). Appellants have presented prima
    facie evidence in support of their removal request. As they have an interest in preserving the
    Estate as disinherited heirs in a will contest proceeding, they have standing to request
    removal of the personal representative. In re Estate of Hitchcock, 
    167 P.3d 1180
    , 1183
    (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (under Washington statute, heir has standing to petition for removal
    of personal representative). Appellants seek to protect their interests in the event the Will is
    invalidated. In light of the Court’s conclusion that “interested person” and “person interested
    in the estate” are synonymous, a determination that Appellants lack standing to pursue
    removal of the personal representative is nonsensical.
    ¶43    Where, as here, a disinherited heir contests the validity of a will and argues for
    removal of the personal representative, presenting prima facie evidence of both, the
    17
    disinherited heir is a person interested in the estate and has standing to contest the validity of
    the will and to request removal of the personal representative.
    ¶44    I would reverse the District Court on both issues.
    /S/ LAURIE McKINNON
    Justice Patricia Cotter joins the dissent.
    /S/ PATRICIA COTTER
    18